Officer Retention

[mmx1]

Hi Matt,

So I'd ask you how you change the attitude of your peers? How do you convince the bright & ambitious young men and women of Cornell, that a career in the uniformed service is something they not only should do to safeguard their freedoms, but something they want to do because it will fulfill both their moral sensibilities and their more physical ones such as providing a standard of living for them and their families which is comparable to the many other vocations their abilities might secure?

Best Regards, Rob

Having done recruiting at the other Ivy that starts with a C, you have to hit all those wickets, simply because of the level of ignorance that exists. Especially at elite universities, very few students know anyone in the military, so the first thing you have to do is clear the slate and set realistic expectations.
-No, you won't make comparable private sector pay, but you'll make comparable public service pay and the difference isn't drastic. Explaining BAH helps dampen the shock of putting a $26,000 base pay against, say, $60k + bonus as a first year analyst at a top firm.
-There is room for disagreement, particularly on ethical issues. The question "what if you get an order you disagree with" often comes up. It's not as though in the private sector, you can disobey your boss without consequences. But where we've gotten a black eye have been instances where no one stood up and said "this is wrong" - tied into the fact that William Calley was a college dropout.

To sell the military as not just something they can do but something they should do, we've hit on the role of college-educated officers as a moral compass. After all, our mandatory Contemporary Civilization course (a 1-year intro to western political philosophies), had its origins in a WWI course called "war studies" for cadets. Its purpose "rested on the fundamental principle that in the long run man's accomplishment can rise no higher than his ideals, and that an understanding of the worth of the cause for which one is fighting is a powerful weapon in the hands of an intelligent man. Indeed, I've come to appreciate the value of the class much more after commissioning, and have looked back on those works to reinforce my belief in and ability to explain why we're in this current fight. As Robert Kaplan puts it,

A frustrated warrior class, always kept in check by liberal-minded officers, is the sign of a healthy democracy.

Especially in a time when most people question our foreign policy, the "serving to defend" argument fails to carry water. Instead, we've refashioned it as a "shaping foreign policy at the ground level" argument. We will be overseas, and not necessarily for the right reasons - but you can do more good and have more influence as a JO interacting with foreigners than as a desk jockey at some other institution.

Ultimately, though, these young minds full of mush still have to adapt to a Martial lifestyle - one that is often alien to folks imagining themselves in a suit behind a desk somewhere. When your friends and family are aghast at such an idea, it's a lot of inertia to overcome.

I have to say I'm disheartened at hearing about the strains the military places on families. I didn't fully appreciate it when I joined and while it wouldn't have changed my decision, it would have given me some pause.

[CNP]

My first post since I joined SWC. By the way, I've enjoyed the exchanges I've read so far and appreciate the thoughtfulness of the comments on serious issues.

WRT bonuses, Navy's experience is quite different as Army is just starting down this road. We've been at it awhile - approx 1975 (I'm referring to specific lump-sum bonuses, not special pays like flight pay, sub pay, etc which are monthly adds that have quite a long history in the service).

My take-away from our experience is that the money, in and of itself, will never bring about a decision to stay for the people you really want to stay, but it will help prep the battlespace for the decision (particularly wrt spouse and family) if you get the amount right and keep it competitive.

What seems to work best in order to keep the best is a blended solution - meaningful operational tours with career recognition for those whose service merits it, advanced education opportunity and maintaining the proper balance between operational time (sea duty for us) and "home" time (shore duty).

Again, very different experiences going on now in Navy than with bulk of Army combat arms JOs, but the principles remain the same, I believe.

And, since in a very special way as Army goes so go the Armed Forces, I'm keeping a close eye on what is happening in my Army. Take care shipmates and all the best, JCHjr

[marct]

Hello Sir,

My first post since I joined SWC. By the way, I've enjoyed the exchanges I've read so far and appreciate the thoughtfulness of the comments on serious issues.

Welcome aboard!

My take-away from our experience is that the money, in and of itself, will never bring about a decision to stay for the people you really want to stay, but it will help prep the battlespace for the decision (particularly wrt spouse and family) if you get the amount right and keep it competitive.

What seems to work best in order to keep the best is a blended solution - meaningful operational tours with career recognition for those whose service merits it, advanced education opportunity and maintaining the proper balance between operational time (sea duty for us) and "home" time (shore duty).

I have a suspicion that it also relates to the concept of a "flexible career path". Ever since the demise of the "Organization Man" as a central cultural expectation (~1982 in Canada at the pop culture level), there has been an increasing expectation that each "job" (in the very old sense of the word) will give people new skills and network contacts that will be useful in finding their next "job", even if they stay in the same organization. A lot of recent research in career points to people choosing less money in order to gain favourable skills and network contacts, but only for a limited time (~2-3 years or so).

Many of the high tech firms got around the problem of retention by bypassing their HR departments in both hiring and career decisions. They adopted a mentoring model with hiring/project managers acting as mentors using a very dense network of weak ties as their basis, and this might be a model that the Army may want to adopt, at least in part (basically, it decentralizes a large part of the "individual career growth" responsibilities from HR to informal networks).

Marc

[Old Eagle]

Patriot --

Yes, it is demoralizing to see less than stellar officers move up the ranks. It is also troubling to see good officers leave, either voluntarily, or not.

If it's any reassurance, the system will correct itself once hostilities wind down. Since the Army intends to stay large, it will not happen with the same alacrity as post-Vietnam or post-Cold War, but it will happen. I was personally disappointed when the Army elected to use market forces to reduce the junior officer corps after the Cold War, rather than making the tough call to eliminate marginal performers.

When re-balancing does occur, it will not be perfect and it won't be "fair". Life ain't fair. As an observer/participant in several RIFs and SERBs, I can tell you from experience that it is heartbreaking to see some really outstanding officers selected to depart, while their less qualified peers survive.

It is incumbent on the senior leadership, starting at the bn level, to counsel young talent, develop it, and provide the OER/awards/etc to keep the talent motivated and moving up. That personal involvement is much more important than any systemic programs.

[Steve Blair]

Many of the high tech firms got around the problem of retention by bypassing their HR departments in both hiring and career decisions. They adopted a mentoring model with hiring/project managers acting as mentors using a very dense network of weak ties as their basis, and this might be a model that the Army may want to adopt, at least in part (basically, it decentralizes a large part of the "individual career growth" responsibilities from HR to informal networks).

Marc

The old regimental system (at least in the US Army) tended to work along similar lines. Obviously the effectiveness varied from regiment to regiment, but officers who didn't make the grade were "encouraged" to leave the service.

[Ski]

There will be no solution until the Army leadership stops working off a "100% = success" system.

It's all about meeting numbers at this point. The entire Army, throughout all components, is becoming critically short on CPT's and MAJ's. Just look at the promotion rates over the last three years. It doesn't matter if you are the Morale and Welfare Officer at Ft. Greely, or the 977th Dishwashing and Laundry Company Commander, you're still going to make 04 without any difficulty, and 05 with a tiny bit of difficulty.

And since the Army has decided to expand by 35,000 pax, these strains will be accentuated rather than addressed because the focus is still on quantity, not quality.

[Van]

Footnote on the "Bad Bosses";

The tour where I decided to exit active duty ('99-'00), I had a BDE CDR who was a real 'go-to-war', light fighter, steely-eyed killer but had a command climate that made it clear that anyone without a ranger tab, anyone who wasn't an infantry officer, wasn't really worth his time, effort, or resources, and should be replaced by a "REAL" officer. In a light brigade, he might have been OK, but this was a mechanized BDE... I left that unit, and was back in the reserves a year later.

Fast forward six years... I did some drill days supporting an exercise, and COL Hoo-ah was in the same room as I was... He wasn't selected for BG, and all the Hoo-ah had left him.

I firmly believe that the heart of the problem is the 'flesh-trader' mentality of the Army's personnel system, treating all officers as interchangable with other officers of a given rank and specialty. That's what put an end to my time on active duty. The best example and most pathetic attempt at negotiation ever, was from my branch manager during my last phone-con with branch. This harassed, overworked/bumbling non-people oriented (you choose) individual couldn't wrap himself around the idea that there might be incentives other than my next assignment to pursuade me to stay on active duty, and that money was not the only reason I was leaving active duty.

[wm]

I firmly believe that the heart of the problem is the 'flesh-trader' mentality of the Army's personnel system, treating all officers as interchangable with other officers of a given rank and specialty.

Van,

I am sure that we all have some story (or stories) about a benighted branch assignment officer. But, these stories are just anecdotal symptoms of the big disease. The "flesh trader mentality" is not unique to the Army's personnel system. It has a much larger scope. It is best expressed in the discussions about reducing the "tooth to tail" ratio.

The miltary could have a very focused effort to match faces and spaces, put the best person for the job in that job. But to do so would require a much larger investment in people and time doing administrative/non-combat/tail sorts of things than our budgets allow. We see this fact in many places--reduction in lengths of time that folks are kept in training, the number of times that people are allowed to train, the move to replace manned with unmanned combat and surveillance vehicles being just a few examples. The point is that budgets drive us to do things we might not otherwise have chosen. However, I think that, to borrow Dr. Seuss's title, if I ran the circus, I'd spend a lot more of my money on the commodity most precious to any organization--the people and better systems to support their needs at the higher levels of Maslow's hierarchy.

Lest I be accused of one-sided thinking, let me acknowledge that there are other considerations that may be more unique to the military's need to manage people at the least common denominator. These have to do with interoperability and continuity of operations. When a TOC gets blown away, one must hope that the leadership was not so specialized that it was irreplaceable. (I realize that this example has a fair amount of hyperbole.) Perhaps a better example would be Army Engineers--one of their explicit missions in the 1993 vintage FM100-5 from is "to fight as infantry when required." Too much specialization and selectivity in assignments run counter to these requirements.

We must find a the middle way.

[Patriot]

The problem in my initial posting was not how to attack ivy league types (who will never elect to enter military service). My objective was to discuss the problem of keeping company and field grade officers in the Army. The pressures on the Army to expand to 48 BCTs, transfrom, and simultaneously fight a long war have required making changes in historically levels and rates of promotion which have directly impacted the perceptions of officers that the promotion system is currently not merit based. The impact of promoting marginal performers can not be overstated. Imagine a CPT that worked with a marginal performing CPT who is now a MAJ. How demoralizing is that? Solutions to problems such as these are not derived in Washington or at some bureau but through dialogue with the force to capture their perceptions.

If company and field grade officers are not asked their opioions, attitudes, and beliefs then their perception is the Army is not interested in what thay have to say. But their is a disconnect in the thinking of many officers on the "Army". The Army is really made up of two halves - one the one hand is the Department of the Army bureaucracy that runs all the personnel and administriva systems - OER, boards, LES, etc., and on the other hand is the "real" Army made of the unit you were in, the one you're in now, and the one you're going to be in. Making the distinction between the two is important because it helps you identify the source of the problem, which is not the unit Army. Again, if the bureaucracy ignores the force it will never figure out why officers are leaving is the first place.

[Cavguy]

The impact of promoting marginal performers can not be overstated. Imagine a CPT that worked with a marginal performing CPT who is now a MAJ. How demoralizing is that? Solutions to problems such as these are not derived in Washington or at some bureau but through dialogue with the force to capture their perceptions.

Again, if the bureaucracy ignores the force it will never figure out why officers are leaving is the first place.

Agreed.

I'm not always a fan of everything posted over at Defense and the National Interest, but this article captured what I had been thinking.

What we are seeing now is little more than the bill coming due from the issues identified and discussed in 2000-2001 when my peers were leaving the force in high numbers due many of the same issues we're discussing here. 9/11 caused a stir of patriotism and service that caused many to decide to stay in the army to fight the enemy. Hence, the low exit rates in 2002-2004.

Now the chickens are coming home to roost. The army never dealt with the issues in the 2000-2001 studies, and the stress on the force (which people thought was bad then!) has grown exponentially. The Army didn’t deal with the structural and generational issues.

In a way, a perfect storm is here. Officers are generally getting out for a mixture of the following reasons:

1) OPTEMPO. Many officers I know that left the army enjoyed their service, but just can’t handle the repeated deployments. It is particularly hard on those who were LT’s since 2002. Most are facing their third or fourth deployment, and they don’t have an “exit option” to a slower job in the immediate future. All they see are additional deployments. If married, this means usually having been deployed to training or war the majority of their marriage. If single, it means they have no opportunity to develop meaningful relationships.

The cumulative effect of deployments cannot be underestimated. The “12 months dwell time” between deployments is more aptly described as “12 months of lighting your hair on fire and running in circles” to prepare for the next deployment. In effect, soldiers really get between 4-6 actual months of deployment time at home, and only the leave period is truly restful.

2) Leadership Failure. This is the issue from the 90’s that remains unaddressed, and the link above has all the studies and essays that define it. 9/11 gave the army a "hall pass" on the issue. Many young officers I know exit because their first boss was a “bad” boss. The army has no institutional incentive (unless another Marshall comes along) to reform it’s officer training and leadership system with respect to junior officers. That attitude is derived from “After all, the system obviously works because it recognized *my* talent and made me a LTC, COL, General, etc., and those who didn’t get promoted didn’t deserve it anyway”

It does all come down to leadership, and many junior officers don’t see that their leaders or the army really care about them. It’s not because the words aren’t right, it’s the actions and “can-do”/”suck it up, it will pass” attitude that comes out. We’ve all watched leave cancelled, equipment shortfalls, training corners cut, etc. It communicates a very clear message. I was fortunate that in my most wavering time I worked for an exceptional battalion commander, who built the best team I’ve seen in the army and made the army “fun”. Even through 15 months of OIF. Unfortunately, he’s the exception.

3) The Peter Principle. 100% of my peers in my year group got promoted to major. I know my peers. 100% of us didn’t need to get promoted. My former company xo, who left the army, citied high promotions as a factor before he left. Pointing to a universally known, subpar peer of mine, he said “If the army’s willing to make him a major and put him in charge of troops again, this isn’t an army I want to be in”.

Jack Welch, the former CEO of GE, writes in his book “Winning” about the criticality of differentiation. If you reward everyone equally, the middle “good” performers lose their motivation quickest (the top generally perform that way because it’s in their nature) and leave the organization. Hence Welch ruthlessly culled the bottom 10%. It resulted in better performance in the organization because people knew performance was rewarded and incompetence and underperformance was cut.

The army is turning into a version of the Special Olympics – in promotions, OER’s, and medals. Everyone’s a winner, but some of us are still handicapped. There is no block check on CPT OER's anymore. Everyone of certain grades (with rare exception) gets a Bronze Star at the end of their OIF rotation, deserved or not, fobbit or not, role or not. When a medal doesn’t differentiate from the population, it loses its meaning. How can someone differentiate what I did for mine versus theirs? What do you tell a young Sergeant who patrolled Ramadi every day and got an ARCOM when individuals who never left the wire walk away with Bronze Stars? (Don’t get me wrong, some supporters deserve every bit of it for keeping the line supplied, but since everyone gets it, it’s meaningless)

4) A mismanaged war. Kaplan’s article, and LTC Yingling’s, describe this one well. Our junior officers see this all unfolding, they have been closest to the line, and seen the most suffering among their soldiers and peers. It's personal, painful, and emotional to them, and they want someone to blame. That's natural (to a point) in all wars.

That said, I remain optimistic. I think that, like after Vietnam, those that remain and went through the crucible as a junior officer will enact significant change on the system. And I think that today’s leadership are actually slightly more attuned to the issue than the Vietnam generation, and are at least beginning to try to find solutions. But I think the calculus is that for now it is easier to bribe them to stay in (bonuses, grad school) than to address the real systemic problems while at war.

Finally the whole discussion and GEN Cody brief reminds me of this incident with GEN Abrams while chief of staff in the early 70’s. Will our leadership be as perceptive?

[mmx1]

The problem in my initial posting was not how to attack ivy league types (who will never elect to enter military service). My objective was to discuss the problem of keeping company and field grade officers in the Army.

That this is assumed to be fact is a problem in and of itself. I was answering marct's question, but the tie-in is that the shift in recruiting in the past decades away from the west and northeast and towards the south is hurting the diversity and quality of the officer pool - with the result that you have more poor performers demotivating everyone else and competing for the same slots come promotion time.

For example, compare the city of New York with Alabama. NYC has twice as many occupants and four times as many college students as the state of Alabama. But we have just 2 AROTC programs vice 10 in Alabama, producing 1/5th as many officers.
http://online.wsj.com/public/resourc...bk0702-14.html
The Army blames this on the difficulty of recruiting Northeast and urban students. But it's become a self-perpetuating prophecy. The closure and consolidation of urban ROTC units and the consequent shift in recruiting funds have dwindled the ROTC presence in major college towns like Boston and New York to a wisp - ROTC recruiting is practically nonexistent outside of the two home campuses.

The distribution of funding and programs makes sense from a numbers perspective to go after easier markets, but only under the dangerous assumption that every student is interchangeable - that the 200th student you add here is just as good as the 10th student elsewhere. When you're digging 20x as deep in one student pool vice another, don't be surprised at the results.

I find it ironic that we'll praise civilian graduate liberal arts education on one hand, holding up Petraeus' Princeton doctorate as an example, and then so quickly write off undergraduates from the same elite institutions as not worth the effort to recruit.

Public service will always have trouble competing with the private sector in terms of monetary compensation - and I worry about the day that the federal government becomes the most lucrative employer. But the problem today is that to many Americans, military service is considered distinct and inferior to other forms of public service.

[Steve Blair]

But the problem today is that to many Americans, military service is considered distinct and inferior to other forms of public service.

This is more a return of what has (sadly) been a typical American mindset. The military in general (and the Army in particular) was considered the refuge of unemployable scoundrels up until the Depression era.

But back to the problem of recruiting and the like at elite schools; you also miss out on some of the best and brightest from other states. These days it's very common for kids to go to out-of-state universities, and there you're really missing a promising recruiting pool. Often those kids are top-notch performers, and in some cases they come from states (like Montana) that still have a strong spirit of service. But if there's no ROTC, they can't take part in that and still attend the school they feel they've had to fight their way into.