U.S. seeks pact with Jaish al-Mahdi

[tequila]

U.S. seeks pact with Shiite militia - LATIMES, 12 Sep.

U.S. diplomats and military officers have been in talks with members of the armed movement loyal to Muqtada Sadr, a sharp reversal of policy and a grudging recognition that the radical Shiite cleric holds a dominant position in much of Baghdad and other parts of Iraq.

The secret dialogue has been going on since at least early 2006, but appeared to yield a tangible result only in the last week -- with relative calm in an area of west Baghdad that has been among the capital's most dangerous sections.

The discussions have been complicated by divisions within Sadr's movement as well as the cleric's public vow never to meet with Iraq's occupiers. Underlying the issue's sensitivity, Sadrists publicly deny any contact with the Americans or British -- fully aware the price of acknowledging such meetings would be banishment from the movement or worse.

The dialogue represents a drastic turnaround in the U.S. approach to Sadr and his militia, the Mahdi Army. The military hopes to negotiate the same kind of marriage of convenience it has reached in other parts of Iraq with former insurgent groups, many Saddam Hussein loyalists, and the Sunni tribes that supported them. Both efforts are examples of how U.S. officials have sought to end violence by cooperating with groups they once considered intractable enemies ...

[Danny]

The Sadrists are playing a game, and using the time to rebuild their army and overhaul it from top to bottom, ending stronger than when they started. The Sunnis were local insurgents. The Sadrists will be an arm of Iran. Big, big difference, and very dangerous strategy in my opinion.

http://www.forbes.com/feeds/ap/2007/...ap4097742.html

[tequila]

I will point out that the Badr Organization is wholly a creation of the IRGC, yet we seem to have no problem allying with them or recruiting them for the Iraqi security forces.

Indeed, the Sunni insurgents may be "local" --- but many of them are also Ba'athists, who have a bit of a hegemonic impulse themselves historically. They also have killed far more Americans and fellow Iraqis than the Sadrists. Yet the most heralded American intiative is to recruit these men by the thousands to join the security forces, to pay them and their leaders, with little real evidence that this is more than a tactical alliance.

I wonder how much of the hatred of the Sadrists derives from the fact that Muqtada himself represents a single, easily personalized hate figure. A peculiar American pathology is the need to personalize their enemies into such easily demonizable hate figures --- see peculiar examples of Adolf Hitler, Fidel Castro, Saddam Hussein, etc. --- without recognizing that these figures often represent larger social forces.

Killing Sadr would not solve the problem of the Sadr movement.

[Rex Brynen]

I will point out that the Badr Organization is wholly a creation of the IRGC, yet we seem to have no problem allying with them or recruiting them for the Iraqi security forces.

I would agree with Tequila's point here, and add to it that Sadr has historically had a very uneasy connection with Iran: in 2003-04 he constantly made not-so-veiled criticisms of Sistani for his Iranian origins and accent, and he has rejected the principle of velayet-e-faqih upon which the Iranian regime is based.

Sadr has also often sought to distinguish himself from SCIRI (whose Badr Brigade fought under Iranian command during the Iran-Iraq war) as an Iraqi nationalist. This was especially evident during the Fallujah campaign in late 2004 and in his position on federalism, but became less convincing with Jaysh al-Mahdi's later prominent role in sectarian cleansing of Sunnis in Baghdad and elsewhere.

The Iranians throw money, and seek to gain influence, wherever they can--the more horses they have in the race the better for them, and they're sometimes able to play one ally off against the other. The SCIRI (now SIIC) alliance with Iran is a deep, strategic one. The Sadr one is tactical--he needs the money, guns, EFPs, etc., and Tehran can't have the most popular Shi'ite political movement off-side. Maliki and the various wings of al-Dawa are somewhere between the two.

To be provocative, I would even argue that there is an interesting parallel between Iran's support for Sadr and US support for the al-Anbar Salvation Council or cooperation with the 1920 Revolution Brigades: its all very "the enemy of my enemy is my friend (for now, at least)" stuff. In the case of Sadr, that marriage of convenience could go on for some time, perhaps as long as there are US forces in Iraq (and no doubt he's using the "look, the Americans are rearming the Ba'thists!" argument with Tehran).

[Cavguy]

The Sadrists are playing a game, and using the time to rebuild their army and overhaul it from top to bottom, ending stronger than when they started. The Sunnis were local insurgents. The Sadrists will be an arm of Iran. Big, big difference, and very dangerous strategy in my opinion.

http://www.forbes.com/feeds/ap/2007/...ap4097742.html

Agreed. We really messed up not killing him when we had the chance in Najaf in May 2004. Instead we legitimized and empowered him.

That said, Sadr today is the hero of the Pepsi generation. Badr Corps is you dad's Coke. We had issues among our IA in both Tal Afar and Ramadi in 06-07 openly displaying Sadr photos and propaganda. We constantly were pulling the stuff down as not to inflame the locals.

Subjectively, I would say a large percentage of the junior IA soldiers (more than half) are Sadr sympathizers/followers.

[Danny]

Yes to all of the above. Badr is particularly problematic because they have been invited right into the midst of the government (they figured out early on how to play the game). Also, take note of the incredibly robust statement made by Petraeus concerning Iran in Iraq, and then the demurral by Ryan Crocker. So troubling from such a smart and polished man ...

http://www.captainsjournal.com/2007/...raeus-on-iran/

Petraeus: “It is increasingly apparent to both coalition and Iraqi leaders that Iran, through the use of the Quds force, seeks to turn the Iraqi special groups into a Hezbollah-like force to serve its interests and fight a proxy war against the Iraqi state and coalition forces in Iraq.”

Perhaps the coalition thinks that they will be able to splinter the JAM and thus marginalize Sadr. I have huge doubts.

[Cavguy]

Perhaps the coalition thinks that they will be able to splinter the JAM and thus marginalize Sadr. I have huge doubts.

Unfortunately when we legitimized him in June 2004, taking him out ceased to be a practical option. He has the heartfelt loyalty of the Shia underclass. While not particularly good fighters, they are numerous and dangerous.

Marginalizing and splitting him is the only politically acceptable (for Iraqis) way to combat him unless he starts another rebellion.

[Danny]

Wow. This is all rather depressing. If taking Sadr out is not a viable option as you suggest, then the Hobson's choice is to wish that he start another rebellion (for which he is too smart), or try to undermine his own forces from within (how likely is this to succeed?).

It makes sense, then, that he would use this opportunity to reorganize and consolidate power, if he senses that the U.S. is trying to fraction the JAM from within.

Well, how about "fracture" or "faction," not "fraction." Sigh ...

[MattC86]

Subjectively, I would say a large percentage of the junior IA soldiers (more than half) are Sadr sympathizers/followers.

To me, this means that we have no choice but to reach some sort of an agreement or accomodation with Sadr.

That is, although our tactics have changed, the basic rule/timeline of us being able to completely withdraw only when ISF have control (more or less) of the country seems to me to remain. And if so much of the IA ranks are Sadr sympathizers, unless he's co-opted, that element of the IA will remain unreliable, right? Isn't that a major obstacle to achieving stability that an indigenous force can maintain?

Or am I (as is likely) missing something?

Matt

[Danny]

Rex wrote:

To be provocative, I would even argue that there is an interesting parallel between Iran's support for Sadr and US support for the al-Anbar Salvation Council or cooperation with the 1920 Revolution Brigades: its all very "the enemy of my enemy is my friend (for now, at least)" stuff. In the case of Sadr, that marriage of convenience could go on for some time, perhaps as long as there are US forces in Iraq (and no doubt he's using the "look, the Americans are rearming the Ba'thists!" argument with Tehran).

With all due respect, this is being short sighted. Iran (leadership) cares nothing about Iran, and protecting their borders or thinking 'friends' and 'marriages' and so forth, short circuits the mindset of the Iranian leaders. You need to see the world through their glasses for a moment. The Mullah's want to export radical Shi'a ideology. If they see Sadr as a willing dupe or participant in such an endeavor, they will never jettison him as an ally. There is nothing temporal about Iranian designs, except that each move is seen as a stepping stone to the other in their world conquest. The very reason that Ryan Crocker and David Petraeus sang such different songs concerning Iran is one of presuppositions. Petraeus sees what Iran is doing. Crocker works for the State Department, who believes that Iran is simply a nation-state like any other nation-state -- problematic, but still a nation-state.

So what's the solution? Michael Ledeen hits the nail on the head. War would be ugly. Regime change through insurgency and revolution to topple the Mullahs is the best solution. I'm all for letting the fly boys do what they need to do if it comes to that, but if we believe that an air war with Iran wouldn't have disastrous consequences (worse Shi'a insurgency in Iraq, attacks on U.S. embassies around the world, price of crude oil skyrockets, U.S. and possibly world economy tanks as the markets crash, some pilots shot down and captured, tortured and paraded on TV, etc.), we are kidding ourselves. An air war with Iran would give some of the AF pilots a chance to test out the value of their SERE training. And an air war is in the planning stages:

http://www.foxnews.com/story/0,2933,296450,00.html

We are also kidding ourselves if we believe that the Mullahs can be trusted with nuclear weapons.

Without regime change, all options are bad. Leaving things as is, I would also point out, does not comport with the warnings Petraeus gave to congress. Later, Brit Hume asked him if he had the latitude to do what he needed in Iraq, and he hedged, saying something to the extent that he had what he needed for Iraq, but outside Iraq was another issue.

We cannot behave as if Iran is not a problem. David Petraeus will not let us.

Don't listen to me. Listen to Petraeus.

[Danny]

As a short followup, up until now you might could have convinced me that alleged planning of an air war was merely sabre-rattling to keep Iran off balance. Sun Tzu type of stuff.

However, the somber words of Petraeus convinced me that they see the problem (at least the military does, the State Department doesn't ... still). I have trouble believing that Petraeus' testimony was staged with certain words to keep Iran off balance. In fact, I don't believe that.

[tequila]

Michael Ledeen believes that the Iranians bombed the African embassies. He thinks that the Iranians controlled Zarqawi. He is basically not credible.

An air war would be disaster, but an insurgency/revolution supported by the United States would be somehow cost-free? I find it difficult to believe that the Iranian regime would not respond ferociously at any genuinely serious attempt to undermine it, which indeed it likely believes the U.S. is engaged in right now.

Seeing the Iranian government as a unified conglomerate bent on "world domination" is remarkably inaccurate. To project an eschatalogical worldview upon the entire Iranian leadership is equally silly. The Iranian clerical leadership is divided not only by worldview but also serious institutional and material interests. Iran is an authoritarian state, but it is not a totalitarian dictatorship like Iraq or North Korea --- it has a functioning system with multiple and competing centers of power, some of which are radical and others which are less so.

[Rex Brynen]

With all due respect, this is being short sighted. Iran (leadership) cares nothing about Iran, and protecting their borders or thinking 'friends' and 'marriages' and so forth, short circuits the mindset of the Iranian leaders. [

I don't agree--I think there's a substantial dose of Iranian national interest in Iranian behaviour, albeit one that is (as everywhere) filtered through an ideological lens.

Interestingly, Iranian officials publicly and privately make a parallel argument (which I also disagree with)--namely, that the Bush Administration cares nothing for the US national interest, but has been captured by crusading neo-cons of mythical power behest to a higher calling (protecting Israel). Its rather hard to convince them that this is a simplistic and misleading analysis, and the frequency with which the view is held in Tehran needs to be factored into any analysis of Iranian foreign policy decision-making.

(I've posted on another thread my thoughts on Iranian regime behaviour and perceptions based on a recent trip there.)

Lest I be misunderstood, I know that the Iranians are doing fundamentally nasty things in both Iraq and Iran--indeed, I know about some of them in considerable detail. I've made that point bluntly in Tehran, and there are some there who agree--but its the IRGC and the MOIS who are setting the policy directions in these areas.

That doesn't change the fact that the Iranians are playing the Iraqi political game pragmatically, by securing influence wherever they can, in a country that is of fundamental strategic importance to them. I think we tend to forget that US troops in Iraq and Afghanistan are rather like Soviet missiles in Cuba in Iranian eyes. They also think they're winning--their Shi'ite allies control the government, much of the IA, even more of the IP. The Kurds, especially the PUK, also know they fundamentally have to remain on good terms with Tehran. Its harder to think what they think of Afghanistan--I think there's a real disconnect between the MFA people who want to want to help Karzai and the IRGC and MOIS who would like to cause the US and NATO grief.

I also think, as I noted in the other thread, that there is a small but real chance of a US use of force against Iran during the Bush Administration--say 20%. I found very few informed Iranians who believed this (which may itself may be rather worrying).

As for Sadr, I think his own positioning as the authentic, Iraqi nationalist (ie, non-Iranian) Shi'ite force in 2003-04 highlights the extent to which this is a tactical alliance for him. As I said before, however, I think the marriage of convenience is likely to last some years.