USIP: Constitutional Reform in Iraq: Improving Prospects, Political Decisions Needed

[Rob Thornton]

From Marc:

"Validity" is, to my mind, a social construct in politics. I believe that it is quite rare, possibly limited to the Anglo complex and, I think, Salic law, that a "law" that is invalid should be overthrown. I'm thinking about Magna Carta style right of revolt, ad yet your first question seems to be predicated on the assumption that something like that exists. I think that most societies have a very different, starker, view of governments and laws. Durkheim once wrote (Elementary forms of Religious Life) that religion is society worshiping itself (i.e. that religion is a sacralization of the social system). I that is true in some cases, and I think it is, then "legislation" has the power of "divine writ" and is not to be questioned. That certainly seems to fit into the older Temple States and a number of other societies.

But if that is the case, and the populace cannot accept a piece of legislation, then there becomes a moral imperative to destroy the government that enacted it, since they are "polluting" the "sacred". It does strike me that the key word is cannot as opposed to just saying that there is no popular support for it.

Marc, the reason I bolded some of the quote was to highlight some important differences you pointed out the role of politics & religion in diverse societies. I just need to think about that for awhile

Best regards, Rob

[Rob Thornton]

Hi RA,

This is why I asked about the objective when I first joined this prestigious group. According to RTK:

In short, it's to win.

As per National Strategy for Victory in Iraq published November 2005. This has not changed.

Victory in Iraq is Defined in Stages
• Short term, Iraq is making steady progress in fighting terrorists, meeting political milestones, building democratic institutions, and standing up security forces.

The tactical COIN progress we're making isn't moving us toward the strategic objective. That's obviously a problem. Especially since the tactics are costing us so much in dollars and blood. Probably the best we can hope for is that AQI can't operate in Iraq. Changing the objective to, "Remove al Qaeda from Iraq" would enable us to win much quicker and cheaper than under the current objectives. Plus domestically, the majority of the population would support it.

I think in this case, tactical success is being translated into operational success and is establishing the conditions for strategic success - but I don't think it is necessarily manifesting itself in the ways we (the big broad "we") are looking for it. We want to see political reconciliation writ large, but that is going to take a long time and its going to require a long period of relative security and stability to occur - we're talking integration to achieve a pluralistic values based society in somewhere we are only now beginning to achieve relative security - how long does it take to effect social change under the best of conditions?

I guess the next big question is if its worth it. That is the source of great debate - what are the primary and extended consequences of changing the objectives (or not changing the objectives). While I appreciate RTK's concise definition, I think it deserves to be placed in the context of preserving our vital interests, and in a lesser sense those of the larger environment we have to live in. Its complicated, of course if it were not we'd have figured it out by now

Best Regards, Rob

[Tom Odom]

I think in this case, tactical success is being translated into operational success and is establishing the conditions for strategic success - but I don't think it is necessarily manifesting itself in the ways we (the big broad "we") are looking for it.

Rob,

I will have to disagree with that one; we have changed defintions for success and the absolute criterion for that success is ever evolving. We meanwhile keep saying this is a surprise. Exactly what is surprising in that the Sunni tribal leaders chose an alliance of convenience when AQI threatened their pregogatives? And I would ask the same thing about the definition of strategic succeess? An Iraq that is stable? An Iraq that is democratic? Those two are not in my view compatible; to the contrary, they have been antagonistic goals. As for the time required to achieve a "strategic success," saying that it will take a long time merely begs the question of how long is long when time is something extremely short.

I agree on the issue of vital interests: I have yet to see a concise defintion of what those interests are and how they align with Iraq's future. There is too much speculation and hype regarding our future course of action from either side of the debate. And there are larger vital interests which are affected by the war in Iraq, some very much closer to home when it comes to funding choices.

Best

Tom

[Rob Thornton]

Hey Tom,

Its something I'm trying to work through - in this case I'm relating operational success to AQ and some of the other AIF groups diminishing freedom of movement and action as they are separated from the population. The tactical successes are the individual tribal alliances being made (and some of the broader alliances being formed where the tribes are more extended) and the success of CF and ISF. Its does not fit well with some of the examples I was taught about operational success - because its less physical I guess. I think its important to define or at least come to a general understanding how to obtain an operational advantage in this type of environment without cloaking it in EBO campaign design.

I agree with you that it should not have been a surprise. Its fair to say its human nature, and speaks to that sometimes para-phrased proverb about "me against my brother, my brother against my cousin, my cousin against the world". Political relationships of convenience are nothing new - you certainly see them here. It may just be what works for these folks for the moment, but I think MNFI is pursuing the right LLOO. Its also the problem I'm having with our criteria being too dependent on what the Iraqi Central government is able to accomplish when they may not have the domestic political reach to accomplish it - that kind of gets to the questions that Marc & Rex were trying to help me understand.

I think I understand the vital interests part. I think its really about world energy markets, long term regional instability and the effects on the global economy. Its not just about where we get our oil, but because so many others are dependent on the region we could be facing larger global instability as states with means struggle to keep their domestic issues in check. In that regard, I see us involved in the region long term. To make matters worse we are the ones that took the lid off the box we created - so there are some other peripheral interests to consider -like credibility, influence, etc.

The oil/gas resources and the wider instability (economies, etc.) combined with regional power redistribution are what defines the vital importance of Iraq from a non-emotional point of view. From the biased, personal side - its the personal investment - I'm aware of it, but try to keep them separate.

Strategic success then might be better defined as long term regional stability - its just a question of the best ways to bring that about - it certainly provides more options - although some might be outside of our strategic culture.

And there are larger vital interests which are affected by the war in Iraq, some very much closer to home when it comes to funding choices.

I think that is an important observation that has to be weighed against our continued investment in Iraq. There are many domestic issues (immigration, health care, the domestic economy, infrastructure, disaster relief, education and many others) which could have been addressed and will continue to suffer unless we scale back our investment i Iraq. There are also a host of other foreign policy issues which have taken a backseat (the effects of large migrations, rising economic powers, pandemics, AQ outside of Iraq, climate changes, Narco-traffic/terror, etc.) - it makes you wonder if we even know how much damage has been done to some of those or how those problems relate to others?

There is too much speculation and hype regarding our future course of action from either side of the debate.

I think this month is going to be ugly - you'd think Don King was promoting the testimony.

Thanks for forcing me to clarify what I'm thinking my way through - it helps - although I don't think I'm where I want to be yet.

Best Regards, Rob