The Former-Insurgent Counterinsurgency

**Sarajevo071** · 09-01-2007

The Former-Insurgent Counterinsurgency
by Michael R. Gordon
The New York Times, September 2, 2007

Checkpoint 20 was the last piece of American-controlled terrain on the road to Hawr Rajab and our linkup point with Sheik Ali Majid al-Dulaimi. Before heading out, Lt. Col. Mark Odom surveyed the terrain from the rooftop of the nearby American combat outpost, a heavily sandbagged structure surrounded by concrete walls to guard against car bombs. A dusty town on the southern outskirts of Baghdad, Hawr Rajab had a strategic importance that belied its humble appearance. It straddled the infiltration routes used by Sunni militants to circumvent Lion’s Gate, the grandiloquently named system of checkpoints, canals and other obstacles designed to stop the suicide attacks that had brought havoc to the Iraqi capital.

Hawr Rajab had been under the dominion of Al Qaeda in Mesopotamia, a predominantly Iraqi group that took its inspiration from Osama bin Laden and whose senior echelons are filled by foreign jihadis. The group’s fighters in Hawr Rajab were armed with AK-47s, machine guns, rocket-propelled grenades, mortars and a seemingly endless supply of homemade improvised explosive devices (I.E.D.’s), many of which were concocted from urea fertilizer and nitric acid. They were hard to detect and yet powerful enough to destroy an armored vehicle. Odom’s soldiers had never driven into the town without encountering some form of “contact,” as his soldiers matter-of-factly referred to the clashes.

This day in early August, however, was to mark a turning point. Just a month earlier, the Americans acquired a new ally: Sheik Ali, a leader of the Dulaimi tribe. In an extraordinary development, a growing number of Sunnis who had sympathized with the insurgency or even fought American forces were now more concerned with removing Al Qaeda from their midst — so much so that they had chosen to ally with their supposed occupiers. Such expedient confederations were emerging across Iraq. They began last year when Sunni tribes and former insurgents in western Anbar Province began cooperating with American forces, cropped up later in the violent Diyala Province and even emerged in the sharply contested Ameriya neighborhood in Baghdad.

...

http://www.nytimes.com/2007/09/02/ma...l?ref=magazine

**MattC86** · 09-01-2007

I'm starting to think the "al-Anbar miracle" or whatever could end up being a tactical- or operational-level success that, in the short term, further muddies the strategic equation. Especially since the strategic timeline has been compressed into just a few months by a skeptical government and public. We've changed the dynamics in the province, and reconciliation at ground level is underway, but that process could take years to reach the macro-level of the Maliki-government, which seems politically unlikely to say the least.

I think the current situation with the Madhi Army and al-Sadr holds more political potential, particularly if he can somehow get shoehorned into the government, or at least tacit acceptance.

With the sectarian strife level being what it is, close collaboration between Sunnis and the Americans is potentially destabilizing for a Maliki government that is suspect in its desire for reconciliation. Closer cooperation (or, as I said, tacit acceptance) with/by al-Sadr and his goons holds more tantalizing prospects for strategic progress, I think.

Of course, that's not going to be a popular view for the US, because it's largely out of our control, and puts the genuineness (unless that's not a word) of both al-Maliki and al-Sadr to the test.

Keep your fingers crossed.

Matt

**Rex Brynen** · 09-01-2007

Originally Posted by MattC86

I'm starting to think the "al-Anbar miracle" or whatever could end up being a tactical- or operational-level success that, in the short term, further muddies the strategic equation. Especially since the strategic timeline has been compressed into just a few months by a skeptical government and public. We've changed the dynamics in the province, and reconciliation at ground level is underway, but that process could take years to reach the macro-level of the Maliki-government, which seems politically unlikely to say the least.

I think Matt has highlighted a critical issue here.

The substantial success in negotiating a modus vivendi with Sunni tribes in al-Anbar (and elsewhere), and in having local actors turn against al-Qa'ida and bolster local security, is seen by many Shi'ite political leaders (and, frankly, many Shi'ites) as evidence of an emerging US pro-Sunni tilt. As a result, they're even less likely to offer compromises (on constitutional reform, petroleum revenues, eliminating sectarian militias in the police and other security forces, etc.). Potentially, therefore, the requirements of short-term security and stabilization could pull in the opposite direction from longer-term national reconciliation.

This is not to say the "flip the Sunni tribes" strategy is wrong, only that there needs to be a clear accompanying strategy for easing the Shi'ite concerns that this exacerbates. I'm not sure I actually see one, at least from a distance.

Complicating things still further, I'm sure (having spent some time in Tehran this summer) that the Iranians see US-tribal rapprochement in al-Anbar as evidence of an emerging US-Sunni-Arab (Jordanian/Saudi/Egyptian) axis in Iraq. In turn, they'll be spinning that (genuinely-held) threat perception to their Iraqi allies.

An interesting element in all of this is Sadr's recent announcement of a suspension of Jaysh al-Mahdi activities. There are many theories as to why he's doing this: reorganization of a splintered militia that only sporadically follows orders, an effort to out-wait the surge, a building phase, an attempt to appear as a more palatable leader as Malaki's political capital continues to fade, an effort to reposition himself as a "national" rather than sectarian figure (and probably a few I haven't seen or heard of yet). Its not at all clear to me how he sees the current US strategy, and whether this is a response to it or motivated by other factors.

**Danny** · 09-01-2007

I have to weigh in and say that while risky, the strategy applied in Anbar was and is still brilliant, and also was the ONLY choice. And, the Marines have implemented it with near perfection. Further, I am convinced that had the Brits not intervened in 2004 to fly Sistani back from being treated for health problems to lobby on behalf of Sadr, with Paul Bremer buckling under the political pressure, the Marines would not have been forced to release Sadr, who was in the custody of 3/2 Marines at that time, and the reconcilation situation in Iraq would not be as bad off as it is today.

http://www.captainsjournal.com/2007/...se-of-the-jam/

Concluding, the Shi'a factions are the biggest long to term threat to peace and stability in Iraq. Our leaving Sadr unmolested and the British failure in the Basra province has set up a wing of Iran in Iraq, just like the Hezbollah in Lebanon. The most significant strategic blunder in all of OIF was leaving Sadr alive (along with perhaps failing to excise Badr from the government). We unwittingly set up OIF to fail by believing that a terrorist like Sadr could be entrusted with government of people.

**Ken White** · 09-02-2007

in your last paragraph that you might wish to consider.

I agree the Shia (in all their various factions -- and there are far more than two) are possibly the greatest threat to stability in Iraq. I'm not sure there will ever be peace there in the western sense; it is after all the ME.

Also agree that releasing Sadr was a mistake -- IMO, it pales into insignificance beside the disbandment of the Army and the Police but it was a bad political decision, I think.

In fairness to the British, they mistakenly tried to leverage their vaunted experience and did not realize that this was not a typical insurgency and Basra was not Belfast or Bidur. We aren't the only ones who have difficulty transferring experience to new generations -- or dealing with other cultures.

I do disagree with your last sentence. I don't think anyone in the US government ever believed that.

**Cavguy** · 09-02-2007

Originally Posted by Danny

And, the Marines have implemented it with near perfection.

Putting aside the maxim that there is little good you can't do if you don't care who gets the credit......

To be clear, the efforts of an ARMY BDE (1/1 AD in Ramadi) under 1 MEF made the tribes flip. I MEF backed us up, and one of our BN's was a Marine INF BN. I'm tired of seeing everyone give the USMC credit for what an army heavy BCT did.

**DGreen** · 09-02-2007

I'm working in Fallujah as the Tribal/Leadership Engagement Officer for my unit. The Anbar tribes initiative has spread out into neighboring provinces and is starting to resonate in the Shia communities as well. Shia tribal leaders are absolutely hungry for engagement and feel quite strongly that tribal identity can trump sectarian divisions. In Taji, for example, a joint Sunni and Shia tribal confederation has been established whereby both groups will jointly fight AQI and JAM. The more religiously based parties in Iraq do not have the deepest roots in large parts of the country and rightfully fear any kind of tribal political awakening in the country. In many respects, I feel the tribes of Iraq, both Sunni and Shia, are the future for creating stability in the country and, with national elections, are the key to political rejuvenation in Baghdad.

**Steve Pampinella** · 09-02-2007

The existence of Sadr is key because he causes competition with Dawa-SIIC for the allegience (sp?) of Iraqi Shiites. Thus, he prevents the Iranian parties from operating unopposed in the South. If he were already removed, nothing would stand in the way of Dawa-SIIC from monopolizing the scene in the south and secede, especially because the Sunnis show no signs of compromise from a government they see of Iran puppets. However, if Sadr were to form an alliance with the Sunnis, then this would restore the necessary (but not sufficient) cross-sectarian cooperation that could make a national government work. At this point, we need to 'flip' Sadr and strike a deal as we withdraw, giving him what he has publicly demanded for the duration of the war. We have kept the pressure on the Mahdi because its rogue elements are attacking us, but these free-lancers are getting their support from the Iranians, and not from Sadr. Because of this, Sadr has been maintaining a low profile since the beginning of the surge because the Iranians are provoking us to go after him. This is what he realized finally this week, and why he is reorganizing his militia. If we were to give him some space, he could form a center of Iraqi politics that works with the Salvation Council and other neighborhood militias and begin to build a Iraqi response to radicalism rather than a purely sectarian one.