Results 1 to 20 of 94

Thread: Understanding Airmen

Threaded View

Previous Post Previous Post   Next Post Next Post
  1. #10
    Moderator Steve Blair's Avatar
    Join Date
    Oct 2005
    Location
    Montana
    Posts
    3,195

    Default

    Ken,

    The main reason I tend to consider the "no air attacks on ground forces since 1950" to be something of a straw man is that we've very rarely engaged an opponent (Gulf War I aside) that had any real capability TO attack our forces from the air, or a reason to do so if they possessed the capability. The limited air capability North Vietnam had could have been defeated by either Navy or Marine air (and in fact the Navy had a higher kill ratio during the Vietnam War and proved much quicker to adapt to NVAF tactics), although the objectives of NVN didn't really call for them to use ANY air power. Deterrence during the Cold War was very much a team effort so all services get a fair share of the credit there (along with occasionally very astute political leadership). The Balkans is something of a unique case, and the AF did very well there. It was a joint effort as well, with Navy air and NATO assets taking part. I'm not knocking the achievements of the AF, but I do think that some statements need to be taken with a grain of salt.

    As for the disagreement, I'd say it stems more from the implication that Dunlap's piece represents something new (in terms of a defense of the AF viewpoint). It's not really new...in fact his tone is more of a throwback to the sort of pieces that came out in the 1950s regarding AF capabilities. As an institution (not as individuals) the AF isn't necessarily proactive; I'd say they spend more time (at the higher levels, mind, and in a form of projected "group vision") trying to craft a dreamstate of war. They (again a collective "they" that refers more to the vocal air power advocates) view warfare as a total activity, with nothing off limits or out of bounds. Politics do not frame conflict so much as they obstruct it and air power's decisive capability. Dunlap isn't establishing a policy at all; he's giving a current voice to a mindset that's been active in one form or another (and in a very consistent shape) since the birth of the Army Air Service.

    Perhaps we aren't disagreeing that much....but there is a certain throwback dreamstate to Dunlap's piece that I find interesting.
    Last edited by Steve Blair; 09-13-2007 at 06:59 PM. Reason: clarification
    "On the plains and mountains of the American West, the United States Army had once learned everything there was to learn about hit-and-run tactics and guerrilla warfare."
    T.R. Fehrenbach This Kind of War

Bookmarks

Posting Permissions

  • You may not post new threads
  • You may not post replies
  • You may not post attachments
  • You may not edit your posts
  •