U.S. Police in Peace and Stability Operations

[SteveMetz]

I've just returned from the second part of a major irregular warfare wargame. Interestingly, the most pressing finding in this game (and others I've participated in) is that the most significant shortfall when the United States provides counterinsurgency support or undertakes SSTR is our inability to provide advice and support to the national police in a partner state. Everyone agrees that the key to stabilization and counterinsurgency are some kind of constabulary or gendarmeries that are more robust than local police, but something less than the military. But because we ourselves don't have such an organization (particularly a deployable one), we are ill-equipped to provide advice and support to partners who might want to develop one.

Several solutions are normally discussed for this problem. All have shortcomings:

1. Use existing military resources, particularly military police, to provide such advice and support. The problem is that American MPs are not trained, educated, and organized to be a national police.
2. Task the State Department to develop such a capability. The problem with this is that they have nothing like the requisite expertise or institutional interest.
3. Create a new organization within the Department of Defense to do this. I kind of like this one, but it would be expensive.
4. "Outsource" it, either to contractors or other nations that do have such a national police capability (France, Italy, Canada, etc). The problem with this, of course, is that contracting it out does not have a very good track record, and other states may not have the capability or the will to undertake the job at a necessary level.
5. Task the Department of Homeland Security to develop an expeditionary law enforcement capability. The problem here is that, say, pulling American border guards out of Arizona to go help stabilize another state and train its national police would be politically difficult, maybe impossible.

Ultimately, it's a big problem for which all solutions are flawed.

[Mark O'Neill]

What chance that the FBI could evolve into having some roles like those of the Australian Federal Police? Our AFP has evolved a hell of a long way in a hurry to get where it is today - given the resources that the US can muster , surely you could do something similar? (unless there are some domestic political reasons that as an Aussie I am unaware of).

[SteveMetz]

What chance that the FBI could evolve into having some roles like those of the Australian Federal Police? Our AFP has evolved a hell of a long way in a hurry to get where it is today - given the resources that the US can muster , surely you could do something similar? (unless there are some domestic political reasons that as an Aussie I am unaware of).

We talked about that but the problem is that such a force would not be deployable. If deploying police advisers and trainers leaves something in the homeland unprotected, it's unlikely to happen.

There would also be opposition based on historical/cultural reasons. We are still burdened by the attitude that it is OUR government which poses the greatest threat to the citizens. The fact that the FBI did abuse citizens' rights for a long period of time wouldn't help the case.

[Tom Odom]

I've just returned from the second part of a major irregular warfare wargame. Interestingly, the most pressing finding in this game (and others I've participated in) is that the most significant shortfall when the United States provides counterinsurgency support or undertakes SSTR is our inability to provide advice and support to the national police in a partner state. Everyone agrees that the key to stabilization and counterinsurgency are some kind of constabulary or gendarmeries that are more robust than local police, but something less than the military. But because we ourselves don't have such an organization (particularly a deployable one), we are ill-equipped to provide advice and support to partners who might want to develop one.

Several solutions are normally discussed for this problem. All have shortcomings:

1. Use existing military resources, particularly military police, to provide such advice and support. The problem is that American MPs are not trained, educated, and organized to be a national police.
2. Task the State Department to develop such a capability. The problem with this is that they have nothing like the requisite expertise or institutional interest.
3. Create a new organization within the Department of Defense to do this. I kind of like this one, but it would be expensive.
4. "Outsource" it, either to contractors or other nations that do have such a national police capability (France, Italy, Canada, etc). The problem with this, of course, is that contracting it out does not have a very good track record, and other states may not have the capability or the will to undertake the job at a necessary level.
5. Task the Department of Homeland Security to develop an expeditionary law enforcement capability. The problem here is that, say, pulling American border guards out of Arizona to go help stabilize another state and train its national police would be politically difficult, maybe impossible.

Ultimately, it's a big problem for which all solutions are flawed.

Steve,

I know you know all of this but many on the SWC do not. Police assistance in the Congo in the 1964 crisis was a focal effort for USAID (as it was in Vietnam). Given the Congo's human rights record of the time, it was to say the least something of a challenge. But USAID went to the states and hired retired state troopers as police advisors. After Stanleyville was retaken by the Dragon Rouge effort, the government held "trials" in the stadium with US advisors wearing "smokey the bear" hats in attendance. Not a few of the folks on "trial" got shot. See picture below.

We had the same problem in Rwanda and again USAID took lead training police inspectors. I backstopped with I-MET military justice training. All of this was occurring in post-genocide where the bodies were still to be buried and the jails were filling to 5 times their capacity with no hope for trials.

And Mark, we had FBI as well in Rwanda. They came in as part of the support to the ICTR in Arusha. It was a real stretch for the guys I met; they simply were not culturally acclimated to the reality of Africa and especially Rwanda.

Bottom line: VERY real problem given our US military and governmental traditions, laws, and mores.


Best

Tom

[slapout9]

Steve, Tom sort of beat me to it before you can talk about which organization would be best you need to look at that culture thing real hard first. That is one problem with Iraq western police models are just not going to work at least at this time in their development. Correctly solving this problem first would help point you in the direction of what type organization you would need long term.

Also I think I read one of your papers called the Future of Insurgency or something like that, it is from the 90's I think. My point is there is a lot Brave New War in that paper if I remember correctly. And it was a free PDF download to.

[Ken White]

police are structured plus the deployability problem, the only viable solution is to develop a 'Constabulary Assistance' Battalion /Group or whatever using the MP Corps. The fact that they are not now trained to do that is irrelevant; what is needed is the relevant factor. We're looking at the future, not at today.

It is an ongoing problem and as one poster here has said -- and as was said at your game -- the Air Force trains their folks to be primarily law enforcement types as opposed to tactical elements. There is no reason in the world that a select number of Army and Marine MPs cannot be similarly trained.

As a national police element, even the RCMP and the AFP are not as applicable as are the models of the Gendarmerie Nationale and the Koninklijke Marechaussee. I have little doubt either would be glad to offer spaces for such training and for the worker bees, there are Police Academies all over this country that can offer civilian LE training, some of it exceptionally good.

Oh, and if we go that route, the lower grade MPs selected need to be second hitch guys; that is NOT a job for 19 year olds with guns...

[Rob Thornton]

Hi Steve,
This was part of our frustration as we realized the task org and training of the ISF in Mosul (IPs and IA) were not ideally suited to the threat. I outlined some of that in the article in SWJ VOL 8. The more I think about it, the more I think we the uniformed services can and should do it, but we need the tools to think outside of our immediate conventional experiences and at some level leadership that is willing to accept the risk of standing up para-military like HN forces. Obviously there is political and organizational risk which we have a hard time qualifying since such organizations are outside our culture. What we have to do is reconcile our misgivings and insecurities about such organizations by admitting that just because we don't have them, does not mean they will not be needed by other states facing different security concerns, or perhaps that we will not need them in the future.

As for training, we would probably find this difficult to outsource to another credible ally since not too many states wish to incur the political penalties for sending troops to Iraq. PMCs are an option, but personally I think they should only be used in a limited role and duration - in other words - don't use them for a capability we see as a mission of long term consequence - they are not a valid stake holder. This sort of leaves us holding the bag. How about a security agreement with a state like Spain, Italy or Romania that does have a good model where we send a cadre to be trained?

To me this makes sense since the failing or failed states which AQ & like organizations are attempting to destabilize will be more likely to suffer from domestic generated terror (aided by external support) then from conventional threats. Being able to go out and advise effectively means we must be able to identify with the security problem as it is, not the one we'd prefer to handle. If you can't do that then you will not have credibility for long, will be unable to request the right resources, be unable to inform the CoC, be unable to help shape the environment and policy, and as such - will not be relevant.

Other OGAs might be able to do it on a very limited basis, but we may be talking large scale that exceeds Iraq - we need to consider that. Certainly OGAs can provide assistance, but they do not have scale.

I'd also add that many of the problems we see abroad are starting to come to the homeland - take a look at Zeta on the Mexican / US border. What did the former CSA say today about the convergence of the Trans National Crime, Narco-Terror, WMD and extremism? We have to ID and develop capabilties for threats that are constantly morphing and growing. Providing these types of advisory capabilities and then providing a mechanism by which the experience get back out into the force is perhaps the best way to stay relevant on this issue.

[LawVol]

It is an ongoing problem and as one poster here has said -- and as was said at your game -- the Air Force trains their folks to be primarily law enforcement types as opposed to tactical elements. There is no reason in the world that a select number of Army and Marine MPs cannot be similarly trained.

Why not use the AF in this role? The Air Force maintains units of Security Forces that are trained as LE and have some infantry-type skills. This would seem to put us closer to the needed skill set. Please correct me if I'm wrong, but MPs don't have much infantry level training and infantry have no LE training (at least I didn't). If the Air Force Security Forces currently have training in both, it would seem that all we have to do is tailor the training to this new mission/focus (and convince pilots that this is a good idea, but that's another issue ).

Steve: I am currently working on a paper that discusses this very thing and proposes using Air Force Security Forces in this role. I would appreciate any insight into this issue you could provide from those wargaming experiences.

[Ken White]

job; whether it's the AF, the Army, Marines is IMO not important -- though the various Chiefs of Staff / CNO (I left out the Masters At Arms, different kettle of Squid. Er, Fish... ) and their personnel folks might not agree.

The current training regimen in the USAFSF is heavily law enforcement oriented and less combat skill oriented; the Army and Marine MP forces reverse the priorities. Any one of the three could do the job, all would need a modified syllabus, extra and special training for the advisory mission. A national policing mission in most other nations in the world is far different from the milieu in US LE circles in all respects other than base human nature characteristics.

The key point is that whoever does the mission in a potentially hostile environment should be military for a number of reasons, not least due to relations with the host nation who understand the military - police or paramilitary regimen and prefer it to the amorphous US model. A minor exception can be made for British Commonwealth nations who are more attuned to the Anglo model but also tend toward the paramilitary school of thought.

While I don't care which service does it, in your paper, you may wish to consider these:

LINK

LINK

LINK

[Ken White]

. . .

Several solutions are normally discussed for this problem. All have shortcomings:

1. Use existing military resources, particularly military police, to provide such advice and support. The problem is that American MPs are not trained, educated, and organized to be a national police.
2. Task the State Department to develop such a capability. The problem with this is that they have nothing like the requisite expertise or institutional interest.
3. Create a new organization within the Department of Defense to do this. I kind of like this one, but it would be expensive.
4. "Outsource" it, either to contractors or other nations that do have such a national police capability (France, Italy, Canada, etc). The problem with this, of course, is that contracting it out does not have a very good track record, and other states may not have the capability or the will to undertake the job at a necessary level.
5. Task the Department of Homeland Security to develop an expeditionary law enforcement capability. The problem here is that, say, pulling American border guards out of Arizona to go help stabilize another state and train its national police would be politically difficult, maybe impossible.

Ultimately, it's a big problem for which all solutions are flawed.

Fatal flaws cannot...

1. MPs, see my previous comment.

2. State is the last place to do this for many reasons including those you cite. As an aside, the USAID and contract elements have worked several places and USAID should be resurrected and removed from the pernicious influence of State. Problem with the AID contractor model is that while it is proven to work in benign or not ovely hostile environments (see dozens of examples in the 50-today period), it does not do nearly as well in the event of hostilities (see Afghanistan and Iraq). Part of the problem there being attracting quality contract personnel. Having that model available where appropriate is a good idea, a more robust capability is required for really hot spots.

3. A new organization in DoD would be flat bad. Another bureaucracy, another 'DoD Field Agency' competing for dollars, another DHS...

4. Your objections say it all. Relying upon weak reeds and all that, plus the recurring problem of national agendas...

5. Either someone is a master of satire or they're trying to scare us. The USBP themselves will tell you that they are the most problem plagued Fedral LE agency; DHS is an unmitigated disaster on all levels other than as a brilliant example of why creating new bureaucracies is not smart and should be avoided if at all possible. Giving them another mission and organization would be marginally worse tha a new DoD aggregation.

The only flaw in a mix of AID operated, contractor supported operations where appropriate and a dedicated and trained MP Constabulary training and advisory organization (which should NOT work for the PMG) for those places where hostilities are present or likely is the training of the MPs. That is so easily remedied as to be inconsequential, it could be done in a year or two.

As an aside, there were two Pams floating about in the early 1960s, green covers so MP School as opposed to DA I think, that discussed (a) training of MPs to support counterinsurgency and (b) structuring a model police force for a developing nation. IIRC, both made sense. They're bound to be in someones Library, perhaps even at Carlisle.

I have always dearly enjoyed the ability of the US Armed forces to reinvent wheels and further have gotten giggles from the fact that in recent years, many of those wheels tend to be triangular or square.

It is absolutely a big problem but there is, for once an easy solution (well, easy if you can get the bureaucracy and the competing interests aligned...).

[Ken White]

I've just returned from the second part of a major irregular warfare wargame. . .

My son was also a participant and said he was introduced to you briefly. Given that he is less rowdy than am I and was in the other group working on your piece of the problem, you may not recall. He obviously couldn't tell me much but did discuss the Police training aspect peripherally.

Sounds like a solution looking for a problem. We've done this before and it worked; then in the post Viet Nam effort to bury our heads in the sand and say "we only do the nations big wars" we buried the result of years of relevant experience. Viet Nam does not have too much relevance today on a number of points but the pre-Viet Nam doctrinal development, training, experience and operational efforts elsewhere at the time aimed worldwide are still pertinent. Minor tweaks to todays conditions are simple (if encumbered with a few easily blown aside turf protection issues ).

Best regards,
Ken

[LawVol]

Rob: I don't have a total number for our security forces, but nearly every base has a squadron of about 2-300. Moody has an entire SF group. Slapout points out an MP/CID combo and has a good point. Our SF guys would probably need OSI (Office of Special Investigations; AF CID) to assist with intell as well.

I would also roll in a judiciary team composed of JAG prosecutors, defense counsel and judges to work with the local criminal justice system. My idea is to have a transitional LE/judiciary capacity to act as a stop gap until the OGAs could catch up and do their thing. This force would essentially lay the ground work and allow US forces to seize the initiative vis-a-vis security.

[Tom Odom]

Sounds like a solution looking for a problem. We've done this before and it worked; then in the post Viet Nam effort to bury our heads in the sand and say "we only do the nations big wars" we buried the result of years of relevant experience. Viet Nam does not have too much relevance today on a number of points but the pre-Viet Nam doctrinal development, training, experience and operational efforts elsewhere at the time aimed worldwide are still pertinent. Minor tweaks to todays conditions are simple (if encumbered with a few easily blown aside turf protection issues ).

Ken,

Correct but we went farther than burying it; we made it semi-illegal in many respects. USAID in particular did a major shift away from cooperation with DoD and especially the CIA. In the realm of police training, USAID stepped back and declared "no mas". I was not involved in the central America operations in the 1980s but friends who were said these chainges--especially the self-declared ban on police training--played a large role. In our efforts in Rwanda, we had benefit of an activist Ambassador and an activist chief of staff of USAID, Dick McCall. Dick came out and stayed with us for months at a time. His presence as the number three man did much to motivate the players back in DC in the Nat Sec Council to at least get out of the way if they were not going to get on board.

Best

Tom

[SteveMetz]

Ken,

Correct but we went farther than burying it; we made it semi-illegal in many respects. USAID in particular did a major shift away from cooperation with DoD and especially the CIA. In the realm of police training, USAID stepped back and declared "no mas". I was not involved in the central America operations in the 1980s but friends who were said these chainges--especially the self-declared ban on police training--played a large role. In our efforts in Rwanda, we had benefit of an activist Ambassador and an activist chief of staff of USAID, Dick McCall. Dick came out and stayed with us for months at a time. His presence as the number three man did much to motivate the players back in DC in the Nat Sec Council to at least get out of the way if they were not going to get on board.

Best

Tom

Tom,

I think there has been something of a paradigm shift in AID. About three years ago I was contacted by one of their senior staff who said their leadership recognized that they need to get on the team for counterinsurgency and stability operations. They were going to contract me to do a major study for them on how to go about it. I had major surgery then began a sabbatical so wasn't able to follow through, but hopefully someone did.

Their problem is that they have a very different organizational model now than they did in the Vietnam era. Then they had someone like 15K of their own personnel in the field. Now they basically are contract managers since most of the actual work is outsourced.

[Ken White]

Tom,

I think there has been something of a paradigm shift in AID. About three years ago I was contacted by one of their senior staff who said their leadership recognized that they need to get on the team for counterinsurgency and stability operations. They were going to contract me to do a major study for them on how to go about it. I had major surgery then began a sabbatical so wasn't able to follow through, but hopefully someone did.

Their problem is that they have a very different organizational model now than they did in the Vietnam era. Then they had someone like 15K of their own personnel in the field. Now they basically are contract managers since most of the actual work is outsourced.

Not that a study might lead to action...

[Ken White]

Ken,

Correct but we went farther than burying it; we made it semi-illegal in many respects. USAID in particular did a major shift away from cooperation with DoD and especially the CIA. In the realm of police training, USAID stepped back and declared "no mas". I was not involved in the central America operations in the 1980s but friends who were said these chainges--especially the self-declared ban on police training--played a large role. In our efforts in Rwanda, we had benefit of an activist Ambassador and an activist chief of staff of USAID, Dick McCall. Dick came out and stayed with us for months at a time. His presence as the number three man did much to motivate the players back in DC in the Nat Sec Council to at least get out of the way if they were not going to get on board.

Best

Tom

Therein lies the problem. The government of the US is a reflection of the society from which it comes -- just as are the Armed forces. There has been a massive societal change in this nation in the last 30 years and the personnel and personal solutions of 1970 are now totally inapplicable. Some of the processes and techniques are, with minor tweaks, still useful but anything involving people and what they are willing to do is an entirely different affair.

The probability of getting USAID or State involved in a conflict in any meaningful way short of total war is unlikely; their support will be tepid at best due to personal preference and a desire to avoid risk.

There will be exceptions like the two you mention (and good for them!) but that's what they'll be, exceptions.

As Steve points out below, as a result of Warren and Maddy, AID is a different animal now then it was then, the US Info Agency is gone and any significant resurrection is unlikely. The culture is the problem.

DoD is going to have to suck up a lot and the coterie of senior folks who still want nothing to do with IW are going to continue fighting that surreptitiously as they have been for years until they're finally retired. It's likely going to take five to ten years to get the Army to adapt to fighting a type of war they don't want to fight. The nay sayers are right, we need heavy capability; full spectrum capability -- but you can't drop off the bottom rung of the capability ladder because it's tedious, difficult, expensive and lacking in the ability to provide victories and a win.

In the interim, fortunately, the kids will make it work well enough to hold the line.

[Jedburgh]

USIP, 20 Aug 07: U.S. Police in Peace and Stability Operations

• The first obligation of an international intervention force in a peace or stability operation is to provide security for the civilian population. Inevitably the arrival of foreign military forces is followed by a breakdown of public order.

• Historically U.S. military forces have been unable or unwilling to perform police functions to control large-scale civil unrest. This was true in Iraq, where looters destroyed government buildings, cultural centers, and commercial areas.

• The United States lacks civilian constabulary (gendarmes) or other national police forces specially trained for crowd and riot control. Instead the U.S. relies on civil police provided by commercial contractors that do not perform this function.

• Fortunately the U.S. government is taking steps to address this deficiency. Current State Department plans call for creation of a Civilian Reserve Corps that would have a police component.

• There is no agreement on the ultimate size and character of this police capacity. However, the history of U.S. interventions from Panama to Iraq argues for a robust capability.

• A review of U.S. interventions in post-conflict environments demonstrates that the United States has repeatedly needed highly capable police forces but has lacked the capacity to respond effectively. The case studies in this report provide lessons applicable to future operations.

• The State Department’s current efforts are a useful first step that will give an opportunity to create the basic infrastructure for expansion of U.S. capabilities in peace and stability operations.

Complete 12 page report at the link.

[Jedburgh]

Given the subject, I thought I'd throw in this older document; it's quite relevant, and is not referenced elsewhere on SWC:

Conference Report: Assessing the Role of Stability Police Units

On April 4-5 2005, the Center of Excellence for Stability Police Units (COESPU), the Institute for National Strategic Studies, the United States Army Peacekeeping and Stability Operations Institute (PKSOI), and the United States Institute of Peace (USIP) conducted a two-day assessment of “The Role of Stability Police Units” in peace operations at the National Defense University in Washington, DC.

The objectives for the workshop were to advance the development of common doctrine and operational procedures for all parties involved in the employment of Stability Police Units (SPU) and to assist CoESPU in establishing a network for discussion and harmonization of SPU doctrine. The focus of the discussion was on the international response to the riots in Kosovo on March 17-19, 2004, and the lessons that should be learned from that experience.

This report summarizes the panel discussions, with an emphasis on what doctrine currently specifies and how the response to the Kosovo riots might inform that doctrine. The report concludes by identifying gaps in current doctrine and discrepancies among the international organizations that field SPUs.

[Jedburgh]

JSOU, Feb 09: Policing and Law Enforcement in COIN - The Thick Blue Line

....Joe Celeski’s current work on the role of policing in confronting security threats highlights the need to shift resources and emphasis towards policing, law enforcement, and internal security. Law enforcement and internal security are key pillars in a comprehensive national security strategy and are often underemphasized. As the campaign against terrorist networks shifts out of a combat phase, the competition between governments and terrorist groups for the public’s support, a key element in irregular warfare, will occur in noncombat zones. It is in these noncombat zones that the police and other internal security elements of governmental power will be critical in negating terrorist network access to populations. The military’s role in these operational environments will be significantly reduced, but select support will be required and this effort will fall heavily on the Special Operations Forces.

This monograph explores the complexity and challenges a government faces in organizing and training multiple levels of a nation’s various police institutions. Through a thorough and excellent analysis, the author highlights the differences of policing in a counterinsurgency environment versus traditional, peaceful societies. He further amplifies his discussion of counterinsurgency policing through a series of vignettes. The true danger of failure in the current campaign is that a successful irregular warfare campaign in one region may spur additional challenges across the globe, and Joe Celeski argues persuasively that the police are the “thick blue line” in this type of campaign....

Complete 110-page study at the link.

[Jedburgh]

RAND, 24 Apr 09: A Stability Police Force for the United States: Justification and Options for Creating U.S. Capabilities

This project investigates the need for a U.S. Stability Police Force, the major capabilities it would need if created, where in the federal government it would best be headquartered, and how it should be staffed. In doing so, it considers options based in the Departments of Defense, Homeland Security, Justice, and State. The project was conducted for the U.S. Army’s Peacekeeping and Stability Operations Institute PKSOI). Its purpose was to make recommendations to PKSOI, the Army, and the community of rule-of-law researchers, practitioners, and policymakers on the need for (and characteristics of) a U.S. Stability Police Force.....