Company Level Intelligence Led Operations

[marct]

Hi Ted,

Marc, now that's something I'd be interested in giving a look-over. Although I enjoy reading the truly ancient, what I've found most useful in that regard is the memoirs, diaries and travel reports of the old Brit "Political Officers" (mostly covering the Middle East & Central Asia) in the late 1800s-early 1900s.

As I said, it's a backburner project at the moment. Part of the reason is that my Latin, Greek (for the Byzantine stuff) and Arabic just isn't up to the task of translating most of what I need . The memoires, diaries, travelogues, etc. are really interesting. I've always been partial to both the popular ones and the organized ones like the Jesuit Relations.

For me, one of the more interesting things about them is the insights on how people built their taxonomies of the world in terms of perception (what do I see that makes a difference), understanding (verstehen) and explanation (erklaren). Sort of taking Bateson's definition of information ("a difference that makes a difference") and inverting it to analyze the cultural mindset of the producers of the document. If I can get a similar thing from the "other side(s)", that's when it gets really interesting, although so far I have only found one (the meeting between the leaders of the First Crusade and the Byzantine Emperor recorded by Fulcher of Chartres and Anna Comnenus).

At any rate, I'll stop side-tracking the discussion .

[Jedburgh]

Infantry, Mar-Apr 08: Suggestions for Creating a Company-Level Intel Cell

AKO Log-In Required

You’re a company commander, deployed in Iraq. You have plenty to do already, and now the boss is pushing you to start a company intel cell, a “fusion cell,” because his boss is pushing him to do so. And though you’d like to “organize for intelligence,” in David Kilcullen’s words, you don’t have a lot of options. Daily patrols, debriefs, and planning consume the time of your platoon leaders and your platoon sergeants. Your fire support officer (FSO) runs around like a maniac between meetings with sheiks and five projects designed to boost the local economy. You look at your training room … and shudder. Where do you begin?......

[William F. Owen]

You’re a company commander, deployed in Iraq. You have plenty to do already, and now the boss is pushing you to start a company intel cell, a “fusion cell,” because his boss is pushing him to do so. And though you’d like to “organize for intelligence,” in David Kilcullen’s words, you don’t have a lot of options. Daily patrols, debriefs, and planning consume the time of your platoon leaders and your platoon sergeants. Your fire support officer (FSO) runs around like a maniac between meetings with sheiks and five projects designed to boost the local economy. You look at your training room … and shudder. Where do you begin?......

I think there is a world of difference between "creating a Coy Int cell" from within the Coy or BG, and having an "Int Cell" (4-6 guys) attached to the company for the duration. I favour bolt-on I-cells with the relevant skills all close to the boil. How you create and sustain such teams is a huge issue.

Perhaps each Brigade could have an COIN Int-Company, that deploys sections down to the company locations, as and when required.

[Tom Odom]

I think there is a world of difference between "creating a Coy Int cell" from within the Coy or BG, and having an "Int Cell" (4-6 guys) attached to the company for the duration. I favour bolt-on I-cells with the relevant skills all close to the boil. How you create and sustain such teams is a huge issue.

Perhaps each Brigade could have an COIN Int-Company, that deploys sections down to the company locations, as and when required.

the units that do this (create an intel cell) report good results

The relevant CALL Newsletter 08-05 is up now on the CALL gateway for those with access.

Tom

[Steve Blair]

the units that do this (create an intel cell) report good results

The relevant CALL Newsletter 08-05 is up now on the CALL gateway for those with access.

Tom

I would tend to suspect (and it's a suspicion, mind) that "growing" a cell would be better than bolt on, if for no other reason than the home-grown cell would understand the unit's AO, operating procedures, and so on. Any element coming from outside would have that additional learning curve to deal with. But that's just me. It also squares to a degree with some of the experience from Vietnam and the Philippines where units grew their own intel sections (although they weren't always called that) and developed a more responsive system of intel collection and (just as importantly) dissemination within the unit. The further removed it become, the less responsive it became.

[wm]

I would tend to suspect (and it's a suspicion, mind) that "growing" a cell would be better than bolt on, if for no other reason than the home-grown cell would understand the unit's AO, operating procedures, and so on. Any element coming from outside would have that additional learning curve to deal with.

We hear on other threads about the "learning curve" issue associated with unit rotations. Perhaps a solution would be to bolt on a newly arrived maneuver company to an existing intel cell that has been in country for 6 months or so. In other words, stagger rotations so that either the maneuver unit or its supporting intel team has enough time on station to bring the other element up to speed on the AO's peculiarities. I doubt a 2-week right seat ride during a RIP/TOA would be adequate.

[Steve Blair]

We hear on other threads about the "learning curve" issue associated with unit rotations. Perhaps a solution would be to bolt on a newly arrived maneuver company to an existing intel cell that has been in country for 6 months or so. In other words, stagger rotations so that either the maneuver unit or its supporting intel team has enough time on station to bring the other element up to speed on the AO's peculiarities. I doubt a 2-week right seat ride during a RIP/TOA would be adequate.

Quite true. Staggering such things would work well. So long as the intel is developed at the local level and can be acted on at the local level without it having to trickle up and back down a chain somewhere I'm a happy camper.

[jcustis]

We hear on other threads about the "learning curve" issue associated with unit rotations. Perhaps a solution would be to bolt on a newly arrived maneuver company to an existing intel cell that has been in country for 6 months or so. In other words, stagger rotations so that either the maneuver unit or its supporting intel team has enough time on station to bring the other element up to speed on the AO's peculiarities. I doubt a 2-week right seat ride during a RIP/TOA would be adequate.

This is so commonsense, it's almost embarrassing. I've mulled this over for a few minutes, and right now, I can see absolutely no good reason why this couldn't work as a win-win.

It may take some imagination to implement, but damn this makes too much sense.

[Tom Odom]

And while I agree such linkups would be a good solution, reality in the form of Murphy's Law concerning scheduling TOAs among various elements with overlapping schedules has been a real problem.

Tom

[William F. Owen]

We hear on other threads about the "learning curve" issue associated with unit rotations. Perhaps a solution would be to bolt on a newly arrived maneuver company to an existing intel cell that has been in country for 6 months or so. In other words, stagger rotations so that either the maneuver unit or its supporting intel team has enough time on station to bring the other element up to speed on the AO's peculiarities. I doubt a 2-week right seat ride during a RIP/TOA would be adequate.

My intention in advocating discussion of Bolt On Int Cells is to prevent the absorption of Infanteers into the "I" side of life. I can't see the difference between an Int Cell and any other attached arm. What is more if there was dedicated Sub-unit Intel grouping they could develop a deeper skills set.

[Tom Odom]

My intention in advocating discussion of Bolt On Int Cells is to prevent the absorption of Infanteers into the "I" side of life. I can't see the difference between an Int Cell and any other attached arm. What is more if there was dedicated Sub-unit Intel grouping they could develop a deeper skills set.

And while the infantry has had some concerns, the use of infantry in such roles has proven quite effective. As I said earlier on this same thread, much of what is discussed as company intelligence operations is done by collators on the British side.

Again for those with access, look at CALL Newsletter 08-05.

Tom

[Jedburgh]

We hear on other threads about the "learning curve" issue associated with unit rotations. Perhaps a solution would be to bolt on a newly arrived maneuver company to an existing intel cell that has been in country for 6 months or so. In other words, stagger rotations so that either the maneuver unit or its supporting intel team has enough time on station to bring the other element up to speed on the AO's peculiarities. I doubt a 2-week right seat ride during a RIP/TOA would be adequate.

Over a decade ago, working with a small multi-national group in an isolated location, as the U.S. intel guy, I was doing six month rotations, while the split team that made up the rest of the U.S. element was on 90-day rotations. We were staggered, so that it essentially worked out the way you described. I thought it was a good system at the time, although, of course, still subject to the personal leadership and individual capabilities vagaries that have already been discussed.

There is no good reason that it shouldn't work just as well in the Big Army on operational deployments. And that's why it won't happen....

[wm]

There is no good reason that it shouldn't work just as well in the Big Army on operational deployments. And that's why it won't happen....

Why is it that folks with an intell background tend to be so cynical?

To several posters' points about scheduling and staffing, I submit that it can work if folks want to make it work. Like most things worth doing, it will require some pain and suffering to implement--some intel teams will have to stay in theater longer than they would otherwise in order to get the overlap going. To Wilf's point, I think we need to require that these cells be staffed with 96/97/98 series MOS (or 35xxx or whatever other number the personnel weenies have decided to hang on Army intel specialists).

[ODB]

I personally am having a hard time accepting the fact you need company level intel cells. Very few units in the Army push missions up vs. missions being pushed down. How will these company cells be tied into the rest of the intel agencies? It's a dangrous game to be playing at this level. Have seen the effects of conventional units playing this game, good people end up dead. IMHO this is another example of the political infighting within the Army itself. See we can do this, we don't need them, give us more funding, the list goes on and on. Everyone trying to do everyone elses job instead of their own. Like to see the TTPs on this one along with what schooling will be required. Will we create another institution or steal the seats from already existing courses?

Personally have yet to see an example of where this was needed? There are more intel assets in that country than anyone could imagine. Sounds like there is not good cross communication between them. Everyone keeps talking about situational awareness, well that includes knowing what assets you have available. Think passage of friendly lines coordination. There are a lot of basic tasks we do not do, simple because we think they are not cool. Get back to basics know who is operating in you AOR both FRIENDLY and enemy.

Please do correct me if I'm not seeing this correctly, reason I joined to gain knowledge and perspective. Thank you.

[Steve Blair]

I can only speak to this from the historical perspective, but crossflow with intel has always been difficult for the Army. In Vietnam, to use one example, info usually flowed up the chain but often didn't come back down to the local units unless some sort of unofficial arrangement was made. There were cases (one occurred near FSB Ripcord) where a unit took serious casualties when they were hit by an NVA unit that a SigInt unit on Ripcord knew about but couldn't tell the local battalion about. After that unofficial arrangements were made, but officially intel continued to flow up and settle. This was a continuous problem with MACV/SOG intel as well, which went straight to the higher command levels and often never made its way back to units that could have acted on the information (later in the war some of the FOB commanders made the same accommodation with local units...and the fiction of a friendly guerrilla unit was created to facilitate the information shift).

It's great to talk about knowing the enemy, and in many cases units do. But their focus can be restricted by real or artificial terrain considerations (don't look behind the bamboo curtain...there are no NVA in Laos or Cambodia - just one example) or by operational concerns. Having a cell that focuses on just intel (be it local gathering, collating information, or what have you) might be worth at least trying. IMO, anyhow.

[jcustis]

How will these company cells be tied into the rest of the intel agencies?

Good question, but they are tied into battalion S-2 as the highest point in the hierarchy. The don't submit RFIs directly to higher HQs.

It's a dangrous game to be playing at this level. Have seen the effects of conventional units playing this game, good people end up dead.

Definitely has that potential, which is why it needs buy-in and a careful eye from the commander (battalion) to ensure things aren't getting loosey goosey.

See we can do this, we don't need them, give us more funding, the list goes on and on.

At least in the Marine Corps context, it's not so much that we don't need them, but rather that we don't have them (a sizeable S-2) or can't tap into them directly due to distance constraints b/n a Bn CP and the company COPs.

Personally have yet to see an example of where this was needed? There are more intel assets in that country than anyone could imagine. Sounds like there is not good cross communication between them. Everyone keeps talking about situational awareness, well that includes knowing what assets you have available. Think passage of friendly lines coordination. There are a lot of basic tasks we do not do, simple because we think they are not cool. Get back to basics know who is operating in you AOR both FRIENDLY and enemy.

You are absolutely right on all accounts, but a battalion isn't going to be able to influence better coordination and/or accountability at those higher levels, so it reverts to what it can do and changes those things it can change (sound like an AA meeting?)

[wm]

I personally am having a hard time accepting the fact you need company level intel cells. Very few units in the Army push missions up vs. missions being pushed down. How will these company cells be tied into the rest of the intel agencies? It's a dangrous game to be playing at this level.

I seed this as an off shoot of transformation and the general inability/undesirability to place a large enough force structure in place in theater to do the job right. We have pushed much of what used to be a division-level function down to the BCTs, Bde-level work has devolved to the Bn TOC, and a company has now become a defacto Bn with regard to certain staff functions/size of its AO. Companies in the AOR seem to operate rather independently and, despite the promise of a "netcentric push" of intel, they need situational awareness (SA) assets to keep their heads (and tails) orientated properly. I submit that an operations support cell (remember that training sergeant and company clerk to supplement the Bn PAC that every company seems to have taken out of hide in garrison? )can do a lot of the routine SA work, but it will easily be overwhelmed when the information (I meant that, not intelligence BTW) firehose from above is turned on to beef up SA at the company level.

[William F. Owen]

And while the infantry has had some concerns, the use of infantry in such roles has proven quite effective. As I said earlier on this same thread, much of what is discussed as company intelligence operations is done by collators on the British side.

Again for those with access, look at CALL Newsletter 08-05.

Tom

I am not doubting their success. I went from Infantry to Intelligence, It's not such a big leap. My question and concerns are posed towards Sub Unit Int Cells becoming part of the TOE.

If they don't become part of the TOE then they'll remain a product of "ad-hocery" and skills will perish between deployments/Operations/Wars especially if they are not under pinned with some solid trade training

- unless the required levels of skills is such that no specialist training is required, the Int Cell is not part of the TOE, but takes men out of the platoons, and is only formed as and when required.

It may be that the later is considered the best option.

[Tom Odom]

WM: but it will easily be overwhelmed when the information (I meant that, not intelligence BTW) firehose from above is turned on to beef up SA at the company level

That is not happening and that is the point. The traditional higher to lower in this fight does not work. That was apparent before we "transformed" the BCT; that transformation certainly complicated life. The company effort is centered on its AO and it drives the continual assessment process.

ODB: I personally am having a hard time accepting the fact you need company level intel cells. Very few units in the Army push missions up vs. missions being pushed down.

That too is happening as astute S3s at BN pick up on the fact that their line companies have the best operational grasp.

Again, I will suggest that if you have access you go read some of the material on this subject. If you don't have access, look at CPT Gwinn's article as an example. It is here on SWJ.

Tom

[Ken White]

WM said:

We have pushed much of what used to be a division-level function down to the BCTs, Bde-level work has devolved to the Bn TOC, and a company has now become a defacto Bn with regard to certain staff functions/size of its AO. Companies in the AOR seem to operate rather independently and, despite the promise of a "netcentric push" of intel, they need situational awareness (SA) assets to keep their heads (and tails) orientated properly.

To which I'd respond that the 'Division' idea only really worked two places -- in garrison around the world; and in combat ONLY in the desert (North Africa WW II, DS/DS and OIF I); the rest of the time from the revolution forward we have, regardless of the existence of Divisions essentially fought as Regiments, RCTs or Bdes -- so what we really did was not a push down; it was simply an alignment of resources to the proper working level. Long overdue. I'd further suggest the only reason the Division still exists is to justify a slew of MG and BG spaces.

Companies should have been de-facto bns (in the sense I think you mean) many years ago and should be even more independent that they now are.

I think Tom expresses it well.