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Thread: How the West was Won (well, at least Ramadi)

  1. #21
    Council Member Cavguy's Avatar
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    Default It's OUT!

    An article on Ramadi by myself and Colonel Sean MacFarland is out in this month's Military Review.

    http://usacac.leavenworth.army.mil/C...ngMarApr08.pdf


    The stunning security improvements in Al Anbar province during 2007 fundamentally changed the military and political landscape of Iraq. Many, both in and outside the military (and as late as November 2006), had assessed the situation in Anbar as a lost cause. The “Awakening” of Sunni tribal leaders and their supporters that began in September 2006 near Ramadi seemed to come out of nowhere. But the “Anbar Awakening”—what some have called the “Gettysburg of Iraq”—was not a random event. It was the result of a concerted plan executed by U.S. forces in Ramadi that would eventually develop into an Iraqi led movement that dramatically changed the security situation in all of Anbar and parts of greater Iraq.
    The Soldiers, Marines, Sailors, and Airmen who served in or with our brigade combat team (BCT) enabled the Anbar Awakening through a deliberate, often difficult campaign that combined traditional counterinsurgency (COIN) principles with precise, lethal operations. The skilled application of the same principles and exploitation of success by other great units in Anbar and other parts of Iraq spread the success in Ramadi far beyond our area of operations (AO) at a pace no one could have predicted.

    The Ready First enabled the Anbar Awakening by—
    O Employing carefully focused lethal operations.
    O Securing the populace through forward presence.
    O Co-opting local leaders.
    O Developing competent host-nation security forces.
    O Creating a public belief in rising success.
    O Developing human and physical infrastructure.

    The execution of this approach enabled the brigade to set conditions, recognize opportunity, and exploit success when it came, to create a remarkable turnaround.
    And Finally:

    Clearly, a combination of factors, some of which we may not yet fully understand, contributed to this pivotal success. As mentioned before, the enemy overplayed its hand and the people were tired of Al-Qaeda. A series of assassinations had elevated younger, more aggressive tribal leaders to positions of influence. A growing concern that the U.S. would leave Iraq and leave the Sunnis defenseless against Al-Qaeda and Iranian-supported militias made these younger leaders open to our overtures. Our willingness to adapt our plans based on the advice of the sheiks, our staunch and timely support for them in times of danger and need, and our ability to deliver on our promises convinced them that they could do business with us. Our forward presence kept them reassured. We operated aggressively across all lines of operation, kinetic and non-kinetic, to bring every weapon and asset at our disposal to bear against the enemy. We conducted detailed intelligence fusion and targeting meetings and operated seamlessly with special operations forces, aviation, close air support, and riverine units. We have now seen this model followed by other BCTs in other parts of Iraq, and it has proved effective.

    The discussion in this thread and the feedback (positive and negative) helped me get this article out the door, and improved its quality immensely. I hope it adds to the discussion and understanding of what happened in Anbar.

    Also, I'm outed!

    Niel
    Last edited by Cavguy; 02-27-2008 at 09:52 PM.
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  2. #22
    Council Member Tom Odom's Avatar
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    Default

    Congrats!

    And of course good work!

  3. #23
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    Default And a SWJ Blog Post to Boot!

    How the West Was Won by Cavguy

    This is news the world doesn’t hear: Ramadi, long a hotbed of unrest, a city that once formed the southwestern tip of the notorious “Sunni Triangle,” is now telling a different story, a story of Americans who came here as liberators, became hated occupiers and are now the protectors of Iraqi reconstruction.

    - - Ullrich Fichtner, “Hope and Despair in Divided Iraq,” Der Spiegel, 10 August 2007.

    Colonel Sean MacFarland and I teamed up to provide a firsthand account of the “Anbar Awakening” in this month’s issue of Military Review. The article details the efforts of the 1st Brigade, 1st Armored Division in Ramadi, Iraq from June 2006 to February 2007. Transferring from Tal Afar into the most violent city in Iraq at the time, the Ready First designed a campaign plan that sought to set the conditions for a tribal alliance, and rapidly exploit success through developing local governance and security forces. Supported by the 1st and 2nd Marine Expeditionary Force leadership, the plan was successfully executed and achieved results beyond anyone’s expectations. This success in execution was carried forward to greater success by the actions of our follow-on unit, 1st Brigade of the 3rd Infantry Division.

    The article describes the key facets of the plan – population security through combat outposts, combat operations against Al Qaeda insurgents, tense negotiations with tribal sheiks, and a few key individuals and decisive combat actions that shifted the tide of conflict and began the transformation of the nation...

  4. #24
    Council Member Boot's Avatar
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    Default Cavguy...

    I know quite a few Marines who were in Ramadi during this time, and spent time at Blue Diamond and Hurricane point, nice to see a different view, I have seen plenty of AAR's from Marines through professional journals, reports themselves, or the actual people involved. I know Col Devlin only in passing and I am a little surprised that he would say something like that especially working for a guy like Gen. Gaskin. One of the Army Captains who was in my team out of FOB Loyalty had an IP checkpoint outside of Ramadi. I have also been to Tal Afar, and I was pretty impressed with how quiet it was.
    Lastly your not implying that the Army BCT is solely responsible for the success out west...are you?

  5. #25
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    Quote Originally Posted by Boot View Post
    Lastly your not implying that the Army BCT is solely responsible for the success out west...are you?
    I hope not ... 1/6 and 3/8 Marines was part of 1/1 AD, and the article clearly credits the Army and Marine members of the BCT, and notice I talk of the USMC Air Support. 4 of 5 maneuver BN's in AO Topeka were Army - but it was a joint fight. It would be no different if it had happened in RCT's to the East and west, both of which have army units working in them but I rarely see them mentioned either, not out of omission, but because most of the forces in those areas are Marines.

    The article also credits 1 and 2 MEF. However, it is undeniable that the (most recent) Awakening began in AO Topeka, and it was under control of a US Army BCT operating under 1 and later 2 MEF, utilizing lessons and mindset largely developed elsewhere.

    If you notice, the article is about the Awakening, and only really mentions (in action) one of the five BCT's under our control 1-9 IN, because they were at the decisive action.
    Last edited by Cavguy; 02-28-2008 at 02:51 PM.
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  6. #26
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    Default Cavguy

    I'm curious about the role of higher headquarters in helping or hindering operations. The impression I get is that your brigade commander was left to his own devices and allowed to get on with it. I wonder whether he had to gain approval for his plans, how closely operations were monitored, and how difficult (or easy) it was to get resources from higher. I ask because a very fine brigade commander in Afghanistan was consistently micro-managed and forced to jump through several briefing hoops each time he wanted to mount an operation.

    I suspect partly this was a matter of scale; there was only one combat brigade with a two-star and several deputy CGs to help him in Afghanistan. I just wonder if the same thing went on in Iraq.

  7. #27
    Council Member Ken White's Avatar
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    Default Scale and personality, I suspect...

    My son reported the same problem you note in his two trips to the 'Stan but noted the absence of GO micro management in his trip to Iraq. All those were with the same Bde but with different Flag Officers each time.

    To state the obvious, the uppermost elephant sets the tone for the herd and scale can affect the personality -- or at least modulate the display thereof.

  8. #28
    Council Member Cavguy's Avatar
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    Quote Originally Posted by Eden View Post
    I'm curious about the role of higher headquarters in helping or hindering operations. The impression I get is that your brigade commander was left to his own devices and allowed to get on with it. I wonder whether he had to gain approval for his plans, how closely operations were monitored, and how difficult (or easy) it was to get resources from higher. I ask because a very fine brigade commander in Afghanistan was consistently micro-managed and forced to jump through several briefing hoops each time he wanted to mount an operation.

    I suspect partly this was a matter of scale; there was only one combat brigade with a two-star and several deputy CGs to help him in Afghanistan. I just wonder if the same thing went on in Iraq.
    I'd really have to have COL MacFarland answer that. I believe in one of his media interviews he half-jokingly says he was given the AO and basically told to keep the lid on it, because no one expected anything out of it. I'm not sure how much/little interaction with MG Zilmer on day to day ops he had, but I never felt 1MEF or 2MEF meddling much in our operational plans. Outside of Baghdad, the size/scope of the MND AO's pretty much limits how much a division commander can actively control, the BCT commanders are kind of like kings of their kingdoms. That is a good and bad thing - allows initative, but also accounts for the "mood swings" that sometimes occur after RIP/TOA's, where a BCT commander with an opposite tactical philosophy takes over. I know that was 3d ACR's fear with us in Tal Afar, and our fear about 1/3 ID. 1/3 ID performed superbly in our place, and I know (despite Ricks' out of context quote in FIASCO) we did well in Tal Afar, violence by October 2006 there was 60% less than the 60% reduction during 3ACR's tour.

    From personal experience, as the BDE Battle Major, I never had tactical interference from the MEF, in fact, I would say they went out of their way to be supportive to our tactical efforts. The CG and ADC were regularly in our AO, so I am sure they were quite familiar with our plans and course of action. How much they gave Ready 6 specific guidance I am unaware.

    I actually enjoyed working for a MEF HQ much better than an Army DIV HQ, micromanagement wise.
    Last edited by Cavguy; 02-28-2008 at 08:06 PM.
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  9. #29
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    Default Update to the article

    All,

    COL MacFarland wrote an addendum to last month's Military Review article on Ramadi. He wanted to address the mistaken perception of some that it was an Army-centric effort. In reality, it was highly joint - from the squad on up.

    You can read the addendum here, and the original article here.

    Money Quote:

    "You old guys need to get over that s—t."
    - Young Marine to Marine Sergeant Major when asked how he felt about fighting alongside an Army unit in Al Anbar, Iraq.
    and

    One of the great legacies of the fight for Al Anbar province will be the enduring, mutual respect earned by the various service-members who fought side by side. This respect was nowhere more evident than in Ramadi, where our Army brigade combat team, the 1st BCT, 1st Armored Division (Ready First Combat Team), fought under the command of I Marine Expeditionary Force (I MEF). The Ready First was not a pure Army BCT. It contained U.S. Marine Corps (USMC) elements, including a reinforced rifle battalion (initially 3/8 Marines and later 1/6 Marines), two rifle companies from a Marine Expeditionary Unit (2/4 Marines), a riverine patrol unit, an air and naval gunfire liaison platoon, and a civil affairs detachment. The Air Force supported the Ready First with an air liaison team embedded in the BCT. The brigade staff itself was a de facto joint organization—it had Army, Navy, Air Force, and Marine officers and NCOs throughout. The electronic warfare officer, a Catholic chaplain, and the head surgeon were all Navy commanders. The civil affairs and public affairs officers were Marines. Outside the brigade, support came from a Marine logistics group and I MEF’s air combat element. Numerous other external USMC units, including a platoon from a radio battalion, a postal unit, explosive ordnance disposal teams, fire-fighting teams, air traffic controllers, and military transition teams, also provided support. So did the Navy, in the form of surgical teams and corpsmen, SeaBee battalions, electronic warfare experts, and SEAL platoons from SEAL Teams 3 and 5.
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  10. #30
    Council Member Boot's Avatar
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    Quote Originally Posted by Cavguy View Post
    I hope not ... 1/6 and 3/8 Marines was part of 1/1 AD, and the article clearly credits the Army and Marine members of the BCT, and notice I talk of the USMC Air Support. 4 of 5 maneuver BN's in AO Topeka were Army - but it was a joint fight. It would be no different if it had happened in RCT's to the East and west, both of which have army units working in them but I rarely see them mentioned either, not out of omission, but because most of the forces in those areas are Marines.

    The article also credits 1 and 2 MEF. However, it is undeniable that the (most recent) Awakening began in AO Topeka, and it was under control of a US Army BCT operating under 1 and later 2 MEF, utilizing lessons and mindset largely developed elsewhere.

    If you notice, the article is about the Awakening, and only really mentions (in action) one of the five BCT's under our control 1-9 IN, because they were at the decisive action.

    Cavguy,
    I sent you a PM and no I didn't think you were implying that, my question was totally tounge in cheek. I have great respect for Col McFarland and what was accomplished in Ramadi, and what is being accomplished in Al Anbar. Sorry if I came across that way.
    I worked for Gen Pittard and Gen Yarbrough at the IAG and have great respect for both and the rest of the Soldiers I worked with there.
    I worked with 4-1 BCT in MND-N and was extremelly impressed with the support they gave TT's and the team I was on when we rolled through there. It was overall better than what my Marine brothers were giving Marine TT's.
    Now if the 3/69th Armor would give back the radio gear they stole from one of the MiTT's!...


    Boot

  11. #31
    Council Member Ken White's Avatar
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    Default The Tankers were just following an old tradition...

    When 1st Recon Co moved from the east coast of Korea to the west, they started with the two 1/4 tons, two 2 1/2 tons and one 100 cubic foot reefer they were authorized; when they arrived on the west coast two weeks later they had about 20 1/4 tons, five new GMC 2 1/2 tons and three reefers -- all painted Marine green with yellow reg and unit numbers. Consider your lost radios payback

  12. #32
    Council Member Boot's Avatar
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    Quote Originally Posted by Ken White View Post
    When 1st Recon Co moved from the east coast of Korea to the west, they started with the two 1/4 tons, two 2 1/2 tons and one 100 cubic foot reefer they were authorized; when they arrived on the west coast two weeks later they had about 20 1/4 tons, five new GMC 2 1/2 tons and three reefers -- all painted Marine green with yellow reg and unit numbers. Consider your lost radios payback
    HEY! I was in 3rd Recon EVERYONE knows 1st Recon are liars and cheats!

    As for us Angels in 3rd Herd...

  13. #33
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    Quote Originally Posted by Boot View Post
    Cavguy,
    I sent you a PM and no I didn't think you were implying that, my question was totally tounge in cheek. I have great respect for Col McFarland and what was accomplished in Ramadi, and what is being accomplished in Al Anbar. Sorry if I came across that way.
    I worked for Gen Pittard and Gen Yarbrough at the IAG and have great respect for both and the rest of the Soldiers I worked with there.
    I worked with 4-1 BCT in MND-N and was extremelly impressed with the support they gave TT's and the team I was on when we rolled through there. It was overall better than what my Marine brothers were giving Marine TT's.
    Now if the 3/69th Armor would give back the radio gear they stole from one of the MiTT's!...


    Boot
    No worries, I just was suprised that COL Mac and I did take some shots from a few Marines over the article - they inferred that it was somehow an attempt of the Army to claim all the credit and ignored their contributions. It wasn't just your (jesting) comment. I thought we tried in the original to highlight the joint nature, but it wasn't strong enough obviously.

    I have run into a number of Marines (incl you) who were in Ramadi and enjoyed the article. I've often said to peers there's about 10 articles needing to be written about what happened there in each BN AO. 1/6 Marines taking back the "racetrack" would be fascinating.
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  14. #34
    Council Member Ken White's Avatar
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    Default Cheat? Never. Lie?

    Quote Originally Posted by Boot View Post
    HEY! I was in 3rd Recon EVERYONE knows 1st Recon are liars and cheats!

    As for us Angels in 3rd Herd...
    Only for war stories. Thieve? Constantly. Only due to military necessity, of course...

  15. #35
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    Reporter Jim Michaels has a forthcoming book on 1/1 AD in Ramadi.

    A Chance in Hell

    Posted by SWJ Editors on June 8, 2010 4:22 AM | Permalink| Print

    How one brigade turned Ramadi, Iraq’s most violent city, into a model of stability. The riveting book by USA TODAY’s Jim Michaels is scheduled for release June 22, 2010. A Chance in Hell: The Men Who Triumphed Over Iraq’s Deadliest City and Turned the Tide of War is available for pre-order on Amazon.com.

    Colonel Sean MacFarland’s brigade arrived in Iraq’s deadliest city with simple instructions: pacify Ramadi without destroying it. The odds were against him from the start. In fact, few thought he would succeed.

    Ramadi had been going steadily downhill. By 2006, insurgents roamed freely in many parts of the city in open defiance of Iraq’s U.S.-backed government. Al-Qaeda had boldly declared Ramadi its capital. Even the U.S. military acknowledged the province would be the last to be pacified.

    A lanky officer with a boyish face, MacFarland was no Patton. But his soft voice masked an iron will and a willingness to take risks. While most of the American military was focused on taming Baghdad, MacFarland laid out a bold plan for Ramadi. His soldiers would take on the insurgents in their own backyard. He set up combat outposts in the city’s most dangerous neighborhoods. Snipers roamed the dark streets, killing al-Qaeda leaders and terrorist cells. U.S. tanks rumbled down the streets, firing point blank into buildings occupied by insurgents. MacFarland’s brigade engaged in some of the bloodiest street fighting of the war. Casualties on both sides mounted. Al-Qaeda wasn’t going to give up easily. Ramadi was too important. MacFarland wasn’t going to back down either. The two sides had fought to a stalemate.

    At least until Sheik Abdul Sattar Bezia al-Rishawi emerged. A minor tribal leader, Sheik Sattar had earned his reputation as a smuggler. He carried a large six-shooter on his hip and had a taste for whiskey. But he hated al-Qaeda and was watching MacFarland’s brigade as they battled militants toe-to-toe. This was a different group of Americans, Sattar thought. Sattar approached MacFarland and said he was ready to join with the Americans and fight al-Qaeda. Other officers might have kept their distance. MacFarland didn’t hesitate. He promised Sattar his support.

    What followed was one of history’s unlikeliest - and most successful - partnerships. Together, the Americans and Sattar’s growing band of fighters drove al-Qaeda from Ramadi. A Chance in Hell is compelling tale of combat leadership and how a handful of men turned the tide of war at a time when it looked most hopeless.

    Jim Michaels is a military writer for USA Today and an experienced war correspondent. He is also a former U.S. Marine infantry officer. Again, A Chance in Hell: The Men Who Triumphed Over Iraq’s Deadliest City and Turned the Tide of War is available for pre-order on Amazon.com.
    I read a draft copy, and it's very well written. He covers in detail many of the debates going on at higher levels about our approach, as well as selected stories of units involved in the fighting. Good read, well told, and I learned some things from reading it.
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    You just have to love Big Army revisionist history.

    Yeah, one Army Colonel and his men were responsible for starting the entire Awakening.

    Talk about ignoring the actual evolution of the "awakenings" - starting out near the Syrian border. And ignoring or giving token credit to the multitude of units, both U.S. military and U.S. civilian agency, involved with nurturing these things along.

    Those on this website, and those who may have never stepped foot in Iraq, will certainly eat this stuff up as fact. Those in the know are just going to chuckle at this slanted view of history. Because those in the know and who were actually involved heavily in the program are not going to open up their pieholes and be posting it all over the internet for internet wasta points.

    Carry on.
    Last edited by Agrippa; 08-26-2010 at 06:39 AM.

  17. #37
    Council Member Cavguy's Avatar
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    Quote Originally Posted by Agrippa View Post
    You just have to love Big Army revisionist history.

    Yeah, one Army Colonel and his men were responsible for starting the entire Awakening.

    Talk about ignoring the actual evolution of the "awakenings" - starting out near the Syrian border. And ignoring or giving token credit to the multitude of units, both U.S. military and U.S. civilian agency, involved with nurturing these things along.

    Those on this website, and those who may have never stepped foot in Iraq, will certainly eat this stuff up as fact. Those in the know are just going to chuckle at this slanted view of history. Because those in the know and who were actually involved heavily in the program are not going to open up their pieholes and be posting it all over the internet for internet wasta points.

    Carry on.
    No one has ever denied what happened out in Al Qaim w/LtCol Alford in 2005. In fact, Jim's book above details a lot of it.

    More than a few of us have spent more than a few months in Iraq, and outside the wire. Your attack is silly, childish, and inane. Counter the points with facts or your own version, but leave the childish namecalling out of it.
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  18. #38
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    Default X-post from the blog

    This discussion between myself and a commenter may illuminate further.

    Makatak:
    This sounds a little bit overblown. The "Anbar Revolution" (where tribal leaders started moving to the coalition side) began in 2005 in the western part of the province and moved east towards Ramadi. The MEF strategy all along was to separate Al Qaeda from the tribal leaders. In that sense, the brigade was a beneficiary of fortunate timing. In addition, they were an active-duty brigade (two rotations earlier, in 2004, a USAR brigade had the fight in Ramadi). Of course, if the author tells a good story and sells lots of books, then good for him. I hope he captures the larger context of actions throughout Anbar province and how the Brigade's actions both fit into that larger context and were enabled by external factors (and actors).

    Posted by Makatak | June 8, 2010 4:24 PM
    Niel Smith:
    Makatak,

    You have a few facts/timelines wrong in your critique.

    The "USAR BCT" you mention was 2/28 ID, PAARNG, not USAR. They were the previous rotation to 1/1 AD (the unit owning AO Topeka in the book) in 2005-2006, not 2004. 2/2 ID, an active BCT from Korea, owned Ramadi 2004-2005. They did have a rough rotation due to a number of factors.

    The western fight was under LtCol Alford in Al Qaim, yes his superb efforts to enlist the tribes in that area preceded 1/1's efforts and achieved some great local results. However, his actions had little influence in what transpired Ramadi 2006.

    Jim Michaels, the author, covers all this in his book. (I read an early draft) While not an exhaustive academic history, he reveals a lot of the debates and discussions between MNF/MNC-I, I and II MEF, and the various BCTs about how to best do what you describe. Jim describes the overall effort to win the tribes in the Ramadi AO and gain the alliance with Sheik Sittar, who became the most important figure in the Awakening movement until his assassination.

    As far as causation, the US's role in it, and other factors, that ground has been covered and re-covered here on SWJ. Reasonable people may disagree on how much one factor weighed vs. others, and we need a lot more interviews with Iraqis and perspective from time to make an accurate judgment. Timing was certainly a factor, and the situation in early 2006 provided opportunities not available in 2004-2005. However, I am firm in my opinion that our change of tactics played a significant role in starting, facilitating, and accelerating the awakening.

    Jim's book, told largely from the perspectives of the major players of the US side in Ramadi, details how that was done. Jim's book does a great job capturing that story, and the essence of what the Soldiers, Marines, Sailors, and Airmen of the Ready First Combat Team paid for in blood in 2006-2007.

    You may also want to read and join the discussion here (http://council.smallwarsjournal.com/...ead.php?t=3864), which has a lot of debate along these lines.
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