Kandahar Province: catch all thread

[davidbfpo]

An open source provincial overview and added to a separate thread as the city of Kandahar maybe the next major target of the ISAF surge.

Link:http:http://www.nps.edu/programs/CCS/Docs...view_Jan09.pdf

The mapping of who is in control dates from January 2008 and I expect many who read this know it may have changed.

There is another, recent thread 'Wheels coming off the bus in Kandahar?', which refers mainly to the recent fighting: http://council.smallwarsjournal.com/...ead.php?t=8082 and at least five other, older threads on Kandahar.

Via http://www.snappingturtle.net/flit/there is a Canada’s Engagement in Afghanistan - Quarterly Report to Parliament for the Period of October 1 to December 31, 2009, which alas has no up to date map and some interesting benchmark gaps: http://www.afghanistan.gc.ca/canada-...x.aspx?lang=en

There are some national maps on MG Flynn's presentation, up to December 2009, that give an overview, but not down to district level: http://council.smallwarsjournal.com/...ead.php?t=9578

Anyone else who knows of a more current provincial map or open source items please add them here.

[davidbfpo]

NYT article from SWJ Roundup: http://www.nytimes.com/2010/03/27/wo...ndahar.html?hp

Only 5 of 17 districts in the province are accessible for government officials. Four districts are completely under the control of the insurgents, according to Nader Nadery, deputy head of the Afghanistan Independent Human Rights Commission.

Alas there is no map and the website has no apparent details.

[davidbfpo]

Steve Coll's column on Kandahar and a certain local politician's future. Note he was accompanying Admiral Mullen on tour.

Link:http://www.newyorker.com/online/blog....html#comments

[davidbfpo]

hat tip to al Sahwa for a short review of the campaign:http://al-sahwa.blogspot.com/2010/04...-kandahar.html

Ends with:

Ultimately, though, there will be no enduring success in Kandahar (or Afghanistan at all) until we're able to establish an effective and legitimate alternative to the Taliban's shadow government.

[Sylvan]

hat tip to al Sahwa for a short review of the campaign:http://al-sahwa.blogspot.com/2010/04...-kandahar.html

Ends with:

AWK doesn't count?

[davidbfpo]

Sylvan,

AWK does feature in the commentary, this is one part:

In essence, real power rests with just two families who have prospered under the presence of American forces in the past eight years. One of them is the family of President Hamid Karzai, who is represented here by his brother, Ahmed Wali Karzai, who heads the provincial council. The other belongs to Gul Agha Shirzai, the former governor of Kandahar, and his brothers Bacha Shirzai and Razziq Shirzai, who have gotten lucrative security and construction deals with NATO forces. Residents and elders accuse the families of persecuting rivals and excluding all other tribes from access to power. Their domination has undercut any popular backing for the government or the foreign forces supporting them.

On my read AWK's role does feature.

[Sylvan]

Sylvan,

AWK does feature in the commentary, this is one part:

On my read AWK's role does feature.

I spent 5 months in Kandahar City (not KAF).
Shirzai is the popular leader for most of KC. Karzai's powerbase was to the North. Our fortunes fell when Shirzai was removed as Governor from Kandahar and moved North.
This is not a shared power-broker deal. This was a muscle move to emplant Karzai's younger brother to take over predominance over Kandahar City. While there have been some pay-offs to avoid civil war, Karzai used his control over the Tajik ANA to ensure Shirzai knew his place.

As to my original comment, AWK doesn't count as either a legitimate or effective counter to the Taliban. Shirzai was. And that is, IMHO, why things went to crap in the South.

[MikeF]

Nato gambles on collaboration with Ahmad Wali Karzai in Kandahar
Anthony Loyd, Kandahar
Times Online

Nato has taken one of the biggest gambles of its mission in Afghanistan by reluctantly deciding to collaborate with Ahmad Wali Karzai, the notorious power-broker of Kandahar — despite allegations that the half-brother of the President is involved in the drugs trade....

Senior coalition officers would prefer to see the back of Wali Karzai but they have come to the conclusion that their only option is to work with him. They are trying, in the words of one officer, to “remodel” a man accused of running a private fiefdom in the south.

“The plan is to incorporate him, to shape him. Unless you eliminate him, you have to [do this],” said a senior coalition official involved in planning what is viewed as this summer’s make-or-break military operation in Kandahar. “You can’t ignore him,” he added. “He’s the proverbial 800lb gorilla and he’s in the middle of a lot of rooms. He’s the mafia don, the family fixer, the troubleshooter

I suppose this has been a long time coming. This Karzai seems to be the main sphere of influence that bridges the underground world of A'stan. He knows everyone through family, trade, and relationships. From a military planning viewpoint, we tread lightly with these types of dudes waiting for the appropriate timing to properly shape. We did the same thing with Muqtada al Sadr and the Ayatolla Sistani.

Recently, I've wondered if waiting too long to talk is the wrong approach. I just watch HBO's new documetary Sergio based on Samantha Power's book "Sergio: One Man's Fight to Save the World."

Sergio Vieira de Mello was the head of the UN mission in Iraq until he was killed, but before that, he worked throughout conflict zones with great success in Cambodia and East Timor. He was fascinated with the intellectual mind of evil men, and his approach upon arriving in country was to go talk to everyone. He did not wait.

Perhaps, we could learn some lessons from the UN .

v/r

Mike

[John T. Fishel]

Mike, from some really capable Brazilian diplomats.

Cheers

JohnT

PS, of the UN, I have always said that it is (1) less than the sum of its parts and (2) if it didn't exist we would vave to invent it.

[MikeF]

Mike, from some really capable Brazilian diplomats.

Cheers

JohnT

PS, of the UN, I have always said that it is (1) less than the sum of its parts and (2) if it didn't exist we would vave to invent it.

True. Today, I'm sorting through Dr. Metz's two recent monographs on Iraq decision making. It is interesting to learn about timing on decision making processes and how some capable men like Sergio intuitively knew it.

It would seem that Ahmad Wali Karzai understands the game as well.

[Entropy]

The plan is to incorporate him, to shape him. Unless you eliminate him, you have to [do this]

Is the coalition "shaping" Karzai or is Karzai "shaping" the coalition?

[MikeF]

Is the coalition "shaping" Karzai or is Karzai "shaping" the coalition?

I'd submit that we should not dismiss the capability of GEN Patraeus. He is no fool; however, some senior coalition official might be receiving an ass-chewing over that comment. It's like showing your hand to the table at a poker game.

Worst case, he can call Ryan Crocker out of retirement for some back-up.

[Danny]

This is a blunder of gargantuan proportions. As I said in a post myself (because I saw this coming), the criminals must all be killed, the drug rings marginalized and it made so dangerous that they cannot operate, and the crime families dysfunctional. This includes Karzai's brother. If we actually do this (as described in the article) then we lose Kandahar. I don't care if some shade of "security" is brought to Kandahar. We are siding with criminals, and criminals they will remain. When we leave Kandahar, we will leave with Soldiers having their legs blown off, hearing damaged, and some will perish. In the end, it will have been for nothing because the people will be longing for the justice that the Taliban bring when they come in and kill Karzai's brother.

I hate to be so negative, but I saw this coming and spoke out against it. We have chosen the wrong path.

[IntelTrooper]

Disclaimer: The assessment provided is the author's alone and does not necessarily reflect my opinion nor the views of the SWC.

How Short-Term Thinking is Causing Long-Term Failure in Afghanistan

"In Afghanistan, second and third-order effects are largely overlooked," Morgan Sheeran, a Sergeant First Class who teaches at the Counterinsurgency Training Center in Kabul, told me. The result, Sheeran said, is that decisions are often made in the moment without understanding their long-term consequences.

The men of Tarok Kalache were enraged by their homes' destruction. "These dudes were extremely angry," Captain Patrick McGuigan, a subordinate of Flynn, later told Stars and Stripes. "The elder (of Tarok Kalacheh) wouldn't even talk to me for three weeks, he was that [angry]." Some compared the U.S. force to the Soviet occupiers. But leveling the village was just the beginning.

[Bob's World]

"The war in Afghanistan is, ultimately, a tactical war, fought at the local level over year-long deployments. When those small, tactical decisions are made for the wrong reasons, it can add up to big, strategic failure."

This is true, but only because:

A. Lead for operations is in the hands of a military headquarters, and such headquarters do not take on political objectives and are also subject to the effects of regular rotations; and

B. Current COIN doctrine, so rooted in the colonial experience, defines success as the preservation of the current regime through a construct of "warfare;" and

C. Failing to fully appreciate the causal effects radiating outward from the Karzai government, we create a functional sanctuary for the government to operate from. This protects and emboldens them to act with ever greater impunity toward their own populace, with little incentive to identify and address areas requiring substantive changes, or to seek reasonable reconciliation with the insurgent leadership of the issues that are most central to their illegal challenge and resistance.

[davidbfpo]

Abu M has two relevant posts on the discussion of COIN tactics in Afghanistan, the first 'Exum and Foust on Tactics in Afghanistan', link:http://www.cnas.org/blogs/abumuqawam...ghanistan.html and part two 'If you only read one thing today ...', link:http://www.cnas.org/blogs/abumuqawam...ing-today.html

I tried to follow it initially and gave up - a storm with The Beltway?