This will come in handy for a piece I'm working on about the Air Force's foundation myth. Thanks for the link!
Interesting....
This will come in handy for a piece I'm working on about the Air Force's foundation myth. Thanks for the link!
"On the plains and mountains of the American West, the United States Army had once learned everything there was to learn about hit-and-run tactics and guerrilla warfare."
T.R. Fehrenbach This Kind of War
I'm getting a sinking feeling that I've just done something wrong.Be nice.
-john bellflower
Rule of Law in Afghanistan
"You must, therefore know that there are two means of fighting: one according to the laws, the other with force; the first way is proper to man, the second to beasts; but because the first, in many cases, is not sufficient, it becomes necessary to have recourse to the second." -- Niccolo Machiavelli (from The Prince)
Actually, it provides a fine window for how the Air Force views itself, which ties directly back to the foundation myth. I could pick the piece apart, but that's not really the point right now. Dunlap is cheerleading, which is often what he does. It's been a characteristic of semi-official Air Force writing going back to the late 1940s (and of course other services do it as well...
His use of LeMay as someone who questioned authority is interesting, especially given LeMay's penchant for crushing those who disagreed with him or deviated from established SAC policy. His comment on AF officers doing most of the fighting is also somewhat disingenuous, because within the AF structure pilots HAVE to be officers.
I'll stop now....but it is a very interesting piece for those who want to see how the Air Force sees itself.
"On the plains and mountains of the American West, the United States Army had once learned everything there was to learn about hit-and-run tactics and guerrilla warfare."
T.R. Fehrenbach This Kind of War
For the most part the Air Force has a habit of eating their young. Too much administration BS for the average airman to want to stick around past one enlistment. What would be the point. They have always lagged in promotion and excelled in training. This leads to unnecessary turnover.Originally Posted by Steve Blair
Actually, it provides a fine window for how the Air Force views itself, which ties directly back to the foundation myth. I could pick the piece apart, but that's not really the point right now. Dunlap is cheerleading, which is often what he does. It's been a characteristic of semi-official Air Force writing going back to the late 1940s (and of course other services do it as well...
His use of LeMay as someone who questioned authority is interesting, especially given LeMay's penchant for crushing those who disagreed with him or deviated from established SAC policy. His comment on AF officers doing most of the fighting is also somewhat disingenuous, because within the AF structure pilots HAVE to be officers.
I'll stop now....but it is a very interesting piece for those who want to see how the Air Force sees itself.
You may find this surprising but my direct experience with Air Force officers was not very good. First off, they were mostly O-1 FAC pilots on an RF-4 air base. Put yourself in their place waiting in line with an antiquated Cessna bathtub with a prop in front and back Thinking back....don't put yourself in their place. In the field most were "wait a minute lieutenants" because we were always having to wait on them for one thing or another. On the ground they were completely lost, even with a compass and map, and didn't have basic coordination to look at a stop watch and a map while transmitting and listening at the same time. There were some that were good but that is all. They were out of shape and had no intention of running with us every morning. I guess you can say I didn't like them. The exception to my rule was the A-10 pilots. I enjoyed working with them but I rarely met them face-to-face. They flew out of different air base to a mutual range we used for practicing. That goes for other attack aircraft pilots I worked with as well as Army battalion commanders.
Now, the talk about LeMay. LeMay was a good commander because he was a sociopathic mass killer at the right time and place in history with God on his side. He did what he had to do and he did it well. He also ate his young.
"But suppose everybody on our side felt that way?"
"Then I'd certainly be a damned fool to feel any other way. Wouldn't I?"
As a Marine Aviator, I have a somewhat unique perspective of the Air Force and it's culture. On the whole when it comes to the Air-to-Air mission, the Air Force is thorougly well trained and professional in what it does. I think when it comes to the direct strike role the Air Force is quite good as well. However, when it comes to integrating with ground forces (as CAS requires)the Air Force generally isn't willing to go to the lengths that we Marine Aviators do. For instance in one fight I was involved in, F-16s showed up with no charts, GRGs, or even basic knowledge of the battleground beneath them and then openly complained on the radio when we were getting most of the drops.
From a historical prospective, the Air Force is indeed wedded to technology and has been since its infancy. In the European theater, the 8th Air Force dogmatically stuck to its belief in unescorted bomber mission, even in the face of extreme casuaties. It did this because many of the Air Force leadership played a roll in the development of the doctrine in the 1930s.
In Nam rumors always went around that the Air Force had secret swimming pools only for Air Force personnel. they had a wonderful PX at Danang and when the NVA blew it up with 122s, we almost broke down and wept. We didn't see many of them but my buddy Curt summed it up best when he said, "they sure are shiny guys, I bet none of them stink". We sort of admired them and rumors spread fast and easy about them, that they had steak to eat on a regular basis was another popular one. It was taken for granted that they had thick mattresses with clean linen to sleep on and we never held it against them.
I can neither confirm nor deny the existence of AF swimmng pools and steak dinners.Off we go, into the wild blue yonder...
-john bellflower
Rule of Law in Afghanistan
"You must, therefore know that there are two means of fighting: one according to the laws, the other with force; the first way is proper to man, the second to beasts; but because the first, in many cases, is not sufficient, it becomes necessary to have recourse to the second." -- Niccolo Machiavelli (from The Prince)
Sorry for getting in late in the game, but this is a good analogy for something that continually bothers me:
In the 25 years now of attending Army Schools, sooner or later we discuss Military Leadership Traits, and unless I've brought it up, this Leadership Trait is never mentioned. And when I do, people tend to look at me like I have two heads.
I want some (not all) military leaders who are sociopathic mass-killers. Just In Case. For those slick boys who brought you "Warrior Ethic" as a buzz-word; excuse me, I don't think they really, really want more Frank Lukes, Chuck Yeagers, Pattons, or to an even worse (or better) example, Harmons. And if they like to kill bad enough, they'll behave within the Law of War, so that they can keep doing it.
And speaking as an outsider, I'm going to say:
No. No, you do not. Because all wars end, and you then have to ask yourself "What the hell do I do with these people are sociopathic mass-killers?"
If your soldier or officer archetype cannot fit in society after being demobilized...I'm not sure I want them, really. I really am not.
Otherwise we risk winning the war, only to wind up with our method of fighting said war causing even bigger problems.
Not in MY Army. Out of box fighters and thinkers, good to have around. Sociopaths and mass killers, absolutely not! I can't believe you would suggest that. Those types always lead to more trouble.
Mass killing is not a capability that we need to have in our kit bag in the contemporary era.
Your examples - Yeager, Patton, etc... were all smart, daring men and great fighters, but not sociopaths. Men like Yeager (one of my favorite autobiographies) were daring, out of the box kind of guys who occasionally gave the institution a well deserved middle finger. I'm pretty sure that's the personality you meant - but your comment scares the hell out of me.
Last edited by Cavguy; 12-11-2007 at 04:35 PM.
To accuse Patton of being a sociopath is to buy totally into the mythic Patton created by Bradley and others who didn't like GSP much at all. Patton was actually a very complicated man, and one hell of a commander in the bargain.
"On the plains and mountains of the American West, the United States Army had once learned everything there was to learn about hit-and-run tactics and guerrilla warfare."
T.R. Fehrenbach This Kind of War
That's a good article.
It's pretty much correct in my opinion and observation. He hits two critical points; first that there has been no attack from the air on US ground forces since 1950 and that the Air force has pretty much done its job while taking care of its people and without getting too wrapped around the axle about Martinetish foolishness...
Far more importantly, he writes this:
(emphasis added /kw)"Airmen may also not read FMFM 3-24’s slogan of “learn and adapt” as the unqualified good the manual touts it to be. While “adaptability” is certainly an important military virtue, when we juxtapose it with “learn,” it strikes Airmen as too defensive and reactive. To Airmen, this sounds a lot like absorbing the first blow and then bending to the enemy by trying to figure out how to fight him on his terms (just do so “better”). That is not the Air Force “way.” In air warfare, the first blow can be fatal to relatively fragile aircraft. This makes Airmen extremely offensive-minded, and they are more inclined to take an “anticipate and shape” approach than a “learn and adapt” process. An Airman likes to seize the initiative and force the adversary to fight on his terms—terms in which he believes his superior technology and training will give him the advantage."
I've been complaining about that for many years. We as an Army tend to be entirely too reactive; we react well, ususally but the mindset is too frequently to react...
Good article if a trifle defensive. The sad thing is that our excessive parochialism caused him to write it...
There's more than enough parochialism to go around, IMO. And don't get me started about the "no air attack on US ground forces" straw man....
The Air Force has, IMO, been fortunate in that it has been able to more or less pick and choose its wars since Vietnam (where, as Dunlap fails to mention, they learned slowly and quickly forgot much of what they learned once the shooting stopped...until the TAC generals gained ascendancy in the 1980s and later). Their op tempo overall has been lower (with the notable exception of certain airframes and communities...tankers, AWACs, and A-10s spring immediately to mind, but there are others that were constantly drawn on as well), which gives them more time to consider the ideal conflict and develop systems for that conflict.
This is an area where we may have to agree to disagree, Ken. I found it most useful as an institutional expression of what the Air Force believes it is, where it's been, and where it's going.
"On the plains and mountains of the American West, the United States Army had once learned everything there was to learn about hit-and-run tactics and guerrilla warfare."
T.R. Fehrenbach This Kind of War
I agree with much of what Outcast had to say about Dunlap's piece. I think that Dunlap provides an accurate and explanatory piece of how airmen view the world. One might not agree with that view but it is their view nevertheless and Dunlap should be lauded for providing us with it in a clear and understandable form. I say this as a historian who has written very criticaly about airmen and airpower since its inception.
I'd be interested to hear your views on the "no
air attacks on US ground forces" 'strawman.'There's more than enough parochialism to go around, IMO. And don't get me started about the "no air attack on US ground forces" straw man....
. . .
This is an area where we may have to agree to disagree, Ken. I found it most useful as an institutional expression of what the Air Force believes it is, where it's been, and where it's going.
As for the rest of your comment, all true. So what? I'm not sure with what you're disagreeing. I made three statements, the foregoing air attacks; that the US Army is in fact too often in the reactive mode; and that it's sad that he felt the need to write what is, effectively an apologia and a defensive (as I noted) attempt to establish a philosophy.
What is the specific disagreement?
Ken,
The main reason I tend to consider the "no air attacks on ground forces since 1950" to be something of a straw man is that we've very rarely engaged an opponent (Gulf War I aside) that had any real capability TO attack our forces from the air, or a reason to do so if they possessed the capability. The limited air capability North Vietnam had could have been defeated by either Navy or Marine air (and in fact the Navy had a higher kill ratio during the Vietnam War and proved much quicker to adapt to NVAF tactics), although the objectives of NVN didn't really call for them to use ANY air power. Deterrence during the Cold War was very much a team effort so all services get a fair share of the credit there (along with occasionally very astute political leadership). The Balkans is something of a unique case, and the AF did very well there. It was a joint effort as well, with Navy air and NATO assets taking part. I'm not knocking the achievements of the AF, but I do think that some statements need to be taken with a grain of salt.
As for the disagreement, I'd say it stems more from the implication that Dunlap's piece represents something new (in terms of a defense of the AF viewpoint). It's not really new...in fact his tone is more of a throwback to the sort of pieces that came out in the 1950s regarding AF capabilities. As an institution (not as individuals) the AF isn't necessarily proactive; I'd say they spend more time (at the higher levels, mind, and in a form of projected "group vision") trying to craft a dreamstate of war. They (again a collective "they" that refers more to the vocal air power advocates) view warfare as a total activity, with nothing off limits or out of bounds. Politics do not frame conflict so much as they obstruct it and air power's decisive capability. Dunlap isn't establishing a policy at all; he's giving a current voice to a mindset that's been active in one form or another (and in a very consistent shape) since the birth of the Army Air Service.
Perhaps we aren't disagreeing that much....but there is a certain throwback dreamstate to Dunlap's piece that I find interesting.
Last edited by Steve Blair; 09-13-2007 at 06:59 PM. Reason: clarification
"On the plains and mountains of the American West, the United States Army had once learned everything there was to learn about hit-and-run tactics and guerrilla warfare."
T.R. Fehrenbach This Kind of War
I met that guy in 1990
Not Homburg; the guy I refer to loved neither Soldiers nor Marines and he was a BG in the Air Force advocating a unilateral air campaign to drive Saddam from Kuwait....Providing support to U.S. troops on the ground is relentlessly imprinted on Airmen. As General Hal Hornburg, one of the Air Force’s most distinguished combat veterans and the former commander of the Air Combat Command, put it, “If you don’t love Soldiers, you have no place in my Air Force.”
I would agree with both of you (Ken and Steve) that this is an interesting piece, providing a window in to the collective mind of the Air Force. I would point out there is a bit of offensive-defensiveness in this; I mean really, an Air Force General feels compelled to explain the Air Force to us ground pounders? I have to wonder how would an Army general be perceived if he penned a similar piece explaining the Army to the Air Force.
In relation to what Steve discusses about the Air Force belief system I find it quite revealing to look at what issues he feels compelled to explain. As I would expect, he certainly explains a view of airpower centered on lethal technology--as delivered by the pilots. The central focus of that lethality is destroying the enemy; he never seems to connect that focus with his continued concerns that FM 3-24 is somehow not lethal enough. Curiously he then feels compelled to explain that airmen are warriors, too, even when they don't fly.
It is also instructive to reflect on those subjects not explained. As a FAO in Africa, I loved airlift. It could be a trying experience but when you needed lots of stuff really fast--no one can beat the US Air Force. Yet this article seems to miss that one. As an intelligence officer looking for Iraqi tank divisions in 1990, I truly missed the SR71. Air breathing intelligence collectors are wonderful things. All the services have come along way since 1990 with regards to UAVs and such. In fact there is a major furr ball in progress right now on the UAV control issue, one not discussed in this piece.
best
Tom
Last edited by Tom Odom; 09-13-2007 at 07:04 PM.
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