Recruiting for SWC members because....

[Kevin23]

With drawdown's coming in Afpak along with the end of the War in Iraq, I feel we are at a crossroads over how to keep this site relevant going forward. I bring this issue up because I notice there has been an active dropoff in the number of articles on the main site, as well as the number of posts in the Council it's self recently.

Therefore, since I feel that SWJ/SWC has been such a valuable resource for both practitioners and students(like myself) of Small Wars. Espeically with debate and the exchange of information from those who have served in these types of conflicts, as well as those studying them, and who may face them in the future.

So I feel we are at a crossraods of how do we keep it relevant and a forum of discussion in regards to new challenges beyond Iraq & Afpak?

I'd like to hear the opinions of other's on here in terms of this issue, and what they think of the future of this site as well.

[davidbfpo]

Kevin23,

There is an earlier thread 'SWC disappointing' about a month ago, which I started after a Dutch comment:http://council.smallwarsjournal.com/...ad.php?t=14620

As SWC has a US majority IMHO it reflects the end of Iraq (OIF) and the intention to draw-down in Afghanistan. Instead of being active commitments, even war-fighting, Small Wars are likely to become more political and some may wish to "lurk" and not comment.

[Bill Moore]

I hope the community doesn't feel OIF and OEF are the only small wars in the world worthy of discussion and study. I realize they're the only small wars that we recently sent thousands of troops of to, so it is only natural that there may be members and viewers from the U.S. and elsewhere that will visit less frequently or leave the community altogether. On the other hand, since OIF and OEF-A were deeply flawed from a policy stand point, so deeply flawed they were abberrations in the study of small wars, it will be good news for the study of small wars when they pass into history. Africa, Central Asia, S. Asia, SE Asia are teeming with small wars that our media doesn't cover, which is why it is important we attempt to increase the number of contributions from non-U.S. writers and participants. I think we probably have chased some off with our biases, especially the general bias towards the approach to small wars that has been propagated in FM 3-24. I have yet to see an article from a Thailand security force that discusses their small war in Southern Thailand, or their successful COIN operation against a communist insurgency in the 70s. There is amble room for African authors to contribute. Fortunately we're seeing articles from members who served in India's security forces, but it would be nice to see the same from Bangladesh, Nepal and Sri Lanka. There are plenty of other forums that address events in the world outside of Afghanistan and Iraq, but even those topics should remain of interest to professionals as their conflicts evolve over time.

I agree that membership will downsize, but I don't think and strongly hope the site doesn't fade away. It is too important, it is a great forum to exchange ideas, and have your ideas challenged in a forum that you'll never find in any of our professional institutions.

[MikeF]

We are only constrained by what authors submit.

Encourage others to send in submissions to submit@smallwarsjournal.com or mike@smallwarsjournal.com

[selil]

Small Wars Journal/Council has been invaluable in helping me modify and codify strategies for cyber warfare. I do fear that the "lessons learned" will be lost.

[carl]

I have yet to see an article from a Thailand security force that discusses their small war in Southern Thailand, or their successful COIN operation against a communist insurgency in the 70s. There is amble room for African authors to contribute.

Bill, here is an article from a Journal past about Thai Village Security Teams.

http://smallwarsjournal.com/jrnl/art...or-afghanistan

I thought it was very good and pointed out a possible way to help things in Afghanistan.

[Bill Moore]

Posted by Carl,

Bill, here is an article from a Journal past about Thai Village Security Teams.

Thanks. I do recall this article and it is good, but what I was trying to get across is I haven't seen an article from a Thai soldier or police officer on the conflict, so we can see it through their eyes. I suspect Jeff Moore isn't Thai

The reality is many cultures tend to prohibit independent thinking and views, and writing an article truly could be detrimental to their careers or worse. In that case we'll have to rely on other sources, but in those cases we miss an important point of view. I would love to see more Afghans write articles that are critical of our strategy in their country and explain why.

Listening to one another is important, but listening to voices from other countries is critical if we're serious about learning.

[Michael C]

One of the more popular posts on the Small War Council asks, "What can we do to keep the SWJ relevant?" Maybe the answer for the SWJ council is, "Quit insulting each other."

I stopped posting on here because people like Bill Moore and "Of the Troops" immediately descend to calling me an idiot or the author of "highly naive articles and this is just another one to add to the compost pile." As a result, I only check the council side when someone links to my article. As usual, most of the "discussion" chooses to personally attack me and avoid the argument.

You gentlemen stay classy.

[Bill Moore]

You're right Michael, I did have a knee jerk reaction to your article or blog post, so I removed the personal attack and apologize for making it. I actually agree with the last paragraph of your article, but strongly disagree with most of it. Not sure why it elicted such a visceral reaction, it was probably just the straw that broke the camel's back that day. We had several generals that were highly incompetent in this war, but still isn't the reason we're struggling in Astan, the reason we're struggling is there isn't military solution that we're willing to pursue. We could have any number of great GOs in charge and it wouldn't change much, and the same is true for Iraq. Why do you think we did so well during Desert Storm and in Panama? Clearly defined and feasible military objectives. In OIF and OEF-A the military did well initially, but we started social engineering we understandably got off track.

If SWJ is going to stay relevant I think it will have to move past population centric COIN. There are a lot of ways for us to achieve our objectives without willingly stepping into guagmires.