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Thread: LTC John Nagl: collection

  1. #81
    Council Member MattC86's Avatar
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    Thanks to all for trying to answer some of my questions - good discussion here.

    First, re: Hacksaw, TT, and Ken, I agree that bureaucratic politics are mind-numbing, and attempts to change often not effective. But while it may be like hitting your head against a while, I think changes need to be made. Especially when, as Ken says, the military mistakenly focuses on WWII as a defining moment, and subsequently has developed and reinforced a self-image that in some ways is detrimental to preparing, procuring, and training for (as well as executing) missions of COIN or other limited-force operations.

    I remember always thinking anthropology (had a bad experience in a freshman course) and, in the same vein, organizational culture theory were bogus ways of reifying intangibles and using them to explain what amounted to common sense. Actually reading and thinking about it a little more helps me realize how inaccurate that is and how big the bureaucratic problem is. Of course, that's old news to everyone. How do we improve it - that's the issue. I liked the comparison of the services to GM circa 1950 - not that an Army should be set up organizationally like a current MNC, but it is worth examining ways in which a the organization can become more efficient.

    Re: Wilf, Marct, Rank Amateur, etc. -

    I think Wilf is right - you're all violently agreeing, with a few caveats. My qualification would not be that military force is still essential to stamping out an insurgency, but that the politics of the situation are very influential in defining exactly what the military force is, and how it is focused. In that way the politics takes primacy over the military aspect.

    Regards,

    Matt
    "Give a good leader very little and he will succeed. Give a mediocrity a great deal and he will fail." - General George C. Marshall

  2. #82
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    Matt,

    Especially when, as Ken says, the military mistakenly focuses on WWII as a defining moment, and subsequently has developed and reinforced a self-image that in some ways is detrimental to preparing, procuring, and training for (as well as executing) missions of COIN or other limited-force operations.
    The bureaucratic politics are mind numbing, but I personally think organizational culture, or self identity, or as Ken says, self image, is the single most significant obstacle to change, and self identity is extremely hard to change.

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    Default washington post reporter looking to talk to troops

    Hi, My name is Dana Hedgpeth and I'm a reporter at the Washington Post. I registered for this site because I'm looking to talk to military personnel who have recently gotten back from serving in Iraq. I'd like to talk to anyone who has worked on CERP projects. That's the Commanders Emergency Response Program. What I'd like to know is how the program works in the field? Is it successful; how so? If you're interested in talking or have comments, please email me at hedgpethd@washpost.com or call me at 202.334.6613. Thanks, Dana.

  4. #84
    Council Member Beelzebubalicious's Avatar
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    Dana,

    I'd like to believe reporters and the media in general are objective but I'm afraid this is not so. I am therefore posting a link to articles you've previously published in the Post.

    http://projects.washingtonpost.com/s...dana+hedgpeth/

    From my brief review of the articles, it appears that you write mostly about DOD and DOD contractor excesses and issues. While you don't write opinion, your stories are definitely coming at these issues from one side. Care to respond to this assessment?

    Thank you,

    Eric

    PS - I work for a not-for-profit organization implementing US government funded contracts. I have never served in the military.

  5. #85
    Council Member William F. Owen's Avatar
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    I have now read "Eating Soup," and I remain of the opinions that I had before.

    Yes, it's an excellent work of scholarship, that is well researched and particularly well written - EG It's easy to read and well laid out - something mostly lacking these days.

    However, there are a number of categoric statements with which I cannot agree, and I would suggest that the operational record does not support. - eg: the idea that an Army skilled in COIN can't be skilled in war fighting - and we have few if any useful measure for comparing the degrees of skill.

    I just can't see the British Army as a "learning organisation." If "learning" means applying common sense out of necessity, then I stand corrected.

    I think Vietnam showed the US Special Forces, Army Aviation and the USAF all seem to have had similarly powerful learning mechanisms in the same way. More over, in 1972 the NLF (VC) were a shadow of what they were in in 1965, and that can't all be laid at the door of the Tet Offensive. Something was working.

    As in Malaya, as in Cyprus and Kenya, the UK killed and tortured our way to success. "Hearts and Minds" does not mean being nice or playing fair. Look how long Northern Ireland took, once we were forced to play by the rules. - and we got kicked out of Southern Ireland in just 3 years of COIN!!

    Most of all, I was confused by the comparing of the British Army fighting a tiny insurgency on it's own home turf, with the US Army fighting a massive coalition war, back dropped by the Cold War.

    No doubt I'll give it another read sometime and find the thing I am missing that everyone else seems to have got.
    Infinity Journal "I don't care if this works in practice. I want to see it work in theory!"

    - The job of the British Army out here is to kill or capture Communist Terrorists in Malaya.
    - If we can double the ratio of kills per contact, we will soon put an end to the shooting in Malaya.
    Sir Gerald Templer, foreword to the "Conduct of Anti-Terrorist Operations in Malaya," 1958 Edition

  6. #86
    Council Member Ken White's Avatar
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    Default Could you please let me know

    if you do? Thanks...

  7. #87
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    Quote Originally Posted by William F. Owen View Post
    Most of all, I was confused by the comparing of the British Army fighting a tiny insurgency on it's own home turf, with the US Army fighting a massive coalition war, back dropped by the Cold War.
    I think your read of John Nagl's important book and your critical review of it is fair and spot-on. There is much to commend in Nagl's book; it is superbly written and well researched. However, it is often read and understood for more than it is. First and foremost it is not a history of the Vietnam and Malayan insurgencies. I think John Nagl might actually agree with that statement. It is a book that uses history but is not history per say. Instead it is a stellar work that looks at organizational theory and practice in military units and uses as case studies Vietnam and Malaya to draw conclusions on how or how not military organizations change and adapt. In this sense the book is very important and has contributed to knowledge.

    Your quote above points to the limits of what we should be reading the book for. In a sense the book has taken on a life of its own as a work of history. But a good history book would not try to compare these vastly different situations without at least three other books, or 2000 pages, between the two cases to explain context, contingency, and change over time. But that is not a critique of John's book but a caution to readers in what they look to it for.

    gian

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    Moderator Steve Blair's Avatar
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    Actually, Nagl says straight out that his book isn't a history of either conflict. Reading introductions is an amazing thing....

    One of the great armchair sports is to try to read things into books that authors didn't intend, or to drag them into areas that they weren't meant to cover. I blame the dramatic decline of teaching standards in history in the United States for this, since many readers wouldn't know an actual history book if it bit them on the backside, and even if they can recognize one they don't have the tools to correctly evaluate it. In our haste to close the "math and science gap" (a source of much hands-wringing since the early 1970s), we've left history and english behind.

    In any case, I still think Nagl's book is a valuable addition to this area. Certainly it makes a good starting point for a newcomer...provided they have the background and inclination to make use of Nagl's bibliography to explore some subjects and topics on their own...
    "On the plains and mountains of the American West, the United States Army had once learned everything there was to learn about hit-and-run tactics and guerrilla warfare."
    T.R. Fehrenbach This Kind of War

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    Quote Originally Posted by Steve Blair View Post
    In our haste to close the "math and science gap" (a source of much hands-wringing since the early 1970s), we've left history and english behind.
    Steve:

    No argument from me here; as I head up to teach plebes in a survey course in American history...

    gian

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    Quote Originally Posted by Steve Blair View Post
    I blame the dramatic decline of teaching standards in history in the United States for this, since many readers wouldn't know an actual history book if it bit them on the backside, and even if they can recognize one they don't have the tools to correctly evaluate it. In our haste to close the "math and science gap" (a source of much hands-wringing since the early 1970s), we've left history and english behind.
    What is most alarming is that we are now on the second and third generations of people who are lacking these skills. This means we have people who were taught by people without these skill teaching today. I agree with you completely on this. I have found it most troublesome dealing with some of the new and outrageous interpretations of literature, but some of the interpretations of history I have seen are almost beyond understanding.

    Adam L

  11. #91
    Council Member William F. Owen's Avatar
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    Quote Originally Posted by Adam L View Post
    I agree with you completely on this. I have found it most troublesome dealing with some of the new and outrageous interpretations of literature, but some of the interpretations of history I have seen are almost beyond understanding.
    This is not new. From my perspective, people have misinterpreted Clausewitz, and Sun-Tzu for a 100 years. In addition, all that is old and written is not necessarily good.
    Infinity Journal "I don't care if this works in practice. I want to see it work in theory!"

    - The job of the British Army out here is to kill or capture Communist Terrorists in Malaya.
    - If we can double the ratio of kills per contact, we will soon put an end to the shooting in Malaya.
    Sir Gerald Templer, foreword to the "Conduct of Anti-Terrorist Operations in Malaya," 1958 Edition

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    Council Member J Wolfsberger's Avatar
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    John Wolfsberger, Jr.

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    Default CNAS John Nagl Stepping Down

    CNAS John Nagl Stepping Down

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    Default Debate on Counterinsurgency: Gentile vs. Nagl

    Debate on Counterinsurgency: Gentile vs. Nagl

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    Default John Nagl on the Future of Military Innovation

    John Nagl on the Future of Military Innovation

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