Officer Retention

[Patriot]

I wanted to share some of my observations on an issue that has become a major topic for Army leaders – officer retention. In the Army we hear a lot about retaining company grade officer and there have been a number of actions taken over the past few years to mitigate the high demand for company grade officers with their requirements.

These actions include eliminating OER (Officer Evaluation Report) blocking, promotion to captain at 39 months, expanded advanced civil schooling programs, extremely high promotion rates (99%) to captain and major (94-98%) and other proposals, i.e. bonuses for additional years of service.

The last proposal of bonus was generally taken as an insult. The $20,000 proposal for a captain translated into four months of pay, while junior enlisted bonuses sometimes equal their entire annual salary. Most of the captains took the proposal as half hearted from a bureaucracy that doesn’t ask their input nor solicit it. The measly amount of $20,000 was never going to entice any captain on the fence to stay in the Army, but would have been good for captains that had every intention of staying. For those that have made multiple deployments it would have been well earned.

So we’ve essentially created a system that doesn’t eliminate poor performers and promotes almost everyone. The captain’s are smart and they see weak performers getting promoted. Frankly, I’d rather see an unfilled assignment then fill it with a poor performer. I would prefer we protect our officer corps’ quality from weaklings by culling them out as we’ve done in the past.

If we’re serious about retaining company grade officers then let’s give them an incentive like $50,000 tax free or a guarantee of graduate degree of their choice in a school of choice or assignment of choice with Army schools of choice. It’s not about pleasing everyone; it’s about recognizing what’s at stake long term and making an appropriate commitment.

The first who get these options ought to be those officers who have made multiple deployments to combat. The combat issue brings to the surface a secondary topic. There are officers hiding in the Army who have avoided combat deployments. Whether they’re hiding in the training base (TRADOC), institutional, high headquarters, Korea, or some other place is irrelevant. After nearly 6 years of war there are too many officers with 2 or 3 deployments and others with none. Since the promotion rates are so high for captain, major, and lieutenant colonel there is no disincentive for not deploying, so they hide. Combat deployments are NOT about punching tickets, slapping on a right-shoulder patch and some medals or some other non-sense especially after nearly 6 years of war. At some point equity of deployment has to be factored. If someone thinks an officer should not be deployed because he/she is weak then they need to get a job at Wal-Mart and not in the Army. If an officer is afraid to deploy because of family separation or fear of combat Wal-Mart is hiring.

The problems in the company grade ranks will not stop there but will expand into the field grade ranks. As the Army promotes marginal performers to major and lieutenant colonel there is a negative incentive to all officers who see weak mid and senior grade officers. Just as incentives are important to retain company grade officers, the same applies to field grade officers. How much are you willing to provide to keep solidly performing majors and lieutenant colonels past 20 years? Right now the Army offers nothing. There are no incentives, other than the promise of promotion or command and for the vast majority these two incentives will never happen. But the Army needs a deep pool of experienced officers to stay beyond 20 years there is nothing to keep them and they, like the company grade officers, are exiting rapidly.

If we’re fighting a new war with a new modular Army using new tactics, equipment, and a new mindset it’s probably time to develop a new way of rewarding performance and a new way of sustaining the force to actually sustain the force. If the promotion rate to captain is 99% why have a centralized board? If the promotion rate to major is 98% why have a board? Under the current system the first time the Army tell an officer he’s not going to “make it” is the battalion command board in year 16 or 17.

[Dennis]

Sir,

I agree with all of your points. From my view, as a post command CPT, it has been troubling to see the advancement of a generation of officers with little to no selection process.

The most bothersome was to see peers who lingered on higher level staffs, mostly because lower level units did not want them, due to their lack of talent and potential. Then of course at some point said CPT must be given a command in order for him to attain his branch qualification and facilitate another number for promotion to the next rank.

In almost all circustances that this happened, the person involved spent barely a year, on paper, in command and their performance was, as expected, less than what is expected of a combat commanders.

Even more troubling was seeing this being done to units that were heading to combat. (Not that I disagree with replacing poor leaders, but rather the requirement to ever have "poor leaders" in the position at all).

I recognize that to some degree it is a numbers game but I think command quality at any level should never be sacrificed. Our soldiers deserve better than that.

[SWJED]

Cross-posted on the SWJ Blog - On Keeping the Best and Brightest.

[Pragmatic Thinker]

This argument is nothing new and most of these "fixes" are temporary to keep the numbers at a reasonable level.

I am not sure the numbers support your claim that folks are "hiding out" in TRADOC. I know Fort Benning cleaned house about three years ago and replaced just about every NCO and Officer who didn't have a SSI-FWS on their right shoulder. Granted there are still some officers and NCO's out there who have avoided deployments but I think most of them are in the very senior grades (O-5 and above or E-9), it's hard to find too many O-3 to O-4's and E-4 to E-7's out there without some time in a combat zone. Again, there are probably some who got by with a 120 or 180 day deployment to Kuwait or Qatar but I am not convinced that folks can hide very easily. Especially since the implementation of dwell time, it is automatically annotated at HRC whenever they pull up your records.

This phenomena is nothing new all you have to do is find a Vietnam-era veteran and they will tell you the same stories. During times of war the Army retains and promotes just about everyone. They have to or otherwise people are forced to leave, and how can you justify getting rid of people during a war when your numbers mean everything? The real shame is lack of leaders effectively counseling and developing junior officers. How many times does someone get shuffled around a command because no one wants them? When was the last time an O-5 sat them down and truly laid out what was wrong and gave them guidance and direction to fix it? Of course, there are officers who do this but all too often the case is to shuffle them around staff positions or send them to higher headquarters.

Never fear though...these wars will end some day and then we will draw down and cut budgets. The mass exodus you are looking for will happen if you wait around that long, and that not too far off future will make the Carter years look like the Reagan years in comparison.

PT

[Cavguy]

I am not sure the numbers support your claim that folks are "hiding out" in TRADOC. I know Fort Benning cleaned house about three years ago and replaced just about every NCO and Officer who didn't have a SSI-FWS on their right shoulder. Granted there are still some officers and NCO's out there who have avoided deployments but I think most of them are in the very senior grades (O-5 and above or E-9), it's hard to find too many O-3 to O-4's and E-4 to E-7's out there without some time in a combat zone. Again, there are probably some who got by with a 120 or 180 day deployment to Kuwait or Qatar but I am not convinced that folks can hide very easily. Especially since the implementation of dwell time, it is automatically annotated at HRC whenever they pull up your records.

PT,

Agree somewhat, but my initial shock upon arrival here at Fort Leavenworth was the sheer number of perm party officers (not ILE students, which are about 98% combat vets) without combat patches. Most of them outrank me, but I always want to ask - what hole have you been hiding in?

Branch has said that those with the higest dwell time will absolutely deploy next, so I agree, it will even itself. I have a post command, MAJ friend who never deployed. Commanded in Korea, a second command at Knox, and then AC/RC. He's getting his first downrange deployment early next year..... I guess the system is working. I think many of them, like my friend, simply had jobs that didn't deploy to SWA, and didn't volunteer to head downrange or were locked into other jobs.

I liked the USMC "Every Marine into the Fight" message that went out recently, the Army needs to do the same.

[tequila]

Following Cavguy's note: General: Deploy or risk promotion chances.

Marines who have not gone to war should be concerned when promotion time comes around, a top Corps official said.

“I guarantee you ... if you have a six- to seven-year war and you don’t get to the war zone, you needn’t wonder what’s going to happen when it’s time for promotion,” said Lt. Gen. Ronald Coleman, deputy commandant for manpower and reserve affairs in Quantico, Va.

Coleman spoke at a Marine Corps Association meeting here Wednesday, where he told an audience of mainly retired and active-duty Marines that leathernecks who haven’t deployed to a combat zone need to find a way to get to the fight.

“If I’m on the promotion board, I’m going to make a note of that,” he said.
While some Marines have served three, four and, in some cases, five tours in Iraq, 40,000 still have not deployed, Coleman said. Some of those Marines are in the pipeline, including those making the transition from boot camp to infantry battalions.

In January, Commandant Gen. James Conway announced his plans to rearrange assignments so that every Marine is given the chance to go to war. At the time of his announcement, titled “Every Marine Into the Fight,” some 66,000 Marines — a third of the force — had not deployed.

[Ken White]

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Never fear though...these wars will end some day and then we will draw down and cut budgets. The mass exodus you are looking for will happen if you wait around that long, and that not too far off future will make the Carter years look like the Reagan years in comparison.
PT

Could happen, I suppose. As a survivor of Eisnhower's cuts and one who was in Florida, DC and Korea during the Carter years, I sure hope we do the absorbtion of cuts in funds better the next time than we did those two times...

[soldiernolongeriniraq]

The working percentage for active duty US Army personnel who have NOT deployed to either OIF or OEF is 40 percent. There was a USA Today article a few months ago about the phenomenon, but it didn't go below the surface of the factoid to explain why this was so.

For those of us who, after two or more deployments, have met many of our peers -- some of whom were promoted over us -- without combat patches, this figure seems about right.

Perhaps they're all on permanent profile.

[Pragmatic Thinker]

Could happen, I suppose. As a survivor of Eisnhower's cuts and one who was in Florida, DC and Korea during the Carter years, I sure hope we do the absorbtion of cuts in funds better the next time than we did those two times...

I am not holding my breath and when the axe falls on those budgets it usually cuts deep and fast...things like early retirements, no pay raises, no training funds, no repair parts...they're a commin' and probably not too far away either.

If the timing works out right the repubs can hope it happens under Obama or Hillary and shift all the blame to the Dems. Much like we heard during the early 90's under Bill Clinton with the draw downs initiated under Bush I. Of course, my pessimism is only couched by my sarcasm so who knows but like I tell the fellas in my office, "...all good things must come to an end", and this current boom in military spending will not be sustained indefinitely. If you're paying attention to the USAF, they are initiating another round of personnel cuts this year to make room for the impending budget cuts. However, for them it is a matter of having enough left over to pay for all the F-22s we will need for the next big air war.

PT

[SWJED]

• Army Offers Officers Incentives
  
• Army Development of Junior Leaders

[SteveMetz]

"Resources are over-stretched. Frustration is up, as families are separated and strained. Morale is down. Recruitment is more difficult. And many of our best people in the military are headed for civilian life...This is not the way that a great nation should reward courage and idealism...we will not be permanent peacekeepers dividing warring parties."

Governor George Bush, speech at the Citadel, September 23, 1999

[Abu Suleyman]

I usually like to be a problem solver, but in this case I have no suggestions. Unfortunately, this is a vicious cycle. Many people who get out of the military do so because of a poor command environment (including me). Do you suppose that more or fewer people will want to stay in under these automatically promoted buffoons?

I am reminded of a man who went through his Officer Basic Course three times, because he was such and idiot. The military offered him a medical honorable discharge, which he refused. When I asked him why he didn't take it, since he was obviously so ill suited to life as a soldier, he replied that he knew he couldn't get a job outside, so he had to stay in. That man is now a Captain. How many people are going to want to stay in after working with him?

I suppose that the upshot of this is that something has to be done soon, and it will have to be drastic.

[Penta]

I suppose that the upshot of this is that something has to be done soon, and it will have to be drastic.

Such as...?

C'mon, don't leave us hanging! You've got me envisioning shooting every nth O-3 at random until we've thinned out the herd sufficiently.

[Abu Suleyman]

Such as...?

C'mon, don't leave us hanging! You've got me envisioning shooting every nth O-3 at random until we've thinned out the herd sufficiently.

Fair enough. How about every tenth O-3, instead of at random. That seemed to work for the Romans.

I think there are several possibilities, but all of them include either dramatically altering the structure or size of the military or both. Including but not limited to:

Conscription including of officers
Mass direct commission (recruiting your battalion, brigade, division commanders directly from the civilian world)
Contract military (Think of the signs from the 1800's 'join the xxx brigade', the privateers, or perhaps even Blackwater type)
Dismantling the current military education structure
Mass recalls of past officers (basically a draft of people who have already served)

Now I am not necessarily advocating these measures, but they are illustrations of what I mean when I say drastic. They have all been done in the past in the United States, and with varying degrees of success.

The real solution is probably something I haven't listed here though. I believe that with as small a pool to draw from, and with as small a mentor pool as we have that the changes that will be needed can't happen without massive influx of new blood. Otherwise, we are merely inbreeding the same problems, over and over again. What makes the good people get out, makes more good people get out, leaving more bad people to set the policy, and then making more good people get out.

It occurs to me that we could also simple RIF out everyone that doesn't measure up, and build a force from there as well, but that would leave our country woefully unprepared as well.

[marct]

I am reminded of a man who went through his Officer Basic Course three times, because he was such and idiot. The military offered him a medical honorable discharge, which he refused. When I asked him why he didn't take it, since he was obviously so ill suited to life as a soldier, he replied that he knew he couldn't get a job outside, so he had to stay in. That man is now a Captain. How many people are going to want to stay in after working with him?

I suppose that the upshot of this is that something has to be done soon, and it will have to be drastic.

I think there was a solution used in 'Nam that is applicable to this individual .

Seriously, though, how could he be allowed to remain? I know that some people who can work well in the military are hopeless at civilian jobs, but this is just ridiculous!

[Old Eagle]

I hope that through forums like this you can find support and understanding. Many of us have shared your frustrations at various times in our lives/careers. All I can offer is that it usually gets better and the dedicated folks like you are the key to the future.

Some of us lived through the dark days at the end of the Viet Nam war. The Army was not a happy place to be. In dealing with the personnel challenges the Army, Like Thos. Edison in discovering the light bulb, never failed, but discovered many potential solutions that didn't work. We upped direct commissions (not always a bad solution), increased OCS, went to 24 mo. TIS promotions to CPT., and numerous other techniques. The overall quality of the Army also sucked. Race riots (Yep, I said riots), drug cartels, lack of training and equipment. Pretty ugly.

It took years to return to equilibrium. After we threw out hundreds of officers, we ended up short. 10% of my IOAC class were active duty recalls. One of the other co cdrs in my bn was an RC "volunteer". But eventually, we got back on track through a lot of hard work.

Hang in there. Vent to us. Be part of the future.

[Rob Thornton]

Old Eagle has some real wisdom there. I've done my share of venting and working my way through problems within the SWC community (which BTW has provided me a place to think on things and get feedback and insights). It amazes me though that I always come back to the idea that I have a hard time imagining myself doing something else besides being a soldier - its the company we keep I suppose, or the idea of doing something that matters.

I got an encouraging "mass" email from HRC today regarding some of the incentives for CPTs - I say it was a mass email, but it did appeal to me on an individual level. I'd like to post an excerpt from that email & highlight some of the positive things within it. I believe it signals a strong commitment by the Army to retain its its company grade leadership.

The most encouraging feedback we hear from our captains is how much they appreciate their senior leaders taking the time to just sit them down and say thank you. They pass along their gratitude for being appreciated and for the recognition of their many contributions this program provides.....

Our young captains need to know there is full understanding of the great sacrifices they have made and a focused effort to address these long deployments.

There was a good deal more in the email regarding the incentive menu available to CPTs of the target year groups, but the most important thing I think is the emphasis placed on people, and the invaluable role leadership plays in retention. This is going to take a little time to gain visual traction, but I think we'll see it. I don't think within my 11 years as an officer I've seen a more personal appeal from HRC - to me this means retention of officers has become a real priority - for the right reasons. What I mean by that is that the message was not a generated response to a shortage of officers in a given grade, but as an acknowledgment that the role of leadership has regained its rightful place within our Army culture as the fulcrum by which other things are accomplished.

The appeal of more senior leaders to reach out to more junior leaders is not an act of desperation, but one to extend the type of "taking care of our own" philosophy that we normally only see in tactical level families to the broader installation and institution - or the Army as a whole. I think we have to adopt the idea that "we" are the Army, and if we want it better we're going to have to look after each other. If a more senior leader discovers or is told of a problem he or she may be the only person who can help solve it, or at least make it visible and consider the broader implications - we can't wait for the "bureaucracy" to catch up - taking action is not what bureaucracy does - it just provides the framework through which leaders can act.

We have a host of challenges ahead - there is a whole generation of junior leaders whose entire life in the Army has been the cycle of deployment to war. They have done incredible work often with the most spartan resources - time in particular. Sooner or later we're going to have to go back to something that will not feel normal to that generation of leaders - one that where its OPTEMPO will still make for some deployments, hopefully will also account for some time to refit, train and bring ourselves back into balance. It will create its own brand of friction, and we will need leaders like you around to lead them.

Best Regards, Rob