Officer Retention

[Cavguy]

Joe Galloway on the editorial page yesterday:

http://www.sltrib.com/Opinion/ci_7217865

The Army reportedly has a shortage of 3,000 captains and majors this year, and recently began offering them bonuses of up to $35,000 if they'd agree to remain on duty for an additional three years. The shortage was forecast to rise to 6,000 by 2010 as the Army tries to grow by 65,000.

Even with the offer of the cash bonus or free graduate school or their choice of assignments, the exodus of young officers continues to grow at a pace that worries commanders. The U.S. Military Academy at West Point was founded to educate career officers for the Army, and upon graduation each officer owes Uncle Sam five years on active duty. The hope is that most will remain for a full career, and historically just 28.8 percent have opted out after five years.

A total of 35 percent of the West Point Class of 2000 left the Army in 2005; 46 percent of the Class of 2001 left in 2006, and a staggering 58 percent of the Class of 2002 left active duty when their obligation expired this year. (emphasis mine)

Joe Galloway has been spot on throughout this mess since 2003. A tremendous reporter who has great love for the Army and soldiers.

[Rob Thornton]

Joe Galloway has been spot on throughout this mess since 2003. A tremendous reporter who has great love for the Army and soldiers.

You know - he (Joe Galloway) also seems to have allot of relationships inside that provide context to the problem. I often worry that the way we collect and analyze content leads to latency (over analyzing and the need to look for silver linings as a mitigation strategy) in making decisions - the effect becomes a solution that was valid for a problem as it may have existed 6 months to a year ago, but now has festered and grown to a point where the proposed solution is a akin to a city's problem of completing a new 4 lane hwy for traffic that has grown to require 8 lanes - you never get in front of the problem that way.

We are great at getting the tactical initiative - but often suffer at the higher echelon - in this case where it alls for adapting the HR bureacarcy to the challenges it faces now and forward, vs. the problem as it existed in the past.

Hard work - but it has to be done.
Best, Rob

[jcustis]

Just got this snippet from an AAR of a recent SNCO selection board. It would appear that the Corps has started to turn the ship on the significance of MiTT folks:

4. Although not a precept for this board (and, of note, combat deployment was not addressed in the precepts, but rather: “bloom where you are planted” was), Marines who had served or are currently serving in these billets should be considered "highly qualified" for promotion and get top consideration for selection, as our national strategy and success in Iraq and Afghanistan literally depend on their success.

I do not know if the officer selection boards are applying the same rules of thumb, but there is hope.

[Ski]

We're on the same page.

Even if ARNG and USAR units were activated for the duration, you'd see recruiting suffer. The AC would have to apply the same standards for their soldiers - you aren't leaving until we're done - and that's a non-starter for them.

For the first time, I am starting to get seriously concerned about the long term health of the entire Army - AC, ARNG and USAR. The next five years are going to be exceeding difficult to be a Reservist, especially a Guardsman.

If the center of gravity of the public is not willing to support a war it's not the publics fault. Even the most ardent supporters of the military and the politics in motion are questioning trillion dollar cost estimates and administration tactics like faux new conferences. Linking disparate political agendas may not be fair but I've never known a soldier to whine about fair.

In a democracy the civilian leadership is required to make a case for a war and in this instance the trust of that case is eroding under public scrutiny. Similarly if the often mistaken "all volunteer Army" is not up to the task of waging a war based solely on an all volunteer force then that is a failure of the senior Army leadership. Federalization of the Army National Guard is nothing more than back door conscription that will likely result in breaking the back of the USANG much like the Army is feeling the pain now if it isn't already to late.

Contrary to popular belief the Army and military in general is not the foreign legion. An all volunteer military has certain rights to vote with it's feet and if those volunteers are saying family life in generational length warfare is important than we have to honor that. If the only way to keep a standing military is stop-loss or forced recall then we have already reached conscription status. You can't use stop-loss and all volunteer as policies at the same time and have credibility as a senior military leader.

If I had to have crazy ideas I'd ask a few questions.

Is the war in Iraq more important than forward deployment of troops in foreign lands? If so, then pull troops from forward deployment and abandon those bases. If not, then you've started a path to cyclical withdrawl from Iraq.

Is the war in Iraq more important than the war in Afghanistan? If so, then withdraw from Afghanistan and if not you've made a choice.

This leads us to some interesting conclusions.

The Army is about defense as well as offensive capability. As a citizen I am concerned that the current civilian and military leadership is chewing up the ability to protect my homeland and has abrogated the defense of America to foreign lands. If the threat of terrorism is so great then force projection can only work so long until the adversary understands the rules. The inter-service rivalries aside the Air Force can not protect against border jumpers and terrorists.

The most critical asset for the military of any branch is the human resource. The public and treasury can only stand so many space age robot warrior toys for the military. Sooner or later somebody is going to have to stand on a chunk of ground and defend it for living breathing people. You want and must demand that the person protecting others be of the highest standards possible. Criminals, and idiots create orders of magnitude parasitic drag on high performance organizations. Where the public is annoyed with expenditure on toys and gadgets they are appalled at war crimes and criminal acts by soldiers. We will be haunted by the specter of Abu Gharib prisoner abuse and Blackwater cowboys for years.

In the cauldron of warfare those charged with keeping the rank and file clean will only stand for so much abuse and mis-management by general staff and civilian leaders. A soldiers life is hard by the nature of the job it is not a leaders right to make that life punitive because we promote idiots to their highest levels of incompetence.

As much as we may wish to promote action for the exigencies of the service we can not do that in generational length war. We can not enforce volunteerism. We can not expect military service to be the only service applicable to those willing to serve society. We can not expect those who show the brightest, greatest, and most love for their country to give up home and family. We can not rob from our reserves and create defacto conscription. We can hold our civilian leaders accountable to make real choices and not false presumptions. We can realize that generational length warfare in Iraq may mean abandoning Afghanistan. We may not like it but a dysfunctional Army shed of it's backbone ranks may mean an isolationist international political environment.

[Ski]

As for the West Pointers leaving:

The ripple effects in the Officer Corps are huge. I think there are roughly 900 graduates per class, so losing 540 out of a single year group is a terrific blow to an already crippled officer manning system. Now add on a loss of 414 out of 900 for the 01 class, and then 315 for the 00 class - you have massive gaps showing in the officer corps. I suspect the ROTC grads are in the same boat.

How are we going to improve retention? It's not just Captains, it's Majors and E7's and E8's as well.

[Patriot]

After recently talking with senior pers types I've come to the conclusion that the medicine offered, monetary incentives for officer retention, is ultimately bad medicine for this illness. How many officers on the fence have opted to remain on active duty due to incentives? How many officers who were going to stay took the incentive anyway? It's the bang for the buck idea. If the benefit is worth the cost then the incentive is valuable. But I would venture to say that we've spent an enormous amount of money not in retention but in a backdoor one time pay raise for a very select group of officers.

Currently, we're paying earily shippers one year's salary up front, re-enlisting Soldiers up to E6 generous in-theater bonuses, paying Captains a one-time$25-35k. We need a serious discussion within the military community on the active duty conpensation system. The shortage of officers will not remain with Captains. The shortage bubble that currently hangs over Captains will migrate to Majors and if we are not careful will once again review this problem in 3-5 years time and again throw a pile on money at the problem.

A more creative program for all members of the active military is essential so we do not create a population of haves and have nots but reward those deserving of higher compensation. Currently, we treat every Captain as deserving when in fact there are some who should not remain and in previous times would never have been promoted.

We do not need to create an officer corps of mediocre performers simply because they are breathing and wear two bars. Incentive pay for green-tabs, advanced education, combat experience, special deployment compensations, special skills, and performance can create the right incentives even with current levels of OPTEMPO.

Here's something to think about - if every eligible Captain received the one-time incentive pay (about 18k Captains x $30k (average incentive pay)) it would cost the Army $540,000,000. But the reality is we will not retain enough Captains with this program and it will cost us over $300,000,000. That's a lot of zeros for zero.

My bottom line - There is no relief in the near term (out to 5-7 years) for a shortage of officers. Recognizing this we need to also recognize that not every billet will be or should be filled, not everyone will get their desired assignment, the mission of supporting combat operations (pre, during, post) is the first mission of all services, and finally creativitiy and not simply the same old medicine is what we need for the future.

[wm]

Over time, as part of the “peace dividend" that resulted from the West “winning” the Cold War, the active component of U.S. Army has been about halved. What is amazing to this writer is that during the same period, the size of the globe has not gotten any smaller, the missions of the Army have not decreased, and the number of potential enemies to be engaged has probably increased. Once the US faced a monolithic major enemy in a fixed location (the Soviet Union in Europe), with the potential for also having to engage several smaller enemies. Now, the US faces the lreality of dealing with a stateless enemy of global scope (terrorism) as well as an even greater number of smaller potential enemies, many of which have greater military capabilities than ever.
The response to the dissolution of the evil empire has been, “do more with less.” As anyone who has any understanding of the real world knows, doing more with less is not possible. What ends up happening is the system breaks by being overtaxed. A system may be able to surge for a short period, but after that surge it can no longer perform at optimum levels. The American military on the ground is near its post-surge point. It is now like an engine that has been run past its RPM redline—If we do not back off soon, it will need a major overhaul that could take it out of competition for quite a while.

[Norfolk]

Over time, as part of the “peace dividend" that resulted from the West “winning” the Cold War, the active component of U.S. Army has been about halved. What is amazing to this writer is that during the same period, the size of the globe has not gotten any smaller, the missions of the Army have not decreased, and the number of potential enemies to be engaged has probably increased. Once the US faced a monolithic major enemy in a fixed location (the Soviet Union in Europe), with the potential for also having to engage several smaller enemies. Now, the US faces the lreality of dealing with a stateless enemy of global scope (terrorism) as well as an even greater number of smaller potential enemies, many of which have greater military capabilities than ever.
The response to the dissolution of the evil empire has been, “do more with less.” As anyone who has any understanding of the real world knows, doing more with less is not possible. What ends up happening is the system breaks by being overtaxed. A system may be able to surge for a short period, but after that surge it can no longer perform at optimum levels. The American military on the ground is near its post-surge point. It is now like an engine that has been run past its RPM redline—If we do not back off soon, it will need a major overhaul that could take it out of competition for quite a while.

And the worst of it is is that while all this has been going on, the good are being driven out (or just plain getting out), and the bad are being kept (who do you think is most likely to stay in for those "bonuses" anyway?).

And just to add to this, I have the bad feeling that when Iraq is more or less over, or at least the US committment there is dramatically reduced, the Armed Forces will see more cuts in the future. I have no evidence for this, just a suspicion that some folks will be looking for another "Peace Dividend" in the not-so-distant future. It'll be thrice difficult for the Army to overhaul itself then.

[Rob Thornton]

and the bad are being kept (who do you think is most likely to stay in for those "bonuses" anyway?).

I know you did not mean it without some context, which is why I wanted to make sure folks know that some of the guys I see taking the bonus, are good folks and are just taking advantage of what I'll call "recognition of their worth". If they have made it to the rank of CPT, then they have probably been afforded the opportunity to deploy and serve with distinction. Our own RTK is a guy that falls into this category, and if I were holding the purse strings I'd pay him that and then some to make up for the "above and beyond" hard work he's done (BTW - the majority of his incentive was spent repairing his house that probably was in disrepair partly due to the fact that he spends a majority of his time, and energy away from while doing Army business. - if the Army had not come along and offered up the bonus he'd of had to come out of pocket - so did he really get an incentive?)

However, it is true I think that those who take the bonus were probably going to stay for awhile anyway - their rational for staying currently outweighs the rational for leaving. What we have to do is find ways to increase the rational for staying and decreasing the rational for leaving to the broader officer population - we might have to approach each officer on an individual basis either through the CoC (not through a survey) or through a personal communication (besides and email) that asks them what is required, and then finding ways to act on it. It'll require giving CDRs the same authority and latitude to retain their officers as we give them in making other decisions relevant to the mission and the health of the command. We've got to make this attractive to the families as well, and we've got to allocate money for that purpose beyond Installation maintenance and housing - make the money available and make it flexible so the community leaders can address the concerns of FRGs - this will make some uncomfortable who count each dollar and insist on following a process that does not allocate funds toward a problem until that problem has festered and migrated, or requires planning so far out that it cannot possibly predict what those problems will be.

We need to look at what things stress the families of deployed soldiers - in some cases for leaders its actually problems associated with other families who cannot who face a myriad of problems - I mention it because we have to make better services available for the spouses and families of all our soldiers - E-1 thru 06 (that covers everything in a BCT). We need better health and dental - no co-payments, and no waiting! We need free day care - that can be scheduled and available for a full day the day prior and and for up to three hours the day of - the spouses of deployed families are often running wide open - and trying to keep it together while their military spouse is gone for 15 months - not to include the time spent during the deployment train up, or the TDY that is endemic to an Army at war.

Speaking of that - we need our support infrastructure updated to match those realities - right now at DFAS if you turn in a voucher its upwards of 5-6 weeks before you get reimbursed for the money you spend doing what the military tells you to go do. This also creates stress in a family - above and beyond the time spent away - we now induce further financial stress because we have an inadequate pay system which forces money out of the soldier's pocket and cannot meet the time limit to reimburse them before their Govt. Credit Card bill comes due and they show up on somebody's hit list - not to mention the GCC is often capped and cannot cover the expenses unless they are paid month to month - more financial stress.

If we are going to send servicemen TDY enroute for anything over a month after they've been deployed - lets make our installation policies adaptable to bringing their families, and lets put it in their orders. This should be a no brainer - but we've just not caught our support systems up with the fact that the Army is at war.

We've got to reduce the stress on the families, and where possible within an Army at war, we need to reduce the stress on the leaders. I think if we spend our limited resources with this in mind, we'll create the conditions where we can change the proportion of the rational for staying or leaving.

Finally, I'd say tackle the tough issue of recruiting the folks we want to fill out the ranks for our expansion. Part of this is showing the types of benefits that demonstrate compassion for what we are asking our volunteer military to do, part of this is showing clearly that their are opportunities for those who may enter without a family, but can envision raising one in a military that is also in persistent conflict. We're going to require compatible pay, a retirement plan that truly incentivizes staying past 20, better educational benefits (I read something about overhauling the GI Bill in the E-bird today), and opportunity to excel (this one we got in spades). Ultimately, if we are going to grow the Army we are going to have to get more folks - a flash of the obvious, but it requires more then just getting them to sign up for a 4 year hitch. Only by replacing the officers we've lost, keeping the ones we have and filling those new billets will we be able to create the long term conditions to sustain a force of the caliber we require.

I know allot of guys who are in my shoes - they are coming to a cross roads - be it the 20 year mark, kids coming of high school age and tired of being displaced, a spouse who is stressed out and looking for the type of stability that allows them to do more then just survive when the other half of the parent team is deployed, TDY or training in the field. Their decisions are not entirely their own - their familes gets a vote. I heard an anecdote from a friend here on the SWC who told me he attended a dinner where a GO joked about seeing so many recently retired leaders now serving in other capacities - that GO may have been joking, but he knew what was up.

Patriot remarked we better do something before our CPT problem turns into a MAJ and LTC problem, I think we already have one, they've made up their mind, but have just not left yet - it ma not be a huge portion of that population, but at a time where we are trying to expand - every good officer is critical. As we go forward, those remaining will inherit ever increasing responsibilities because there will be less to shoulder them - more billets will go unfulfilled, but the work will likely increase, not decrease - the stress on both leaders, their families and the soldiers will increase. The rational for leaving will increase and the rational for staying will decrease.

An all volunteer service full of the "best and brightest" is a hard thing to sustain under good conditions, under trying conditions such as sustained war with no mitigation of the stress on individuals and families, it may be too hard - unless you take steps to compensate for what you are asking them to do. You know, there are allot of guys and gals who love the Army, but they love their families more. You gotta show these folks that we will take care of their families in a concrete manner that goes beyond the concept of placing the burden on the leaders and their spouses ala a FRG (command and spouse run Family Readiness Group), and ACS Centers (Army Community Services ) that are more aligned and staffed for a peace time Army.

The next three years are going to be critical I think - I heard recently that in 2010 a significant part of the federal work force is going to retire - the military, as always will be called on to fill gaps in creative ways at home or abroad; as such they will have employment opportunities to serve in other agencies. The challenges continue to grow.

Best, Regards, Rob

[Norfolk]

I know you did not mean it without some context, which is why I wanted to make sure folks know that some of the guys I see taking the bonus, are good folks and are just taking advantage of what I'll call "recognition of their worth". If they have made it to the rank of CPT, then they have probably been afforded the opportunity to deploy and serve with distinction. Our own RTK is a guy that falls into this category, and if I were holding the purse strings I'd pay him that and then some to make up for the "above and beyond" hard work he's done (BTW - the majority of his incentive was spent repairing his house that probably was in disrepair partly due to the fact that he spends a majority of his time, and energy away from while doing Army business. - if the Army had not come along and offered up the bonus he'd of had to come out of pocket - so did he really get an incentive?)Best, Regards, Rob

Rob,

Thanks for clarifying this on my behalf; I certainly did not intend to say that all bonus-takers were mediocrities. I apologize for my negligence. But I very much did intend to say that mediocrities would be those most inclined to take such incentives. I an unambiguous about that, and just as troubled by that fact.

There are only two ways to keep the good guys that are either leaving, or planning to leave; either impose universal conscription (not selective service) or drastically reduce the Arm'y committments - neither of which are possible; and give the good their due, drive out the bad, and let the good do their job the way they see fit - and that can be done. It would be very hard, but it can be done.

[Rob Thornton]

Norfolk -
I certainly agree we have to safeguard against accepting mediocrity as a substitute - the consequences of not doing so are final in the worst way - our profession simply requires the best, second best = second place in war that is unacceptable. I'm sure all our SWC knew what you meant - but we have many a lurker these days

Best, Rob

[MattC86]

Norfolk -
I certainly agree we have to safeguard against accepting mediocrity as a substitute - the consequences of not doing so are final in the worst way - our profession simply requires the best, second best = second place in war that is unacceptable. I'm sure all our SWC knew what you meant - but we have many a lurker these days

Best, Rob

Shelby Stanton talked about some of these problems cropping up forty years ago in Rise and Fall of an American Army which I just finished. . . the demands of war combined with the loss of skilled personnel, either from casualties, leaving the service, or (in Vietnam) one year tours, makes for ugly compromises. With need greatly expanded, and the pool of available personnel - or willing replacements - smaller, there's a huge gap between the needs and what can be fielded.

If enhancing the pay, benefits, and support given personnel is the answer (as Rob advocated two posts ago), the costs simply are going to be enormous, at least as I see it. The changing demographics of enlisted men and the officer corps over the decades since the pre-WWII Regular Army means that the size and scope of the support required - Rob mentioned daycare, improved access for medical and dental, etc - will be huge. And that increases pressures for streamlining elsewhere; like outsourcing combat service support and logistics functions, as Gen. Casey mentioned in the video clip where he answered (or sort of answered, or sort of not really answered) the question about LTC Yingling's article.

The short shrift, in funding and resources, is going to go somewhere, it's just a question of where.

Hopefully that didn't sound like I was upbraiding serving officers for having families to support . . .

Matt

[Rob Thornton]

Middletown (NY) Time Herald-Record
October 31, 2007

Army Steps Up For Families
By Alexa James, Times Herald-Record

West Point — In his first six months as Army Chief of Staff, Gen. George Casey Jr. traveled across the country, asking soldiers' families what they wanted from the Army.
What could the military create to make their lives better? What could they do to keep them enlisted?
The answer was always the same.
"(They) don't want fancy new programs," Casey told a crowd of officers, cadets and children gathered at a youth center at the United States Military Academy yesterday. "(They) want us to fund what we've got."
Casey was on post yesterday, along with Secretary of the Army Pete Geren, to sign the new Army Family Covenant, a mandate to improve family programs at military installations worldwide. It means bigger schools and day-care centers, better housing and health care, and more career and personal opportunities for the families attached to soldiers. The covenant also comes with money — $1.4 billion in 2008 to rebuild, refurbish and staff this higher standard of living.
This, Geren said, was the Army's belated commitment to catch up with the demands of today's soldier in an "era of persistent conflict."
"We're in the seventh year of the war in Afghanistan, as you all know better than I," Geren said. "We're in our fourth year in Iraq. We're in uncharted territory."
The wars in Iraq and Afghanistan are the largest and longest conflicts the nation has faced using an all-volunteer force. To sustain the numbers it needs, the Army will have to win the hearts and minds of its troops' families.

The way this reads the desire is there by Army leadership to implement this - it may as Matt points out cost more then we predict - particularly to maintain in an Army we are trying to expand - however, this is a very significant step and I think if the Army can articulate its (the Covenant's) strengths while recognizing whatever limitations it has and publicize it around the Army - tell the families what it means, and perhaps get some feedback at the family level this will lay the foundation for building retention. Every installation is probably going to be a little bit different though - so there will need to be some flexibility built in.

This cannot appear as a "one-time" shot - it has to be seen a continuous commitment that will not waiver, that will show emphasis on soldiers and their families, and that will demonstrate unequivocally that while we want our soldiers to have the best tech on the battlefield to ensure our soldiers our equipped to win and survive, our quality people are the means by which we succeed - and to retain these talented and dedicated personnel we are willing to create and sustain the correct standard of living for them and their families.

If anybody can get a copy of the "Army Covenant", we should put it up.

Best regards, Rob

[tequila]

[Rob Thornton]

Tequilla,
Thanks - looks like a good frame work to start from.
Best, Rob

[jcustis]

Oh bother.

I'm a deeply concerned that any "improvements" will get mired down by the pile of bureaucracy that shapes about eveything happening in the military right now.

I'll give a quick example: The Deputy Director position with the base Family Advocacy Branch was only recently filled after a 18 month gap. We definitely needed it, but it's only come around just now.

I believe that any of these great ideas also means that we have to change the culture of these supporting structures. We can improve the infrastructure that you can touch and feel pretty easily. It's more difficult to change the mindset of the folks who make that same infrastructure run. It may only be small rudder steers in some cases (like schools and such), but I know the medial side has been nothing short of an abyssmal mess for years, hence the multiple pages devoted to Tricare issues in each issue of the Marine Corps, Navy, Army, and Air Force Times.

We also need to tighten up our internal admin and pay situation immediately. I am thoroughly convinced that if IBM had employess that had to deal with some of the pay issues that our warriors face, mid-level managers would be getting fired wholesale. Having a bad pay experience has to be one of the greatest reasons for members leaving the force, hands-down.

We simply do not have the same controls to correct pay and admin situations like big business does, and it is unfortunately hurting us as a result.

[selil]

We also need to tighten up our internal admin and pay situation immediately. I am thoroughly convinced that if IBM had employess that had to deal with some of the pay issues that our warriors face, mid-level managers would be getting fired wholesale. Having a bad pay experience has to be one of the greatest reasons for members leaving the force, hands-down.

We simply do not have the same controls to correct pay and admin situations like big business does, and it is unfortunately hurting us as a result.

Let me give you a real world big business example of pay. As a senior systems engineer often I traveled every day of the week. My entire team traveled substantially. Monthly expenditures easily exceeded $25K per month per person. We had a pay roll clerk who thought it was his job to protect the company from the malfeasance and criminal intent of my crew.

Some of the younger guys working on my team didn't have $25K in savings to cover credit card bills each month. When pay started to hit the 90 day mark in delay I halted travel and basically stopped business. It took about three hours to replace the entire system of gatekeeper and replace it with a facilitator based person. From 90 days to two weeks pay processing or less in three hours. It was a chronic problem, but it took somebody in leadership standing up and saying no more.

Sometimes it just takes a leader not accepting piss-poor performance from support people who say they can't change. Change or seek employment elsewhere. What is the mission? Why accept garbage that negatively impacts that mission? When the Hayman Fire (massive Colorado forest fire) nearly burned down one of my team members house we pulled together the team not on the road and moved that members family out as he was in South America unable to get home. Even in big business you have to have heart, but you do whatever it takes to keep the staff on task. Pay, benefits, and family are pretty darn important.

We were fixing main-frames and telephone networks. Nobody was shooting at us (though there was that little incident at the Columbian Telephone Company), but my team got us done on time and under budget. As I told my leadership the least we could do is pay them on time.

[jcustis]

Excellent contrast Selil, but try as the silverbacks might to make the chimps square themselves away, the chimps simply hide behind a crotchety personnel officer, who in turn hides behind the blinding array of rules and regs that his E-2s and E-3s can't possibly learn completely, as well as the folks at DFAS.

Believe me, I've done the leadership thing many times over, like ensuring a married SNCO went in with married junior Marines when they were knocking out their deployment audits. If the admin clerk was more concerned about what he would wear to the E-Club that night, it was like beating your head against a wall.

[Norfolk]

Excellent contrast Selil, but try as the silverbacks might to make the chimps square themselves away, the chimps simply hide behind a crotchety personnel officer, who in turn hides behind the blinding array of rules and regs that his E-2s and E-3s can't possibly learn completely, as well as the folks at DFAS.

Believe me, I've done the leadership thing many times over, like ensuring a married SNCO went in with married junior Marines when they were knocking out their deployment audits. If the admin clerk was more concerned about what he would wear to the E-Club that night, it was like beating your head against a wall.

Terribly, terribly true. One of the Admin Clerk NCOs in my old Battalion was so incompetent that when he was briefly posted out of the Battalion, he was quickly busted down in rank by the higher-ups at his temporary posting. Shortly after he returned to the Battalion, he was promoted back to his old rank. Dealing with Base Wogs is more often than not an exercise in utter futility.

I believe Patton in late 1944 conducted a clear-out of his HQ echelons, and after removing 2/3 rds of them concluded that there had been no loss in efficiency.

I strongly suspect that as far as military families go, there is no substitute for having the full range of services that DoD used to provide, on or immediately adjacent to base. I know that this constitutes isolationism from the rest of society, but when much of the rest of society has difficulty even comprehending the stresses that military families are under, it leaves military families and especially children that much more isolated and vulnerable out in the mainstream if they have to access services there instead.

Self-contradictory as this appears on the surface, military families are in fact more isolated when having to fend for themselves out in mainstream society, than they are if miltary families as a body are isolated from mainstream society, by having the full range of services they used to get from DoD. "Saving" money by cutting back on or reducing DoD services to military families (and benefits to military personnel) has had perhaps the most devastating impact on retention and morale after the length and frequency of overseas deployments.

[Maggie]

I strongly suspect that as far as military families go, there is no substitute for having the full range of services that DoD used to provide, on or immediately adjacent to base. I know that this constitutes isolationism from the rest of society, but when much of the rest of society has difficulty even comprehending the stresses that military families are under, it leaves military families and especially children that much more isolated and vulnerable out in the mainstream if they have to access services there instead.

Self-contradictory as this appears on the surface, military families are in fact more isolated when having to fend for themselves out in mainstream society, than they are if miltary families as a body are isolated from mainstream society, by having the full range of services they used to get from DoD. "Saving" money by cutting back on or reducing DoD services to military families (and benefits to military personnel) has had perhaps the most devastating impact on retention and morale after the length and frequency of overseas deployments.

Try turning this around. This is a hot point for me, particularly when reading military discussions from my civilian side.

My sister and brother-in-law were in the Air Force. They had several overseas postings while serving, as well as posts in the US. When overseas they always--if possible--lived in the communities rather than on base to "make the most" of their time there. Did rather well too; when I visited them in Germany I was invited to dinner at their German landlord's home which I gather is somewhat usual re social customs there. However--when here they lived on base and rarely left it. As you point out, military families ARE isolated from mainstream society--and it seems by choice as well as circumstances.

And you go on to state that military families are in fact more isolated when they have to "fend for themselves" out in "mainstream" society. I blink at the implications behind this, not quite sure where to start.

DISCLAIMER: I don't begrudge the military their benefits and services. As far as I'm concerned it's part of the pay package for doing the job. However....

1)It makes no sense to slam society in general for their perceived lack of support for the military when it's extremely unlikely, given the numbers, that most of us will even meet a military family in day to day living. I'd not sure there is "fault" on any side, given that 1% is the number often cited as the military vs general population. How do us civilians get the chance to help support/mainstream (?, peculiar choice of words, given the usage in other fields)/or in general treat the military families as what they are, a part of our society, when for the vast majority of us "the military" is an abstract hidden away on a base few of us can even visit?

2)There needs to be an understanding on the military side that PERCEPTIONS are important if the military wants public support for military benefits. When talking to Joe and Jane Sixpack, who are trying to figure out how to pay for medical care on (it seems) negative income and who are worried about their own schools (fending for themselves?) one should remember that the PERCEPTION is that their taxes are going to fund benefits they don't get.

3)Try and remember that civilian families often have the same or similar stresses that military families do--even in wartime. There are civilian employees of many companies in the ME, for instance. Or even closer to home--my dad worked for a utility company and was sent, more than once, to work on construction at other plants away from home. A brother in law moved his family three times for an employer because jobs are tight in his field. Families of police and firefighters never know if their loved ones are going to come home each day. They die even when there's no war on. Coming home is not a given for anyone, comes to that. Traffic accidents claim over 50,000 civilians each year. A sister-in-law was killed in one four months after the wedding--an innocent bystander in a high speed police chase.


Yes, it's different being a soldier. But the solution is not to further isolate the military and refuse possible ways of building understanding between the military and the rest of us by stating that integration of military families within civilian society is bad for the families because we can't understand at all what military families go through.