Recruiting for SWC members because....

[Morgan]

It does seem we're often kicking a dead horse. I also agree with whoever wrote that the quality of the articles overall are going down, and if peer review was mandated SWJ would return to it original quality level articles.

I, too, hope I'm not looked upon as one of "those people" that is less than qualified to add to the discussion on here.

As to the topics being discussed, while some have been discussed at length, some have barely been addressed.

For example I just ran across an article about a proposal to create a new agency....US Office of Contingency Operations. Apparently, Rep. Steve Stockman of Texas has put forth HR 2606 that advocates the creation of an agency that is designed to focus on stabilization & reconstruction operations instead of relying on ad-hoc relationships seen during the last 10+ years. I advocated something similar (Bureau of Strategic Assistance) in an earlier article. I think this proposal is a pretty good idea. Any takers on this new topic of discussion?

[Bill Moore]

http://www.govtrack.us/congress/bill...r2606#overview

4% chance of getting past committee.
1% chance of being enacted.

This overall idea is far from new, I only posted the link above to provide "one" perspective on the possibility of it going anywhere.

The following link is more entertaining.

http://www.phibetaiota.net/2010/01/j...cy-operations/

“That proposal may be controversial in some circles — particularly in areas the development community, where there’s concern that USOCO might represent a more cumbersome bureaucratic structure. But Bowen’s idea is attracting some powerful allies, like the widely admired former U.S. ambassador to Iraq, Ryan Crocker. “I do support the concept,” Crocker, the incoming dean of the George Bush School of Government at Texas A&M University, emailed me. “The current situation requires a perpetual reinventing of wheels and a huge amount of effort by those trying to manage contingencies.”

Don't forget rice bowls (U.S. Dept of State and USAID).

http://www.state.gov/j/cso/releases/...013/206410.htm

GOAL #1. Make an impact in three or four places of strategic significance: In 2012, CSO focused 80 percent of its effort on four major engagements – Burma, Honduras, Kenya and Syria. CSO also worked in more than 15 other countries, including Afghanistan, Belize, the Central African Republic, Democratic Republic of Congo, Libya, Nigeria, Senegal, Sierra Leone, and South Sudan.

Clearly an argument can be made that all these countries are so much better since CSO has intervened on their behalf; however, I can't make it.

It is a worthwhile topic to resurface, I realize OCO is a new proposal, but it is the same gal we talked about before. She is just wearing a different dress.

My two cents:

Cent one: If we're going to do it, we should of course endeavor to do it effectively.

Cent two: There is no clear linkage between doing reconstruction and stability in areas where the conflict is based on ethnic conflict. So even if we do it get right, which is doubtful, what will it accomplish? That is how I would frame the debate.

[jmm99]

My three or four cents worth.

My premise is that people post because of a combination (variable per person and per post) of (1) a desire to add value useful to others; and (2) self-interest.

Nothing about that is novel. Just over a century ago, James Malony Spaight, in his 1911 classic "War Rights on Land", pp.17-18, made both points:

Many causes are at the bottom of the general neglect of the study of war law. The time of officers is fairly well occupied, nowadays, in regimental duties and training work. They say, who know, that the British Army is a finer engine of war to-day than it has ever been. Most gladly and thankfully I accept that statement ; yet I am entirely and most sincerely convinced that one small, not unimportant, though neglected, part of the machinery needs oiling and attention. War law has never been presented to officers in an attractive form, as it might have been (I submit with diffidence) if the writers had insisted on the historical, human, and practical side rather than on the legal and theoretical one.

and:

... for an ambitious subaltern who wishes to be known vaguely as an author and, at the same time, not to be troubled with undue inquiry into the claim on which his title rests, there can be no better subject than the International Law of War. For it is a quasi-military subject in which no one, in the army or out of it, is very deeply interested, which everyone very contentedly takes on trust, and which may be written about without one person in ten thousand being able to tell whether the writing is adequate or not.

While I do post for Spaight's higher purpose (with emphasis I hope on the historical, human, and practical side, and staying away from the theoretical legal weeds), I also admit that I post for the fun of it - the dilettante subaltern at work.

This is strictly a personal preference, but I like SWC better than SWJ - the former being more fun to me. Others prefer to read and not post at all. Others prefer more academic articles and post to SWJ. Different strokes, etc.

And, for a lot of military people today, I expect that decompression is a more important project than being an author (dilettante or otherwise ).

BL: I intend to keep on trucking.

Regards

Mike

[John T. Fishel]

This is my opinion. As such it is clearly open to challenge. But it is based on a fair historical perspective and so might be worth something. At the height of the COIN revival I was fearful that we would fall back into the default mode of trying to forget about small wars as we did after Vietnam. We also did the same after every single major war we have fought. After the Revolution we fought Indians in the Northwest Territories and Florida but then along came the War of 1812 with a major conventional enemy (and we darn near lost the war). After New Orleans we fought Indians again all over the West. Then along came the Mexican War against a major conventional enemy and Scott, Taylor, and Doniphan led us to victory. After that we had to learn to fight Indians all over again. In 1861 along came the civil war with West Pointers fighting West Pointers. Big armies on the move. Lots of technical innovation. After it was all over and Sheridan had scared the French out of Mexico massing 50,000 troops on the border, we had to learn to fight Indians again. Then we fought Spain in 1898 - it is amazing how many former Confederate generals marched again to the sound of the guns in the blue and khaki uniforms of the US, Fitzhugh Lee and William Oates come to mind. In the aftermath, the dirty little wars in the Philippines and Caribbean raised up and Pershing chased Pancho Villa all over Northern Mexico but we had to learn that these weren't the kinds of wars we were prepared to fight because people were not only not learning the lessons, they weren't even recording them. WWI was followed by the Banana Wars which only the Marines were interested enough to record but they were also preparing for the next big one. They published their Small Wars Manual at almost the same time as their Tentative Landing Operations Manual which was a major influence on conventional operations in WWII.

The point of all this is that neither our political nor our military leaders like the small, nasty, dirty wars. We all want to fight the "big one" (why are we pivoting toward Asia? - not merely for the obvious and real threat of China). As the small wars wind down, interest fall off among both military and civilian national security analysts. This leaves the door open for smart, intelligent challenges to the prevailing wisdom of small wars - challenges like those of Gian Gentile both on these pages and his new book. As for our junior officers, they are looking at being assigned to units planning against conventional conflicts with China (perhaps) and certainly not toward Iraq now seen in the media as a totally foolish effort without any redeeming social virtue or Afghanistan which our president says we are leaving in 2014 regardless of conditions on the ground. The Administration has floated the idea of no residual force of any kind - the zero option. and who wants to be the last casualty of a war we have deemed is not worth fighting anyway? As a result, interest in our broad topic has died down.

This fact - loss of broader interest - makes our forum (Journal and Council alike) all the more important. Here we can not only record the lessons we needed to learn but debate them and, perhaps, allow the next generation to actually learn them and not make the same mistakes that we and previous generations made.

On that note

Cheers

JohnT

[Steve Blair]

I agree with you, John, and have commented many times here about the similarities I feared (and am seeing) between what the Army (and military generally) did after Vietnam and what they're doing now. It's been something of a historical pattern for the US, and one that is concerning (or should be, at least). Information, knowledge, discussion, and historical context for small wars are all things that need to be preserved and continued. If not us, who?

[Fuchs]

The pattern which irritates me is that the U.S. returns into the wars of choice business again and again, no matter how poor an investment it is.

I don't care about whether it's a very poor or skilled and thus simple poor investment. Neither should be done.

[slapout9]

I go all the way back to the Urban Operations Journal (precursor to the Small Wars Journal) I can still remember when we couldn't even break 100 as far as members go. So what happened? It is pretty typical as far systems thinking goes. We went from the formative phase to the normative phase (which lead to the revamped Journal section) to where we are now.........the adaptive or integrative phase. We have to change(adapt) or we will get all extinct and stuff Not a good option. More is less...we need to focus. The Journal is competing with the Council....not good IMO.... we may need to kill it! Or we need to kill the Council but we have to choose IMO. I always felt all naked and stuff when I posted at the Journal.... it is nice and cozy over here.....that might be good but could also be bad.

Some of us are facing age and health issues that were not present at the Big Bang. Nobody knows where Ken White is! We are in deep sh@@ just like the country. Only one thing left to or figure out. We need a great Strategic Reawakening(is that a word?) anyway just my random thoughts from the cultural center of the Universe.

[Bill Moore]

I agree with you, John, and have commented many times here about the similarities I feared (and am seeing) between what the Army (and military generally) did after Vietnam and what they're doing now. It's been something of a historical pattern for the US, and one that is concerning (or should be, at least). Information, knowledge, discussion, and historical context for small wars are all things that need to be preserved and continued. If not us, who?

Institutionally yes, at the individual level I still see a high level of interest. Those of us in the SW community have to take some responsibility also, because we have a number of amateurish articles that claim all future wars will be small wars, and there has been too much non-critical comments on our COIN doctrine within our own community. In many ways the Small Wars tribe isn't that much different than the Big Wars tribe.

If we were more self-critical and receptive to non-doctrinal ideas instead of being perceived as COIN doctrine Kool-Aid drinkers (doesn't apply to all, or even most, but it does to many of our most vocal and well known SW advocates), and we provided options that supported achieving the balance between capabilities that SECDEF Gates advocated we may be in a different place. I too share your concerns that we'll throw the baby out with the bathwater, based on the past decade of far less than successful small wars. If our community provides options for future defense policy makers that address all security concerns (and hopefully our diehards in SWJ realize there are more security concerns than Small Wars) then maybe we'll bring the more rational and deep thinkers on war back into the community? SWJ has provided a great service to the national security discussions from the tactical to strategic levels, we just need to realize where our nation is at now and find a way to contribute to that dialogue in way that keeps small wars in the discussion.

[Steve Blair]

Institutionally yes, at the individual level I still see a high level of interest. Those of us in the SW community have to take some responsibility also, because we have a number of amateurish articles that claim all future wars will be small wars, and there has been too much non-critical comments on our COIN doctrine within our own community. In many ways the Small Wars tribe isn't that much different than the Big Wars tribe.

If we were more self-critical and receptive to non-doctrinal ideas instead of being perceived as COIN doctrine Kool-Aid drinkers (doesn't apply to all, or even most, but it does to many of our most vocal and well known SW advocates), and we provided options that supported achieving the balance between capabilities that SECDEF Gates advocated we may be in a different place. I too share your concerns that we'll throw the baby out with the bathwater, based on the past decade of far less than successful small wars. If our community provides options for future defense policy makers that address all security concerns (and hopefully our diehards in SWJ realize there are more security concerns than Small Wars) then maybe we'll bring the more rational and deep thinkers on war back into the community? SWJ has provided a great service to the national security discussions from the tactical to strategic levels, we just need to realize where our nation is at now and find a way to contribute to that dialogue in way that keeps small wars in the discussion.

Bill,

One of the problems I've seen historically is that this topic is usually viewed as an "either/or" sort of statement. There's too often a tendency to shove one of the topics off the table to make room for the other (or the "flavor of the month"). Obviously there are more security concerns than Small Wars, but small wars are the problem that just doesn't want to go away. I don't vocally advocate for one over the other: obviously they're equally important in a sense, with one or the other getting priority depending on the international situation. But I do worry that (yet again) we'll shed any number of hard-learned lessons (or learn the wrong ones) in our rush away from the current situation. We've done that so well too many times in the past.