Sadr and Jaysh al-Mahdi

[Dennis]

I think that what's going on right now is a practical response from Muqtada. Over the last 4 years if Muqtada has demonstrated anything it's that he is practical and flexible enough in basic ideology to cooperate or fight against just about any group if it suits the purposes of the Sadr movement.


This aspect is what I think doesn' get enough attention. Muqtada is more than a common street thug and there are some pretty good reasons why he has and will continue to have support from Iraqi's.

1. His personal lineage
2. The fact that the Sadr movement represents one of the only ones that is distinctely Arab, Iraqi, and Shia.
3. The focus on providing support and services to the Shia urban poor.
4. The perception that Sadr leaders have always stood, fought(physically or ideologically), and represented their constituency in the face of oppression while others have fled to exile.

What's holding Muqtada up is his ability to appeal to the merchant and elites of Iraq. These groups have been allying more with groups like SCIRI and follow leaders such as Sistani and Hakim. However, both of these are regarded as Iranian in origin and influence. If Muqtada is to take the Sadr movement to the next level he has to bridge the gap between appealing to the urban poor and also appealing to the elites.

He can only accomplish this if he can attain designation as an "object of emulation" within Shia Islam. What's going on right now is more about Muqtada getting his ideological house in order to have the greatest appeal to all Iraqi constituencies. He has a built in base of support, due to the group he leads, however he has repeatedly hit a wall by either overplaying his military capability or reaching the limits of his base of appeal. If he is to move to the next level he must have credentials on par with his uncle and father who preceded him.

[Jedburgh]

ICG, 7 Feb 08: Iraq's Civil War, the Sadrists and the Surge

.....Among Sadrist rank and file, impatience with the ceasefire is high and growing. They equate it with a loss of power and resources, believe the U.S. and ISCI are conspiring to weaken the movement and eagerly await Muqtada’s permission to resume the fight. The Sadrist leadership has resisted the pressure, but this may not last. Critics accuse Muqtada of passivity or worse, and he soon may conclude that the costs of his current strategy outweigh its benefits. In early February 2008, senior Sadrist officials called upon their leader not to prolong the ceasefire, due to expire later in the month.

The U.S. response – to continue attacking and arresting Sadrist militants, including some who are not militia members; arm a Shiite tribal counterforce in the south to roll back Sadrist territorial gains; and throw its lot in with
Muqtada’s nemesis, ISCI – is understandable but shortsighted. The Sadrist movement, its present difficulties aside, remains a deeply entrenched, popular mass movement of young, poor and disenfranchised Shiites. It still controls key areas of the capital, as well as several southern cities; even now, its principal strongholds are virtually unassailable. Despite intensified U.S. military operations and stepped up Iraqi involvement, it is fanciful to expect the Mahdi Army’s defeat. Instead, heightened pressure is likely to trigger both fierce Sadrist resistance in Baghdad and an escalating intra-Shiite civil war in the south.

Muqtada’s motivations aside, his decision opens the possibility of a more genuine and lasting transformation of the Sadrist movement. In the months following his announcement, he sought to rid it of its most unruly members, rebuild a more disciplined and focused militia and restore his own respectability, while promoting core demands – notably, protecting the nation’s sovereignty by opposing the occupation – through legitimate parliamentary means. The challenge is to seize the current opportunity, seek to transform Muqtada’s tactical adjustment into a longer-term strategic shift and encourage the Sadrists’ evolution toward a strictly non-violent political actor.....

The Jamestown Foundation's Terrorism Monitor, 7 Feb 08:

Becoming an Ayatollah: The New Iraqi Politics of Moqtada al-Sadr

As a political and military force, Iraq’s Shiite Sadrist movement has undergone a number of radical transformations since 2003, when its leader, Moqtada al-Sadr, surprisingly emerged as a leading political figure. Al-Sadr’s recent decision to continue with his seminary studies and graduate as an ayatollah at the conservative seminary school of Najaf underpins a major change in the movement’s structure that could have serious repercussions for the future of Iraq. Against the backdrop of changing political alliances between Kurds and Sunnis, al-Sadr is transforming his movement into a new political phenomenon with implications for the country’s political structure and security dynamics. The consequences are also immense for Shiite Iraq, posing serious challenges to the conservative clerical establishment in Najaf.

Al-Sadr’s attempt to become an ayatollah follows his earlier call to suspend operations by his militia, the Jaish al-Mahdi (The Mahdi Army, or JaM) in the summer of 2007. Together with his decision to study in Najaf, this has marked a decisive new beginning in the organizational structure and leadership dynamics of the Mahdi militia. The decision to suspend JaM was made largely because of the outbreak of violence between Mahdi forces and the rival Badr Organization in Karbala in August 2007. The incident was a major embarrassment for al-Sadr, who had been seeking the support of Ayatollah Ali al-Sistani, Shiite Iraq’s grand cleric, and the conservative establishment in Tehran against the rebellious splinter groups within his own militia since 2005. The suspension, which came in August 2007, was a way to ensure his Shiite partners that he was willing to restructure his forces for the sake of Shiite unity at a time when US—or Israeli—forces seemed to be on the brink of starting a major military conflict with Iran.....

[tequila]

Sadr extends ceasefire - BBC News, 22 Feb.

Shia cleric Moqtada Sadr has ordered the renewal of the ceasefire his powerful militia has been observing for the past six months.


He announced in August that his Mehdi Army would not attack rival armed groups or American forces in Iraq.

This was widely credited with reducing sectarian tensions and contributing to the recent overall drop in violence.

BBC Baghdad correspondent Jim Muir says the government and US military will clearly be relieved by the move.
US military officials have publicly recognised this contribution of the ceasefire as helping to stabilise parts of Iraq ...

[Jedburgh]

The Jamestown Foundation's Terrorism Focus, 25 Mar 08:

Moqtada al-Sadr’s Religious Strategy Complicates Jaysh al-Mahdi Ceasefire

.....Without the central arbiter figure in Moqtada al-Sadr, the Jaysh al-Mahdi is likely to further fragment as deeper splits are created within the ranks. Al-Sadr’s absence leaves a power vacuum susceptible to being filled by informal players. According to an Iraqi intelligence report, Iran is one of the main beneficiaries of al-Sadr’s new religious ploy. The IRGC holds great influence within a large faction of the JaM. With al-Sadr’s temporary absence, Iran may be inclined to sway JaM commanders to opt out of the ceasefire to confront Awakening Council fighters and/or U.S. troops. As an insurance policy in gaining a greater share in JaM policy, Iran may decide to further infiltrate and seek influence over militia commanders—redefining local Shiite loyalties.

External factors have much influence on what becomes of JaM. One such variable is the Awakening movement, which has developed into a militia that arguably surpasses and threatens JaM supremacy. The rise of Awakening power has contributed to obvious splits within JaM. Targeted assassinations against Awakening members have been blamed on a growing number of splintered factions from the Shiite militia. According to intelligence corroborated by sources belonging to the Awakening councils, rogue elements of the JaM have been sponsored by the Iranian Qods Force in starting “armed activities” against Awakening members.

Another variable is the potential disintegration—rather than rise—of the Awakening councils. Awakening commanders are threatening to rejoin the Sunni insurgency and back al-Qaeda if Iraq’s central government does not integrate their fighters as part of the country’s security forces with permanent payrolls. Prime Minister Nouri al-Maliki’s government is resisting that call, claiming that the movement is largely made up of yesterday’s terrorists. An increase in the number of Sunni insurgents would compel Shiite militiamen to break away from al-Sadr, simultaneously pressuring al-Sadr to lift the ceasefire—a prospect leading back to sectarianism.....

[William F. Owen]

http://news.bbc.co.uk/1/hi/world/mid...st/7313894.stm

Seems like things are hotting up a bit.

[Ron Humphrey]

http://news.bbc.co.uk/1/hi/world/mid...st/7313894.stm

Seems like things are hotting up a bit.

These things have to be addressed and it's good to see the Iraqi government trying to address it themselves. We'll just have to wait and see how it ends up.

[jcustis]

http://news.bbc.co.uk/1/hi/world/mid...st/7313062.stm

That article link from the page posted earlier reads so much like an analysis of the goings-on in Muqdisho and the factions under Aideed, Ali Mahdi, and some sideline wranglings and deal-cutting from Osman Atto.

Different circumstances for sure, but the violence plays out so much the same. I don't suppose these guys will be wearing wedding dresses, kapoks, or run around with four AK-47 magazine taped together....