Could happen, I suppose. As a survivor of Eisnhower's cuts and one who was in Florida, DC and Korea during the Carter years, I sure hope we do the absorbtion of cuts in funds better the next time than we did those two times...Originally Posted by Pragmatic Thinker
Working number
The working percentage for active duty US Army personnel who have NOT deployed to either OIF or OEF is 40 percent. There was a USA Today article a few months ago about the phenomenon, but it didn't go below the surface of the factoid to explain why this was so.
For those of us who, after two or more deployments, have met many of our peers -- some of whom were promoted over us -- without combat patches, this figure seems about right.
Perhaps they're all on permanent profile.
Stats from Branch
A slide from Armor branch on HRC Website (as of Jan 07 - AKO Login Required) indicated that 72% of officers in Ranks CPT-COL in Armor have combat experience. Lowest YG's were 91-94 and 1980-84. That is the demographic that would have been in AC/RC, recruiting, or post command jobs during the first years of OIF. YG's 95 and later are tracking above 90% combat experience - the ranks where officers serve as PL's, XO's, and Commanders since 2003.
The skew of high experience in the 1984-1990 YG's is most likely because Desert Storm experience is counted, and the high density of BN/BDE CDR's, XO's, and S3's in those YG's in the 2003-2007 period. I haven't seen data posted on whether the combat experiencewas OEF, OIF, DS, Panama, or Grenada.
I imagine Armor Branch's trend is typical for other combat branches.
As a reservist, I have volunteered to deploy repeatedly, only to be stone-walled by apathetic bureaucrats in uniform. I'd like one more promotion, and without a deployment, my chances are getting slimmer. I'll echo Cavguy that for some, maybe many of the folks that haven't deployed, it isn't for lack of trying. Frankly, I'm to the point where if I hear one more person complaining about a lack of volunteers in the reserves, I'll give an answer that is candid beyond professionalism...
Oh, BTW- According to LTG Caldwell, Commander Combined Arms Center and Ft. Leavenworth, the current class of CGSC at Ft. Leavenworth is 75% combat veterans as opposed to the fraction of one percent when he went through the course.
I actually thought it would be higher now - interesting. I don't know if he was counting cross-service and foreign officers in the percentage though.
Thanks for the info.
Ako
CavGuy, you forced me to boldly go where I've never gone before. Who knew?
I can't see if there is any way to drill the numbers down further, to see if the combat patches came from earlier expeditionary campaigns or not, but I would imagine that for most of us in the combat arms of a certain generation it doesn't really matter: We hit Panama or Desert Storm (check), then Restore Hope (double check), then either Kosovo/Bosnia or Haiti before at least two deployments to OIF (double check) or OEF (not yet).
As one might obviously realize, these were unescorted tours, so the wives weren't hiding out at the Osan O-club after spending the paycheck at the PX grocery.
I don't really mind doing the unescorted tours because I signed the contract and expected as much. It's particularly annoying to hear National Guard officers and senior non-commissioned officers kvetch about being sent anywhere, considering most of their units hadn't seen combat since the Battle of the Bulge.
I think a combat deployment every 60 years or so is OK.
But it's also fair to say that the current optempo has been destabilizing for an Army (and its officer corps) that is increasingly married, unlike for previous wars.
Not seeing one's spouse for two out of the past three years can be bad for morale, as are the inevitable scourges of divorce, child custody battles, et al, that radiate from the deployment like so many ripples in a besplashed pond.
Agreed. The discussion made me think of the branch brief from Armor, so I thought it may be relevant. And as stated earlier, I like the USMC message because it doesn't belittle those who haven't been, but makes clear that they should start finding a way.....
Ref the deployments, I hear you. I spent four of my six years in Germany (2001-2007) either deployed (OIF x2, KFOR) or deployed for training aka "Grafenfels") The family separation is hard, and doesn't help a marriage ..... Not to mention even the single guys who desire a life.
Welcome to the board. Make sure you introduce yourself in the appropriate thread, if you haven't already.
As was pointed out, we've done allot of thinking over this subject. I read Patriot's piece, and thought about it for the last couple of days.Two Council Related Threads...
* Army Offers Officers Incentives
* Army Development of Junior Leaders
Its one of these things where you know you have to have more qualified people to achieve the solution - which is to grow the officer corps to meet the OPTEMPO of the Long War, but at the same time you can't keep the people you want to keep because you can't grow qualified people fast enough to reduce the burden, and we are unwilling to go try something else besides incremental approaches toward retention.
We have a two-fold problem. Keeping what we have & growing more of it.
I think the solution may be one in the same. If you show the people currently serving that their worth means a great deal to the state by an investment strategy that speaks for itself, and is on par with the hardships they and their families endure for the freedom of their countrymen and their countryman's families enjoy, then perhaps they will continue to volunteer and deny themselves and their families the life that other Americans lead.
Once you have convinced the ones you already have, who are already risking all in the service of their nation, it stands to reason word will get out, and enough others will volunteer to meet our expanding needs.
I'd also submit that today's (and tomorrow's) battlefield, while as dangerous as any in its own way, requires a much broader, more mature and diverse skill set, with the ability to provide the type of innovation and creativity that private enterprise and OGAs covet, and are willing and capable of paying for. Companies have strategies for attracting and retaining talent that appeal to both the individual and their families. In some ways we do too, but our strategies are more inline with our requirements of the 1990s. Our need for the best and brightest have grown with our commitments, while our incentives and recognition of changing demographics have not kept pace.
The other day on Forbes Ben Stein was asked why we might have a tax increase and what we might do with it - he replied we should pay our military more, they are inadequately compensated for the job they do. I almost fell out of my chair - here is a well known financial guru on Fox, who the first answer out of the chute - is compensate the military adequately for the job they do! If he gets it, if that is his first answer out of all the things he could have said, why shouldn't legislators understand as well? Why would Stiller say that?
The first requirement for a civilization is security, without it, leisure time, art, economy,etc. will all fall to the barbarians. Our problem with officer retention should not be considered solely a problem which the military must fix, its far more important. It is a national problem. Its atrophy effects far more then just the uniformed services.
This does not necessarily mean a pay raise only, the plan would have to be holistic as mentioned before, and must appeal to the families as the demographics suggest - but a serious pay raise would immediately make the point about how much the nation values the services of its military.
Regards, Rob
Last edited by Rob Thornton; 08-28-2007 at 11:44 AM. Reason: Changed Stiller to Stein :-)
I can't speak to retaining current officers, but as far as attracting new officers with the skill sets I think you're referring to, I'm not sure the money will cut it. There's something deeper, more generational.
I'm sure this has been discussed elsewhere so I'll keep it short, but at least from my perspective at Cornell, there is very little you could reasonably offer a lot of today's college students to become military officers. ROTC numbers are down, I am (so far, anyway) the only Cornell junior applying for Marine Corps PLC, and I know of almost no one who would entertain the idea. It's partly the fact that there's a war going on, but part of it is that lingering attitude of the military being no place for a young, educated, ambitious man (or woman). And as false as you guys may know this to be, I don't see additional money, whether in salary or bonus form, making the difference.
Matt
"Give a good leader very little and he will succeed. Give a mediocrity a great deal and he will fail." - General George C. Marshall
Hi Matt,
Thanks for making a decision to serve!
I agree with you. I also agree with the your observation about youth, ambition and talent. What I am trying to say though is you have to change that sentiment, and you have to break down how you do that. It is probably not mono-causal since we are dealing with people's perceptions. I do think the first step in changing perceptions is by demonstrating the value you place on something. How do we do that in our society? When we really want to demonstrate how much something or somebody means to us, we sacrifice. How much does an education at the best University cost & why do people value it? How much does the best mechanic in town cost and why are people willing to pay him? How about food, automobiles, or anything else in our society? All of those things have some type of value and worth that translates and appeals to the general public. No matter if we are talking services or goods, we place value on things.I can't speak to retaining current officers, but as far as attracting new officers with the skill sets I think you're referring to, I'm not sure the money will cut it. There's something deeper, more generational.
It's partly the fact that there's a war going on, but part of it is that lingering attitude of the military being no place for a young, educated, ambitious man (or woman). And as false as you guys may know this to be, I don't see additional money, whether in salary or bonus form, making the difference.
So I'd ask you how you change the attitude of your peers? How do you convince the bright & ambitious young men and women of Cornell, that a career in the uniformed service is something they not only should do to safeguard their freedoms, but something they want to do because it will fulfill both their moral sensibilities and their more physical ones such as providing a standard of living for them and their families which is comparable to the many other vocations their abilities might secure?
Best Regards, Rob
what's the Marine take on this right now?
Out of curiousity, what is the situation with the marine's in regards to mid-level officer retention?
Having done recruiting at the other Ivy that starts with a C, you have to hit all those wickets, simply because of the level of ignorance that exists. Especially at elite universities, very few students know anyone in the military, so the first thing you have to do is clear the slate and set realistic expectations.
-No, you won't make comparable private sector pay, but you'll make comparable public service pay and the difference isn't drastic. Explaining BAH helps dampen the shock of putting a $26,000 base pay against, say, $60k + bonus as a first year analyst at a top firm.
-There is room for disagreement, particularly on ethical issues. The question "what if you get an order you disagree with" often comes up. It's not as though in the private sector, you can disobey your boss without consequences. But where we've gotten a black eye have been instances where no one stood up and said "this is wrong" - tied into the fact that William Calley was a college dropout.
To sell the military as not just something they can do but something they should do, we've hit on the role of college-educated officers as a moral compass. After all, our mandatory Contemporary Civilization course (a 1-year intro to western political philosophies), had its origins in a WWI course called "war studies" for cadets. Its purpose "rested on the fundamental principle that in the long run man's accomplishment can rise no higher than his ideals, and that an understanding of the worth of the cause for which one is fighting is a powerful weapon in the hands of an intelligent man. Indeed, I've come to appreciate the value of the class much more after commissioning, and have looked back on those works to reinforce my belief in and ability to explain why we're in this current fight. As Robert Kaplan puts it,
Especially in a time when most people question our foreign policy, the "serving to defend" argument fails to carry water. Instead, we've refashioned it as a "shaping foreign policy at the ground level" argument. We will be overseas, and not necessarily for the right reasons - but you can do more good and have more influence as a JO interacting with foreigners than as a desk jockey at some other institution.A frustrated warrior class, always kept in check by liberal-minded officers, is the sign of a healthy democracy.
Ultimately, though, these young minds full of mush still have to adapt to a Martial lifestyle - one that is often alien to folks imagining themselves in a suit behind a desk somewhere. When your friends and family are aghast at such an idea, it's a lot of inertia to overcome.
I have to say I'm disheartened at hearing about the strains the military places on families. I didn't fully appreciate it when I joined and while it wouldn't have changed my decision, it would have given me some pause.
Sir, my apologies; didn't mean to hijack your thread. I do want to respond to Rob, though.
Thank you. But only if they let me - I still gotta apply and pass OCS. . .
Certainly the money is an issue - it's the right place to start. Beyond that, I'm not sure I can solve the problem; maybe just further diagnose it. The problem lies in part in what my peers value - and what their parents value. My parents are exceedingly unhappy about my decision, and they aren't nearly as shallow as some were about the importance of "Ivy League" status or any of that. It's as if some parents (and it transfers to their kids) believe all that matters is status, as represented by money and "rank" on the social totem pole. Beyond the money, the military is no longer viewed by these people as honorable. The stereotype of homocidal neanderthal remains. The only way to break that cycle, obviously, is to prove it wrong by attracting more ambitious college grads.
So it's a self-perpetuating problem. The only way out of it I see is a national call to service - someone or something simply has to inspire certain kids in my generation to stop worrying only about instant gratification and serve the nation. I think Bush failed after 9/11 to do that. There was no call for America's best and brightest to put off their legal or I-banking ambitions and don a uniform. And at this point, I don't think anyone would listen to him. I am not sure what short of a new leader and a new national catastrophe would change that.
I know - I didn't really solve the problem, just explained it more. Oh, well.
Matt
"Give a good leader very little and he will succeed. Give a mediocrity a great deal and he will fail." - General George C. Marshall
Rob,
I know you've been in my professional neighborhood for a while and know what I do on a day to day basis. After over 400 new lieutenants over the last 10 months, I can safely say that the attitude won't change until the societal values change. I never would have thought to ask a senior branch-qualified captain the question "why" when given a specified task. Perhaps its a sign of me getting old. I actually called an LT "son" today in a derogatory manner. He's 7 years younger than me. I feel like I just turned into my father last night....
Example is better than precept.
I'm going back a long way!
Rob, I know I am going back a ways but I haven't had the time to sit down and respond on this issue.
1. Our “best and brightest” is a complicated group to deal with as well as define. First, with the movement in the educational system too many of those who are truly of this sort are being discouraged and hurt. There is a trend towards (forgive me) “goody-two-shoes” book smarts over actual academic excellence. It is hard to find a subject which has not been destroyed under the name of “progressive education. (Niel Postman the father of “progressive education” has written about this.) Our best and brightest are no longer our best and brightest. Their educations have predominantly been myopic and are lacking in depth. I do believe with incentives there would be no problem finding potential officers for positions more in logistics, communications and other technical areas. On the other hand I believe that there will be difficulty finding those with good, let alone exemplary, potential for infantry (and other front line jobs.) Too many of them have had pragmatism, creativity (not in an artistic sense), common sense, mental toughness, the ability to cope with moral ambiguity and most importantly “pride” beaten out of them. We have indoctrinated a generation (or 2+/-) of people that think they are the most important thing. We have taken “don't be a hero” which used to mean “don't get yourself killed for stupid silly reasons”, but it did not mean “don't be a hero, save yourself at all costs.” Also, the concept of working form the inside is gone. Kid's say they want to stop certain “things”, but they wouldn't dare work from the inside where you can normally make the most difference. I know I am ranting a little, or a lot, on this but I really think these are the issues. I just don't know if many people are left (or available) who can psychologically, intellectually and practically deal with the moral as well as real world stresses. Here is the question I have to bring up: Are those we are considering our “best and brightest” really our “best and brightest?”
2. College isn't what it used to be. Too many people are in college today who don't belong there. Degrees are becoming less and less meaning full. Bachelors and Graduate degrees are becoming more and more specialized. We have invented disciplines which are ridiculous. We have turned psychology into a farce. As much as there are many exemplary professors one only has to look at the writings by the staff at many so called “top” universities to see the decline over the last 50 years. It's been really bad the last 20 years. I'm tired of literarature professors talking about how Blake's “Tiger, Tiger” is all about G-d. Anyone who has studied Blake knows this isn't true. The private sector hires the top graduates out of Harvard's law and business schools and pays them 120k (or more) starting wage. The problem is they don't know much and aren't worth pocket change. We have MBA's running around thinking they actually know how to run a company.
- Incentives are a good and bad idea at the same time. While they may in fact get more officers we may not be getting them for the right reasons.
- I understand the difficulties socially for officers serving one tour after another. I understand how it is hard to go so long without companionship, but should so many young officers have families so early on in their career. Traditionally in the service (I'm going back at least 45-60 years), especially among the elite, for officers to refrain from marriage until their early 30's if not later was quite common. Normally, by this point those who were not to stay in the service would have been settled in a civilian job, while those still in the service would have achieved a pay grade better suited to supporting a family. I am not preaching this, but I am commenting this is one of the differences now vs. historically. It is less and less common to have 8-12, let alone more, years separating couples in age today.
- I think too many people on this site (from the military) are being too modest about their academic capabilities. Most students graduating from “Ivy League” institutions may be more polished (in certain very narrow areas) but I would not say that many of them are more intelligent, nor are most as knowledgeable. Whether or not you went to college I think that pretty much everyone I have encountered here wants to learn and is self starting. As the educational lingo says these days, “a life long learner.” I've always said that college can be a great learning experience but not necessarily beneficial to being well educated. A motivated person with basic academic skills (I should note that what I consider basic may be more lofty than what you would expect), or what a person should come out of high school with, merely needs a public library card and the will, determination and humility to surround oneself with those who are more knowledgeable than oneself to gain a first class education.
- SEE THE REST NEXT POST
Last edited by Adam L; 10-01-2007 at 06:46 AM.
Cuts will happen...
I am not holding my breath and when the axe falls on those budgets it usually cuts deep and fast...things like early retirements, no pay raises, no training funds, no repair parts...they're a commin' and probably not too far away either.
If the timing works out right the repubs can hope it happens under Obama or Hillary and shift all the blame to the Dems. Much like we heard during the early 90's under Bill Clinton with the draw downs initiated under Bush I. Of course, my pessimism is only couched by my sarcasm so who knows but like I tell the fellas in my office, "...all good things must come to an end", and this current boom in military spending will not be sustained indefinitely. If you're paying attention to the USAF, they are initiating another round of personnel cuts this year to make room for the impending budget cuts. However, for them it is a matter of having enough left over to pay for all the F-22s we will need for the next big air war.
PT
About the distance between the officer corps and professional classes, I have been ruminating on that for awhile. Not long ago I was on an airplane and happened to sit next to a wealthy businessman and a lawyer, both from New England. I took that time to chat about world affairs and offer them a perspective from the profession of arms.
Towards the end of the flight, the businessman asked me what sort of things officers study to be ready for war. I happened to have my copy of Roots of Strategy and showed him a few diagrams from Frederick the Great's "Instructions to his Generals", explaining how the principles of war used in those maneuvers are applicable today.
By discussing warfare at an intellectual level, I think I removed many Vietnam-era stereotypes that these men had accepted for forty years. I think we need to engage professionals at the same level that their professions engage them.
That said, I believe there are many barriers between the military and the professional classes, and one very large one is terminology. Why do we say "land navigation" instead of orienteering? The word navigation has a maritime connotation. Adding the word "land" does not change the connotation, it only makes the term sound as though it were created by someone with a small vocabulary. Why do we say "human terrain" instead of "demographics" or "anthropology" when both of these are established and esteemed disciplines? Do we discourage demographers, anthropologists, and other professionals from working with the military because we appear meddlesome, unwilling to respect the venerable terms used by the scholars of their discipline? Too often we invent new terms instead of consulting a thesaurus.
One of my friends argues that a profession must have terms which are used almost exclusively by that profession in order to be taken seriously. I agree. If I have to explain to someone what Clausewitz meant by tactics, I feel that I am acting as an ambassador of the profession of arms. If I have to explain that a VBIED is a car bomb or that a DFAC is a cafeteria or that HMMWV stands for High Mobility Multi-Wheeled Vehicle (a term which could arguably be applied to a bicycle); I cringe inside because these terms are esoteric for the sake of being esoteric.
What's more, many officers I know are not very good with spelling, grammar, nor oration. I have seen many slide shows with 2-3 misspellings per slide and a few officers who used the phrase "in terms of" as a crutch. We cannot give the impression of war as a thinking person's game unless we show the same level of literacy as other professions.
To that end, the Army needs to spend time in its basic courses on grammatical instruction and writing. From my personal experience, the average high school graduate can only discern a subject from a predicate. They do not know the parts of speech, cases, nor how to diagram a sentence. If the officer does not receive any more instruction in college (which many don't), then that is the level of ability we see after commissioning. This makes instruction in language very difficult. Some people have an aptitude for learning languages; they can just "pick it up". I learn best through comparing the grammars, as I think do many people, but they are handicapped by their insufficient instruction. I, personally, suffered in my studies because the course work was written for learners who understand the mechanics of speaking naturally and do not need to be explicitly told the rules and phonetics of the language to become conversational.
Commanders must also encourage professional development through reading classics. The Art of War is a very short book, yet I have immense trouble convincing my peers to spend an hour reading it. They expect the Army to train them in everything they need to know. What they really need to know is that the body of martial thought is larger than any set of field manuals.
In conclusion, the Army can improve its retention of officers by using three methods to raise the esteem of the officer corps in the eyes of the professional classes. Firstly, encourage professional development through reading from BOLC I to the end of an officer's career. This will allow officers to engage other professionals in discourse at the theoretical level. Secondly, ensure that officers have writing and speaking skills comparable to other professions in order to remove any prejudices other professionals may have against them as uneducated. Finally, offer language instruction that takes advantage of the officers' mastery of English syntax. Other professionals will view a bilingual person as more educated than an unilingual one. Taken together, these measures will show the professional classes that the officer corps is a good place for young, ambitious, college graduates who yearn for more initiative and adventure than they could ever have in the private sector.
Last edited by AdaptAndOvercome; 09-10-2007 at 02:06 AM. Reason: Typo
Adapt and Overcome,
I find your post interesting for a number of reasons. Given what I know about your background from your intro post, that you're going to get commissioned next year, and under the assumption that you are not prior service I have a few honest comments and observations. I say this, not to nit pick, but to enter into the honest and professional intellectual dialog that you infer is so lacking in the profession of arms.
I've seen and taught a lot of LTs this year (somewhere in the neighborhood of 450). Those with the most difficulty with their chosen profession have been those who can explain the strategic and operational level, but can't apply a basic battle drill or skill level one task, especially when under duress. There are varying levels of professional expertise. Certainly the new bank teller isn't an expert on the futures markets in Asia. Nor should the new officer in regards to the strategic application of applied kinetic diplomacy
I hope that I'm incorrectly reading into this that your assumption is that we don't. We do. Chances are you haven't been in the environment to witness or participate in it firsthand yet.
Terminology is a barrier within the profession of arms as well, mainly due to individual discipline and understanding of one's job. Ask your average logistics officer the differences between seize, contain, hold, secure, and isolate and you'll get as many different answers as you will people.
By definition, according to Webster's, orienteering is a sport. Navigation, as a transitive verb, is to make one's way over or through. As an intrasitive verb, it is to steer a course through a medium.
Consider the first paragraph of the five paragraph Operations Order (Enemy, terrain, weather, friendly forces). By describing socio-demographics as terrain the factors of OAKOC can be applied. For instance, how can the civilian populace be an obstacle, how can they be "key terrain," what benefits to they afford in terms of observation (reconnaissance), how can they affect mobility corridors and avenues of approach etc....?
Take a look at the staff at SSI, CALL, SAMS, The Army War College, and any number of professional education establishments around.
It's actually High Mobility Multi-Purpose Wheeled Vehicle (ref. Army Technical Manual TM 9-2320-280-10)
Let me invoke my right to free speach on this one, since it's a call to change the program of instruction within my area of expertise.
Here's the bottom line; if you get this far through life with a mean age of around 22 for a brand new LT, do you really think that the schoolhouse is going to be able to undo in 85 days what you were deficient in receiving your first 22 years of life? There are a lot of things I can teach. I can teach actions on contact. I can teach platoon tactical tasks, fundamentals of maneuver, battle drills, and reporting procedures. I cannot do three things; I cannot teach character, I cannot bestow upon someone drive and initiative, and I cannot undo what your previous educators, friends, parents, or guardians failed to do.
Two things on this.
1. The CSA has a reading list broken down level of experience/responsibility. It's available at AAFES and here.
2. I'll tell you the same thing I told Fred Kaplan last month. As a Commander, I was much more concerned about whether my guys could secure a ground convoy than whether they could recite all 14 Chapters of Sun Tzu's Art of War.
I wasn't under the impression that we were held in low esteem. In fact, I'm tired of getting phone calls of people outside the Army trying to hire me.
You come into this profession with a lot of preconcieved notions that may or may not pan out for you. Try not to get so myopic on that which the military is not. Make the most of what you have in front of you. After all, you're at the start line of a marathon.
Last edited by RTK; 09-10-2007 at 02:36 AM. Reason: CSA Reading List link
Example is better than precept.
"I find your post interesting for a number of reasons. Given what I know about your background from your intro post, that you're going to get commissioned next year, and under the assumption that you are not prior service I have a few honest comments and observations. I say this, not to nit pick, but to enter into the honest and professional intellectual dialog that you infer is so lacking in the profession of arms."
I am beginning to regret having made an introduction. One of the most enlightening posters here is marct who is an anthropologist. This site is so didactic because people from all different backgrounds contribute their diverse viewpoints. Before coming here, I would never have consulted an anthropologist for insights into counterinsurgency. Now, my horizons are much wider. I believe that the central theme of small wars is that in strength there is weakness; and in weakness there is strength. In the same way, every poster here has something worth saying no matter where he is from.
"I've seen and taught a lot of LTs this year (somewhere in the neighborhood of 450). Those with the most difficulty with their chosen profession have been those who can explain the strategic and operational level, but can't apply a basic battle drill or skill level one task, especially when under duress. There are varying levels of professional expertise. Certainly the new bank teller isn't an expert on the futures markets in Asia. Nor should the new officer in regards to the strategic application of applied kinetic diplomacy"
I don't think one proficiency excludes another. Anyone who can not perform basic tasks needs to be remediated, but I hope the people who are the best at basic tasks can also understand higher levels of war. As we said before, the promotion rate is so high that most lieutenants will become lieutenant colonels if they stay with the Army.
"I hope that I'm incorrectly reading into this that your assumption is that we don't. We do. Chances are you haven't been in the environment to witness or participate in it firsthand yet."
You are reading that the way I meant it. My experience is in the Northeast. Few people know much about the military, and the most professionally educated people often have the dimmest view. I would like to hear how we have been promoting our profession to those people if you'd like to share.
"Consider the first paragraph of the five paragraph Operations Order (Enemy, terrain, weather, friendly forces). By describing socio-demographics as terrain the factors of OAKOC can be applied. For instance, how can the civilian populace be an obstacle, how can they be "key terrain," what benefits to they afford in terms of observation (reconnaissance), how can they affect mobility corridors and avenues of approach etc....?"
This is problematic because we are defining the environment based on our standard operating procedures instead of the other way around. Why can't we change OAKOC or say that OAKOC can analyze demographics as well?
"Do we discourage demographers, anthropologists, and other professionals from working with the military because we appear meddlesome, unwilling to respect the venerable terms used by the scholars of their discipline?"
It was simply a suggestion for something we should investigate. Many people who teach at those institutions were in the military or have strong ties through family. What of everyone else?
"It's actually High Mobility Multi-Purpose Wheeled Vehicle (ref. Army Technical Manual TM 9-2320-280-10)"
That's a strike against me for not checking that fact. Still, the term is very vague.
"I cannot undo what your previous educators, friends, parents, or guardians failed to do."
I was thinking more along the lines of BOLC I and Captain's Career Course doing this. I know time is short when they get to you.
"The CSA has a reading list broken down level of experience/responsibility."
It's a good list, but it needs more promotion. We need to work together to make sure that all officers continue their learning.
"As a Commander, I was much more concerned about whether my guys could secure a ground convoy than whether they could recite all 14 Chapters of Sun Tzu's Art of War."
Reading military classics is not about recitation; it's about learning a way of thinking. I have put my faith in the writings of great generals because there is a consistent thread across time, place, and culture. Sun Tzu (whether he was one author or many) put it most succinctly, so I encourage that as a starting point.
"I wasn't under the impression that we were held in low esteem. In fact, I'm tired of getting phone calls of people outside the Army trying to hire me."
Army officers do get a lot of very attractive job offers, but I still assert that the profession of arms is held in very low esteem in some quarters, notably New England. Since part of this discussion was about recruiting at Ivy League universities, I thought it was worth mentioning my discussion with the two men from the Northeast. Take a trip to Boston some time. It's a nice city, and I think you'll see what I mean.
"You come into this profession with a lot of preconcieved notions that may or may not pan out for you. Try not to get so myopic on that which the military is not. Make the most of what you have in front of you."
I've got a computer in front of me, and I think becoming a contributor to this site is the best thing I've done professionally in a long time.
Thanks to everyone for your time and responses.
Let's be honest, your intro was thin gruel at best. So far your experiences are yours alone. You're going to have to overcome this feeling of inadequacy considering you'll be taking a platoon within the next two years full of junior enlisted soldiers and NCOs with 2 or 3 combat tours under their belt. You have to start somewhere.
They don't necessarily exclude another, but a book worm who can rattle off the 9 Principles of War who can't make a decision under fire is a problem. They may make LTC, but it doesn't mean they'll command anything. Making LTC isn't an automatic ticket to the command slate.
I spoke at a business conference on commuities of practice at Harvard about a year and a half ago about COIN principles and how they relate to the workplace. But, recall that we're an Army at War. The onus isn't on us to educate the masses. We live in a democracy and a volunteer Army at War. We have enough things to do right now than worry if Joe Shmedlap at Brown University understands what we're doing. The point is that our professional discussions, professional journals, and professional seminar process exists, is viable, and useful to our trade.
Because we've been conducting operations with a standardized format for over 50 years with a military education system that has been teaching the same standardized formats for just as long. Are you suggesting we change exisiting SOPs that have been in place for over some 50 years to adapt to society?
You seem to have answers for everything, an attitude that may not serve you well in the future. Good luck to you.
Last edited by RTK; 09-10-2007 at 10:34 AM.
Example is better than precept.
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"A Sherman can give you a very nice... edge."- Oddball,
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