How the West was Won (well, at least Ramadi)

[Agrippa]

You just have to love Big Army revisionist history.

Yeah, one Army Colonel and his men were responsible for starting the entire Awakening.

Talk about ignoring the actual evolution of the "awakenings" - starting out near the Syrian border. And ignoring or giving token credit to the multitude of units, both U.S. military and U.S. civilian agency, involved with nurturing these things along.

Those on this website, and those who may have never stepped foot in Iraq, will certainly eat this stuff up as fact. Those in the know are just going to chuckle at this slanted view of history. Because those in the know and who were actually involved heavily in the program are not going to open up their pieholes and be posting it all over the internet for internet wasta points.

Carry on.

[Cavguy]

You just have to love Big Army revisionist history.

Yeah, one Army Colonel and his men were responsible for starting the entire Awakening.

Talk about ignoring the actual evolution of the "awakenings" - starting out near the Syrian border. And ignoring or giving token credit to the multitude of units, both U.S. military and U.S. civilian agency, involved with nurturing these things along.

Those on this website, and those who may have never stepped foot in Iraq, will certainly eat this stuff up as fact. Those in the know are just going to chuckle at this slanted view of history. Because those in the know and who were actually involved heavily in the program are not going to open up their pieholes and be posting it all over the internet for internet wasta points.

Carry on.

No one has ever denied what happened out in Al Qaim w/LtCol Alford in 2005. In fact, Jim's book above details a lot of it.

More than a few of us have spent more than a few months in Iraq, and outside the wire. Your attack is silly, childish, and inane. Counter the points with facts or your own version, but leave the childish namecalling out of it.

[Cavguy]

This discussion between myself and a commenter may illuminate further.

Makatak:
This sounds a little bit overblown. The "Anbar Revolution" (where tribal leaders started moving to the coalition side) began in 2005 in the western part of the province and moved east towards Ramadi. The MEF strategy all along was to separate Al Qaeda from the tribal leaders. In that sense, the brigade was a beneficiary of fortunate timing. In addition, they were an active-duty brigade (two rotations earlier, in 2004, a USAR brigade had the fight in Ramadi). Of course, if the author tells a good story and sells lots of books, then good for him. I hope he captures the larger context of actions throughout Anbar province and how the Brigade's actions both fit into that larger context and were enabled by external factors (and actors).

Posted by Makatak | June 8, 2010 4:24 PM

Niel Smith:
Makatak,

You have a few facts/timelines wrong in your critique.

The "USAR BCT" you mention was 2/28 ID, PAARNG, not USAR. They were the previous rotation to 1/1 AD (the unit owning AO Topeka in the book) in 2005-2006, not 2004. 2/2 ID, an active BCT from Korea, owned Ramadi 2004-2005. They did have a rough rotation due to a number of factors.

The western fight was under LtCol Alford in Al Qaim, yes his superb efforts to enlist the tribes in that area preceded 1/1's efforts and achieved some great local results. However, his actions had little influence in what transpired Ramadi 2006.

Jim Michaels, the author, covers all this in his book. (I read an early draft) While not an exhaustive academic history, he reveals a lot of the debates and discussions between MNF/MNC-I, I and II MEF, and the various BCTs about how to best do what you describe. Jim describes the overall effort to win the tribes in the Ramadi AO and gain the alliance with Sheik Sittar, who became the most important figure in the Awakening movement until his assassination.

As far as causation, the US's role in it, and other factors, that ground has been covered and re-covered here on SWJ. Reasonable people may disagree on how much one factor weighed vs. others, and we need a lot more interviews with Iraqis and perspective from time to make an accurate judgment. Timing was certainly a factor, and the situation in early 2006 provided opportunities not available in 2004-2005. However, I am firm in my opinion that our change of tactics played a significant role in starting, facilitating, and accelerating the awakening.

Jim's book, told largely from the perspectives of the major players of the US side in Ramadi, details how that was done. Jim's book does a great job capturing that story, and the essence of what the Soldiers, Marines, Sailors, and Airmen of the Ready First Combat Team paid for in blood in 2006-2007.

You may also want to read and join the discussion here (http://council.smallwarsjournal.com/...ead.php?t=3864), which has a lot of debate along these lines.