How the West was Won (well, at least Ramadi)

[Cavguy]

As to whether the Awakening would have been possible without the surge ....

As the timeline indicates, all the major muscle movements took place in August-November 2006. Well before the surge. We were augmented by a few companies from a MEU on an Anbar surge from November-January, which enabled us to expand further in 1-9 IN's AO.

In fact, we were extended from 12 to 14 months in theater in Oct 2006 because our replacement BDE was shifted to support the Baghdad surge. This past spring it became policy for all units to have 15 month tours.

1/1 AD remains the only BDE extended during both of its OIF tours - 15 months in OIF 1 to combat the Sadr Rebellion in 2004 and then again this past tour in Ramadi.

[tequila]

Cavguy - Awesome, very informative post. Guys like you who write stuff like this is why SWJ exists.

A few questions:

1) How well understood are tensions and shifts of power within or between tribes? For instance, Sheikh Sittar has often been described as a relatively minor entity at the beginning of the ASC. How have more established leadership figures within the Dulaimi confederation taken the sudden rise of American-backed sheikhs?

2) Are most of AQIZ's Iraqi fighters locally based, i.e. from the tribes themselves, or do they represent a sort of detribalized urban agglomeration, i.e. like many unemployed young men who join the Mahdi Army on the Shia side?

3) To address the main concern of those for whom the tribal strategy represents a short-term solution that works against the long-term strategy --- doesn't empowering the tribes, or at least certain tribal figures, work against the establishment of a legitimate central government, given the transient, violent, and often corrupt nature of tribal power structures?

4) Also, do you know if this was useful at all during 1/1 AD's Ramadi operations?

5) Added late: To what degree has U.S. support come through financing or directly arming the Anbar Salvation Council, as opposed to armed support/combined operations i.e. the tank parked near Sheikh Sittar's home?

[Danny]

May we correspond offline (briefly) about this post? I have a few questions I would like to ask. Thank you.

[Cavguy]

May we correspond offline (briefly) about this post? I have a few questions I would like to ask. Thank you.

Sure, Send me a PM.

[Cavguy]

Cavguy - Awesome, very informative post. Guys like you who write stuff like this is why SWJ exists.

A few questions:

1) How well understood are tensions and shifts of power within or between tribes? For instance, Sheikh Sittar has often been described as a relatively minor entity at the beginning of the ASC. How have more established leadership figures within the Dulaimi confederation taken the sudden rise of American-backed sheikhs?

Quick answer is that the bigger sheiks came along quickly once they felt their position was declining vis a vis Sittar and his confederation. However, we didn't "sell out" Sittar to the Johnny come latelies. However, tribe positions have changed regularly throughout the ages in Anbar, and they work and adjust to whoever is in favor at the moment.

2) Are most of AQIZ's Iraqi fighters locally based, i.e. from the tribes themselves, or do they represent a sort of detribalized urban agglomeration, i.e. like many unemployed young men who join the Mahdi Army on the Shia side?

I would say it's 99/1 local/foreign. The Iraqis will claim it's all foreign fighters, but I think we actually captured one real foreign fighter in our time there.

I would say the comparison to the Mehidi army is close - AQIZ fighters come from the Pepsi Generation, so to speak.

3) To address the main concern of those for whom the tribal strategy represents a short-term solution that works against the long-term strategy --- doesn't empowering the tribes, or at least certain tribal figures, work against the establishment of a legitimate central government, given the transient, violent, and often corrupt nature of tribal power structures?

Yes and No. Yes, empowering the tribes makes establishing a central government harder. But that assumes you have a functioning government in the first place, which Anbar had none. The tribes would control who gets elected anyway. I think no central/democratic government is possible as long as you don't have security, which wasn't possible without empowering the tribes or flooding Anbar with tens of thousands of additional US troops.

4) Also, do you know if this was useful at all during 1/1 AD's Ramadi operations?

First I've seen it, but that doesn't mean someone in my BDE didn't read it.

5) Added late: To what degree has U.S. support come through financing or directly arming the Anbar Salvation Council, as opposed to armed support/combined operations i.e. the tank parked near Sheikh Sittar's home?

Both. Money=Power in Iraq. Also, guns=power. Money+Guns+Influence with US = You da man.

I think most of it is the result of AQIZ overstepping the "line" combined with the tribal power base being threatened by AQIZ. Arabs shift alliances fast, and suddenly the US wasn't so bad - I think Sittar was brilliant to seize the opportunity and make him and his tribe more powerful than ever before .....

[JJackson]

Thank you very much for that CavGuy. Sounds like one of those rivers of dominos must have been fantastic to be a part of after so much banging your head on the wall.

P.S. Who won at the cards?

[Cavguy]

Thank you very much for that CavGuy. Sounds like one of those rivers of dominos must have been fantastic to be a part of after so much banging your head on the wall.

P.S. Who won at the cards?

CARS ... not cards.

Did give me a humorous mental image of my son smoking a cigar with sunglasses on playing poker ........

I was lucky both my tours in Iraq to serve with exceptional units in exceptional places - Baghdad/Najaf in 2003-2004, and Tal Afar/Ramadi in 2006-2007.

[tequila]

Sheikh Abdul Sittar al-Rishawi killed in car bomb.

The most prominent figure in a revolt of Sunni sheiks against al-Qaida in Iraq was killed Thursday in an explosion near his home in Anbar province, police said.

Abdul-Sattar Abu Risha was leader of the Anbar Salvation Council, also known as the Anbar Awakening — an alliance of clans backing the Iraqi government and U.S. forces.

He was among a group of tribal leaders who met President Bush earlier this month at al-Asad Air Base in Anbar province.

Abu Risha and two of his bodyguards were killed by a roadside bomb, said Col. Tareq Youssef, supervisor of Anbar police.

No group claimed responsibility for the assassination but suspicion fell on al-Qaida in Iraq, which U.S. officials say has suffered devastating setbacks in Anbar thanks to Abu Risha and his fellow sheiks. It's unclear how his death would affect U.S. efforts to organize Sunnis against the terrorist network.

A senior member of Abu Risha's group, Sheik Jubeir Rashid, said the explosion took place at 3:30 p.m. as Abu Risha was returning to his home in Ramadi, Anbar's provincial capital.

"It is a major blow to the council, but we are determined to strike back and continue our work," Rashid said. "Such an attack was expected, but it will not deter us ..."

[Sarajevo071]

And from the BBC:

Iraqi insurgents kill key US ally

A key Sunni ally of the US and Iraqi governments has been killed in a bomb attack in the city of Ramadi, Iraqi police and media say.

Abdul Sattar Abu Risha led what was known as the "Anbar Awakening", an alliance of Sunni Arab tribes that rose up against al-Qaeda in Iraq.

The movement helped reduce violence dramatically and was hailed by the US as an example for the rest of Iraq.

President George Bush met and endorsed him during a visit to Iraq last week.

Abu Risha's assassination will be a severe blow to the "Awakening" in Anbar province, says the BBC's Hugh Sykes in Baghdad.
...

http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/middle_east/6993211.stm

BTW, killing the prominent (Sunni) U.S. ally ("poster child" of Iraq volunteer police, force where three-quarters of the volunteer forces were Sunni Muslims) can benefit some other (opposite) players (ea those that do not wish creation of strong Sunni militias).

[Gian P Gentile]

As to whether the Awakening would have been possible without the surge ....

As the timeline indicates, all the major muscle movements took place in August-November 2006. Well before the surge.

I appreciate you taking the time to write your experiences down. They are important and need to be heard, especially your sequencing of key events.

A couple of questions for you: Was the establishment of Cops necessary? Or was the necessary condition for flipping of the tribes the decision on Colonel McFarland's part to ally with them and in essence stop targeting tribal sunni insurgents and a reciprocation on their part to stop attacking CF? Did any of the tribal sheiks ever tell you that the Cops were necessary?

thanks

gentile

[Cavguy]

I appreciate you taking the time to write your experiences down. They are important and need to be heard, especially your sequencing of key events.

If I ever get my head out of my 4th point of contact, my Mil Review article will be finished on the subject.

A couple of questions for you: Was the establishment of Cops necessary?

In my mind, yes. I commanded my company from a COP in Tal Afar (until the b*stards promoted me and I had to leave), where we were before Ramadi. I am convinced that COP's are the way to go. You absolutely have to secure the populace 24/7 where they live. Maybe a COP isn't always the right answer, but you have to achieve that effect.

When we inherited Ramadi, no one expected us to do anything but keep the lid on so to speak. It was COL MacFarland's decision to use the same tactics proved in Tal Afar in Ramadi - using clear, hold, build to take back ground, and use that leverage to bring in fence-sitters to our side. You have to understand, in June 2006 AIF OWNED nearly all of Ramadi. Full freedom of movement, multiple IED belts, etc. We went in south Ramadi first with COPs, and basically fought daily there from July-November. The AIF lost control there once the COPs went in. Same in Ta'meem (W Ramadi) and East Ramadi when COPs were established. They interdicted AIF freedom of movement in the vicinity of COPs, which provided the opening to engage with the sheiks. They also bought enormous credibility with the locals who were fence-sitting.

Or was the necessary condition for flipping of the tribes the decision on Colonel McFarland's part to ally with them and in essence stop targeting tribal Sunni insurgents and a reciprocation on their part to stop attacking CF?

I wasn't in the discussions, but I know we wouldn't have made such an explicit arrangement. We never stopped targeting any active insurgents. However, certain people associated with certain nationalist insurgents told us they wouldn't fight us anymore, and we accepted that. We didn't declare amnesty, but if reporting stopped on certain individuals who were involved in tribes we wanted to flip, we certainly didn't spoil the movement by arresting them for past sins unless it was someone too dirty to tolerate. You can't have it both ways. The beauty was that these former insurgents led us to huge caches and were ruthless on targeting the AQIZ fanatics once empowered.

I think you get to the idea of it in your article about there bing a lethal/non-lethal balance. We were heavily invested in lethal operations (in Jul-Oct we had almost as many daily sigacts than ALL six BCT's in Baghdad). However, we were equally invested in non-lethal operations to persuade the tribes to take up arms against AQIZ.

If you think about it, 1/1 AD certainly wasn't the first BCT to engage locals, build COPs, invest heavily in ISF, and develop governance. We certainly didn't have a monopoly on good leadership. What was different was our synchronization of the lethal/non-lethal. Also COL MacFarland levied the BN's for some former combat CO's and BN S3's to build his BCT staff in Ramadi - especially reinforcing the S3 shop and ISF cell as decisive multipliers. It makes a big difference having that kind of ground experience in your BCT TOC reacting versus the pre or post-CCC CPT's that are usually there.

The best analogy I can make is to a major conventional battle. Ideally, you array your forces in a tactically sound manner to initiate the battle and develop contact. You develop a collection plan to assess the enemy's decisions and get inside his cycle. When the opportunity presents (i.e. a flank exposed, etc.) you ideally have the flexibility to exploit the opening while it exists with enough combat power to decimate the enemy's formation. That is what happened in Ramadi. We were arrayed correctly in tactics, units, personnel and mindset that when the opening came, we were able to recognize and exploit it to achieve decisive success. Such is the difference that has separated the great commanders from the mediocre throughout history.

Did any of the tribal sheiks ever tell you that the Cops were necessary?

In Tal Afar they certainly did. They wanted more COPs (really POPs) than I had platoons. (Grab the Jul-Aug ARMOR Mag and read my article on "Re-taking Sa'ad) We leveraged ISF into the role there. The COPs in Ramadi were for different reasons. We maintained approx 16 COPs manned by US/IA around Ramadi - some were to re-take ground and others to protect friendly tribes. We always sought to transition COPs to ISF as soon as they were capable to establish newer ones in more hostile areas.

I also just finished reading The Tipping Point. Much of what also happened was about getting to the Mavens, Salesmen, and Connectors in the tribes.

Hope this answers your inquiry - my challenge in writing an article has been that there is no single factor I can point to - it was multiple factors that cascaded into radical success - leadership, organization, COPs, plans, local engagement, tactics, tribes, ISF, and some just plain stupid moves by AQIZ all influenced the result. Explaining exactly why we succeeded where others failed is my great challenge - I can't even point to blind luck because it also worked in Tal Afar.

One note is also pertinent - I discussed this at the COIN seminar today with an attendee - We "owned" a very large battlespace in both cases. Impact of our flank units was absolutely minimal. Therefore, we were able to synchronize effects in our AO much easier than a large city like Baghdad where multiple BCTs have to work in harmony. There was absolutely no functioning government in Ramadi, and the one in Tal Afar was completely under our influence. That may have been a significant factor as well.

Also, check out this thread on SWJ, dealing with the amazing contributions of a talented young Captain in our BDE to winning the war. Sometimes, individual actions make a difference.

[Rex Brynen]

In a Force for Iraqi Calm, Seeds of Conflict
By ALISSA J. RUBIN and DAMIEN CAVE
New York Times
Published: December 23, 2007

The Awakening movement, a predominantly Sunni Arab force recruited to fight Sunni Islamic extremists like Al Qaeda in Mesopotamia, has become a great success story after its spread from Sunni tribes in Anbar Province to become an ad-hoc armed force of 65,000 to 80,000 across the country in less than a year. A linchpin of the American strategy to pacify Iraq, the movement has been widely credited with turning around the violence-scarred areas where the Sunni insurgency has been based.

...

Despite the successes of the movement, including the members’ ability to provide valuable intelligence and give rebuilding efforts a new chance in war-shattered communities, the American military acknowledges that it is also a high-risk proposition. It is an experiment in counterinsurgency warfare that could contain the seeds of a civil war — in which, if the worst fears come true, the United States would have helped organize some of the Sunni forces arrayed against the central government on which so many American lives and dollars have been spent.

[Norfolk]

Iraq Warning over Sunni Patrols
BBC News International Version
Published Saturday, 22 December, 2007

http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/middle_east/7157581.stm

Iraq warning over Sunni patrols

Gen Jassim wants the patrols to be integrated into mainstream forces
Iraq will not allow US-backed neighbourhood patrols to become a "third force" alongside police and the army, Iraq's defence minister has said.
Gen Abdel Qader Jassim said the Sunni-dominated patrols should be integrated into the regular Iraqi security forces.

The patrols have been credited with the recent drop in violence in Iraq.

But Shia leaders fear the patrols will turn against them after US troops leave Iraq, correspondents say...

"We categorically reject them [the neighbourhood patrols] turning into a third military organisation," said Mr Jassim, himself a Sunni Arab, at a joint press conference with the Iraqi Interior Minister, Jawad al-Bolani.

The neighbourhood patrols consist of some 71,000 men, many of whom were formerly members of the insurgency, fighting against US troops and the Shia-led Iraqi government.

Patrol members are paid about $10 (£5) a day by US authorities, but responsibility for paying them will pass to the Iraqi government next year.

The patrols have been credited with helping to bring down violence

In their press conference, the ministers made clear that payment would only be forthcoming if 20% of the patrols are integrated into the mainstream Iraqi security forces...

Shia leaders fear that unless the patrols can be assimilated into the mainstream Iraqi security forces, the violence could increase once US troops have left Iraq.

This is not going to go down well with Sunni Tribal and Clan leaders or their populations.

[Ron Humphrey]

Iraq Warning over Sunni Patrols
BBC News International Version
Published Saturday, 22 December, 2007

http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/middle_east/7157581.stm



This is not going to go down well with Sunni Tribal and Clan leaders or their populations.

Considering that much of the Sunni tribal concern can be found in their ability to have a part in their own governance this really might be a good time frame to look at more local and regional elections within the established framework of the constitution. This would be one step in bringing a sense of incorporation to the current governing environments. There would be alot of important factors to keep in mind and would require involvement of the national government, but it might just work if outside allies agrred to encourage it.

This also might bring some changes which would affect other areas in ways some outside interests might not like so as usual baby steps is best.

[Cavguy]

An article on Ramadi by myself and Colonel Sean MacFarland is out in this month's Military Review.

http://usacac.leavenworth.army.mil/C...ngMarApr08.pdf

The stunning security improvements in Al Anbar province during 2007 fundamentally changed the military and political landscape of Iraq. Many, both in and outside the military (and as late as November 2006), had assessed the situation in Anbar as a lost cause. The “Awakening” of Sunni tribal leaders and their supporters that began in September 2006 near Ramadi seemed to come out of nowhere. But the “Anbar Awakening”—what some have called the “Gettysburg of Iraq”—was not a random event. It was the result of a concerted plan executed by U.S. forces in Ramadi that would eventually develop into an Iraqi led movement that dramatically changed the security situation in all of Anbar and parts of greater Iraq.

The Soldiers, Marines, Sailors, and Airmen who served in or with our brigade combat team (BCT) enabled the Anbar Awakening through a deliberate, often difficult campaign that combined traditional counterinsurgency (COIN) principles with precise, lethal operations. The skilled application of the same principles and exploitation of success by other great units in Anbar and other parts of Iraq spread the success in Ramadi far beyond our area of operations (AO) at a pace no one could have predicted.

The Ready First enabled the Anbar Awakening by—
O Employing carefully focused lethal operations.
O Securing the populace through forward presence.
O Co-opting local leaders.
O Developing competent host-nation security forces.
O Creating a public belief in rising success.
O Developing human and physical infrastructure.

The execution of this approach enabled the brigade to set conditions, recognize opportunity, and exploit success when it came, to create a remarkable turnaround.

And Finally:

Clearly, a combination of factors, some of which we may not yet fully understand, contributed to this pivotal success. As mentioned before, the enemy overplayed its hand and the people were tired of Al-Qaeda. A series of assassinations had elevated younger, more aggressive tribal leaders to positions of influence. A growing concern that the U.S. would leave Iraq and leave the Sunnis defenseless against Al-Qaeda and Iranian-supported militias made these younger leaders open to our overtures. Our willingness to adapt our plans based on the advice of the sheiks, our staunch and timely support for them in times of danger and need, and our ability to deliver on our promises convinced them that they could do business with us. Our forward presence kept them reassured. We operated aggressively across all lines of operation, kinetic and non-kinetic, to bring every weapon and asset at our disposal to bear against the enemy. We conducted detailed intelligence fusion and targeting meetings and operated seamlessly with special operations forces, aviation, close air support, and riverine units. We have now seen this model followed by other BCTs in other parts of Iraq, and it has proved effective.

The discussion in this thread and the feedback (positive and negative) helped me get this article out the door, and improved its quality immensely. I hope it adds to the discussion and understanding of what happened in Anbar.

Also, I'm outed!

Niel