Counterinsurgency in Iraq RFI

[SWJED]

All, I have a quick turnaround requirement for an article (2000 words max and final draft by Tuesday 4 September for Military.com) to offer up thoughts based on Counterinsurgency FM 3-24 principles, imperatives and paradoxes (listed below) bounced off recent operations in Iraq and prospects for the future.

Initially I thought no, but asked if a consensus view from the SWJ and SWC would be acceptable. The Military.com editor thought that was a great idea so here I am with an RFI.

Assumption – up front and need not address in main article:

Yes, if we had the doctrine, a real Phase IV Plan and had implemented the doctrine with full participation of interagency assets things could very well be different now. Well, we didn’t, we didn’t and we didn’t so lets move on to the following in terms of the principles, imperatives and paradoxes of COIN (as outlined in FM 3-24) since the new doctrine was implemented in Iraq.

For each (below – respond to all, one or several depending on your comfort level) – how are we doing now and prospects for the future. I’ll take care of final editing and will attempt to present the consensus and provide alternative viewpoints as necessary or required. Please be concise and to the point, short vignettes to reinforce a point are good.

Also up front will be a ‘disclaimer’ that this consensus represents a wide variety of experience, study and “snapshots” of Iraq based on location, time-frame, unit, and mission…

Historical Principles for Counterinsurgency

1. Legitimacy Is the Main Objective

2. Unity of Effort Is Essential

3. Political Factors Are Primary

4. Counterinsurgents Must Understand the Environment

5. Intelligence Drives Operations

6. Insurgents Must be Isolated from Their Cause and Support

7. Security Under the Rule of Law is Essential

8. Counterinsurgents Should Prepare for a Long-Term Commitment

Contemporary Imperatives of Counterinsurgency

1. Manage Information and Expectations

2. Use the Appropriate Level of Force

3. Learn and Adapt

4. Empower the Lowest Level

5. Support the Host Nation

Paradoxes of Counterinsurgency Operations

1. Sometimes, the More You Protect Your Force, the Less Secure You May Be

2. Sometimes, the More Force Is Used, the Less Effective It Is

3. The More Successful the Counterinsurgency Is, the Less Force Can Be Used and the More Risk Must Be Accepted

4. Sometimes Doing Nothing Is the Best Reaction

5. Some of the Best Weapons for Counterinsurgents Do Not Shoot

6. The Host Nation Doing Something Tolerably Is Normally Better than Us Doing It Well

7. If a Tactic Works this Week, It Might Not Work Next Week; If It Works in this Province, It Might Not Work in the Next

8. Tactical Success Guarantees Nothing

9. Many Important Decisions Are Not Made by Generals

If you need additional information on each of the above here is a link to FM 3-24.

[Old Eagle]

Great opportunity but --

I planned to spend the long weekend snuggled up with a good book (or someone who'd read one). (Yes, Stan, after 30+ years, I'm still with Number One).

I'm in.

Please try to re-work the outline to focus the effort. Your post is too expansive for 2000 words. Come up with a thesis statement or constrained topic outline.

Steve Metz could write 2000 words on each one of your sections.

Many of us in the forum are of the infantry persuasion, so it might help if you could use some pictures to make your point.

[Tom Odom]

Eagle is right. Narrow it down.....suggestion

Write 2000 words using historical examples that I know you know explaining that FM 3-24 is a restatement of US military history in modern terms. Use Marine Corps Small Wars, Army Fronteir Wars, PI COIN, etc etc

Cap it with the statement that our inablity to come to terms with COIN today rests with our inability to understand our own history.

Best

Tom

PS

I have a date with a .223 and hopefully a few coyotes

PS PS

See Jedburg's post Restoring the Army's Culture of Irregular Warfare on this paper

[Stu-6]

Well to address a couple of obvious short comings (sorry but failures are always more obvious).

1. Legitimacy Is the Main Objective

If you fail here you got major problems and so far we are failing. We have from day one made it clear that this is a US show and everyone else is supporting actor. This actually predates the invasion going back to the way we treated the UN and our allies before the war and has continued through our present debate about weather the Prime Minster should resign. Bottom line it has always appeared as through Washington was calling the shots in Baghdad with at most an Iraq, coalition, or UN façade, and not many Iraqis are going to risk their lives for that.

1. Sometimes, the More You Protect Your Force, the Less Secure You May Be

This stands out just for one glaring example The Green zone i.e. fortress America. This is especially poor planning in a place like Iraq, where the evil dictator we were freeing the from lived in big walled of palaces. We might as well just put a sign out front saying “under new management”.

Well those are my instant reactions more may follow, especially if you get those pictures Old Eagle mentioned . . .

[Stu-6]

1. Manage Information and Expectations

Now here is something that we have at least improved one. Early on the message was we would transform Iraq (and the reset of the Middle East) to look something like Western Europe. Now we seem to be more aiming for somewhere between Lebanon and Yemen. Not great but more achievable and certainly better than Somalia.

6. Insurgents Must be Isolated from Their Cause and Support

Sort of a mixed bag on this one; we have at least some measure of success of this in Western Iraq recently pitting tribal factions against jihadist, of course the possible down side it these tribe will not necessarily support the central government. With Shiite population we have had much less success and seem to have legitimized the militia groups. This has had the side effect of increasing Iran’s influence, which of course strengthens the insurgence they choose to support.

[SWJED]

Eagle is right. Narrow it down.....suggestion

Write 2000 words using historical examples that I know you know explaining that FM 3-24 is a restatement of US military history in modern terms. Use Marine Corps Small Wars, Army Fronteir Wars, PI COIN, etc etc

Cap it with the statement that our inablity to come to terms with COIN today rests with our inability to understand our own history.

Best

Tom

PS

I have a date with a .223 and hopefully a few coyotes

PS PS

See Jedburg's post Restoring the Army's Culture of Irregular Warfare on this paper

I just need short blurbs much along the lines as Stu is doing. I don't have the luxury of time narrowing or organizing with the day job, family, other SWJ tasks and getting this out by Tuesday.

[John T. Fishel]

There are several wars for legitimacy related to Iraq. As Stu pointed out, one is in the international arena. We may be doing better here - Sarkozy in France for example. Another is in the US. Here GEN Petraeus seems to have an excellent and quite successful strategy that includes such things as John Nagl's appearance on The Daily show. Then ther is the legitimacy war on the ground where Dave Kilcullen has really made the case. Finally, there is the legitmacy war at the national level in Iraq where the picture is bleaker - although Kilcullen's observations qualify that judgement.

Too bad it took so long to recognize that there were multiple wars of legitimacy ongoing.

[Rex Brynen]

A couple of areas where it might be worth highlighting the importance for differentiated thinking:

6. Insurgents Must be Isolated from Their Cause and Support

AS FM 3-24 makes clear in some places (but not others), there are multiple overlapping (and competing) causes and supports to any insurgency, and even single insurgent groups are not above tailoring different messages to different potential constituencies (witness the ability of the Viet Minh to win support simultaneously from peasants, some Vietnamese landlords, and the scholar-gentry). There is a real danger in reductionist thinking that reduces insurgent motivation and popular attitudes to a limited number of variables (unemployment, Iranian support, Islamist radicalism, whatever).

There is, of course, a large debate on greed vs grievance variables in fuelling insurgency, and the balance between the two varies from conflict to conflict. It is important to never underestimate the extent to which insurgents market their message in normative terms, however, even when also linked to narrower material interests. In the Middle Eastern polling data I've worked with, for example, it is striking the extent to which normative factors sometimes far outweigh socio-economic ones (such as unemployment) in shaping political attitudes and behaviour.

8. Counterinsurgents Should Prepare for a Long-Term Commitment

Yes... but. The "but" here is that long-term commitment can also be read by the local population as continued external interference, foreign occupation, or other nefarious objectives. The damage caused in Iraq by Washington's unwillingness to disavow any intention of permanent military bases there, or the extent to which continued NATO operations in southern Afghanistan can easily provoke memories of previous Sooviet and British intervention are cases in point. While to some extent this issue lies in the hands of political decision-makers, it is important that military personnel in the field send "we're here as long as we're needed" signals rather than "we're here to stay."

[marct]

Historical Principles for Counterinsurgency

1. Legitimacy Is the Main Objective

2. Unity of Effort Is Essential

3. Political Factors Are Primary

4. Counterinsurgents Must Understand the Environment

5. Intelligence Drives Operations

6. Insurgents Must be Isolated from Their Cause and Support

7. Security Under the Rule of Law is Essential

8. Counterinsurgents Should Prepare for a Long-Term Commitment

1. "Legitimacy" derives from those ruled, hence the purpose of a counterinsurgency must be to achieve an agreement from the populace that is acceptable internationally.
2. Disunity plays into the insurgents hands - they are jacks of all trades and should be able to spot and exploit the seams of a disunited effort.
3. The military cannot win a counterinsurgency, it can only loose one. Politics, in the sense of the legitimate use of power, is the only way to win by getting an acceptance of legitimacy for a political process rather than an armed conflict.
4. Without understanding you will appear like a fool, and fools do not have legitimacy.
5. You cannot understand an environment if you have no idea of what is happening in it.
6. Causes of insurgency are the bleeding ulcers in the body politic. Cure hem, and you have eliminated the legitimacy of the insurgency. Support for an insurgency relies on a continuing communication of the argument for de-legitimacy. Contain their communications and their support withers.
7. Without minimal physical security (food, shelter, water, no IEDs, etc), the counterinsurgency has no legitimacy. A "Rule of Law" that is perceived by the populace to be "fair" and applied appropriately is part of this security.
8. Insurgencies do not happen overnight - they come out of systemic situations that have taken decades and, sometimes centuries, to develop. Counterinsurgnecy, in its truest sense, cannot be a band aid, it must be a cure, and this takes time.

Contemporary Imperatives of Counterinsurgency

1. Manage Information and Expectations

2. Use the Appropriate Level of Force

3. Learn and Adapt

4. Empower the Lowest Level

5. Support the Host Nation

1. Part of social legitimacy relies on trust which can only be fostered by increased, high information density, communications - not blind rhetoric.
2. Only a fool kills flies with a flamethrower.
3. There is nothing more foolish than a person who repeats the same mistakes over and over again. Thankfully, in a counterinsurgency situation, they are usually killed.
4. While only politics can win a counterinsurgency the military can loose it. The "military", in this case, is who the populace interacts with on a day to day basis, and this is not general officers but, rather Privates, Corporals and Sargents.
5. "We are here to help our mutual friends" is much moe persuasive than "we are here to tell you what to do".

Paradoxes of Counterinsurgency Operations

1. Sometimes, the More You Protect Your Force, the Less Secure You May Be

2. Sometimes, the More Force Is Used, the Less Effective It Is

3. The More Successful the Counterinsurgency Is, the Less Force Can Be Used and the More Risk Must Be Accepted

4. Sometimes Doing Nothing Is the Best Reaction

5. Some of the Best Weapons for Counterinsurgents Do Not Shoot

6. The Host Nation Doing Something Tolerably Is Normally Better than Us Doing It Well

7. If a Tactic Works this Week, It Might Not Work Next Week; If It Works in this Province, It Might Not Work in the Next

8. Tactical Success Guarantees Nothing

9. Many Important Decisions Are Not Made by Generals

1. Are you afraid of the people you claim to be there to help? If so, they will recognize that and hate you for it. Are you there to help them? If so, do it.
2. see the comment on flies and flamethrowers.
3. "Legitimacy" requires that you operate by a rule of law which, in most current versions, requires an increasing lack of force as the insurgency looses steam. An insurgency has been "beaten" at the political level, when it is generally accepted in the population that the "insurgents" are now just criminals.
4. Only fools and young children react to every taunt hurled at them. Again, the best way to demonstrate your foolishness and, hence, lack of legitimacy, is to run around like a chicken with its head cut off.
5. Counterinsurgencies are won by politics, not the military.
6. We are allies and friends, not conquerors.
7. Alaska and Texas are, of course, the same.
8. The operation was a success, but the patient died.
9. Generals can cause a loss of the counterinsurgency, but privates will help to win it.

Okay, I've tossed a lot of "sayings" in. I've no idea if this is the type of stuff you are looking for, but it really does boil down to a couple of key points.

1. The military cannot win a counterinsurgency, only loose it. This means that a chance for negative loss (not a win) happens every time any military personnel interact with the populace. They must appear to be intelligent and there to help the populace.
2. The centre of gravity in a counterinsurgency is the legitimacy of the host government in the eyes of the populace and at the international level.
3. In some counterinsurgency situations, the insurgency has developed because and is supported by perceived systemic problems in the resolution of basic needs (e.g. Bolivia). In others, the original state has either collapsed into a civil war (e.g. Yugoslavia) or has been toppled by an outside agency (e.g. Iraq and Afghanistan). The political solutions to "winning" each of these scenarios varies, but all require that basic needs be met by "the host nation".

Anyway, hope that helps.

Marc

[tequila]

Nice post, Rex. I was reminded of this article.

Simcock said he watched how many Sunnis paid close attention to the U.S. mid-term elections in 2006, which led them to determine that Republican losses meant the U.S. wouldn’t be a permanent fixture in Iraq.

“Iraqis came to the conclusion that we weren’t making the 51st state of Iraq,” he said.

Simcock said he had noticed a distinct difference in the way tribal leaders had stopped referring to coalition forces as an occupation force since those elections.

Also this rather ironic article.

Compared with previous years, the celebration was muted. Trees were draped in the red, green, and black of the Afghan flag, and lights strung across the roads lit up the evening.

Lashkar Gah, the capital of Helmand province, was preparing to commemorate the end of the Third Anglo-Afghan War in 1919, which finally drove the British out of this proud, mountainous land. Known as Afghan Independence Day, it is a major event on the national calendar.

But there was little in the way of festivities. After a two-hour event at the local stadium marked by a few pro forma speeches and some sports exhibitions, Lashkar Gah's residents went back to their daily routine.

A suicide bomb outside the capital took four lives, but that too has become a routine event for this battle-scarred province.

"In previous years, everyone would prepare for many days in advance," said one Helmand resident. "They were happy and excited. But now the presence of the British forces in the town has turned people against the celebration. It leaves a bitter taste in the mouth."

[davidbfpo]

Operations in a new territory and landscape require understanding - not adherence to existing policies and plans. Does history provide any help today? Ask around, even those you'd not usually ask. Remember the information will be in the local language and not English or on the web. Get people who can understand and speak the local culture / language at every level of command.

Start small and work up, not work down.

Expect top-down directions not to work unless commanders get involved.

Get local support at the start, make compromises, bribe / buy help and build on existing institutions - even if that means 100% change. Use old names, maybe from far back.

Forget firepower, mobility and armour - this is not war as you expected. Low intensity means that.

Finally provide plenty of armchairs.

davidbfpo

[Stu-6]

4. Counterinsurgents Must Understand the Environment

If we had done this in the first place we could have reduced our long term problems. On the up side even though we have major institutional short comings here the troops on the ground have, in many case, taken this one into their own hands much to our benefit.

[John T. Fishel]

We need to remember that there are multiple parties to an insurgency such as the one in Iraq. A simplistic disaggregation:
Good guys
Iraq national government
Sunni sheiks of the "awakening"
Shia supporters of the government
Coalition less US
US
Bad guys
AQI
Other Islamist extremists
Secular Sunni rebels
Shiite extremist factions
The winners do not need to be perfect - only better than the losers
COIN operators will be better than insurgents to the extent that they remember and act on the multiple precepts of FM 3 - 24 and adapt them to the local reality.

Cheers

JohnT

[Stu-6]

1. Legitimacy Is the Main Objective

Coming back to this one. There is no substitute for legitimacy. People will take risk to support a government they believe is legitimate. Saddam had no legitimacy outside his narrow Sunni base as a result his Shiite conscripts abandon the army during the US invasion, conversely Sadar has not had trouble recruiting for his militia.

The following points are there because they can foster legitimacy.

Political Factors Are Primary

Counterinsurgents Must Understand the Environment

Insurgents Must be Isolated from Their Cause and Support

Security Under the Rule of Law is Essential

Manage Information and Expectations

Use the Appropriate Level of Force

Support the Host Nation

Sometimes, the More You Protect Your Force, the Less Secure You May Be

Sometimes, the More Force Is Used, the Less Effective It Is

The More Successful the Counterinsurgency Is, the Less Force Can Be Used and the More Risk Must Be Accepted

The Host Nation Doing Something Tolerably Is Normally Better than Us Doing It Well

It is hard to see how our approach of a “surge” will help legitimacy. Any increase in security helps, but if it done by American troops it makes the government look more like a US puppet and less like a legitimate Iraqi government.