SSTRO-Stability,Support,Security,NationBuilding,FID,COIN , etc. and Logisitics

[Rob Thornton]

We've hit this from different angles in other threads, but I don't know that we've tackled it head on before. The logistical framework for OIF and OEF, as well as the many other critical GWOT missions and the spectrum of operations across the COCOMs is nothing short of incredible.

The LOG required to support OIF alone is staggering. While I appreciate the Joint nature of projecting, moving it around and receiving it by air and sea, the ground logistics of basing and supporting not only U.S. troops, bur CF partners and ISF is really where we actually see it in its endstate. On the ground its often taken for granted where things come from, or how they got there, but its absence is immediately felt.

Much of the discussion on Thursday's testimony by GEN (R) Jones and his group addressed the ISF's ability to operate independently of CFs and how soon it could happen. Establishing the linkage between logistics infrastructure and sustained independent operations by the ISF so that Congress could understand it seemed to be difficult at best. I guess that is no surprise as often US FGs and senior officers also have a trouble considering the scope of wat it takes to create a viable LOG backbone that is suitable to the task at hand and is sustainable. Like many things, we've grown up not having to want for much (a good thing) for too long a period of time before it got there.

Like many other things the answer in creating an ISF LOG system seemed to be to make it in our own image - it was pointed out on Thursday that this is not necessarily so as the ISF have different requirements.

However, I'll use an anecdotal story that I think is relevant to a discussion on LOG and COIN campaigns.

Background:

The IA were using unarmored Toyota and Mitsubishi trucks to do their patrols. They were often out gunned and had no protection against IEDs - as a result, their patrols were overly careful, often static, and they had a high rate of injuries. When one of these trucks was hit - it was usually a catastrophic loss for vehicle and crew. The only bright spots were when parts naturally wore out there were enough shade tree mechanics and parts obtained commercially to fix them.

We (meaning the US in conjunction with the Iraqi MOD) made the decision to start equipping the IA with up armored HMMWVs so that they would have protection, mobility and mounted firepower equal to the tasks and risks the conditions in the COIN environment required. IMO this proved to be the tool which allowed are Iraqi Army BN to take the lead more then any other. Within a month the quality of the patrols had significantly improved, and within 6 months the IA BN had seized the initiative and had the AIF on the run in our BN AOR. Many other things undertook a positive change as a result.

However, the HMMWVs also brought increased LOG overhead. Its a more complicated vehicle. More patrols = more fuel consumption. CL IX (repair parts) for the HMMWV is not commercially available. Mechanics have to be trained. This meant additional CF support. The more aggressive patrols meant the IA were in more fights with the AIF. The increased effectiveness of the IA meant the AIF were now targeting the IA HMMWVs with more sophisticated IEDs that had previously been used only against US and CF troops. Without sustained CL IX and speedy repair, the IA mechanics were forced to cannibalize (controlled substitution) parts from one HMMWV that might be NMC (Non-Mission Capable) in order to bring up sufficient HMMWVs to meet the days ambitious patrol schedule. OR (Operational Readiness Rates) were tough to maintain. Our CF partner were honestly busting their logistical rear ends to assist the Iraqis once they understood the relationship, but there were some shortfalls in adopting our system to meet the IAs.

The problem is not always easy to understand in even the most fundamental manner. The DIV MiTT TM XO, was a good guy, but really did not understand the relationship. I got an email back through our BDE TM Chief where the DIV TM XO thought that it was not really a problem as the IA were really under a Light Infantry MTO&E (Table of Organization & Equipment) and only needed vehicles for administrative functions. Here was a guy inside the operational environment and he really did not understand that just because something on a piece of paper states one thing, the reality of the conditions on the ground is what determines success or failure. IF we wanted the IA (and in the broader scope the ISF) to succeed, then they had to have the tools to do so in the environment they are operating.

This is not limited to CL IX for HMMWVs, it extends across the spectrum of Logistics. One of the things that made a huge difference in IA confidence was knowing that if they were wounded they would receive the best medical care available. 3/2 and 4/1 BCTs made the US CSH more accessible to wounded ISF. They understood that if the individual Iraqi soldier or policemen knew that when he was wounded in action, he would be provided the best care available to him by his allies, he stood a far better chance of surviving and recovering well. It was a huge morale boost. One of the things we'd considered was the need for health care and trauma capability indigenous to the ISF for IA and IP, perhaps on the larger IA bases/FOBs - perhaps equal to that of a US?CF CSH - what would it take to build, train and sustain such infrastructure? Force protection assets such as barriers and infrastructure at IP stations and IA COPs are also another example of how LOG measures make a huge difference in effectiveness.

I would not limit it to the support to indigenous security forces though. The LOG required to reconstruct and build civil infrastructure that brings stability is another task our folks have taken on. Part of this is in working the contracts that reach outside of our own capabilities, but they are certainly related.

The scope of LOG support for these operations has certainly reached outside of fixing, feeding, manning, basing re-arming and refueling our own folks. For these operations the US LOG system has extended to the HN government and security forces and the HN populace and infrastructure on a massive scale. We often talk about capabilities required in the trigger puller, but we should also consider adding additional capability to our trigger puller support infrastructure, those critical capabilities certainly contribute to us working ourselves out of a job.

Best Regards, Rob