Officer Retention

[Jones_RE]

Our available resources are going to have to determine the national strategy and not the other way around.

Personally, I think we're better off with an Army that is shorthanded but populated by motivated, high quality individuals than an Army that fills all of the slots on its org chart by watering down its most important officer and NCO slots.

If I remember correctly, my grandfather (who was enlisted Army) served for a time in Vietnam as an officer. If the shortage of captains is that critical, we're probably better off promoting smart NCOs whether permanently or on a temporary basis than we are trying to keep the bottom 10% of the school trained officers.

[Cavguy]

Our available resources are going to have to determine the national strategy and not the other way around.

Personally, I think we're better off with an Army that is shorthanded but populated by motivated, high quality individuals than an Army that fills all of the slots on its org chart by watering down its most important officer and NCO slots.

If I remember correctly, my grandfather (who was enlisted Army) served for a time in Vietnam as an officer. If the shortage of captains is that critical, we're probably better off promoting smart NCOs whether permanently or on a temporary basis than we are trying to keep the bottom 10% of the school trained officers.

You're assuming those getting out are the bottom 10%. I'd say there's an even distribution across - some of the best LT's (now CPTs) in my BN bailed out, a few of the ok, and some of the bad.

Categorizing all those who leave as the bottom 10% seriously misreads the situation. Our bigger worry is only the bottom 10% stay . Promoting from the ranks is an option.

Also to Ken's earlier - we're having heavy attrition in the E-5/E-6 arena as well, but we're throwing massive re-up money at them, which is holding them in. Shoot, we pay $40k now to first term enlistees.

[Ken White]

jealous of them and that, you're quite wrong. I was, at the time quite happy with my $360.00 reenlistment bonuses for each burst of six years. Did I mention that I was really quite happy. Did I mention they were 360 lousy dollars? That's 360, no string of obscene zeros , just 3.6..0 pathetic little dollars. No sirree, not at all envious. Nope.



On a serious note, more power to 'em and I'm happy for 'em on the Re-up bonus side; less thrilled with the initial entry bonus but hopefully that won't do too much damage or last too long. My son's last tour was as a 1SG and he had a good retention rate even before the bonuses went as high as they are today -- his big concern was the impact on families. That was a ball buster during Viet Nam for Officers and NCOs. Divorces and debts went through the roof and I'm sure it's equally bad today...

Veet Nam screwed up the Army big time. Lot of guys got out earlier than they'd planned, I figure the Army was fairly good until they lost their way over there and I'd stick around until it got back on its feet, did that, never regretted staying.

There were a few times in the early 70s when I questioned my sanity, though...

I think it's very much an individual preference and tolerance thing and the preference and tolerance of the wife in question if there is one have a big impact.

I do not question the turmoil and trauma caused -- and I don't like it any more than anyone else -- I'm merely saying that, no platitude, no jibe -- this too will pass. We've been there before; that doesn't make it one bit easier to take right now and I know that but I do believe that those that want to go deserve all the thanks in the world and good wishes; those that decide to stay get the good wishes -- and a tougher job.

What's that old saw; "They told me to cheer up, things could be worse." "So I cheered up and sure enough, things got worse..."

Illegitimi non carborundum...

[Eden]

Good lord, I feel old, posting this, but here goes:

When I commanded a battalion, I took an hour each to counsel my lieutenants and captains each time I rated them. This is what I had been taught to do, and I felt this was the minimum effort I could put forth. My first go 'round, I was stunned to learn that probably 75% of them had never been counseled, and most of the rest had had pro forma sessions at best. Even the ones I raked over the coals were pathetically grateful to get some kind of feedback.

My own experience as a Lieutenant Colonel was disillusioning. In four years, two of which I spent as a battalion commander, I received maybe thirty minutes of counseling from my senior raters. I don't mean just formal counseling, I mean total one-on-one feedback. One senior rater saw me for the first and only time when I came in to sign my efficiency report. My two-star senior rater, having just effectively spiked my career, spent almost three minutes telling me what a great command team my wife and I had been before hustling me out of the office.

Now, I'm not just venting my spleen. My point is that when deployments are long, pay and benefits are so-so, and the work is back-breakingly hard, what is it that keeps people in? I would say two things: a sense that the mission is overwhelmingly important, and the ties of camraderie. I personally lost that a few years back and got out five years before I had to.

As a senior officer with no chance for promotion and no opportunity to go back to troops, I foresaw two or three tours on staffs in my future. Not the Army I signed up to serve in. My senior leaders appreared disinterested in me, so how could what I was doing be important? I therefore resolved to do one last tour in Afghanistan and get out.

The young captains I led were in the same predicament. They were told they were the backbone of the officer corps, but their leaders never invested a great deal of time in developing them; even those who didn't particularly need it felt the lack. They were constantly told they were trusted, but they couldn't run a range without an overweight civilian watching every move. They were told to develop soldiers with initiative, but had to personally sign off on risk assessments every time a soldier took a three-day pass. As a result of all this they discounted what leadership told them about their future prospects and never really felt that they were - as they are - the vital future of the Army.

Developments over the last twenty years have also led to a loss of that sense of mission that keeps people in despite all the hardships. We have created so many programs - for alcohol dependency, abuse, finances, etc - that leaders no longer solve soldier's problems, they just refer them somewhere. We have created a sense of entitlement among soldiers that didn't exist in the past, and this erodes any sense that what I am doing, what my unit is doing, is more important than any personal problems I may have. I suspect that Iraq and Afghanistan and the War on Terror have renewed that sense of mission in a certain slice of the Armed Forces, and may be keeping as many in as they are driving out.

What can we do? I don't know what we can do in the officer corps, but I do have two suggestions for the NCO corps, where I think the problems are similar. First, I would eliminate all Sergeant Major positions above brigade level. Why we take our finest NCOs and turn them into glorified personnel clerks is beyond me; keep these guys with soldiers where they can motivate and inspire and teach, which is what they do best. Give them merit pay and raises for seniority by all means, but get them back where they can actually contribute. Secondly, imitate the British Army's Late Entry Commission program, where senior NCOs - maybe a little long in the tooth for humping rucksacks or changing track - are made captains and majors and assigned to training, recruiting, and other slots where we are hurting for captains and majors. This would alleviate the shortage of officers while giving these guys a chance to make a greater contribution than they do as the G-5 Staff Sergeant Major.

[CR6]

the majority of those who are leaving are those who are better (and in some cases, best) suited to leading the Army now and into the future.

Norfolk,

We haven't interacted on these boards, but I read what you post with interest and appreciate your analysis and understanding of history. That said, what is the substantive basis for your statement quoted above? Most every officer I know has anecdoteal stories about good guys who left the service for various reasons, but I don't know of any quantitative analysis (if it were even possible to do one) that shows the majority leaving the Army are the better leaders. Is this based off an analysis of the level of combat experience held by these officers vice their peers? Leadership positions held? A comparrison of ACOM OERs to COM OERs? If it's an assumption, what are the facts upon which it is based? That only the duds with no options will stick around? (True in my case, but let's not sell the rest of the US officer corps short!)

[Norfolk]

Norfolk,

We haven't interacted on these boards, but I read what you post with interest and appreciate your analysis and understanding of history. That said, what is the substantive basis for your statement quoted above? Most every officer I know has anecdoteal stories about good guys who left the service for various reasons, but I don't know of any quantitative analysis (if it were even possible to do one) that shows the majority leaving the Army are the better leaders. Is this based off an analysis of the level of combat experience held by these officers vice their peers? Leadership positions held? A comparrison of ACOM OERs to COM OERs? If it's an assumption, what are the facts upon which it is based? That only the duds with no options will stick around? (True in my case, but let's not sell the rest of the US officer corps short!)

Hello CR6,


First off, I intended no offence to anyone, and I apologize for causing any.

Admittedly I don't have a formal study sitting in front of me stating that X-number/percentage of such-and such rated officers have taken their leave of the Army. But I have seen the official figures posted on these boards of junior officer classes who have taken their releases - the latest and most startling being that of the class of 2002 in which 57% of the Army's officers who entered that year have taken their releases. Undoubtedy that will include a good many of the best. It will be itnersting to see what the retention and release figures for the class of 2003 will be.

I have also listened to the statements made by other serving officers here on these boards, from Cavguy to Rob Thornton to 120 mm, et al. about not only how so many of the good one's they've seen go, but also how they've struggled with the decision to leave or stay while seeing their peers or subordinates go. That, and having witnessed what happened to the Canadian Army under many of the same stresses back in the 1990's, and I think a fairly decent picture of what is happening to the junior and future senior leadership of the U.S. Army is starting to take form. We are unlikely to get a formal report from the U.S. Army explicitly stating that it has lost either a significant proportion or even the bulk of its best young officers. But something much more substantial than just a bunch of horror stories about officer retention is going on.

[CR6]

I intended no offence to anyone, and I apologize for causing any.

None taken. You come across as a consumate pro.

Admittedly I don't have a formal study sitting in front of me stating that X-number/percentage of such-and such rated officers have taken their leave of the Army. But I have seen the official figures posted on these boards of junior officer classes who have taken their releases - the latest and most startling being that of the class of 2002 in which 57% of the Army's officers who entered that year have taken their releases. Undoubtedy that will include a good many of the best. It will be itnersting to see what the retention and release figures for the class of 2003 will be.

We are unlikely to get a formal report from the U.S. Army explicitly stating that it has lost either a significant proportion or even the bulk of its best young officers. But something much more substantial than just a bunch of horror stories about officer retention is going on.

This links to a JAN 2007 GAO report on officer accesions and retention. Without addressing the "quality" issue, there are some interesting stats on overall retention in various Fiscal Years by various year groups. Some precipitous spikes in departures, but overall decent retention by commissioning source overall. Very interesting to see the similarities in FY 2001 and FY 2005 on page 31.

[Norfolk]

Thank-you for your patience with me, CR6, and again I am sorry for my thoughtless and careless words; no insult was intended to the Officer Corps of the U.S. Army, but having reflected on my previous statements, it is clear that I went too far. I beg the pardon of all whom I have offended.

The GAO statement that you have provided, CR6, is good enough for me.
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As I am reposting the (unoffensive) part of a previous post, as I am hoping that the offensive post will be deleted shortly:

jcustis' post is excellent, even outstanding - and why indeed don't the Armed Forces (throughout the English-speaking world) commission more from the ranks? As Patton himself said, it takes 10 years for an officer to begin earning his pay. There is a good case to be made for taking talented and experienced sergeants and offering them commissions. And in addition to their mastery of their craft, there is, as jcustis said, the likelihood that these guys are in for the long haul. And that's because they are more likely to view the military as a calling, a vocation, or a profession, rather than as a career - careers can change, but a calling is rather more resilient.

Quote:
Originally Posted by Cavguy
You're assuming those getting out are the bottom 10%. I'd say there's an even distribution across - some of the best LT's (now CPTs) in my BN bailed out, a few of the ok, and some of the bad.

Categorizing all those who leave as the bottom 10% seriously misreads the situation. Our bigger worry is only the bottom 10% stay . Promoting from the ranks is an option.

Also to Ken's earlier - we're having heavy attrition in the E-5/E-6 arena as well, but we're throwing massive re-up money at them, which is holding them in. Shoot, we pay $40k now to first term enlistees.

During the 1990's, the Canadian Armed Forces, and especially the "Army", suffered the almost wholesale loss of its best and most experienced officers and NCOs - not to mention ordinary soldiers. This was partly due to "Peace Dividend" reductions, partly due to massive over-committment to overseas "Peacekeeping" missions that virtually burned the Army out, and partly due to the Department of National Defences policies of conducting "purges" (that was indeed the actual word used in a few statements by DND officials) of those elements within the military who most felt that it was a calling, not just a career - because those elements were most definitely not PC.

By 1995, there was not a single officer left who had experience manoeuvring a Brigade, let alone a Division, and shortly afterwards even the experience of Battalion manoeuvre was something that only a few of the older senior officers could claim - and none of the younger field-grades. I read some CF College papers these days, some of them calling for capabilities that we still had back in the early 90's, and these guys are writing as if the CF never had them in the first place. The younger Captains and Majors, who were not in and never new the "old" Army prior to the mid-1990's, have little idea of what there was before their time, because most of those who knew are long gone. Standards throughout the Army, and especially the Infantry Corps, suffered a precipitous decline, right from the individual-level on up to Company-level, which formed the upper-limit of training in the Army. The Armed Forces as a whole suffered a loss of public esteem from which they have never fully recovered, and recruiting standards have been lowered to the point where as long as you are not disabled, physically or mentally, and possess Canadian citizenship, you pretty much are guaranteed acceptance - and you need no personal references either.

And this goes to Cavguy's point. It isn't just, or even mostly, those that the U.S. Army can best do without who are leaving; [Note: the following part is edited] quite a few of those who are leaving are those who are better (and in some cases, best) suited to leading the Army now and into the future. At present, there is a dearth, becoming serious now, of officers who have actual experience manoeuvring Brigades and Divisions, and even Battalions. Once Major-Unit and Formation-level Combined Arms practical know-how is lost or seriously degraded, it's hard to get it back. The Canadians, for example, for the last few years have been engagaed in the arduous task of trying to relearn and remaster Combined-Arms at Battalion-level, with some attempts at Brigade-level; Division-level is not going to happen, but needs to.

The U.S. Army, by a combination of operational over-committment (unavoidable of course) to Iraq and Afghanistan, and the concomittant loss of the [Note: Edited] a significant part of its younger, better officers (amongst others), is at increasingly serious risk of a talent gap not only at subaltern-level, but most especialy at field-grade and flag officer level - where they can do the most good if they were to make it that far.

Edit Note: This part was just so people don't wonder what happened to an older post.

[Ken White]

...
This links to a JAN 2007 GAO report on officer accesions and retention. Without addressing the "quality" issue, there are some interesting stats on overall retention in various Fiscal Years by various year groups. Some precipitous spikes in departures, but overall decent retention by commissioning source overall. Very interesting to see the similarities in FY 2001 and FY 2005 on page 31.

was that the much hyped loss of Captains is there but is not nearly as far out of the norms as the noise would lead one to bleieve.

Even more interesting is the fact that equally loud screaming about Majors is apparently true -- but doesn't affect the combat arms, other than FA much at all -- the losses are in the CS and particularly the CSS arena.

Since I've long contended that our Log tail is way, way too big, I can live with that...

Nor does the report address the ideal number of Officers overall in relation to the total force; if it did, I suspect they might infer that our reliance on significant Officer over staffing across the board to meet a potential mobilization goal might be better modified and that goal achieved in other ways.

World War II in northern Europe is still defining the US Army...

[jonSlack]

We are unlikely to get a formal report from the U.S. Army explicitly stating that it has lost either a significant proportion or even the bulk of its best young officers. But something much more substantial than just a bunch of horror stories about officer retention is going on.

I personally doubt that an analysis on staying and departing company grade officers based on an objective assessment of their performance is currently feasible due to problems with the OER system. The main problem, in my opinion, is "grade inflation" in junior officer OERs driven either by a fear of damning a junior officer with only "faint praise" or the inability of some Raters or Senior Raters to be the "bad guy" and give a poor evaluation to an officer who truly deserves one.

That being said, I do not know if there are any alternative systems that can truly remedy the current problems with the company grade officer OER system and which are free of similar or more serious problems of their own. Also, while I have not rated a junior commissioned officer, I can understand the difficulties some, if not many, Company Commanders have or would have in some how "ranking" their Platoon Leaders and XO if they all are accomplishing their assigned mission as well as properly caring for their Soldiers.

[Steve Blair]

OERs have been inflated pretty much since they began giving them. Same with EPRs. No one wants to consider the fact that doing one's job with a basic level of competence is AVERAGE performance. I think it has something to do with the compulsion to consider everyone special and therefore not average. It's a nasty cycle, and isn't fair to either the person doing average work or the person who's outperforming just about everyone in the unit. But I can't honestly see it changing much in the near future.

I tend to agree with Norfolk that the current exodus is worrying. It's happened before, and the institution survived it, but it also hamstrung development and progress for many years.

And Ken...I'd say that World War I is still defining the Army...which is even more depressing.

[wm]

OERs have been inflated pretty much since they began giving them. Same with EPRs. No one wants to consider the fact that doing one's job with a basic level of competence is AVERAGE performance. I think it has something to do with the compulsion to consider everyone special and therefore not average. It's a nasty cycle, and isn't fair to either the person doing average work or the person who's outperforming just about everyone in the unit. But I can't honestly see it changing much in the near future.

(

The problem with, at least the Army's, performance evaluations is that the person being evaluated is judged for performance in a specific, local position but is measured against a global population. We need to get over that hurdle. I doubt anyone has ever seen a rater or senior rater write "This officer did an average job in this position, but then even the best officer in the force would not have done much better." That is the issue to overcome in evaluation reporting IMHO.

[Shek]

That being said, I do not know if there are any alternative systems that can truly remedy the current problems with the company grade officer OER system and which are free of similar or more serious problems of their own. Also, while I have not rated a junior commissioned officer, I can understand the difficulties some, if not many, Company Commanders have or would have in some how "ranking" their Platoon Leaders and XO if they all are accomplishing their assigned mission as well as properly caring for their Soldiers.

Jon,

I didn't find rating platoon leaders that difficult and it was amazing to see the separation that developed between them in terms of performance. The top and bottom ones clearly distinguished themselves, and it was clear who had the potential as they moved along.

For example, I had one 2LT who made more than his share of 2LT mistakes, and so I thought he was a below center of mass performer at the time. However, he clearly had the intelligence and ability to think and just needed some time to develop his leadership skills, and I got him a platoon sergeant who was the right fit to build his confidence and leadership skills. On the other hand, I had a platoon leader who was very strong tactically and was a marginal above center of mass performer (that seems like a contradiction in terms ). Yet, he lacked initiative and as such, seemed like someone who had the talent to excel beyond company command but would probably peak at company command.

While this is anecdotal, of my top four lieutenants, three of them got out once they had completed their initial service obligation.

[sandbag]

I didn't find rating platoon leaders that difficult and it was amazing to see the separation that developed between them in terms of performance. The top and bottom ones clearly distinguished themselves, and it was clear who had the potential as they moved along.

Agreed. It wasn't too hard to do as a commander, and I suspect it's much easier now that blocking's eliminated. I had six lieutenants. They stratified themselves on their own, and only some senior rater interference (my battalion commander was enamored with one of my poorer performers) kept things from being as they should be. Only two remain in the Army now. I really think that retention starts at the lower echelons; if we put as much work into keeping our young officers as we did first-term enlistees, we'd be good to go.

[Steve Blair]

Our available resources are going to have to determine the national strategy and not the other way around.

Except that this has never been the case...

During the Indian Wars there were periods where the Army as a whole was not paid for almost a year because Congress failed to pass the proper military appropriations. No supplemental spending bills in those days. Even when pay was flowing, it often didn't arrive for four-five months. The whole Army at that time was the size of a large division (say 20k tops...including officers and EM), and it was tasked with securing the entire Western US. They had some bonuses for EM back then....an extra dollar a month if they reenlisted (which made base pay a whole $14 per month...less charges for clothing, the laundress, and any sutler's bills). But on the whole it was a damned good army...good enough to serve as the bedrock for the force that was sent to the Philippines and later World War I.

We've never done a good job with matching strategies with resources. But we always seem to discover that those resources go a lot further than we thought they would.

[jcustis]

Those that want more stability, family time or coins and less hassle will leave -- as they should. I think we should all wish them well. The masochists will stay and do their best and life will go on, the system will adapt and survive. We should also all wish those that stay well.

This is a re-tread statement from what I think I said earlier in the thread, but this is exactly why someone needs to expend more energy to figure out why people stay...not necessarily why people leave.

Categorizing all those who leave as the bottom 10% seriously misreads the situation. Our bigger worry is only the bottom 10% stay . Promoting from the ranks is an option.

Also to Ken's earlier - we're having heavy attrition in the E-5/E-6 arena as well, but we're throwing massive re-up money at them, which is holding them in. Shoot, we pay $40k now to first term enlistees.

CG, that is by far one of the sharpest points I think anyone has made on this board. So simple, yet it's been right in front of our faces for far too long. I know of tons of sharp young men who would, following the exact same MOS and follow-on career training that all infantry officers receive, make a damn fine platoon commander and company commander down the road. Controlling close air support is about as difficult a task out there across the specturm of small-unit tatical combat operations, and if hard-charging enlisted men can be trained as ETACs/JTACs, then the capability to promote from the "other ranks" is there...we just apply the resources to develop that capability.

When you get an enlisted guy, who has some time in service under his belt that pushes him over the 10+ yr mark by the time he is a captain, I think you'd be more likely to find a guy who desires to stay until he hits at least the twenty mark. I could be in left field on that, but that's my hunch.

This business of retention and initial accessions is an odd one. On the one hand (in my former capacity as a site admin at MarineOCS.com) I would see quite a few young people with interest in the various officer commissioning programs that the Corps has to offer. I don't understand why the Marine Corps is currently offering loan repayment as some sort of incentive to get these college-age kids on board. Maybe the actual numbers of interested folk aren't high enough, but that doesn't square with rumblings that lieutenants are going to start being billeted 12 to a suite at O'Bannon Hall (new construction, extra student companies, etc. ?) for the near future, and that throughput out of The Basic School is somewhat backed up, with commisioned officers hanging on the timeline for when they can actually get to TBS and start training.

I will say this one last thing and then get off of my box. It applies to enlisted retention and bears some relationship to what Ken said about wishing them well.

As a company commander, I had my head up my ass about enlisted career retention until I had the unit career retention specialist sit down with me and give me a class on bonuses, lateral moves, the whole nine yards. I became smarter, but I still wasn't efficient until I took off the "well look what staying in the Marine Corps can do for you" cape and started to just talk with each Marine, on more of a man-to-man basis. I also did more listening in the process, and let them addres their reasons and thought process as they saw it.

I'd get a lot of the "well, my uncle is a manager at this plant, and he says I can get a job there while I start school." At that point I could have tuned out the rest of what he was saying, considering I could have simply assumed he had a job already locked in. Instead I would probe and ask some fairly pointed questions, like whether they had submitted an application for the upcoming school year at the local community college, or if they knew how to start using their MGIB benefits. Even with a mandatory separations/transition class, I was routinely shocked b just how many of these Marines really had no idea how to get onto civvy street and not just survive, but thrive.

I'd offer resume-proofing assistance, mock job interview assistance, etc. as we continued the discussion, because I wanted them to succeed regardless of their long-term career choice. It was disappointing that many of them told me they were interested in doing some extra work on their stuff, but the motivation eventually faded away.

The point to all this is that enlisted and officer accessions (and retention to some degree) are like renewable energy in a way, but we have to pay close attention to how we are replenishing the resource. If Joe Marine leaves the Corps, gets married and starts a family within a year of separating, we either have the potential to reap what we sow in 18-20 years, or that veteran Marine will not serve as the foundation for his children to take an interest in military service (it doesn't have to be the Marine Corps). Even with the bad apples, their children won't necessarily be bad apples, so I think there needs to be some outreach in that realm as well. One of the most rewarding phone calls I've ever received came from one of my 10% "####birds" that I had to kcik out of the Corps for drugs and other violations. He had been a good Marine during the invasion, had worked hard during his first 3 years, then sort of took a nose-dive. He had called just to tell me that he thought my taking the time to talk to him on the eve of his departure straightened him out a bit, and he realized the opportunity lost but didn't blame the Marines for his problems. If I could capture that sentiment and bottle it, it would make for a great "get your life straight" elixir.

[Ken White]

"This is a re-tread statement from what I think I said earlier in the thread, but this is exactly why someone needs to expend more energy to figure out why people stay...not necessarily why people leave."

True. As he said earlier, we know and understand why they leave and we sort of understand why some stay (for various reasons depending on how well we know the individual or his or her situation). What we don't have a handle on is the broad 'why.'

I think that applies as a matter of need to both Officers and to Peons...

Speaking of Peons and harking to their elevation to commissioned status, here are some random thoughts:

Why do Platoon leaders need to be commissioned -- I understand the training (of them) aspect but that isn't the vital thing many imagine, there have been many who skipped that step for one reason or another. Seems to me to be somewhat of a waste of an expensively trained officer.

Why do over man most Staffs other than to meet the archaic requirements of the bureaucratic staffing guides.

Why can't we pay a guy or gal extra money for doing a good job instead of having to promote them in rank?

Do we have too many ranks? Both Officer and enlisted. Shouldn't the number of ranks in both categories be based on level required by echelons of employment. For NCOs, Individual troop / Team / Squad / Platoon /Company / Higher -- that's five or six ranks, not nine. For Officers, Company / Battalion / Brigade-Regt / Higher; that's four to six, not ten or eleven.

How smart is up or out?

A look at all those items quickly tells us that a personnel system designed to easily 'manage' large numbers of people and provide 'incentives' to enter and stay may not be what we really need...

Goes back to J Custis; Why do they stay?

[Ski]

Custis - good story will follow up with one of mine own I think may be valuable.

Had three E4's in my tank platoon in the California Guard in the mid-90's. All three had been in the AC, all three were still in their twenties and wanted to stay in the Guard. We had an opportunity to get some people into the State OCS program and these were the three guys I thought had the capability to become officers. One had come out of
2ID, one had come out of 3rd ACR, and the last had been a 1CD Desert Storm vet.

I sat all three of them down at the same time, told them that they had the opportunity to go to OCS if they wanted. I told them they were the three best enlisted soldiers in the platoon, and they showed me and the Company Commander enough promise that OCS was an option. I told them that either way, I think you will all be superb NCO's if you don't want to get involved in the OCS program.

One guy went into the program, he's now a Company Commander. The two other guys left the company within 18 months to transfer into MOS's they wanted to work in - one went Aviation and the other went to a MP Company. All three of them, however, told me that I was the first officer who ever gave a crap about their career, and tried to make them better. I think if you sit down with people, regardless of rank, and show interest in their lives and careers, you can get a lot out of them. It sounds simple but I don't think it happens as much as I would like.

[selil]

Why do Platoon leaders need to be commissioned -- I understand the training (of them) aspect but that isn't the vital thing many imagine, there have been many who skipped that step for one reason or another. Seems to me to be somewhat of a waste of an expensively trained officer.

Didn't we have this discussion way back when like during the strategic corporal thread, or maybe the platoon discussion? I'm not sure if it was via pm or a post but somebody mentioned or linked to something that said the officer at the platoon level is relatively new. Sorry I'm being vague but search returned to much to look through.