Officer Retention

[Ken White]

In the post Korea era, the Army has tried to use direct commissions (as opposed to OCS) as little as possible.The normal COA during the VN era was to send candidates to OCS, then to basic branch courses...

I didn't mention that, probably should have. Did not intend to imply that the direct commissioning of senior NCOs was common, it wasn't, only a small percentage of officers were so obtained. Just wanted to point out there were precedents. As Old Eagle says, OCS was the preferred route during both Korea and Viet Nam. Standards for access and graduation were relaxed a bit and OCS was conducted at Belvoir, Sill and Eustis (I think...) as well as at Benning; supply and demand...

During the post-VN reduction in force era, many previously enlisted officers were RIFfed back to their previous grades or shown the door. Of those that remained, all were told to finish school and do other penance to bring them in line with the rest of the officer corps as a whole. Those who refused or failed were shown the door.

IIRC, there was a two stage process; first stage dispensed with those who wouldn't or couldn't get a degree through the Bootstrap program; the second stage got even a few of those and tossed 'em after paying for two to four years of college. Some -- a few -- managed to stick long enough to get to COL, I only know one who did.

[tankersteve]

Anyone hear about the Marine Corps missing their retention goal for 2008 by 5%? I went back for the article but can't seem to locate it.

I know this thread is about officer retention, but as the economy moves forward, a substantial part of that issue will fix itself.

What I am curious is if the constant grind of Iraq is causing 2nd and 3d term Marines to elect not to reenlist? While the Army has had issues for years in making their enlistment goals, reenlistments have actually been very strong. The Marines have felt some of this pain but have always had an easier time getting quality recruits than the Army. However, if they are now feeling the pain among the group they want to keep as career Marines, this could quickly become an issue. The Marines pride themselves in having much more junior leaders running the same size elements as compared to what the Army uses (SGTs and CPLs running squads, SSGs running platoons). This problem probably wouldn't be felt for some time, even if the issue persists for a few years, but it is of interest. It could impact the Marines in a lot of ways, such as manning and how they operate in a more decentralized manner.

I haven't heard of Marines having any kind of enlistment/reenlistment issues since 2005 and even that was only for a single year and the first time in 10 years.

Don't anyone take this the wrong way - I am not gloating. I have been envious of the USMC for years as to their superior 'combat focus' which the big Army often forgets. It is just a very interesting circumstance and doesn't seem to fit very well with the economy and the likely move of the USMC from Iraq to Afghanistan. I hope it is not a sign of things to come for the Army as well (mainly because the Marines will adapt quickly to fix this while HRC will spin for 2-3 years until they recognize and analyze the issue or give a knee-jerk reaction that treats the symptoms, not the problem).

Tankersteve

[Schmedlap]

The Marines pride themselves in having much more junior leaders running the same size elements as compared to what the Army uses (SGTs and CPLs running squads, SSGs running platoons). This problem probably wouldn't be felt for some time, even if the issue persists for a few years, but it is of interest. It could impact the Marines in a lot of ways, such as manning and how they operate in a more decentralized manner.

Has the USMC accelerated their NCO promotions in the same manner that the Army has? If not, it seems that they could easily overcome this if the problem persists. While not a perfect substitute, combat experience often has greater immediate, practical value than what is taught in the school house. It seems that they could slightly accelerate their promotions, if they haven't already. In my opinion, the Army has accelerated its promotions too quickly, but it has not significantly harmed us <knocking on my wooden desk while I type>. I suspect the USMC could find a way to do likewise.

[qwerty1971]

I will post my thoughts on this even though the topic thread died out a few weeks ago, but I just joined. I graduated from ROTC back in 2001, a few months before 9/11 (I was at IOBC at the time). Did my IOBC at Benning, deployed to Iraq as part of the 82nd, went to MICCC in 2005, and back to Iraq twice since then. I would have to say I am one of the four ROTC officers left from my commisioning class of 24 still in uniform. About 1/2 of my IOBC and MICCC classmates are already out of the service. In my last tour in Iraq of the 10 MI CPTs in the BDE, four of them departed the Army within 60 days of redeployment. Very few MI CPT's within my YG range took the "blood money" bonus. I took the grad school option (what I am completing right now). It is hard to keep MI CPT's in uniform when they know they can get a better paying job outside of the Army. Lack of command opportunities forced some of them out (1 MI company with 5-6 folks haggling for it), lack of quality mentorship probobly got some others, repeated assignments to tactical units deploying got some as well. With all these CPTs jumping ship you are going to have some bottom barrel officers suddenly rise to the top. Officer retention will not get better until the OPTEMPO balances itself out. I had a great college buddy who commissioned MP and went to Bragg. The nature of MP assignements at Bragg had him deployed 30 out of the 36 months he was stationed at Bragg. It was no wonder he opted out when he could. He was burnt out. Just my two cents worth.

[Schmedlap]

It is hard to keep MI CPT's in uniform when they know they can get a better paying job outside of the Army. Lack of command opportunities forced some of them out (1 MI company with 5-6 folks haggling for it), lack of quality mentorship probobly got some others, repeated assignments to tactical units deploying got some as well... Officer retention will not get better until the OPTEMPO balances itself out. I had a great college buddy who commissioned MP and went to Bragg. The nature of MP assignements at Bragg had him deployed 30 out of the 36 months he was stationed at Bragg. It was no wonder he opted out when he could. He was burnt out.

The first sentence in that excerpt had me scratching my head. I don't know anyone who joined for the money, which makes it kind of odd in my mind that any significant number would leave for the money. But, the rest of the excerpt gives plenty of other reasons for leaving which, in my opinion, make me think that my hunch is right - they are not leaving for higher paying jobs. They may get higher paying jobs, but that is not the motivation. I can get a great salary if I want it. I've got 9 years of service as an Infantry Officer, including 3 combat deployments, and I'm nearing completion of an MBA and JD. But the more that I think about it, the less interested I am in a civilian job, regardless of how it pays. I ETS'd a year ago and I'm already considering going back in as soon as I finish school in December. And, frankly, after this year-long vacation, I'm thinking, "bring on the OPTEMPO!" (But hold back on the PowerPoint )

[jmm99]

Schmed ...

I ETS'd a year ago and I'm already considering going back in as soon as I finish school in December.

good for you.

[drschmidt]

Greetings all,
I'm new to posting. Here is goes:

I'm currently a CPT recalled from the IRR. I have 4 years active duty and OIFI under my belt. I got out for reasons that are typical of Junior Officers but are often overlooked by the Army: I interpreted my future as being nothing more than dealing with bone-head chain of commands, working in thankless staff jobs, and spending a disproportionate amount of my time working on non-value adding activates like PowerPoint. In other words I did not feel I was being a productive human being. Anybody else out there that felt this way????
I have been following the topic of Officer retention for 10 years now. The lack of internal criticism and self blame for the Army failure to attract and retain this nation's best potential is a real shame. Everywhere I look the Army blames external forces like continuous deployments, priorities of the JO, desires to spend time with the family, civilian pay differential, etc. Am I the only one that has pickup up on this?
Now that I have a few years of corporate leadership experience under my belt, I can attest that some of the management methodologies the Army practices (especially at the BN staff officer level) are so unbelievably draconian that I’m surprised they retain as many JOs as they do.

[Ken White]

The same thing has been noted by others here on several Threads over the past few years.

Most people, Officer and Enlisted, leave the Army and the Marines (those I know -- and I suspect the Navy and air force as well...) due to either the BS you cite or because they are disillusioned; they thought they were going to do combat like things and found out that instead they did a lot of military like things (the two are not the same all too frequently). Some people tolerate BS better than others just as some people shoot better, command better or play basketball -- or even do Power Point -- more proficiently than do others.

I noted that factor over 50 years ago, before computers, the internet and SWJ. I and many others have noted it frequently since then. I will also note that the situation is somewhat better now than it was then -- but it still needs much improvement. Much...

You're correct, issues of family, pay and deployments are a small part of the retention problem. They are problems but they are insignificant compared to the BS, disillusion and stifling factors.

[Courtney Massengale]

Most people, Officer and Enlisted, leave the Army and the Marines (those I know -- and I suspect the Navy and air force as well...) due to either the BS you cite or because they are disillusioned; they thought they were going to do combat like things and found out that instead they did a lot of military like things (the two are not the same all too frequently).

I call it the One Reason Theory™

People who join for "One Reason", regardless of what that reason may be, are the ones who burn out the fastest. Usualy because that "One Reason" turns out to not be valid because of persumptions, requires them to do things they don't want to, or gets surpassed by other career/life goals. You have to love doing whatever the Army tells you to do. Some days that's going to be jumping out of airplanes, some days its going to be organizing the FRG's corn dog booth.

I think the real answer is to remove all input from the individual for branch selection. One of the cruelest things we do is make Cadets/Officer Candidates put in their picks. It builds up expectations, encourages false motivations and hides the reality of what a long term career in that branch is like.

Plus it would help set the stage for the next twenty years of lack of input and individual consideration.

[Ken White]

...I think the real answer is to remove all input from the individual for branch selection. One of the cruelest things we do is make Cadets/Officer Candidates put in their picks. It builds up expectations, encourages false motivations and hides the reality of what a long term career in that branch is like.

Plus it would help set the stage for the next twenty years of lack of input and individual consideration.

Good idea -- I take it a step further; do away with Branches. Totally. Combat Commander Officer types from various sources (and in far smaller numbers than we now access, giving a quality boost) and Staff Officers who are mostly former Enlisted guys in the specialty who can be trained and educated to handle all the nuances of that specialty (giving not necessarily a quality boost but providing adequate capability and a good source of competence and residual knowledge who would not expect -demand??? -- to be commanders of combat units ).

We probably need fewer Enlisted types in the CS/CSS arena as well if we could get a little smarter about how we do business, thus could increase both quality and quantity in Combat Arms elements.

Congress, of course, would applaud and assist such efficiencies and far more importantly, increased effectiveness.


I have GOT to stop smoking that stuff...

[Schmedlap]

I got out for reasons that are typical of Junior Officers but are often overlooked by the Army: I interpreted my future as being nothing more than dealing with bone-head chain of commands, working in thankless staff jobs, and spending a disproportionate amount of my time working on non-value adding activates like PowerPoint. In other words I did not feel I was being a productive human being. Anybody else out there that felt this way????

Oh yes. See here. It has certainly been voiced in this forum. Welcome.

[Courtney Massengale]

Good idea -- I take it a step further; do away with Branches. Totally. Combat Commander Officer types from various sources (and in far smaller numbers than we now access, giving a quality boost) and Staff Officers who are mostly former Enlisted guys in the specialty who can be trained and educated to handle all the nuances of that specialty (giving not necessarily a quality boost but providing adequate capability and a good source of competence and residual knowledge who would not expect -demand??? -- to be commanders of combat units ).

I totally agree that we have too many branches, MOSs and AOCs out there right now. However, I do think that there is some validity in keeping *a* branch structure to write doctrine, train, promote and validate force structure.

I do really dig the idea of a "staff MOS". BLUF is that not everybody gets to be an astronaut. Hell, there's only six Battalions in my branch, three of which come open for every year group. That means you've got to be one of the top three people out of a pool of ~45 to be a Battalion Commander.

There might be seven total rock stars in that year group, but the four who didn't make it just wasted the past 17 years getting divorced, drinking Pepto-Bismol, and popping Motrin to walk across the parking lot all so they could get told they didn’t make it.. The other 38 shurg and say "Well, I figured this is where I would wind up anyway, glad I didn’t destroy my family and body in the process”.

Just call a spade a spade and quit selling the idea that everyone who works hard, does the right things and believes in truth, justice and the American Way will get to lead at the highest levels. I’ve been a PL, XO, and Company Commander twice - I can die happy if the Army decides I get to fill out PowerPoint slides for the next ten years. Just don't make me compete for promotion with the motrin junkies who have three divorces and eighteen dismounts scattered throughout FORSCOM.

[drschmidt]

We probably need fewer Enlisted types in the CS/CSS arena as well if we could get a little smarter about how we do business, thus could increase both quality and quantity in Combat Arms elements.
[/I]

As a CSS Officer, I can totally agree. When I was a maintenance platoon leader I had a PSG, 2 SFC Section Sergeants, and 2 Warrant Officers in the platoon. Also, not enough work for the platoon to do. A little top-heavy if you were to ask me. Anyway, to this day I still believe that the Army should abolish the PL position in a MT Company. I feel that it would increase officer retention if that officer was in a position that actually needed him in a branch that could employ him.

[Ken White]

...I had a PSG, 2 SFC Section Sergeants, and 2 Warrant Officers in the platoon. Also, not enough work for the platoon to do...

Partly a function of the need in a mobile war for jump and 24 hour operations in support of fast moving combat and lots and lots of battle damage -- which with all respect, neither Afghanistan nor Iraq has been or provided much in the way of battle damage on the scale of major combat so the appearance of over manning is enhanced.

The over rank is not an appearance issue. It is real and it is a problem. The Warrant problem exists because the Army foolishly bowed to the Air Force and made most of its pilots Warrants instead of NCOs as it wished to do and absolutely should have done. Then came Viet Nam; tons of Helicopters required tons of Pilots. That large mob of people, after the war, acquired the clout and status of a 'community.' Communities like to grow and become self sustaining...

It's also a function of grade creep -- Army's bad about that. We still have a rank structure developed by 1920, modified by a WW II pay structure and for the NCOs, the unnecessary, detrimental and poorly done add-on of E8 and E9 in 1958. Totally and completely out of date. The Per and Finance communities will fight you to avoid changing either. So, for now, the only way to reward a person for doing a good job is to promote them to the next higher rank. Law of probabilities says the Peter Principle is bound to strike...

I've never met a Motor Sergeant or Shop Supervisor who wasn't the best mechanic in sight. Most of 'em did not want the job of supervising but to get more pay, promotion was necessary. Then add in up or out and promotion predicated entirely too heavily on time in service and time in grade as opposed to competence. Really smart...

[patmc]

My squadmate found a new direct commission policy memo today, which he said went into effect last week or so (I gave it a quick read, but do not know any other details behind it). Anyone else see this to confirm it is real?

Due to the shortage of CPTs and MAJs, CG's will be able to nominate, board, and appoint select senior NCOs and Warrants as Captains and Majors. The memo had the details of the board process. It is a stop-gap measure but no end date is published.

From memory, MSG will be eligible for DC to Captain. SGM will be eligible for DC to Major. WO3 to CPT, WO4+above to MAJ (may be wrong on the WO part). Officer will serve in their enlisted branch and will not require schooling or degree requirements. It did not say what the service requirement will be for taking the dive.

The biggest question mark I see is the service requirement. How long will they have to serve in the new rank? Will it be long enough to benefit the Army by taking these senior leaders away from their duties with Soldiers. Will senior NCO's or WO's who have served 20+ hard years be willing to stay on for another 4 or 5 as a company or field grade officer? A lot of the senior NCOs I worked with were great, but expressed little interest in switching sides. They appreciated I was there to do my part, and I appreciated that they were there for theirs.

Some of the grumbling I heard was the lack of branch schooling, (fair debate, does the career experience prepare for staff work? I think it does, except maybe for technical branches. 3 years as a PL and / or XO prepares a LT for staff as a CPT. Does SGM make a good switch to MAJ? I don't know. 2 of the 3 CSM's I worked with, and both of the Ops SGM's were great, and took care of the battalion, but they executed the plan, and did not make it. I've only seen the S3 and Bn XO from the staff CPT perspective, so my view is limited. Any field grade officers have an opinion after serving as the 3 or XO? The other issue was paying officer dues (the more expensive kind, even though the cup and flower always seems empty). My buddy did not look forward to getting chewed out by a new DC Major, who spent his time in the trenches, yes, but still did not work as a LT and CPT. Anyone with earlier DC environment remember how this dynamic worked?

Again, my facts may be a little off because I did a quick read during our captstone PE, so if anyone knows better, please update or correct.

[Ken White]

Much the same thing was done during Viet Nam -- and, to a lesser extent in Korea (for that one there still existed a very large Reserve / Guard pool of WW II Officers). The effect of the VN effort was beneficial, some good Officers, very few bad ones. Most had no problem coping with staff work all the way up to 4-star cmds. Above Bde, it was just as tedious and moslty marginally necessary then as now. Fortunately, there was no Power Point...

However, most of those commissioned were poorly served by the Army after the war. If they had no degree they were sent to Schools to obtain one but the majority were separated from the service regardless of a degree. Many served three years commissioned and reverted to their NCO rank, some (MOS dependent) were just told 'goodbye." The brilliant effort was selection of the best and brightest Warrants, commissioning them for three years and then forcing them out -- no reversion to Warrant, not even back to their old NCO rank. Out. Really a dumb move by then PersCom.

A few survived the RIF. I know several who were accessed as CPTs who made MAJ and served until retirement in that rank, one who made LTC and one who made COL. A lot seemed to depend on collection a decoration for Valor as an Officer, those who did stayed longer. Don't think that will work for these wars, not as many opportunities. I guess the law's still the same -- have to serve ten years minimum as an officer to retire as one, otherwise, you're retired at your NCO rank. They may have changed that; hopefully so.

My guess -- and it is no more than that -- is that during VN, about half those offered a commission declined. I did and know about as many who also did that as I do those who accepted.

[82redleg]

I saw that memo last fall, as a draft. If it didn't change, the transitions are correct- MSG/CW3 to CPT, SGM/CW4 to MAJ.

As for how well it will work, I think it depends on the NCO. How many times have PSGs run PLTs without a PL? All the time, so they should do all right with the MSG to CPT.

As for the SGM to MAJ? I guess it depends on what you have them do. As a BN XO, they might have some issues. Either one of our OPNS SGMs could do the CHOPS gig with no issues- in fact, I don't know why we have a CHOPS (I thought that was what the OPNS SGM was for) or a Battle CPT (again, an NCOIC could do it).

I don't know if it has been approved, or even if its a good idea- because the personnel toads tend to mess good things up (COHORT, Unit Manning, etc, etc), not because the individuals can't handle the level of responsibility.

[Courtney Massengale]

As for the SGM to MAJ? I guess it depends on what you have them do. As a BN XO, they might have some issues. Either one of our OPNS SGMs could do the CHOPS gig with no issues- in fact, I don't know why we have a CHOPS (I thought that was what the OPNS SGM was for) or a Battle CPT (again, an NCOIC could do it).

The logic behind it (if I'm reading the tea leaves correctly) is the same as allowing for two BZ looks to Major and counting (P) as the next higher grade.

The BLUF is that the people who select these positions will be placed into assignments that are already being filled by non-MOSQ personnel (by MTOE, MEL, and career progression).

We're allowing for two looks at BZ for Major because there are Captains sitting in Major slots who have completed their BQ jobs. Thus, they get the opportunity to make it official, if their file is competitive.

This policy is going to free up the best and the brightest to go out and do the "hard" jobs while others who are looking toward completing their careers fill the "soft" ones. A SGM going to be a Chops is a perfect example.

Of course, there are going to be a few who ARE part of that best and brightest and the spotlight is going to unfairly shine on them as examples of how this is "broken". Hopefully this policy effects the people it was meant to in a positive way and gives the Army the outcome it desires.

[qwerty1971]

The first sentence in that excerpt had me scratching my head. I don't know anyone who joined for the money, which makes it kind of odd in my mind that any significant number would leave for the money. But, the rest of the excerpt gives plenty of other reasons for leaving which, in my opinion, make me think that my hunch is right - they are not leaving for higher paying jobs. They may get higher paying jobs, but that is not the motivation.

I was one of 2 MICCC-grad CPTs to stay in service within my BDE after our last rotation in Iraq out of 7 MICCC CPTs. Three of the CPTs getting out already had intel jobs waiting for them once they ETS'd. One had a job as a deputy sheriff lined up and one went backl to school. Only 2 of 7 stayed in. Now I do not know if all of them received higher paying jobs than an Army CPT with 5-6 years in, but after eating lunch with those folks over the 15 month deployment I can say money had something to do with them leaving.

[Courtney Massengale]

I was one of 2 MICCC-grad CPTs to stay in service within my BDE after our last rotation in Iraq out of 7 MICCC CPTs. Three of the CPTs getting out already had intel jobs waiting for them once they ETS'd. One had a job as a deputy sheriff lined up and one went backl to school. Only 2 of 7 stayed in. Now I do not know if all of them received higher paying jobs than an Army CPT with 5-6 years in, but after eating lunch with those folks over the 15 month deployment I can say money had something to do with them leaving.

To build on this, if you look at it as a combined household income, the money is a significant factor.

You can be a deputy sheriff anywhere and take a $20K hit... but your spouse can find a better job than the one she has in Killeen Texas or Fayetville NC that more than makes up the difference.