Understanding Airmen

[LawVol]

Below is a link to Gen Dunlap's latest article regarding AF culture.

http://usacac.leavenworth.army.mil/C...gseptoct07.pdf

[Steve Blair]

This will come in handy for a piece I'm working on about the Air Force's foundation myth. Thanks for the link!

[LawVol]

I'm getting a sinking feeling that I've just done something wrong. Be nice.

[Steve Blair]

Actually, it provides a fine window for how the Air Force views itself, which ties directly back to the foundation myth. I could pick the piece apart, but that's not really the point right now. Dunlap is cheerleading, which is often what he does. It's been a characteristic of semi-official Air Force writing going back to the late 1940s (and of course other services do it as well...).

His use of LeMay as someone who questioned authority is interesting, especially given LeMay's penchant for crushing those who disagreed with him or deviated from established SAC policy. His comment on AF officers doing most of the fighting is also somewhat disingenuous, because within the AF structure pilots HAVE to be officers.

I'll stop now....but it is a very interesting piece for those who want to see how the Air Force sees itself.

[Culpeper]

Actually, it provides a fine window for how the Air Force views itself, which ties directly back to the foundation myth. I could pick the piece apart, but that's not really the point right now. Dunlap is cheerleading, which is often what he does. It's been a characteristic of semi-official Air Force writing going back to the late 1940s (and of course other services do it as well...).

His use of LeMay as someone who questioned authority is interesting, especially given LeMay's penchant for crushing those who disagreed with him or deviated from established SAC policy. His comment on AF officers doing most of the fighting is also somewhat disingenuous, because within the AF structure pilots HAVE to be officers.

I'll stop now....but it is a very interesting piece for those who want to see how the Air Force sees itself.

For the most part the Air Force has a habit of eating their young. Too much administration BS for the average airman to want to stick around past one enlistment. What would be the point. They have always lagged in promotion and excelled in training. This leads to unnecessary turnover.

You may find this surprising but my direct experience with Air Force officers was not very good. First off, they were mostly O-1 FAC pilots on an RF-4 air base. Put yourself in their place waiting in line with an antiquated Cessna bathtub with a prop in front and back Thinking back....don't put yourself in their place. In the field most were "wait a minute lieutenants" because we were always having to wait on them for one thing or another. On the ground they were completely lost, even with a compass and map, and didn't have basic coordination to look at a stop watch and a map while transmitting and listening at the same time. There were some that were good but that is all. They were out of shape and had no intention of running with us every morning. I guess you can say I didn't like them. The exception to my rule was the A-10 pilots. I enjoyed working with them but I rarely met them face-to-face. They flew out of different air base to a mutual range we used for practicing. That goes for other attack aircraft pilots I worked with as well as Army battalion commanders.

Now, the talk about LeMay. LeMay was a good commander because he was a sociopathic mass killer at the right time and place in history with God on his side. He did what he had to do and he did it well. He also ate his young.

[stanleywinthrop]

As a Marine Aviator, I have a somewhat unique perspective of the Air Force and it's culture. On the whole when it comes to the Air-to-Air mission, the Air Force is thorougly well trained and professional in what it does. I think when it comes to the direct strike role the Air Force is quite good as well. However, when it comes to integrating with ground forces (as CAS requires)the Air Force generally isn't willing to go to the lengths that we Marine Aviators do. For instance in one fight I was involved in, F-16s showed up with no charts, GRGs, or even basic knowledge of the battleground beneath them and then openly complained on the radio when we were getting most of the drops.

From a historical prospective, the Air Force is indeed wedded to technology and has been since its infancy. In the European theater, the 8th Air Force dogmatically stuck to its belief in unescorted bomber mission, even in the face of extreme casuaties. It did this because many of the Air Force leadership played a roll in the development of the doctrine in the 1930s.

[120mm]

Now, the talk about LeMay. LeMay was a good commander because he was a sociopathic mass killer at the right time and place in history with God on his side. He did what he had to do and he did it well. He also ate his young.

Sorry for getting in late in the game, but this is a good analogy for something that continually bothers me:

In the 25 years now of attending Army Schools, sooner or later we discuss Military Leadership Traits, and unless I've brought it up, this Leadership Trait is never mentioned. And when I do, people tend to look at me like I have two heads.

I want some (not all) military leaders who are sociopathic mass-killers. Just In Case. For those slick boys who brought you "Warrior Ethic" as a buzz-word; excuse me, I don't think they really, really want more Frank Lukes, Chuck Yeagers, Pattons, or to an even worse (or better) example, Harmons. And if they like to kill bad enough, they'll behave within the Law of War, so that they can keep doing it.

[Ken White]

It's pretty much correct in my opinion and observation. He hits two critical points; first that there has been no attack from the air on US ground forces since 1950 and that the Air force has pretty much done its job while taking care of its people and without getting too wrapped around the axle about Martinetish foolishness...

Far more importantly, he writes this:

"Airmen may also not read FMFM 3-24’s slogan of “learn and adapt” as the unqualified good the manual touts it to be. While “adaptability” is certainly an important military virtue, when we juxtapose it with “learn,” it strikes Airmen as too defensive and reactive. To Airmen, this sounds a lot like absorbing the first blow and then bending to the enemy by trying to figure out how to fight him on his terms (just do so “better”). That is not the Air Force “way.” In air warfare, the first blow can be fatal to relatively fragile aircraft. This makes Airmen extremely offensive-minded, and they are more inclined to take an “anticipate and shape” approach than a “learn and adapt” process. An Airman likes to seize the initiative and force the adversary to fight on his terms—terms in which he believes his superior technology and training will give him the advantage."

(emphasis added /kw)

I've been complaining about that for many years. We as an Army tend to be entirely too reactive; we react well, ususally but the mindset is too frequently to react...

Good article if a trifle defensive. The sad thing is that our excessive parochialism caused him to write it...

[Steve Blair]

There's more than enough parochialism to go around, IMO. And don't get me started about the "no air attack on US ground forces" straw man....

The Air Force has, IMO, been fortunate in that it has been able to more or less pick and choose its wars since Vietnam (where, as Dunlap fails to mention, they learned slowly and quickly forgot much of what they learned once the shooting stopped...until the TAC generals gained ascendancy in the 1980s and later). Their op tempo overall has been lower (with the notable exception of certain airframes and communities...tankers, AWACs, and A-10s spring immediately to mind, but there are others that were constantly drawn on as well), which gives them more time to consider the ideal conflict and develop systems for that conflict.

This is an area where we may have to agree to disagree, Ken. I found it most useful as an institutional expression of what the Air Force believes it is, where it's been, and where it's going.

[Gian P Gentile]

I agree with much of what Outcast had to say about Dunlap's piece. I think that Dunlap provides an accurate and explanatory piece of how airmen view the world. One might not agree with that view but it is their view nevertheless and Dunlap should be lauded for providing us with it in a clear and understandable form. I say this as a historian who has written very criticaly about airmen and airpower since its inception.

[Ken White]

There's more than enough parochialism to go around, IMO. And don't get me started about the "no air attack on US ground forces" straw man....

. . .

This is an area where we may have to agree to disagree, Ken. I found it most useful as an institutional expression of what the Air Force believes it is, where it's been, and where it's going.

air attacks on US ground forces" 'strawman.'

As for the rest of your comment, all true. So what? I'm not sure with what you're disagreeing. I made three statements, the foregoing air attacks; that the US Army is in fact too often in the reactive mode; and that it's sad that he felt the need to write what is, effectively an apologia and a defensive (as I noted) attempt to establish a philosophy.

What is the specific disagreement?

[PhDWarrior]

This was an interesting article that once again, tries to explain the professionalism and contributions that Airmen make in any war. However, we are also guilty, as we have allowed our own successes cloud reality. As an example, after Gulf I, many in the Air Force touted airpower as the “war winner". It made the then-deposed Tony McPeak look like a hero even though he was dismissed from the top Air Force leadership position for "speaking out of school." In any case, the 1990's "proved" that air power ruled supreme, or so many thought. The sad reality is that most of the other services understood the need for air power as a partner but Air Force leaders looked at themselves as "The Big Dog."

What is often overlooked then and now, is/was the contributions of those airmen who did not fly airplanes but provided support to airpower or the end-users of that airpower. I am retired Air Force and I spent my entire career in what is now called "Combat Weather". This included several tours with the U.S. Army directly supporting their combat operations. In fact, we were "more in bed" with the Army than the rest of the Air Force community who provided other services and the Army knew it. When I deployed with the Army, it was with an M16 and/or M9, 110lb ruck on my back, plus portable weather equipment; you did not see me carrying golf clubs or a portable color televisions as some of the other Air Force warfighters might have had with them. In addition, we used to take pride and enjoy "out Armying the Army" so to speak. I can remember an FTX when I was stationed with the 7ID(L) and the division's Chief of Staff stood up in the headquarters area and announced in a very loud voice how the Air Force comes to war with their S&*t together and the rest of the division didn't. The lesson here is that many Air Force members are not just "glory hounds" supporting, the "fast mover" community. Many had to undergo the same difficult situations as their Army brothers-in-arms did. The same holds true today. They are often overlooked.

It is too bad that the article will not receive mainstream coverage and that the image of the Air Force remains as it is. However, this was a great try to overcome some of the "bad press."

[slapout9]

The Winter edition of Air and Space Power is out. Below is a link to General Dunlap's newest article on Air power use in Irregular warfare.
SWC's member Steve Metz is referenced in the article for his expertise in understanding Airpower in a COIN environment.


http://www.airpower.maxwell.af.mil/a...07/dunlap.html

[Tom Odom]

This was an interesting article that once again, tries to explain the professionalism and contributions that Airmen make in any war. However, we are also guilty, as we have allowed our own successes cloud reality. As an example, after Gulf I, many in the Air Force touted airpower as the “war winner". It made the then-deposed Tony McPeak look like a hero even though he was dismissed from the top Air Force leadership position for "speaking out of school."

No McPeak replaced the AF Chief of Staff in the fall of 90 after the Chief ran off at the mouth about war plans. McPeak was very much involved in the AF effort to use Desert Storm to say the AF won the war. McPeak directed the Gulf War Study and then classified the results when after 3 rewrites it did not say what he wanted. I know this because I worked the Army srtudy and the Air Force historians came over and briefed Bob Scales, my boss.

Best

Tom

[Gian P Gentile]

No McPeak replaced the AF Chief of Staff in the fall of 90 after the Chief ran off at the mouth about war plans. McPeak was very much involved in the AF effort to use Desert Storm to say the AF won the war. McPeak directed the Gulf War Study and then classified the results when after 3 rewrites it did not say what he wanted. I know this because I worked the Army srtudy and the Air Force historians came over and briefed Bob Scales, my boss.

Tom:

Correct. The last chapter in my book on the World War II USSBS was on the GWAPS and it was clear that senior AF leaders like Gen McPeak were not satisfied with the results and wanted them supressed. Too, these senior airmen were supported by historians like Richard Hallion who were making preposterous claims that the Gulf War had proved that airpower could "control ground." Nothing new, however, in this thinking and it can be traced all the way back to Douhet.

gian

[slapout9]

Here is link to an article on Dynamic Targeting from an AF viewpoint on another thread but it should probably go here to. Link to article is on the other thread, it should pop up when you go there.

http://council.smallwarsjournal.com/...3564#post33564

[SteveMetz]

The Winter edition of Air and Space Power is out. Below is a link to General Dunlap's newest article on Air power use in Irregular warfare.
SWC's member Steve Metz is referenced in the article for his expertise in understanding Airpower in a COIN environment.


http://www.airpower.maxwell.af.mil/a...07/dunlap.html

Now I feel obligated to stop referring to Charlie as the antichrist.

Actually what he's doing is trying to use someone seen as an "Army" guy against the Army. I've spent decades critiquing the Army while on its payroll though. I never quite fit in. I feel like Marilyn on the Munsters.

[Tom Odom]

Now I feel obligated to stop referring to Charlie as the antichrist.

Actually what he's doing is trying to use someone seen as an "Army" guy against the Army. I've spent decades critiquing the Army while on its payroll though. I never quite fit in. I feel like Marilyn on the Munsters.

Traitor

I bet you have an autographed pic of GEN McPeak at home and...

Your 'jammies' probably have F22s on them

Tom

PS

I worked for the Air Force during THAT firestorm so I was mentally prepared for the Shinseki/beret brouhaha.

A HA! The twuth emerges!

[slapout9]

Norfolk, you forgot Steve Blair a Marine who teaches Air Force ROTC cadets.

I am gonna tell you a story. At the SMART wars workshop I went to during a discussion about what to call the present situation going on(LWOT,GWOT, Global Insurgency,Etc.) in the world an Air Force Col. asked me why the Army dosen't call it Small Unit Wars instead of all the other names.


They also had list of Great Air Power Commanders...You know who made the list General Mathew Ridgeway former commander of the 82nd Airborne.

[Van]

I never quite fit in. I feel like Marilyn on the Munsters.

Please tell me I didn't really read this. Someone pass the bleach for the mind's eye.

Back on topic-
I really liked the observation comparing AF history to Stalinist history, that hit the ten ring...

MG Dunlap's article- He still operates from an unspoken assumption of symmetry, that there are infrastructures, hard and virtual, and other basically conventional targets. He believes in technology driven processes for what is an innately human and personal endeavor.

In COIN, airpower is the big firebase at altitude, it is ISR, and it is logisitical support. In support of COIN, it can also assist with isolating the area of operation from the bad guys' sanctuaries. Read the article carefully, MG Dunlap fails to identify anything new on these points. Regarding cyber and psyops, he basically says that somehow being in blue gives Airmen a different perspective on these disciplines than anyone else in DoD. Not convincing, when you look at the capabilities in DoD but outside the Air Force.

The article completely ignores a fundamental truth about COIN; that the center of successful COIN ends up with people meeting face-to-face and developing relationships as a foundation for future improvements.

Frankly, the article is little more than air force cheerleading and shouldn't be brought into a serious discussion of COIN much less the broader catagory of Small Wars. (Except to support Steve's CV )



Don't get me wrong; airpower is an essential edge over our opponents, but this guy sounds like he's channeling GEN McPeak.