I can only concur with the discussion so far, including Merv Benson’s warning that we do need to be wary of our enemy inflating numbers and/or simply manufacturing from a whole cloth an incident of civilian casualties.

What Dunlap also seems to miss is the issue of broader perceptions of the use of force in Afghanistan (and Iraq) that such incidents create in the minds of our own publics and wider international community. Mark and Steve point to this with their observations about amicide. But it is broader than this. If one reflects back to the war over Kosovo, one of the more significant emerging political issues as the war wore on stemmed from the public’s knowledge of the directive that Allied aircraft fly no lower than 15,000 ft coupled with tragic collateral damage from aerial attacks (some of which were hyped up by the Serbian gov’t). Striking was that a commonly articulated public complaint in 1999 is exactly what wm noted; a growing perception that the Alliance was not willing to risk a single life to save innocent civilians. This public perception amongst our own populations started to present a political problem in 1999 and it is starting to create a real problem today.

Dunlap seemingly exposes his lack of understanding that our forces on the ground need to be seen as legitimate by the local population, but also that our use of force needs to be perceived as legitimate by our populations and allies. The apparent callous disregard of civilian casualties (however much this is a function of enemy info ops) does impact adversely on our publics. In the case of Afghanistan, that it seems to be the US that seemingly is so callous (ie, the recent request by the Brits for the Americans to go away) makes it very difficult for Euro gov’ts to sustain what limited commitments they have to Afghanistan, never mind increase their contributions and relax their ROEs as NATO, Washington, London, Ottawa and The Hague have been urging.

Arguments such as those put forth by Dunlap do not help the situation.