Paper and COIN: Exploiting the Enemy's Documents

[Webfoot]

marct,

Only DOCEX I got from non-US forces was the Brits and Kiwis, and that was only because I made the effort to go up to MeS and Bamiyan and ask. Most national units, if they did document collection, evacuated via their own national intel chains. Best docex stuff I got from non-US, aside from the previously mentioned, was when I "acquired" about 2,000 UN intel reports (long story, buy my book some day).
That was in Afghanistan.
In Iraq, the Brits were an integral part of the DOCEX process in ISG, as were the Aussies. However, the Brits provided analysts and tech personnel, the Aussies provided engineers who wanted to kick doors down and kill bad guys. Each were valuable in their own way.
In the Horn of Africa, DOCEX was very sparse and done poorly. Best folks there were the Germans, they just handed what they got over to me. Don't even get me started on the French. Of course, they aren't as bad as a few US ambassadors, who were very "anti-military," especially if it was the US military.
Now I'm up to four cents.

Webfoot

As for Aranas, yes, I was armed. And angry. However, I had some FBI types with me so I knew I would have gotten in trouble.

[marct]

Hi Webfoot,

Only DOCEX I got from non-US forces was the Brits and Kiwis, and that was only because I made the effort to go up to MeS and Bamiyan and ask. Most national units, if they did document collection, evacuated via their own national intel chains. Best docex stuff I got from non-US, aside from the previously mentioned, was when I "acquired" about 2,000 UN intel reports (long story, buy my book some day).

I'll look forward to it . BTW, that rhythmic thumping you hear is my head beating against a wall. All via their own national intel chains? No central clearing house? <thud, thud, thud> Are these people crazy?!? (No, that was a purely rhetorical expression of disbelief - no answer necessary) Honestly, that has to be one of the most insane ways to run a "war" that relies on actionable intelligence I have ever heard of!

In Iraq, the Brits were an integral part of the DOCEX process in ISG, as were the Aussies. However, the Brits provided analysts and tech personnel, the Aussies provided engineers who wanted to kick doors down and kill bad guys. Each were valuable in their own way.

That makes sense; certainly better than what was going on in Afghanistan. What about the really minor players like Poland, Spain (before they left), Estonia, etc.? Were they tied in to ISG as well?

In the Horn of Africa, DOCEX was very sparse and done poorly. Best folks there were the Germans, they just handed what they got over to me. Don't even get me started on the French. Of course, they aren't as bad as a few US ambassadors, who were very "anti-military," especially if it was the US military.

You know, you are sounding remarkably similar to some of the things Tom has said abut the French and some US ambassadors. Must be pure coincidence .

Back to the difference between Army and Marines/SF for a second, I'm wondering if you think the Army deficiency could be made up with some simple training, or if that's not enough? What I'm trying to get at is do you think that the difference is solely a result of specific training or is it a general organizational culture bias?

Marc

[Tom Odom]

Marc,

FYI the guy who took that pic of me and the RPA G3 was a Canadian Warrant Officer. He worked for a Canadian Major who just contacted me last week after 12 years. He was the other part of the "we" in my post.

The Major is in the foreground of the pic below. I asked him to join SWJ and he said he would. FYI my Rwandan deminers found a US anti-tank mine right where that boat nosed onto the beach.

Best

Tom

[Jedburgh]

Our cultural misunderstandings inhibit our effective use of local or even Cat II terps. I was working with various units in Afghanistan and they kept complaining about the untrustworthiness of even their Cat IIs, US citizens all. When I asked the nature of the problem I was told that while they were often quite good at rapid translation and even limited document translations, each terp seemed to have a faulty memory when it came to certain tribes. Of course, each CAT II was from the good ole USofA but had previously lived in Afghanistan. Turns out that the terps retained the tribal loyalty and "overlooked" much of what could be considered "bad news" for that tribe, even if the terp in question had been a US citizen over 20 years. My solution was to mix the terps up, as the existing policy was to send a terp originating from, say, Kandahar province (lets make him a Achakzai of Durrani background) to Kandahar area, as he "understood" the culture better. I said to send anybody of Durrani background up into the Ghilzai areas and send Ghilzai terps to the Durrani areas. Then there would be no "loyalty conflict" based on regional association. Of course, Pushtu speaking terps from tribal confederacies in Pakistan were easier, just send them deeper into Afghanistan away from the border (say, Helmand or Nimruz provinces). Not always workable nor a surefire solution, but much better than nothing.

Don't know if it was enacted because of the fluidity of the terp length of service and replacement policies. Please don't misunderstand, the great majority of Cat IIs were loyal Americans but they had familial and tribal blinkers that they didn't realize they had. Baggage that needs to be acknowledged.

Good post. Of course, the same problems exist in Iraq. However, there is also another issue - a lot of Iraqis who are first or second generation US citizens are Christian Arabs. Many of them, especially the first generation, carry with them a tremendous amount of bigotry towards Muslim Iraqis - both Shi'a and Sunni. In far too many cases, this ultimately affects how they carry out their duties. As you implied above, if the US elements making use of their services recognize this bias, it can be dealt with. Unfortunately, a lot do not - because it often feeds into their own preconceived bias.

...Best DOCEX stuff I got from non-US, aside from the previously mentioned, was when I "acquired" about 2,000 UN intel reports....

I worked with UNSCOM in '96 - at the time the mission had been in existence for a while - and although DOCEX was a critical collection aspect of the mission, there was no standard operating procedure, policy, format etc. Myself and another MI guy ended up putting together a team policy for DOCEX during mission execution. Given how intense the hunt was for documentary and other evidentiary proof of WMD linkages and activity, I found it shocking that there was no structured procedure for DOCEX other than find'em and translate'em - let me know if they're important.

But it paid extremely well for a TDY - no Army per diem for that trip. Plus the UN flew us First Class back and forth between the US and Bahrain, putting us in at Habbaniyah on a German military bird. I got the feeling at the time that a lot of the folks were in it more for the entertainment and the cash than any sense of executing an important mission.

[Webfoot]

Marct,

We should start the Society of Flat-Headed Humans, entry based solely on frustration.
As to your questions, no, none of the other national troops were tied into ISG that I could see. Only the Brits and the Aussies had liaison cells within ISG. As noted, the Aussies were more involved in the SSE side vice intel side, at least from what I could see. Never saw any other furriners in ISG.
In Afghanistan, ISAF was a hoot to see; I saw Brit intel types mixed in with French, Turks, Norwegians and Danes. There was even a Croat Air Intel officer (lots of Taliban airstrikes in-bound, apparently). They all depended on (to a critcal degree) the attached US LNO types for good intel. Reporting was to whom ever ISAF reports to, I never saw any of it.
As for the soldiers, I think it is a lack of specific training, not institutional culture. When shown what to do and why, they became quite proficient at it. I rewarded with Oreos, when possible. Lost a whole box full when a helo went down outside Bagram in late 2003, lost the 1stSgt who was carrying them as well.

Webfoot

[Jedburgh]

AKO Log-In Required

TC 2-91.8 Document and Media Exploitation Enabled Intelligence, Final Draft - 24 July 2008

As an integral part of today’s operational environment, DOMEX is an increasingly specialized full-time mission requiring advanced automation and communications support, analytical support and expert linguists. DOMEX and translation operations were once considered purely human intelligence (HUMINT) processing activities directly associated with language capabilities and extensive background knowledge in area studies. Current doctrinal thought acknowledges that HUMINT is no longer the sole asset capable of conducting DOMEX operations. Personnel involved in DOMEX do not require HUMINT training in order to screen or translate a document, particularly since the unit may better utilize its sparse HUMINT assets to conduct the HUMINT mission. DOMEX is an Army-wide responsibility and while HUMINT assets may be utilized to perform the DOMEX mission when available, HUMINT is a consumer of DOMEX information, rather than the major provider.

Edit to add: Access may require registration in the Intelligence community on AKO; look for the Draft MI Doctrine KC, which may also require registration to get to the document.