Cross-posted on the SWJ Blog - On Keeping the Best and Brightest.
On Keeping the Best and Brightest
Cross-posted on the SWJ Blog - On Keeping the Best and Brightest.
It's quantitative not qualitative...always has been during war
This argument is nothing new and most of these "fixes" are temporary to keep the numbers at a reasonable level.
I am not sure the numbers support your claim that folks are "hiding out" in TRADOC. I know Fort Benning cleaned house about three years ago and replaced just about every NCO and Officer who didn't have a SSI-FWS on their right shoulder. Granted there are still some officers and NCO's out there who have avoided deployments but I think most of them are in the very senior grades (O-5 and above or E-9), it's hard to find too many O-3 to O-4's and E-4 to E-7's out there without some time in a combat zone. Again, there are probably some who got by with a 120 or 180 day deployment to Kuwait or Qatar but I am not convinced that folks can hide very easily. Especially since the implementation of dwell time, it is automatically annotated at HRC whenever they pull up your records.
This phenomena is nothing new all you have to do is find a Vietnam-era veteran and they will tell you the same stories. During times of war the Army retains and promotes just about everyone. They have to or otherwise people are forced to leave, and how can you justify getting rid of people during a war when your numbers mean everything? The real shame is lack of leaders effectively counseling and developing junior officers. How many times does someone get shuffled around a command because no one wants them? When was the last time an O-5 sat them down and truly laid out what was wrong and gave them guidance and direction to fix it? Of course, there are officers who do this but all too often the case is to shuffle them around staff positions or send them to higher headquarters.
Never fear though...these wars will end some day and then we will draw down and cut budgets. The mass exodus you are looking for will happen if you wait around that long, and that not too far off future will make the Carter years look like the Reagan years in comparison.
PT
PT,Originally Posted by Pragmatic Thinker
Agree somewhat, but my initial shock upon arrival here at Fort Leavenworth was the sheer number of perm party officers (not ILE students, which are about 98% combat vets) without combat patches. Most of them outrank me, but I always want to ask - what hole have you been hiding in?
Branch has said that those with the higest dwell time will absolutely deploy next, so I agree, it will even itself. I have a post command, MAJ friend who never deployed. Commanded in Korea, a second command at Knox, and then AC/RC. He's getting his first downrange deployment early next year..... I guess the system is working. I think many of them, like my friend, simply had jobs that didn't deploy to SWA, and didn't volunteer to head downrange or were locked into other jobs.
I liked the USMC "Every Marine into the Fight" message that went out recently, the Army needs to do the same.
Following Cavguy's note: General: Deploy or risk promotion chances.
Marines who have not gone to war should be concerned when promotion time comes around, a top Corps official said.
“I guarantee you ... if you have a six- to seven-year war and you don’t get to the war zone, you needn’t wonder what’s going to happen when it’s time for promotion,” said Lt. Gen. Ronald Coleman, deputy commandant for manpower and reserve affairs in Quantico, Va.
Coleman spoke at a Marine Corps Association meeting here Wednesday, where he told an audience of mainly retired and active-duty Marines that leathernecks who haven’t deployed to a combat zone need to find a way to get to the fight.
“If I’m on the promotion board, I’m going to make a note of that,” he said.
While some Marines have served three, four and, in some cases, five tours in Iraq, 40,000 still have not deployed, Coleman said. Some of those Marines are in the pipeline, including those making the transition from boot camp to infantry battalions.
In January, Commandant Gen. James Conway announced his plans to rearrange assignments so that every Marine is given the chance to go to war. At the time of his announcement, titled “Every Marine Into the Fight,” some 66,000 Marines — a third of the force — had not deployed.
Could happen, I suppose. As a survivor of Eisnhower's cuts and one who was in Florida, DC and Korea during the Carter years, I sure hope we do the absorbtion of cuts in funds better the next time than we did those two times...
Working number
The working percentage for active duty US Army personnel who have NOT deployed to either OIF or OEF is 40 percent. There was a USA Today article a few months ago about the phenomenon, but it didn't go below the surface of the factoid to explain why this was so.
For those of us who, after two or more deployments, have met many of our peers -- some of whom were promoted over us -- without combat patches, this figure seems about right.
Perhaps they're all on permanent profile.
Stats from Branch
A slide from Armor branch on HRC Website (as of Jan 07 - AKO Login Required) indicated that 72% of officers in Ranks CPT-COL in Armor have combat experience. Lowest YG's were 91-94 and 1980-84. That is the demographic that would have been in AC/RC, recruiting, or post command jobs during the first years of OIF. YG's 95 and later are tracking above 90% combat experience - the ranks where officers serve as PL's, XO's, and Commanders since 2003.
The skew of high experience in the 1984-1990 YG's is most likely because Desert Storm experience is counted, and the high density of BN/BDE CDR's, XO's, and S3's in those YG's in the 2003-2007 period. I haven't seen data posted on whether the combat experiencewas OEF, OIF, DS, Panama, or Grenada.
I imagine Armor Branch's trend is typical for other combat branches.
As a reservist, I have volunteered to deploy repeatedly, only to be stone-walled by apathetic bureaucrats in uniform. I'd like one more promotion, and without a deployment, my chances are getting slimmer. I'll echo Cavguy that for some, maybe many of the folks that haven't deployed, it isn't for lack of trying. Frankly, I'm to the point where if I hear one more person complaining about a lack of volunteers in the reserves, I'll give an answer that is candid beyond professionalism...
Oh, BTW- According to LTG Caldwell, Commander Combined Arms Center and Ft. Leavenworth, the current class of CGSC at Ft. Leavenworth is 75% combat veterans as opposed to the fraction of one percent when he went through the course.
I actually thought it would be higher now - interesting. I don't know if he was counting cross-service and foreign officers in the percentage though.
Thanks for the info.
Ako
CavGuy, you forced me to boldly go where I've never gone before. Who knew?
I can't see if there is any way to drill the numbers down further, to see if the combat patches came from earlier expeditionary campaigns or not, but I would imagine that for most of us in the combat arms of a certain generation it doesn't really matter: We hit Panama or Desert Storm (check), then Restore Hope (double check), then either Kosovo/Bosnia or Haiti before at least two deployments to OIF (double check) or OEF (not yet).
As one might obviously realize, these were unescorted tours, so the wives weren't hiding out at the Osan O-club after spending the paycheck at the PX grocery.
I don't really mind doing the unescorted tours because I signed the contract and expected as much. It's particularly annoying to hear National Guard officers and senior non-commissioned officers kvetch about being sent anywhere, considering most of their units hadn't seen combat since the Battle of the Bulge.
I think a combat deployment every 60 years or so is OK.
But it's also fair to say that the current optempo has been destabilizing for an Army (and its officer corps) that is increasingly married, unlike for previous wars.
Not seeing one's spouse for two out of the past three years can be bad for morale, as are the inevitable scourges of divorce, child custody battles, et al, that radiate from the deployment like so many ripples in a besplashed pond.
Agreed. The discussion made me think of the branch brief from Armor, so I thought it may be relevant. And as stated earlier, I like the USMC message because it doesn't belittle those who haven't been, but makes clear that they should start finding a way.....
Ref the deployments, I hear you. I spent four of my six years in Germany (2001-2007) either deployed (OIF x2, KFOR) or deployed for training aka "Grafenfels") The family separation is hard, and doesn't help a marriage ..... Not to mention even the single guys who desire a life.
Welcome to the board. Make sure you introduce yourself in the appropriate thread, if you haven't already.
As was pointed out, we've done allot of thinking over this subject. I read Patriot's piece, and thought about it for the last couple of days.Two Council Related Threads...
* Army Offers Officers Incentives
* Army Development of Junior Leaders
Its one of these things where you know you have to have more qualified people to achieve the solution - which is to grow the officer corps to meet the OPTEMPO of the Long War, but at the same time you can't keep the people you want to keep because you can't grow qualified people fast enough to reduce the burden, and we are unwilling to go try something else besides incremental approaches toward retention.
We have a two-fold problem. Keeping what we have & growing more of it.
I think the solution may be one in the same. If you show the people currently serving that their worth means a great deal to the state by an investment strategy that speaks for itself, and is on par with the hardships they and their families endure for the freedom of their countrymen and their countryman's families enjoy, then perhaps they will continue to volunteer and deny themselves and their families the life that other Americans lead.
Once you have convinced the ones you already have, who are already risking all in the service of their nation, it stands to reason word will get out, and enough others will volunteer to meet our expanding needs.
I'd also submit that today's (and tomorrow's) battlefield, while as dangerous as any in its own way, requires a much broader, more mature and diverse skill set, with the ability to provide the type of innovation and creativity that private enterprise and OGAs covet, and are willing and capable of paying for. Companies have strategies for attracting and retaining talent that appeal to both the individual and their families. In some ways we do too, but our strategies are more inline with our requirements of the 1990s. Our need for the best and brightest have grown with our commitments, while our incentives and recognition of changing demographics have not kept pace.
The other day on Forbes Ben Stein was asked why we might have a tax increase and what we might do with it - he replied we should pay our military more, they are inadequately compensated for the job they do. I almost fell out of my chair - here is a well known financial guru on Fox, who the first answer out of the chute - is compensate the military adequately for the job they do! If he gets it, if that is his first answer out of all the things he could have said, why shouldn't legislators understand as well? Why would Stiller say that?
The first requirement for a civilization is security, without it, leisure time, art, economy,etc. will all fall to the barbarians. Our problem with officer retention should not be considered solely a problem which the military must fix, its far more important. It is a national problem. Its atrophy effects far more then just the uniformed services.
This does not necessarily mean a pay raise only, the plan would have to be holistic as mentioned before, and must appeal to the families as the demographics suggest - but a serious pay raise would immediately make the point about how much the nation values the services of its military.
Regards, Rob
Last edited by Rob Thornton; 08-28-2007 at 11:44 AM. Reason: Changed Stiller to Stein :-)
I can't speak to retaining current officers, but as far as attracting new officers with the skill sets I think you're referring to, I'm not sure the money will cut it. There's something deeper, more generational.
I'm sure this has been discussed elsewhere so I'll keep it short, but at least from my perspective at Cornell, there is very little you could reasonably offer a lot of today's college students to become military officers. ROTC numbers are down, I am (so far, anyway) the only Cornell junior applying for Marine Corps PLC, and I know of almost no one who would entertain the idea. It's partly the fact that there's a war going on, but part of it is that lingering attitude of the military being no place for a young, educated, ambitious man (or woman). And as false as you guys may know this to be, I don't see additional money, whether in salary or bonus form, making the difference.
Matt
"Give a good leader very little and he will succeed. Give a mediocrity a great deal and he will fail." - General George C. Marshall
Cuts will happen...
I am not holding my breath and when the axe falls on those budgets it usually cuts deep and fast...things like early retirements, no pay raises, no training funds, no repair parts...they're a commin' and probably not too far away either.
If the timing works out right the repubs can hope it happens under Obama or Hillary and shift all the blame to the Dems. Much like we heard during the early 90's under Bill Clinton with the draw downs initiated under Bush I. Of course, my pessimism is only couched by my sarcasm so who knows but like I tell the fellas in my office, "...all good things must come to an end", and this current boom in military spending will not be sustained indefinitely. If you're paying attention to the USAF, they are initiating another round of personnel cuts this year to make room for the impending budget cuts. However, for them it is a matter of having enough left over to pay for all the F-22s we will need for the next big air war.
PT
About the distance between the officer corps and professional classes, I have been ruminating on that for awhile. Not long ago I was on an airplane and happened to sit next to a wealthy businessman and a lawyer, both from New England. I took that time to chat about world affairs and offer them a perspective from the profession of arms.
Towards the end of the flight, the businessman asked me what sort of things officers study to be ready for war. I happened to have my copy of Roots of Strategy and showed him a few diagrams from Frederick the Great's "Instructions to his Generals", explaining how the principles of war used in those maneuvers are applicable today.
By discussing warfare at an intellectual level, I think I removed many Vietnam-era stereotypes that these men had accepted for forty years. I think we need to engage professionals at the same level that their professions engage them.
That said, I believe there are many barriers between the military and the professional classes, and one very large one is terminology. Why do we say "land navigation" instead of orienteering? The word navigation has a maritime connotation. Adding the word "land" does not change the connotation, it only makes the term sound as though it were created by someone with a small vocabulary. Why do we say "human terrain" instead of "demographics" or "anthropology" when both of these are established and esteemed disciplines? Do we discourage demographers, anthropologists, and other professionals from working with the military because we appear meddlesome, unwilling to respect the venerable terms used by the scholars of their discipline? Too often we invent new terms instead of consulting a thesaurus.
One of my friends argues that a profession must have terms which are used almost exclusively by that profession in order to be taken seriously. I agree. If I have to explain to someone what Clausewitz meant by tactics, I feel that I am acting as an ambassador of the profession of arms. If I have to explain that a VBIED is a car bomb or that a DFAC is a cafeteria or that HMMWV stands for High Mobility Multi-Wheeled Vehicle (a term which could arguably be applied to a bicycle); I cringe inside because these terms are esoteric for the sake of being esoteric.
What's more, many officers I know are not very good with spelling, grammar, nor oration. I have seen many slide shows with 2-3 misspellings per slide and a few officers who used the phrase "in terms of" as a crutch. We cannot give the impression of war as a thinking person's game unless we show the same level of literacy as other professions.
To that end, the Army needs to spend time in its basic courses on grammatical instruction and writing. From my personal experience, the average high school graduate can only discern a subject from a predicate. They do not know the parts of speech, cases, nor how to diagram a sentence. If the officer does not receive any more instruction in college (which many don't), then that is the level of ability we see after commissioning. This makes instruction in language very difficult. Some people have an aptitude for learning languages; they can just "pick it up". I learn best through comparing the grammars, as I think do many people, but they are handicapped by their insufficient instruction. I, personally, suffered in my studies because the course work was written for learners who understand the mechanics of speaking naturally and do not need to be explicitly told the rules and phonetics of the language to become conversational.
Commanders must also encourage professional development through reading classics. The Art of War is a very short book, yet I have immense trouble convincing my peers to spend an hour reading it. They expect the Army to train them in everything they need to know. What they really need to know is that the body of martial thought is larger than any set of field manuals.
In conclusion, the Army can improve its retention of officers by using three methods to raise the esteem of the officer corps in the eyes of the professional classes. Firstly, encourage professional development through reading from BOLC I to the end of an officer's career. This will allow officers to engage other professionals in discourse at the theoretical level. Secondly, ensure that officers have writing and speaking skills comparable to other professions in order to remove any prejudices other professionals may have against them as uneducated. Finally, offer language instruction that takes advantage of the officers' mastery of English syntax. Other professionals will view a bilingual person as more educated than an unilingual one. Taken together, these measures will show the professional classes that the officer corps is a good place for young, ambitious, college graduates who yearn for more initiative and adventure than they could ever have in the private sector.
Last edited by AdaptAndOvercome; 09-10-2007 at 02:06 AM. Reason: Typo
Adapt and Overcome,
I find your post interesting for a number of reasons. Given what I know about your background from your intro post, that you're going to get commissioned next year, and under the assumption that you are not prior service I have a few honest comments and observations. I say this, not to nit pick, but to enter into the honest and professional intellectual dialog that you infer is so lacking in the profession of arms.
I've seen and taught a lot of LTs this year (somewhere in the neighborhood of 450). Those with the most difficulty with their chosen profession have been those who can explain the strategic and operational level, but can't apply a basic battle drill or skill level one task, especially when under duress. There are varying levels of professional expertise. Certainly the new bank teller isn't an expert on the futures markets in Asia. Nor should the new officer in regards to the strategic application of applied kinetic diplomacy
I hope that I'm incorrectly reading into this that your assumption is that we don't. We do. Chances are you haven't been in the environment to witness or participate in it firsthand yet.
Terminology is a barrier within the profession of arms as well, mainly due to individual discipline and understanding of one's job. Ask your average logistics officer the differences between seize, contain, hold, secure, and isolate and you'll get as many different answers as you will people.
By definition, according to Webster's, orienteering is a sport. Navigation, as a transitive verb, is to make one's way over or through. As an intrasitive verb, it is to steer a course through a medium.
Consider the first paragraph of the five paragraph Operations Order (Enemy, terrain, weather, friendly forces). By describing socio-demographics as terrain the factors of OAKOC can be applied. For instance, how can the civilian populace be an obstacle, how can they be "key terrain," what benefits to they afford in terms of observation (reconnaissance), how can they affect mobility corridors and avenues of approach etc....?
Take a look at the staff at SSI, CALL, SAMS, The Army War College, and any number of professional education establishments around.
It's actually High Mobility Multi-Purpose Wheeled Vehicle (ref. Army Technical Manual TM 9-2320-280-10)
Let me invoke my right to free speach on this one, since it's a call to change the program of instruction within my area of expertise.
Here's the bottom line; if you get this far through life with a mean age of around 22 for a brand new LT, do you really think that the schoolhouse is going to be able to undo in 85 days what you were deficient in receiving your first 22 years of life? There are a lot of things I can teach. I can teach actions on contact. I can teach platoon tactical tasks, fundamentals of maneuver, battle drills, and reporting procedures. I cannot do three things; I cannot teach character, I cannot bestow upon someone drive and initiative, and I cannot undo what your previous educators, friends, parents, or guardians failed to do.
Two things on this.
1. The CSA has a reading list broken down level of experience/responsibility. It's available at AAFES and here.
2. I'll tell you the same thing I told Fred Kaplan last month. As a Commander, I was much more concerned about whether my guys could secure a ground convoy than whether they could recite all 14 Chapters of Sun Tzu's Art of War.
I wasn't under the impression that we were held in low esteem. In fact, I'm tired of getting phone calls of people outside the Army trying to hire me.
You come into this profession with a lot of preconcieved notions that may or may not pan out for you. Try not to get so myopic on that which the military is not. Make the most of what you have in front of you. After all, you're at the start line of a marathon.
Last edited by RTK; 09-10-2007 at 02:36 AM. Reason: CSA Reading List link
Example is better than precept.
"I find your post interesting for a number of reasons. Given what I know about your background from your intro post, that you're going to get commissioned next year, and under the assumption that you are not prior service I have a few honest comments and observations. I say this, not to nit pick, but to enter into the honest and professional intellectual dialog that you infer is so lacking in the profession of arms."
I am beginning to regret having made an introduction. One of the most enlightening posters here is marct who is an anthropologist. This site is so didactic because people from all different backgrounds contribute their diverse viewpoints. Before coming here, I would never have consulted an anthropologist for insights into counterinsurgency. Now, my horizons are much wider. I believe that the central theme of small wars is that in strength there is weakness; and in weakness there is strength. In the same way, every poster here has something worth saying no matter where he is from.
"I've seen and taught a lot of LTs this year (somewhere in the neighborhood of 450). Those with the most difficulty with their chosen profession have been those who can explain the strategic and operational level, but can't apply a basic battle drill or skill level one task, especially when under duress. There are varying levels of professional expertise. Certainly the new bank teller isn't an expert on the futures markets in Asia. Nor should the new officer in regards to the strategic application of applied kinetic diplomacy"
I don't think one proficiency excludes another. Anyone who can not perform basic tasks needs to be remediated, but I hope the people who are the best at basic tasks can also understand higher levels of war. As we said before, the promotion rate is so high that most lieutenants will become lieutenant colonels if they stay with the Army.
"I hope that I'm incorrectly reading into this that your assumption is that we don't. We do. Chances are you haven't been in the environment to witness or participate in it firsthand yet."
You are reading that the way I meant it. My experience is in the Northeast. Few people know much about the military, and the most professionally educated people often have the dimmest view. I would like to hear how we have been promoting our profession to those people if you'd like to share.
"Consider the first paragraph of the five paragraph Operations Order (Enemy, terrain, weather, friendly forces). By describing socio-demographics as terrain the factors of OAKOC can be applied. For instance, how can the civilian populace be an obstacle, how can they be "key terrain," what benefits to they afford in terms of observation (reconnaissance), how can they affect mobility corridors and avenues of approach etc....?"
This is problematic because we are defining the environment based on our standard operating procedures instead of the other way around. Why can't we change OAKOC or say that OAKOC can analyze demographics as well?
"Do we discourage demographers, anthropologists, and other professionals from working with the military because we appear meddlesome, unwilling to respect the venerable terms used by the scholars of their discipline?"
It was simply a suggestion for something we should investigate. Many people who teach at those institutions were in the military or have strong ties through family. What of everyone else?
"It's actually High Mobility Multi-Purpose Wheeled Vehicle (ref. Army Technical Manual TM 9-2320-280-10)"
That's a strike against me for not checking that fact. Still, the term is very vague.
"I cannot undo what your previous educators, friends, parents, or guardians failed to do."
I was thinking more along the lines of BOLC I and Captain's Career Course doing this. I know time is short when they get to you.
"The CSA has a reading list broken down level of experience/responsibility."
It's a good list, but it needs more promotion. We need to work together to make sure that all officers continue their learning.
"As a Commander, I was much more concerned about whether my guys could secure a ground convoy than whether they could recite all 14 Chapters of Sun Tzu's Art of War."
Reading military classics is not about recitation; it's about learning a way of thinking. I have put my faith in the writings of great generals because there is a consistent thread across time, place, and culture. Sun Tzu (whether he was one author or many) put it most succinctly, so I encourage that as a starting point.
"I wasn't under the impression that we were held in low esteem. In fact, I'm tired of getting phone calls of people outside the Army trying to hire me."
Army officers do get a lot of very attractive job offers, but I still assert that the profession of arms is held in very low esteem in some quarters, notably New England. Since part of this discussion was about recruiting at Ivy League universities, I thought it was worth mentioning my discussion with the two men from the Northeast. Take a trip to Boston some time. It's a nice city, and I think you'll see what I mean.
"You come into this profession with a lot of preconcieved notions that may or may not pan out for you. Try not to get so myopic on that which the military is not. Make the most of what you have in front of you."
I've got a computer in front of me, and I think becoming a contributor to this site is the best thing I've done professionally in a long time.
Thanks to everyone for your time and responses.
Two Council Related Threads...
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