Company Level Intelligence Led Operations

[Coldstreamer]

I'm about to take my company to Afghanistan next month, to an independent location away from my usual chain of command - great for autonomous command! - but will equally be very short on Int and surveillance assets other than what actionable stuff my guys and I can gather from our own framework patrolling. Linking in and making friends with all our allied and agency neighbours will be critical. Does anyone have any top tips about how I can optimise my processes, and achieve more focussed results. Gathering atmospherics is one thing...getting multi-source info properly analysed and turned into target packs at company level is another. My platoon commanders are all very green, likewise my company intel cell. My instinctive approach is slowly slowly catchee monkey - all the good Kilcullen 28 article stuff - but the last time I did this was Iraq, and at Div/ Bde level. Grateful for any pointers.

[jcustis]

You've probably seen many of these considerations before, but here goes:

-Your smartest NCO should be the intel cell leader. He must have an aptitude for for data, statistics, faces, etc. A guy who follows sports scores and stats closely often proves to be the best choice.
-Build the depth required to operate the intel cell if one or two members take ill, are wounded, or simply need a break. The same folks cannot do it every day, on their own. They can fall into a rut of the same pattern, start to get sloppy, and worst of all, make mistakes that causes the men on the line to miss subtle things in the field. Along that line, one of the most critical things can be a Be-On-The-Lookout (BOLO) list. Any changes have to be promulgated to the maneuver elements as soon as possible.
-In the last few weeks you have to train and prepare, analyze the operations debrief script that your intel cell will work from when a patrol comes in. Sit back and ask yourself whether the information the script attempts to collect is actually beneficial. Put another way, are patrols going to be compiling information to satisfy a debrief, or compiling information and atmospherics that could facilitate follow-on missions in the field, and in-stride?
-Organize your command post to utilize both old school hardcopy and electronic target folders, as well as map, pen, and paper mission planning alongside your electronic planning tools. The enemy does not care that the generator just cut out.
-Train throughout the deployment, and keep personnel informed about not only your slice of the AO, but also the bigger picture of events that have occured elsewhere that may have an impact on your region (especially where transient bad guys may take up residence in your AO).
-Get your intel cell, battle captains/NCOs, and any other command post personnel out on aleaders reconnaissance, or at least out and about with a patrol once in a while. It goes a long way towards maintaining their situational awareness, perspective, and grasp of what the maneuver elements are dealing with every day. They should go out at least once a month, and preferably to all of the sectors within your AO.

[Ken White]

LINK.

LINK.

LINK.

LINK

[jcustis]

http://smallwarsjournal.com/referenc...insurgency.php

The Small-Unit Leader's Guide to Counterinsurgency (one of the links on the page above) is also a very solid guide, and speaks to the intel-focused things you seem to be concerned about.

[Tom Odom]

Go to CALL and look at the Company-level Stability Operatios and Support Operations series of newsletters. We used Brit TTPs heavily in Vols 1 and 3 by the way.

Vol 1 Command and Control--heavy on organizing for COIN
Vol 2 peacekeeping, EBo, and Security
Vol 3 Patrolling, Int, and IO
Vol 4 Counter-IED Ops
Vol 5 VBIEDs, Elections, PSDs
Vol 6 Tactical Marksmanship, Sniper, Counter-Sniper

Vol 7 will be COIN and Organizing for COIN with new material reemphasizing Vols 1 and 3.

See also Newsletter 07-01 Tactical Intelligence

Again go to Call and log on.

Best

Tom

[Cavguy]

http://coin.army.mil

It also has the links to the CALL compilation of COIN knowledge. If you need specific research advice and work from CALL send me a PM.

[Erick]

From my limited perspective, I'm very glad to see you'll have a co intel cell.

We were quite close to the flag pole but ended up developing the position of a co intel nco on our own. Being a NG entity and having a decent number of police officers / deputy sheriffs, many of whom had investigative experience, we had a group to draw from.

It was a fledgling effort, more could've been done but it was better than what we inherited.

[SFdude]

All,

I have been reading some of the discussions and articles on this site and had not thought to talk about my current thesis project until someone else suggested it.

I am conducting a survey to complete my data collection, and evaluate some of my ideas and recommendations on establishing and useing company intelligence sections. If you are interested in completing the survey please follow the link below and follow the online instructions. Please feel free to contact me if you have more ideas and opinions not covered in the survey. If you are interested in my findings or what I have learned so far please feel free to contact me directly.

The introduction below will give you an idea of what I am doing for my research and thesis. I am looking for individuals who have experience in OEF/OIF and other conflicts as company commanders, Battalion Staff, or intelligence experience with tactical units, during operational deployments.

thanks
LTC Paul Cuppett







Survey link: http://www.zoomerang.com/Survey/?p=WEB227LJM8QRYW (if this does not activate please cut and paste)


National Defense Intelligence College Thesis Survey

1. Introduction. My name is LTC Cuppett; I am a Special Forces officer currently transitioning to Military Intelligence. As part of my transition schooling, I am attending the National Defense Intelligence College and completing a Masters in Strategic Intelligence. My thesis project is examining how to improve the intelligence capabilities of units conducting the local counterinsurgency fight. Based on the literature that I have read and personal experience, I feel the critical part of winning a counterinsurgency war, is dependent on the successful mission executed at the local level. Local by my definition, is the area of responsibility for a maneuver company. Usually the company area is a small city, several connected villages or a large neighborhood. In my research and past OIF experience, intelligence appears to be the key to successfully executing the local counterinsurgency mission.

2. Purpose. The following survey is being used to help determine how to best support maneuver companies with intelligence assets. The data from this survey will be compiled with previously collected data that has been gathered through observation, After Action Review’s and Lessons Learned articles. This data will first be used as data for my thesis argument, as part of the requirement for completing a Masters in Strategic Intelligence. I will share the findings of my research with action officers working this issue at the United States Army Intelligence School and Center along with the current Action Officer at the Army G2 office.

3. Attribution. The answers will be considered your personal opinion and not the views of your unit or the Army. Your answers will only be referenced by your position in a unit and experience. The information you provide in your answers will be kept confidential and will only be used to identify trends as part of the larger thesis research project.

3. Attribution. The answers will be considered your personal opinion and not the views of your unit or the Army. Your answers will only be referenced by your position in a unit and experience. The information you provide in your answers will be kept confidential and will only be used to identify trends as part of the larger thesis research project.

4. It is critical that the issues being examined in the survey be addressed by operational units and leaders. The data from the survey, thesis abstract or thesis will be available upon request for anyone participating in the survey. Please contact me at the address below to request a copy of any of the research data or written products. Thank you for your time and participation. This is a critical issue that I hope to assist in resolving.

5. Directions. Please follow the attached link to the online survey and follow the directions on the website. http://www.zoomerang.com/Survey/?p=WEB227LJM8QRYW If you are unable to access the survey on the web, use the attached word document to complete the survey. Indicate your answer by either filling in a short answer or placing the corresponding letter of your answer in the space provided. Please return the survey by forwarding the email to my AKO account.


LTC Paul Cuppett
NDIC Student
(202) 231-3806
DSN 428-3806
AKO paul.cuppett@us.army.mil
SIPR paul.cuppett@us.army.smil.mil
JWICS yacuppj@dia.ic.gov

[Tom Odom]

Paul,

Look at the following CALL products. They all cover the arena you are studying.


Newsletter 05-17 Company level SOSO Vol 1, Command and Control

Newsletter 05-27 Company level SOSO Vol 3, Patrolling, Intelligence, and IO

Newsletter 07-01 Tactical Intelligence

Newsletter 08-05 Company level SOSO Vol 7,Organizing for COIN

I would also suggest that you go to the CALL web site and search the CTC trends for the past 4 years using company and intelligence separately as key words.

best

Tom

[Stan]

Colonel, Welcome aboard !
I would have gladly taken your survey, but didn't make it past the "Rank" drop down menu

A shame, that such a survey would not consider or include NCOs. I think you stand to gain quite a bit from NCO/SNCOs.

Good luck with your thesis !

Regards, Stan

All,

I have been reading some of the discussions and articles on this site and had not thought to talk about my current thesis project until someone else suggested it.

I am conducting a survey to complete my data collection, and evaluate some of my ideas and recommendations on establishing and useing company intelligence sections. If you are interested in completing the survey please follow the link below and follow the online instructions.

[Vic Bout]

as a former 180A w/ intel experience in OEF/OIF I was dismayed that you had no Warrant Officers on the pull down. Lotsa my fellow warrants involved with that business.

[marct]

Hi Paul,

This is more of a conceptual question, but can you define what limits you are placing on "Intelligence"? For example, are you including Human Terrain, local semantics, etc. in your definition or are you restricting it to a more "classical" military definition?

Marc

[Jedburgh]

...This is more of a conceptual question, but can you define what limits you are placing on "Intelligence"? For example, are you including Human Terrain, local semantics, etc. in your definition or are you restricting it to a more "classical" military definition?

Marc,

At the risk of hijacking Paul's thread, I just wanted to state that I feel your question reflects a common misperception about Military Intelligence. What you refer to as "Human Terrain, local semantics, etc", are aspects of intelligence that have long been a piece of the MI collection and analysis puzzle, although using different terms over the years, and often neglected by the conventional Army side of MI. But even the conventional side paid attention to the "subject peoples" of the former Soviet Union and their potential for exploitation should the Cold War have turned hot. I trust that Paul, coming from the SOF side of the house, is more than familiar with past and current applications.

And as an aside, you can't get much more "classical" in a military sense than Ceasar's Commentarii de Bello Gallico, where he certainly covers the bases in analyzing the human terrain.

[Meh]

Gentlepersons (very PC),

I shall be spending a good amount of time in Afghanistan over the next year, researching company-level intelligence cells. I'll be working for the military, so I'm out to find TTP best practices.

If you know any people worth communicating with - and especially if you know any currently deployed units I should be interviewing/embedding with - please send me a pm.

[davidbfpo]

Try: http://council.smallwarsjournal.com/...ead.php?t=5139 and http://council.smallwarsjournal.com/...ead.php?t=3797

davidbfpo

[IntelTrooper]

What are your questions?

[Michael C]

My best advice is to talk to platoon leaders and then squad leaders. If an intelligence cell, whether division, brigade or battalion, or company, doesn't get out and patrol then it never really understands the AO it is trying to provide intelligence to. Too often intelligence shops preach bottom-fed intelligence but practice top down distribution.

[Meh]

Recently got back from six weeks of research in-theatre, including approx. half the time down south with a line inf. bn. Fascinating stuff. Michael C, you're quite right. I went out on a good number of patrols, and saw the disconnects.

Much more in-country research to follow - mid-December to mid-January and April through August.

In the meantime, I'm looking at the history of int cells. I think I've found most of the related articles, but there are certainly still large holes in the story. Any contacts would be appreciated.

I'd also love a chance to send anyone who's had int cell experiences a list of questions (the more responses, the better the overall data).

Finally, if anyone is interested in discussing my more detailed impressions, please feel free to PM me.

[Woland]

Gents, a pleasure to be welcomed aboard this inner sanctum.

Hopefully I can offer something here and there. By way of brief background, I served in Lashkar Gah, Helmand Province, as an all source J2 analyst (NCO) attached to 3 Commando Brigade between Sep 08 and Apr 09. Our particular cell had reasonably comprehensive access to closed source reporting from various collection agencies and our role was simply to analyse it and attempt to answer the commander's questions. Our outlook was somewhat more strategic than tactical, so perhaps I'm not the chap to ask about TTPs, but we produced as much output on politics as we did the insurgency. I worked on a variety of topics whilst deployed, in simplistic list form I would say regional influences (Iran, Pak), reconciliation, the insurgency/narco 'nexus,' Quetta and senior leadership matters and part way through the tour, influence ops (we were unbelievably bad at this, by the way), took up most of my time.

I've also got some thoughts about pre deployment training for int personnel and how the whole J2 things works (or doesn't) and I might also have some unclass powerpoint presentations lying around somewhere from briefs I've given since. I'm not in the same line of work now, unfortunately, so there may be some gaps in knowledge which have developed, but I'm only too keen to impart whatever I can.

Again, it's a pleasure to be aboard.

[jcustis]

I am very interested in your thoughts about the training for intelligence personnel, as I am struggling to light a fire under my intelligence section and the OIC to get something going in the right direction...and I'm having a very tough time getting him steered straight.

If you could review this article: http://tiny.cc/JmFa9, either through your own assessment or recommendation of this article to former counterparts who could lend a hand, and then confirm whether it fits the Helmand situation, that would help me considerably.

Also, you used the term "influence ops." Could you provide more detail as to what that means?

Oh, and welcome aboard. Your background seems remarkably a lot like mine when I first started out.