Recruiting for SWC members because....

[Bob's World]

We have learned how to do the wrong things better, but at the same time have somehow convinced ourselves that any strategic failures in the face of that tactical prowess are the fault of others - the host, the congress, the unwillingness to fully commit to a Clausewitzian or Galulaian solution either one, etc.


I for one hope that the primary lesson learned is that we still are not very good at this and that our "new" approaches are no better than our old ones at actually helping some place become more naturally stable; and that forced conditions of artificial stability by our hands are harder to create and less durable to sustain in the emerging environment. They also will remain hotbeds for follow-on insurgencies and recruiting grounds for acts of transnational terrorism.

In the words of Huey Lewis, we "need a new drug."

[davidbfpo]

Bill M. asks a good question:

What lessons do you feel are critical that we allegedly learned since 9/11 that we are at risk of losing?

So I think a thread entitled 'Lost Lessons' may emerge, but then Madhu's post entitled 'I don't see any fresh thinking on Small Wars....' gives a contrary viewpoint. So the thread maybe called 'Lost Lessons & Fresh Thinking: a challenge for SWC'.

My reopening of this thread was four days ago and we have just hit a 1k views, with thirty one posts. That indicates to me an ample readership, but only a fraction comment.

[slapout9]

In the late 40's and early 50's the Air Force came up with the concept of using an American Air Force and a small force of advosrs(CIA) but let the supporting country supply the needed Army. So I say the biggest lesson lost is that the Air Force cannot fight a Small War.....They can.

[Bob's World]

In the late 40's and early 50's the Air Force came up with the concept of using an American Air Force and a small force of advosrs(CIA) but let the supporting country supply the needed Army. So I say the biggest lesson lost is that the Air Force cannot fight a Small War.....They can.

Back when the Air Force was made up of Army guys??

Try to get the current Air Force to invest in the platforms necessary for that type of engagement today. Even AFSOC is invested in the wrong platforms the wrong personnel, and focused on the wrong missions to support small wars effectively.

But your point is a valid one.

[davidbfpo]

In the late 40's and early 50's the Air Force came up with the concept of using an American Air Force and a small force of advisers (CIA) but let the supporting country supply the needed Army. So I say the biggest lesson lost is that the Air Force cannot fight a Small War.....They can.

Slap,

Was this concept proved though? If so please enlighten me, where?

Sounds like the Imperial British 'air policing' model used in the Middle East, notably in Iraq and less certain now on he North-west Frontier between the wars.

[Fuchs]

Slap,

Was this concept proved though? If so please enlighten me, where?

Sounds like the Imperial British 'air policing' model used in the Middle East, notably in Iraq and less certain now on he North-west Frontier between the wars.

Afghanistan invasion 2001.

The concept's description does indeed sound conspicuously like the British aerial 'policing' over Iraq around 1930, though.


The idea of running a small war with the air force is q highly questionable one. Air force and even more so naval air operations are insanely expensive (especially if you don't want to have troops in the country to run and guard bases and supply convoys). Small wars' utility is rather small, so the means employed should have rather low variable costs.

[Steve Blair]

Slap,

Was this concept proved though? If so please enlighten me, where?

Sounds like the Imperial British 'air policing' model used in the Middle East, notably in Iraq and less certain now on he North-west Frontier between the wars.

The concept was resurrected in no small part due to the budget wars playing out at the end of the Eisenhower administration and the transition to Kennedy and his "flexible response" ideas. In particular they were trying to fend off an emphasis on conventional conflict (and special operations) that might cut into their bomber funding (and the rise of helicopters within the Army drove their thinking as well, but that's a different story in some ways). Fuchs is correct that something superficially similar did take place in Afghanistan. As for testing at the time, the Air Force claimed that some small-scale deployments in the late 1950s and early 1960s "validated the concept," but the only battlefield testing I'm aware of would have taken place in Laos. And even then it wasn't the same thing.

And Bob, they didn't invest in the platforms to fight that kind of war back then, let alone now.

[Dayuhan]

In the late 40's and early 50's the Air Force came up with the concept of using an American Air Force and a small force of advosrs(CIA) but let the supporting country supply the needed Army. So I say the biggest lesson lost is that the Air Force cannot fight a Small War.....They can.

Aren't we the supporting country?

That might work in some circumstances, if the country we're supporting has a functional army and the terrain is suitable. There will also be many circumstances in which it will not work, notably those in which the "country" we're supporting has no army, or if we've chosen to disband that army.

The US, it seems to me, has a uniquely persistent habit of entering what might be called "large small wars": conflicts that may be fought on a "small wars" model, but with a scope, duration, and expenditure that are anything but small. Creating a government, building a nation, installing a democracy are not small endeavors. If we adopt goals that require us to do these things, we are moving into a large small war, and that's troublesome territory. In a large small war attrition and political will become major factors, and public tolerance will be limited.

One overlooked lesson, if it was ever learned in the first place, would be to keep small wars small, and to resist the temptation to pursue objectives that push the scale out of hand.