USIP: Constitutional Reform in Iraq: Improving Prospects, Political Decisions Needed

[marct]

Hi Rob and Rex,

Rex, a worthwhile bit of reading that should simulate some discussion,

I'll second that.

We tend to focus on an organizational political body as the reflection of reconciliation, integration, tolerance, stability and peace, but does that mean it is the only means to accomplish the ends?

I would have to say "no" while, at the same time, noting that this is a fairly recent historical development.

If a government adopts a policy or enacts legislation, but for whatever reason the populace will not or cannot accept it - does that still make it valid? Will a domestic policy be sustainable if it does not have domestic support? Will a politician push or support domestic legislation if the constituents he or she represents threatens to abandon them?

Some really good, and really tricky questions, Rob. I hope TT and John will jump in on them, since I'm not a political scientist . Having said that, however, let me toss out a few observations from mine own, biased, position.

"Validity" is, to my mind, a social construct in politics. I believe that it is quite rare, possibly limited to the Anglo complex and, I think, Salic law, that a "law" that is invalid should be overthrown. I'm thinking about Magna Carta style right of revolt, ad yet your first question seems to be predicated on the assumption that something like that exists. I think that most societies have a very different, starker, view of governments and laws. Durkheim once wrote (Elementary forms of Religious Life) that religion is society worshiping itself (i.e. that religion is a sacralization of the social system). I that is true in some cases, and I think it is, then "legislation" has the power of "divine writ" and is not to be questioned. That certainly seems to fit into the older Temple States and a number of other societies.

But if that is the case, and the populace cannot accept a piece of legislation, then there becomes a moral imperative to destroy the government that enacted it, since they are "polluting" the "sacred". It does strike me that the key word is cannot as opposed to just saying that there is no popular support for it.

On your second question, I would have to say that it is possible to keep a piece of legislation if there is no support for it as long as it does not cross the line of becoming a "danger". Some legislative artifacts, i.e. remnants of moral codes from older historical periods that no longer have general moral support, certainly can be kept around. Sometimes, people have just forgotten about them and sometimes they have been exapted into serving a new purpose. Newer legislation would be harder, to my mind, but it could still be done if it was sold under an exapted purpose - the form of government in Afghanistan is a good example of that.

On your final question, I think the answer depends on the political system and the motivations of the individual politician.

This is one of the problems I have with what I understand about the GAO report on political benchmarks, be they good or bad, do they reflect the willingness of the people to reconcile, share, integrate, etc. ....
I think a more accurate barometer for Iraq's path to security and eventually stability at this juncture might be found at the grass roots level because if the people and their societal leadership have decided they can or cannot live with it, it will come to be reflected by the risks the politicians are willing to take. If we want an accurate assessment of potential and progress, we probably need to stop mirror imaging the type of consensus we wish we had in our own domestic politics, and instead see the challenges as they are.

I would certainly have to agree with this. A lot of the difficulties I have seen in both Afghanistan and Iraq stem from what I have to characterize as an amazingly naive assumption about what politics "should be". Some of my more left wing colleagues would describe it as the "imposition of American Hegemony" but, personally, I am more inclined to assume ignorance than malice . I'm calling it "ignorance" because the actions of imposing republican forms of government in both states seems to go against the expressed wishes of many of the populace. This is one of the paradoxes inherent in the promulgation of "democracy" by the west. Do "we" accept the democratically made decisions of other nations when they go against our own national interests?

Marc

[marct]

I think this really illustrates some of the points I was making. Have fun...

Marc

[Tom Odom]

I would certainly have to agree with this. A lot of the difficulties I have seen in both Afghanistan and Iraq stem from what I have to characterize as an amazingly naive assumption about what politics "should be". Some of my more left wing colleagues would describe it as the "imposition of American Hegemony" but, personally, I am more inclined to assume ignorance than malice .

Marc,

While I would perhaps agree on a lack of malice, I would have to say the the degree of determined ignorance well exceeded the threshold for outright stupidity, the classic case being of course Paul Wolfowitz statement that there were no ethnic divisions in Iraq as in the Balkans. The real issue of course is whether reality has set in; I guess that it has, given that we are now hailing tribalism as an element of emerging democracy, an true oxymoron if there ever was one.

Best

Tom

[tequila]

I would certainly have to agree with this. A lot of the difficulties I have seen in both Afghanistan and Iraq stem from what I have to characterize as an amazingly naive assumption about what politics "should be". Some of my more left wing colleagues would describe it as the "imposition of American Hegemony" but, personally, I am more inclined to assume ignorance than malice . I'm calling it "ignorance" because the actions of imposing republican forms of government in both states seems to go against the expressed wishes of many of the populace. This is one of the paradoxes inherent in the promulgation of "democracy" by the west. Do "we" accept the democratically made decisions of other nations when they go against our own national interests?

This is interesting to me, since I think a review of the history will show that direct elections and the rapid democratic transition in Iraq were in fact "imposed" on the U.S. by the Shia political parties and massive public demonstrations ordered by Grand Ayatollah Ali al-Sistani --- the original CPA plan proposed by Bremer called for "caucuses" where voters would choose from a CPA-approved slate of candidates (similar to Iranian-style elections). In fact, I have a hard time finding any sort of "anti-democratic" rhetoric coming from any Iraqi political figure outside the jihadi/ISI ranks - even Sunni politicians and groups like the Association of Muslim Scholars do not discount elections as a means of legitimate government.

[marct]

Hi Tequila,

This is interesting to me, since I think a review of the history will show that direct elections and the rapid democratic transition in Iraq were in fact "imposed" on the U.S. by the Shia political parties and massive public demonstrations ordered by Grand Ayatollah Ali al-Sistani --- the original CPA plan proposed by Bremer called for "caucuses" where voters would choose from a CPA-approved slate of candidates (similar to Iranian-style elections). In fact, I have a hard time finding any sort of "anti-democratic" rhetoric coming from any Iraqi political figure outside the jihadi/ISI ranks - even Sunni politicians and groups like the Association of Muslim Scholars do not discount elections as a means of legitimate government.

I certainly don't deny that "democracy" was being hailed by many Iraqis. But, I would have to ask, democracy to what end? First off, the Iraqi leaders are well aware that any rhetoric opposing democracy would be a failure - they're not stupid . There is no doubt in my mind that "democracy" is to the current world what the divine right of kings was to the 15th century - the generally accepted way of getting a government.

Still and all, Hamas was democratically elected, the current Iranian government was democratically elected as were Hitler, Stalin, Idi Amin and Pol Pot. And, as I think we all know, every tin pot dictator running around for the past 50 years has been "democratically" elected. My comments were aimed more at the difference between the form of legitimacy and the reality of power. The Western forms of democracy all have some connection between the form and the exercise of power. This is, in part, a result of certain cultural assumptions that exist in our background. That "should be" I used was a way to point towards that.

The naivety that I was talking about was the blythe assumption that such a series of assumptions either existed or where strong enough within Iraq and Afghanistan to allow for a republican form of government that would work in the ways they do in the west.

Marc

[tequila]

The Western forms of democracy all have some connection between the form and the exercise of power. This is, in part, a result of certain cultural assumptions that exist in our background. That "should be" I used was a way to point towards that.

Actually, I think this is one example where the non-Western form of democracy --- direct elections --- had a far greater connection between the form and the exercise of power than the preferred American solution of indirect elections/caucuses from a preselected slate of candidates. Undoubtedly in the American scenario, power would have remained completely with CPA officials as opposed to Iraqi political figures.

[marct]

Hi Tequila,

Actually, I think this is one example where the non-Western form of democracy --- direct elections --- had a far greater connection between the form and the exercise of power than the preferred American solution of indirect elections/caucuses from a preselected slate of candidates. Undoubtedly in the American scenario, power would have remained completely with CPA officials as opposed to Iraqi political figures.

True, but don't forget that Canada has direct elections . The indirect / caucus form tends to be more centered in the US or when party organizations absolutely control the process (BTW, did you know that in our last election, one of the Quebec ridings returned an Independent radio Shock Jock? Talk about direct elections!).

Marc

[tequila]

I think comparing the planned CPA system with American caucus system for party nominations isn't really valid, as those caucuses don't occur with candidates preselected by foreign officials who currently run the country.

[Rob Thornton]

From Marc:

"Validity" is, to my mind, a social construct in politics. I believe that it is quite rare, possibly limited to the Anglo complex and, I think, Salic law, that a "law" that is invalid should be overthrown. I'm thinking about Magna Carta style right of revolt, ad yet your first question seems to be predicated on the assumption that something like that exists. I think that most societies have a very different, starker, view of governments and laws. Durkheim once wrote (Elementary forms of Religious Life) that religion is society worshiping itself (i.e. that religion is a sacralization of the social system). I that is true in some cases, and I think it is, then "legislation" has the power of "divine writ" and is not to be questioned. That certainly seems to fit into the older Temple States and a number of other societies.

But if that is the case, and the populace cannot accept a piece of legislation, then there becomes a moral imperative to destroy the government that enacted it, since they are "polluting" the "sacred". It does strike me that the key word is cannot as opposed to just saying that there is no popular support for it.

Marc, the reason I bolded some of the quote was to highlight some important differences you pointed out the role of politics & religion in diverse societies. I just need to think about that for awhile

Best regards, Rob

[Rex Brynen]

Still and all, Hamas was democratically elected, the current Iranian government was democratically elected as were Hitler, Stalin, Idi Amin and Pol Pot.

Well no, they weren't (with the exception of Hamas, and the only partial exception of Iran). It is true that they all tried to claim democratic legitimacy (which is I think your point), but I think that only highlights the (potential) power of expressed popular consent.

The Western forms of democracy all have some connection between the form and the exercise of power. This is, in part, a result of certain cultural assumptions that exist in our background.

The question of democracy and underlying political culture is a hotly debated (perhaps THE most hotly debated) issue in the democratization literature. Certainly it helps a great deal if underlying cultural values support democracy—but the "third wave" of democratization suggested that it could also take root in societies with no prior history of democratic politics.

The naivety that I was talking about was the blythe assumption that such a series of assumptions either existed or where strong enough within Iraq and Afghanistan to allow for a republican form of government that would work in the ways they do in the west.

Yes, absolutely.

"Validity" is, to my mind, a social construct in politics. I believe that it is quite rare, possibly limited to the Anglo complex and, I think, Salic law, that a "law" that is invalid should be overthrown. I'm thinking about Magna Carta style right of revolt, and yet your first question seems to be predicated on the assumption that something like that exists. I think that most societies have a very different, starker, view of governments and laws.

I think the prevailing social practice in much of the world is not so much overturning laws, or the governments that made them, but rather simply ignoring them (or a passive-aggressive non-cooperation with government, in what James Scott called "everyday forms of resistance")--especially where the central government lacks the ability to enforce its legal writ.

I tend to think that democratic politics has a lot to do with boundaries of the acceptable and unacceptable, in which public attitudes, capabilities, perceived intentions, and the local balance of forces play a key role. Democracies tend to work when political entrpreneurs are unwilling or unable to contemplate using nondemocratic methods to achieve policy ends. Its kind of like successful nuclear deterrence

[marct]

Hi Rex,

Well no, they weren't (with the exception of Hamas, and the only partial exception of Iran). It is true that they all tried to claim democratic legitimacy (which is I think your point), but I think that only highlights the (potential) power of expressed popular consent.

What I was trying to highlight was that a form was followed. I included the ones you say weren't democratically elected to make (admittedly poorly ) the point that all "democracies" are not total democracies. Every democratic society limits the franchise somehow or other, age if nothing else, and this creates a situation where it is very unlikely that you will ever have the expression of a full majority of "the people". Stalin, Idi Amin, Pol Pot all limited the franchise extensively, while Hitler used the mechanisms and forms of democracy in 1932 to do the same.

One of the things that bothers me a lot about the debates surrounding "democracy" is that there is very little discussion of the assumptions behind the franchise. It's a bit of a soapbox of mine left over from my time in politics.

The question of democracy and underlying political culture is a hotly debated (perhaps THE most hotly debated) issue in the democratization literature. Certainly it helps a great deal if underlying cultural values support democracy—but the "third wave" of democratization suggested that it could also take root in societies with no prior history of democratic politics.

Maybe I'm just being pessimistic, but I don't think it can in the vast majority of cases. A form of it, sure, but not if we mean something like universal suffrage of everyone over 18. And, even if that particular form were to come in, how would it be different from, say, US party politics but reflected via tribal "parties"? I think Rhodesia/Zimbabwe is a very god example of just that: tribal organization and power cloaked in a "democratic" form.

I think the prevailing social practice in much of the world is not so much overturning laws, or the governments that made them, but rather simply ignoring them (or a passive-aggressive non-cooperation with government, in what James Scott called "everyday forms of resistance")--especially where the central government lacks the ability to enforce its legal writ.

Agreed. The more extreme eamples would be, say, the Sudan.

I tend to think that democratic politics has a lot to do with boundaries of the acceptable and unacceptable, in which public attitudes, capabilities, perceived intentions, and the local balance of forces play a key role. Democracies tend to work when political entrpreneurs are unwilling or unable to contemplate using nondemocratic methods to achieve policy ends. Its kind of like successful nuclear deterrence

Oh, beautifully put! I really like that Rex! And it captures quite nicely why I feel that many efforts to "democratize" "nations" fail - the political entrepreneurs like the clothing of democracy; it's coll, hip and happening and guarantees they'll get all sorts of Western aid goodies, but the underlying assumptions are, essentially, non-democratic.

Marc

[tequila]

Stalin, Idi Amin, Pol Pot all limited the franchise extensively, while Hitler used the mechanisms and forms of democracy in 1932 to do the same.

One of the things that bothers me a lot about the debates surrounding "democracy" is that there is very little discussion of the assumptions behind the franchise. It's a bit of a soapbox of mine left over from my time in politics.

Idi Amin and Pol Pot never held elections. Stalin did not limit the franchise but rather banned all parties except the Communist Party, resulting often in single-candidate elections or elections where voters were given a choice of "yes/no" on the Party's selected candidate.

These rulers ruled primarily through nondemocratic means, not through manipulation of democratic forms.

I think better examples would be, for instance, Algeria under French rule, Rhodesia under the RF or South Africa under the National Party. In these cases, elections did matter as the winners did form governments that exercised power --- however these governments were not democratic as significant portions of the population were excluded through franchise limitation.

[TT]

Quote:

Originally Posted by marct
Still and all, Hamas was democratically elected, the current Iranian government was democratically elected as were Hitler, Stalin, Idi Amin and Pol Pot.

Rex
Well no, they weren't (with the exception of Hamas, and the only partial exception of Iran). It is true that they all tried to claim democratic legitimacy (which is I think your point), but I think that only highlights the (potential) power of expressed popular consent.

The question of ‘legitimacy’ is a bit of a slippery concept these days. In the post WWII period, the legitimacy of a state, and more particularly its gov’t, was not a function of the population of that state, rather it was conferred by the international community. That is, other states would accept the gov’t, whatever form it was, as being legitimate and opened diplomatic relations, and so on and so forth, up to offering a new gov’t/state a seat in the UN (if it was a new independent state – ie decolonized) or allowing the new gov’t to assume their state's seat in the UN. The UN Charter reflects a state centric, or what is often referred to as a Westphalian perspective, in which states are sovereign. The UN Charter pretty much says that what a gov’t does internally, even to its own people, is none of any other states business. In world we live in today, the international system tends to distinguish between 'good' states (democratic) and 'bad' (non democratic and/or gov’t that violate international norms), so gov’t will, as Rex importantly noted, ‘claim’ to be democratic. And states have made such claims going back essentially to WWII - the USSR went thru the motions of democratic elections while other states went further and named themselves ‘democratic’ (ie the German Democratic Republic aka East Germany).

Of course, subject populations, ignored in the state centric approach, have a very different perspective on ‘legitimacy’ and always have. Hence revolutions. In short, if the population of a state or segments of a population do not accept the legitimacy of their gov’t, then they may very well ignore its policies and carry on doing what they have been doing (and thinking). As an example, think of the cartels in Columbia that operated/operate by providing their local area with clean and repaired streets, medical clinics, low crime, etc, when the central gov’t will not or can not provide such. What do the cartels get for this largesse? The receiving population perceives the cartel as more legitimate as a governing body and hence will offer a form of protection or cover for the cartels from the efforts of the central gov’t. Worth noting, of course, is that if a state gov’t was willing to use brutal force against its own population, it could enforce at least superficial agreement/compliance from its population (think of those subversive Russian writers). But if the state is not willing (eg. Britain and Ghandi) or not able to enforce compliance, well……

In today's, much more transparent world, we are able to better estimate the degree of, as Rex says, popular consent - we no longer believe that states (gov'ts) can do as they please within their sovereign borders. That we are increasingly attuned to and pay attention to populations at the expense of their state, because our values are evolving to the point where the population is more important than the 'state' (we are willing to contemplate violating sovereignty for humanitarian purposes, up to using force to do so) is a significant shift in international affairs. The confering of legitimacy not longer lies just with the international, it also increasingly lies with the local population in the eyes of the international. This shift, however, is in early days, and may not go anywhere (Burma and Zimbabwe). And of course, the down side of the attendent erosion of state sovereignty (or state legitimacy) are 'the ugly' - non state actors such as al Qaeda.

TT