All, I have a quick turnaround requirement for an article (2000 words max and final draft by Tuesday 4 September for Military.com) to offer up thoughts based on Counterinsurgency FM 3-24 principles, imperatives and paradoxes (listed below) bounced off recent operations in Iraq and prospects for the future.
Initially I thought no, but asked if a consensus view from the SWJ and SWC would be acceptable. The Military.com editor thought that was a great idea so here I am with an RFI.
Assumption – up front and need not address in main article:
For each (below – respond to all, one or several depending on your comfort level) – how are we doing now and prospects for the future. I’ll take care of final editing and will attempt to present the consensus and provide alternative viewpoints as necessary or required. Please be concise and to the point, short vignettes to reinforce a point are good.Yes, if we had the doctrine, a real Phase IV Plan and had implemented the doctrine with full participation of interagency assets things could very well be different now. Well, we didn’t, we didn’t and we didn’t so lets move on to the following in terms of the principles, imperatives and paradoxes of COIN (as outlined in FM 3-24) since the new doctrine was implemented in Iraq.
Also up front will be a ‘disclaimer’ that this consensus represents a wide variety of experience, study and “snapshots” of Iraq based on location, time-frame, unit, and mission…
Historical Principles for Counterinsurgency
1. Legitimacy Is the Main Objective
2. Unity of Effort Is Essential
3. Political Factors Are Primary
4. Counterinsurgents Must Understand the Environment
5. Intelligence Drives Operations
6. Insurgents Must be Isolated from Their Cause and Support
7. Security Under the Rule of Law is Essential
8. Counterinsurgents Should Prepare for a Long-Term Commitment
Contemporary Imperatives of Counterinsurgency
1. Manage Information and Expectations
2. Use the Appropriate Level of Force
3. Learn and Adapt
4. Empower the Lowest Level
5. Support the Host Nation
Paradoxes of Counterinsurgency Operations
1. Sometimes, the More You Protect Your Force, the Less Secure You May Be
2. Sometimes, the More Force Is Used, the Less Effective It Is
3. The More Successful the Counterinsurgency Is, the Less Force Can Be Used and the More Risk Must Be Accepted
4. Sometimes Doing Nothing Is the Best Reaction
5. Some of the Best Weapons for Counterinsurgents Do Not Shoot
6. The Host Nation Doing Something Tolerably Is Normally Better than Us Doing It Well
7. If a Tactic Works this Week, It Might Not Work Next Week; If It Works in this Province, It Might Not Work in the Next
8. Tactical Success Guarantees Nothing
9. Many Important Decisions Are Not Made by Generals
If you need additional information on each of the above here is a link to FM 3-24.
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