Recruiting for SWC members because....

[Bill Moore]

For the group at large, many have commented that here we go again, we're going to forget all the lessons learnt about Small Wars just like we did after Vietnam. What lessons do you feel are critical that we allegedly learned since 9/11 that we are at risk of losing?

This is an important question, because so far no one has really addressed it.

I'll challenge some comments I find to be illogical that are offered up by small wars advocates:

1. DOD pushed the "Rebalance to the Asia-Pacific" so they could focus on big wars and ignore small wars. This is wrong on all accounts. The rebalance to the Asia-Pacific was directed by our National Leadership (not DOD) for very sound strategic reasons. It just so happens that there are a number of potential scenarios in the region that could result in a state on state conflict of significant severity. DOD is focused on preventing those, if that fails we have to be ready to fight. The number of U.S. service members that would be killed in a conventional conflict would most likely be significantly higher than those killed in Small Wars. Bottom line we have to be ready for the unlikely, because the unlikely is more important to our national interests than the very often exaggerated threat from small wars to our interests. Second, there are more small wars in the PACOM area of responsibility than any other. There are over 20 separatist, insurgencies and terrorist movements in India along, and the number rapidly increases as you start moving east through Bangladesh, Nepal, Burma, Thailand, etc. The PACOM conducts FID in a number of countries (at different levels), so no one is exactly running away from Small Wars, but at the same time our leaders have an appreciation of the full spectrum of threats and what ones pose significant risk to us, and which ones simply counter some of our interest.

2. There are more small wars than larger state on state wars. That is very true, and lets hope that remains the case. However, in and of itself that is not a strong argument for the U.S. military to focus on Small Wars, because the vast majority of them we have little or nothing to do with. On the other hand, it is important to note that sometimes it is very much in our interests to engage in Small Wars for strategic reasons (not just because there are more of them).

3. We lost our Small Wars knowledge after Vietnam? What small wars skills did we gain during Vietnam that we lost? I admit many in the conventional army and Marines (especially LTCs and below in the 90s couldn't spell insurgency) may have ignored them, but Special Forces and some elements of general purpose forces were constantly engaged in small wars around the globe since the end of the Vietnam until 9/11. I came in during the late 70s and most of my career was focused on so called small wars and irregular warfare.

4. At the tactical and operational level what did we learn since 9/11 that we need to maintain that we're at risk of losing? I don't want to touch policy an and strategy, because we apparently didn't learn much in that regard. I can think of a few things, but want to hear your comments first.

The point of this effort is to move beyond the empty rhetoric of here we go again repeating history and tossing the baby out with the bath water and identify specific skills and knowledge we're at risk of losing. Once identified we can develop recommended ways to preserve these skills/knowledge.

I'm not convinced our military was as ate up as some of you seem to think. Our guys were doing back to back rotations in Bosnia and Kosovo prior to going into Afghanistan and Iraq, and that was certainly a messy small war by definition. 3d Special Forces Group (many of them) deployed to Afghanistan shortly after redeploying from Africa where they were supporting Peace Operations (small wars in this case), we had a long history of conducting counter narcotics missions globally (small wars sort of), and the list goes on. Go back to the 80s the list gets much more extensive. We seemed to do pretty well initially in Afghanistan with a few extraordinary men, local partners, and bombers. It got stupid when the policy got stupid. We did well in Iraq, to include the SF units working with Kurds who played a significant role in the decisive operations to oust Saddam. It was our politicians who denied we faced an insurgency that delayed the military's adaption to the threat. Not saying big Army was prepared for what came, but it wasn't as simple as some here seem to imply it was.

[Bob's World]

We have learned how to do the wrong things better, but at the same time have somehow convinced ourselves that any strategic failures in the face of that tactical prowess are the fault of others - the host, the congress, the unwillingness to fully commit to a Clausewitzian or Galulaian solution either one, etc.


I for one hope that the primary lesson learned is that we still are not very good at this and that our "new" approaches are no better than our old ones at actually helping some place become more naturally stable; and that forced conditions of artificial stability by our hands are harder to create and less durable to sustain in the emerging environment. They also will remain hotbeds for follow-on insurgencies and recruiting grounds for acts of transnational terrorism.

In the words of Huey Lewis, we "need a new drug."

[davidbfpo]

Bill M. asks a good question:

What lessons do you feel are critical that we allegedly learned since 9/11 that we are at risk of losing?

So I think a thread entitled 'Lost Lessons' may emerge, but then Madhu's post entitled 'I don't see any fresh thinking on Small Wars....' gives a contrary viewpoint. So the thread maybe called 'Lost Lessons & Fresh Thinking: a challenge for SWC'.

My reopening of this thread was four days ago and we have just hit a 1k views, with thirty one posts. That indicates to me an ample readership, but only a fraction comment.

[slapout9]

In the late 40's and early 50's the Air Force came up with the concept of using an American Air Force and a small force of advosrs(CIA) but let the supporting country supply the needed Army. So I say the biggest lesson lost is that the Air Force cannot fight a Small War.....They can.

[Bob's World]

In the late 40's and early 50's the Air Force came up with the concept of using an American Air Force and a small force of advosrs(CIA) but let the supporting country supply the needed Army. So I say the biggest lesson lost is that the Air Force cannot fight a Small War.....They can.

Back when the Air Force was made up of Army guys??

Try to get the current Air Force to invest in the platforms necessary for that type of engagement today. Even AFSOC is invested in the wrong platforms the wrong personnel, and focused on the wrong missions to support small wars effectively.

But your point is a valid one.

[davidbfpo]

In the late 40's and early 50's the Air Force came up with the concept of using an American Air Force and a small force of advisers (CIA) but let the supporting country supply the needed Army. So I say the biggest lesson lost is that the Air Force cannot fight a Small War.....They can.

Slap,

Was this concept proved though? If so please enlighten me, where?

Sounds like the Imperial British 'air policing' model used in the Middle East, notably in Iraq and less certain now on he North-west Frontier between the wars.

[Fuchs]

Slap,

Was this concept proved though? If so please enlighten me, where?

Sounds like the Imperial British 'air policing' model used in the Middle East, notably in Iraq and less certain now on he North-west Frontier between the wars.

Afghanistan invasion 2001.

The concept's description does indeed sound conspicuously like the British aerial 'policing' over Iraq around 1930, though.


The idea of running a small war with the air force is q highly questionable one. Air force and even more so naval air operations are insanely expensive (especially if you don't want to have troops in the country to run and guard bases and supply convoys). Small wars' utility is rather small, so the means employed should have rather low variable costs.

[Steve Blair]

Slap,

Was this concept proved though? If so please enlighten me, where?

Sounds like the Imperial British 'air policing' model used in the Middle East, notably in Iraq and less certain now on he North-west Frontier between the wars.

The concept was resurrected in no small part due to the budget wars playing out at the end of the Eisenhower administration and the transition to Kennedy and his "flexible response" ideas. In particular they were trying to fend off an emphasis on conventional conflict (and special operations) that might cut into their bomber funding (and the rise of helicopters within the Army drove their thinking as well, but that's a different story in some ways). Fuchs is correct that something superficially similar did take place in Afghanistan. As for testing at the time, the Air Force claimed that some small-scale deployments in the late 1950s and early 1960s "validated the concept," but the only battlefield testing I'm aware of would have taken place in Laos. And even then it wasn't the same thing.

And Bob, they didn't invest in the platforms to fight that kind of war back then, let alone now.

[Dayuhan]

In the late 40's and early 50's the Air Force came up with the concept of using an American Air Force and a small force of advosrs(CIA) but let the supporting country supply the needed Army. So I say the biggest lesson lost is that the Air Force cannot fight a Small War.....They can.

Aren't we the supporting country?

That might work in some circumstances, if the country we're supporting has a functional army and the terrain is suitable. There will also be many circumstances in which it will not work, notably those in which the "country" we're supporting has no army, or if we've chosen to disband that army.

The US, it seems to me, has a uniquely persistent habit of entering what might be called "large small wars": conflicts that may be fought on a "small wars" model, but with a scope, duration, and expenditure that are anything but small. Creating a government, building a nation, installing a democracy are not small endeavors. If we adopt goals that require us to do these things, we are moving into a large small war, and that's troublesome territory. In a large small war attrition and political will become major factors, and public tolerance will be limited.

One overlooked lesson, if it was ever learned in the first place, would be to keep small wars small, and to resist the temptation to pursue objectives that push the scale out of hand.