Thanks to all for trying to answer some of my questions - good discussion here.

First, re: Hacksaw, TT, and Ken, I agree that bureaucratic politics are mind-numbing, and attempts to change often not effective. But while it may be like hitting your head against a while, I think changes need to be made. Especially when, as Ken says, the military mistakenly focuses on WWII as a defining moment, and subsequently has developed and reinforced a self-image that in some ways is detrimental to preparing, procuring, and training for (as well as executing) missions of COIN or other limited-force operations.

I remember always thinking anthropology (had a bad experience in a freshman course) and, in the same vein, organizational culture theory were bogus ways of reifying intangibles and using them to explain what amounted to common sense. Actually reading and thinking about it a little more helps me realize how inaccurate that is and how big the bureaucratic problem is. Of course, that's old news to everyone. How do we improve it - that's the issue. I liked the comparison of the services to GM circa 1950 - not that an Army should be set up organizationally like a current MNC, but it is worth examining ways in which a the organization can become more efficient.

Re: Wilf, Marct, Rank Amateur, etc. -

I think Wilf is right - you're all violently agreeing, with a few caveats. My qualification would not be that military force is still essential to stamping out an insurgency, but that the politics of the situation are very influential in defining exactly what the military force is, and how it is focused. In that way the politics takes primacy over the military aspect.

Regards,

Matt