How the West was Won (well, at least Ramadi)

[Boot]

I hope not ... 1/6 and 3/8 Marines was part of 1/1 AD, and the article clearly credits the Army and Marine members of the BCT, and notice I talk of the USMC Air Support. 4 of 5 maneuver BN's in AO Topeka were Army - but it was a joint fight. It would be no different if it had happened in RCT's to the East and west, both of which have army units working in them but I rarely see them mentioned either, not out of omission, but because most of the forces in those areas are Marines.

The article also credits 1 and 2 MEF. However, it is undeniable that the (most recent) Awakening began in AO Topeka, and it was under control of a US Army BCT operating under 1 and later 2 MEF, utilizing lessons and mindset largely developed elsewhere.

If you notice, the article is about the Awakening, and only really mentions (in action) one of the five BCT's under our control 1-9 IN, because they were at the decisive action.

Cavguy,
I sent you a PM and no I didn't think you were implying that, my question was totally tounge in cheek. I have great respect for Col McFarland and what was accomplished in Ramadi, and what is being accomplished in Al Anbar. Sorry if I came across that way.
I worked for Gen Pittard and Gen Yarbrough at the IAG and have great respect for both and the rest of the Soldiers I worked with there.
I worked with 4-1 BCT in MND-N and was extremelly impressed with the support they gave TT's and the team I was on when we rolled through there. It was overall better than what my Marine brothers were giving Marine TT's.
Now if the 3/69th Armor would give back the radio gear they stole from one of the MiTT's!...


Boot

[Ken White]

When 1st Recon Co moved from the east coast of Korea to the west, they started with the two 1/4 tons, two 2 1/2 tons and one 100 cubic foot reefer they were authorized; when they arrived on the west coast two weeks later they had about 20 1/4 tons, five new GMC 2 1/2 tons and three reefers -- all painted Marine green with yellow reg and unit numbers. Consider your lost radios payback

[Boot]

When 1st Recon Co moved from the east coast of Korea to the west, they started with the two 1/4 tons, two 2 1/2 tons and one 100 cubic foot reefer they were authorized; when they arrived on the west coast two weeks later they had about 20 1/4 tons, five new GMC 2 1/2 tons and three reefers -- all painted Marine green with yellow reg and unit numbers. Consider your lost radios payback

HEY! I was in 3rd Recon EVERYONE knows 1st Recon are liars and cheats!

As for us Angels in 3rd Herd...

[Ken White]

HEY! I was in 3rd Recon EVERYONE knows 1st Recon are liars and cheats!

As for us Angels in 3rd Herd...

Only for war stories. Thieve? Constantly. Only due to military necessity, of course...

[Cavguy]

Reporter Jim Michaels has a forthcoming book on 1/1 AD in Ramadi.

A Chance in Hell

Posted by SWJ Editors on June 8, 2010 4:22 AM | Permalink| Print

How one brigade turned Ramadi, Iraq’s most violent city, into a model of stability. The riveting book by USA TODAY’s Jim Michaels is scheduled for release June 22, 2010. A Chance in Hell: The Men Who Triumphed Over Iraq’s Deadliest City and Turned the Tide of War is available for pre-order on Amazon.com.

Colonel Sean MacFarland’s brigade arrived in Iraq’s deadliest city with simple instructions: pacify Ramadi without destroying it. The odds were against him from the start. In fact, few thought he would succeed.

Ramadi had been going steadily downhill. By 2006, insurgents roamed freely in many parts of the city in open defiance of Iraq’s U.S.-backed government. Al-Qaeda had boldly declared Ramadi its capital. Even the U.S. military acknowledged the province would be the last to be pacified.

A lanky officer with a boyish face, MacFarland was no Patton. But his soft voice masked an iron will and a willingness to take risks. While most of the American military was focused on taming Baghdad, MacFarland laid out a bold plan for Ramadi. His soldiers would take on the insurgents in their own backyard. He set up combat outposts in the city’s most dangerous neighborhoods. Snipers roamed the dark streets, killing al-Qaeda leaders and terrorist cells. U.S. tanks rumbled down the streets, firing point blank into buildings occupied by insurgents. MacFarland’s brigade engaged in some of the bloodiest street fighting of the war. Casualties on both sides mounted. Al-Qaeda wasn’t going to give up easily. Ramadi was too important. MacFarland wasn’t going to back down either. The two sides had fought to a stalemate.

At least until Sheik Abdul Sattar Bezia al-Rishawi emerged. A minor tribal leader, Sheik Sattar had earned his reputation as a smuggler. He carried a large six-shooter on his hip and had a taste for whiskey. But he hated al-Qaeda and was watching MacFarland’s brigade as they battled militants toe-to-toe. This was a different group of Americans, Sattar thought. Sattar approached MacFarland and said he was ready to join with the Americans and fight al-Qaeda. Other officers might have kept their distance. MacFarland didn’t hesitate. He promised Sattar his support.

What followed was one of history’s unlikeliest - and most successful - partnerships. Together, the Americans and Sattar’s growing band of fighters drove al-Qaeda from Ramadi. A Chance in Hell is compelling tale of combat leadership and how a handful of men turned the tide of war at a time when it looked most hopeless.

Jim Michaels is a military writer for USA Today and an experienced war correspondent. He is also a former U.S. Marine infantry officer. Again, A Chance in Hell: The Men Who Triumphed Over Iraq’s Deadliest City and Turned the Tide of War is available for pre-order on Amazon.com.

I read a draft copy, and it's very well written. He covers in detail many of the debates going on at higher levels about our approach, as well as selected stories of units involved in the fighting. Good read, well told, and I learned some things from reading it.

[Agrippa]

You just have to love Big Army revisionist history.

Yeah, one Army Colonel and his men were responsible for starting the entire Awakening.

Talk about ignoring the actual evolution of the "awakenings" - starting out near the Syrian border. And ignoring or giving token credit to the multitude of units, both U.S. military and U.S. civilian agency, involved with nurturing these things along.

Those on this website, and those who may have never stepped foot in Iraq, will certainly eat this stuff up as fact. Those in the know are just going to chuckle at this slanted view of history. Because those in the know and who were actually involved heavily in the program are not going to open up their pieholes and be posting it all over the internet for internet wasta points.

Carry on.

[Cavguy]

You just have to love Big Army revisionist history.

Yeah, one Army Colonel and his men were responsible for starting the entire Awakening.

Talk about ignoring the actual evolution of the "awakenings" - starting out near the Syrian border. And ignoring or giving token credit to the multitude of units, both U.S. military and U.S. civilian agency, involved with nurturing these things along.

Those on this website, and those who may have never stepped foot in Iraq, will certainly eat this stuff up as fact. Those in the know are just going to chuckle at this slanted view of history. Because those in the know and who were actually involved heavily in the program are not going to open up their pieholes and be posting it all over the internet for internet wasta points.

Carry on.

No one has ever denied what happened out in Al Qaim w/LtCol Alford in 2005. In fact, Jim's book above details a lot of it.

More than a few of us have spent more than a few months in Iraq, and outside the wire. Your attack is silly, childish, and inane. Counter the points with facts or your own version, but leave the childish namecalling out of it.

[Cavguy]

Cavguy,
I sent you a PM and no I didn't think you were implying that, my question was totally tounge in cheek. I have great respect for Col McFarland and what was accomplished in Ramadi, and what is being accomplished in Al Anbar. Sorry if I came across that way.
I worked for Gen Pittard and Gen Yarbrough at the IAG and have great respect for both and the rest of the Soldiers I worked with there.
I worked with 4-1 BCT in MND-N and was extremelly impressed with the support they gave TT's and the team I was on when we rolled through there. It was overall better than what my Marine brothers were giving Marine TT's.
Now if the 3/69th Armor would give back the radio gear they stole from one of the MiTT's!...


Boot

No worries, I just was suprised that COL Mac and I did take some shots from a few Marines over the article - they inferred that it was somehow an attempt of the Army to claim all the credit and ignored their contributions. It wasn't just your (jesting) comment. I thought we tried in the original to highlight the joint nature, but it wasn't strong enough obviously.

I have run into a number of Marines (incl you) who were in Ramadi and enjoyed the article. I've often said to peers there's about 10 articles needing to be written about what happened there in each BN AO. 1/6 Marines taking back the "racetrack" would be fascinating.