Understanding Airmen

[Steve Blair]

Probably because I simply was not looking for it, I failed to see evidence of this statement. But then I came across this article this morning:

I first noticed the trend when reading about Air Force involvement in Vietnam. I came across it again when reading about Korea. There was a constant "airpower could have won everything if we had been allowed to do it our way" thread, which usually translated into bombing everything that moved (and most things that didn't). There's often a disconnect between the theory and its application in a world where political constraints are ALWAYS a part of military operations.

In terms of the failing to fight consideration, I don't think it's a recruiting tool as much as it is an IO consideration in many areas and with some cultures. By failing to put people on the ground, you can appear to be afraid of the insurgents, giving them a sense of legitimacy they might not have otherwise. You also deprive yourself of invaluable COIN intelligence: being able to SEE and HEAR the people. Sensors are great, but they just don't substitute for the impressions that can be formed on the ground.

Peck's VC example is nothing short of ludicrous. Intimidation has always been a part of insurgent operations, but most COIN attempts to "pay them back in their own coin" have been total failures. Part of successful COIN is being able to offer real alternatives to the insurgents, not a choice between who's going to shoot you in the back of the head.

[Van]

In the article, GEN Dunlap says

Airmen shamelessly seek to destroy adversaries with as little risk to themselves... as possible.

All the way back to the Iliad, close combat is considered valient and couragous, and stand-off weapon users (then archers, now airmen) were considered lacking in martial virtue. Note that 'couragous' literally means 'having heart' and 'virtue' comes from vir, Latin for man so means manliness. So, stand-off weapons make the user heartless and unmanly...

Pretty archaic attitude from folks whose basic weapon has a maximum effective range of 500m against point targets and 800m against area targets (M16A2).

I think the central, unspoken issue is that most air force folks do not display the degree of respect for folks who go into close combat that ground forces feel is their due. And possibly, the air force folks are doing this to compensate for their own questions about their virtue when compared to us knuckle-dragging ground pounders.

In the current conflict, we are seeing a similar pattern to early Viet Nam. If the enemy has no strategic infrastructure to bomb, strategic bombing can continue 24-7 without effect. I would argue (as an Army guy) that precision munitions were one of the two things missing from the Douhet/Mitchell vision of air power (the other being information operations) to minimize collateral damage that turns into an IO victory for the opponent. In other words, were are closer now to the capabilities required for strat air to carry the day than ever before, but strat air requires an opponent who has an infrastructure that can be targeted with bombs. The bad guys in Iraq don't have big IED factories, they have dozens of home workshops, they don't have electric power plants discrete from the friendly power plants, their comm system might be a guy on a scooter who looks just like every other scooter in the city from 30,000 ft. In this circumstance, airpower is the big fire base in the sky, with someone on the ground as the forward observer, not an independant, autonomous fleet of airmachines envisioned by Douhet.

[LawVol]

I think the central, unspoken issue is that most air force folks do not display the degree of respect for folks who go into close combat that ground forces feel is their due. And possibly, the air force folks are doing this to compensate for their own questions about their virtue when compared to us knuckle-dragging ground pounders.

Perhaps the following link would be useful to you.

http://www.truesilence.com/psychological-projection.htm

[Steve Blair]

All the way back to the Iliad, close combat is considered valient and couragous, and stand-off weapon users (then archers, now airmen) were considered lacking in martial virtue. Note that 'couragous' literally means 'having heart' and 'virtue' comes from vir, Latin for man so means manliness. So, stand-off weapons make the user heartless and unmanly...

This is very much a Western myth of warfare, and ignores the experiences and cultures of the various nomadic/semi-nomadic horse tribes of Central Asia....not to mention the whole longbowmen myth. However, it can also tie into the fighter pilot "kill tally" idea and their own arguments about prowess (and lack thereof) with their bomber pilot brethren.

It's also worth remembering that the Romans trained their soldiers to use sword AND the pilum, which was a missile weapon and a central part of their tactics through at least the early Empire period. One of the key parts of the Byzantine military was the heavily-armored horse archer. I suspect the "unmanly" part may have crept in during the romanticism of the Medieval period....

[wm]

This is very much a Western myth of warfare, and ignores the experiences and cultures of the various nomadic/semi-nomadic horse tribes of Central Asia....not to mention the whole longbowmen myth. However, it can also tie into the fighter pilot "kill tally" idea and their own arguments about prowess (and lack thereof) with their bomber pilot brethren.

It's also worth remembering that the Romans trained their soldiers to use sword AND the pilum, which was a missile weapon and a central part of their tactics through at least the early Empire period. One of the key parts of the Byzantine military was the heavily-armored horse archer. I suspect the "unmanly" part may have crept in during the romanticism of the Medieval period....

Romans threw the pilia, which had soft, hollow heads, first. The soft head embedded the spear into an opponent's shield. The shaft then distorted, pulling the opponent's shield downward as well. Thereby, the enemy was uncovered and made easy prey as the Roman legionnaires closed to use the gladius, the heavy short sword, which was designed as a stabbing rather than a slashing weapon.

The Romans had no compunction about using their allies as archers and slingers to soften up their opponebnts first. Roman's didn't use these weapons themselve primarily because they didn't know how. Why waste time learning how to use them if you have allies available who are better at this than you--sort of like the US Army using Native American scouts during the frontier conflicts of the 1800s.

I think Steve is partly correct about the the unmanly aspect of "indirect fire" weapons/long distance engagements creeping in during the Middle Ages--it was, I believe, a hallmark of the Germannic "barbarians'" style of fighting to engage in one-on-one combat rather than long distance "missile" exchanges. Thes folks became the martial leadership of Western Europe as Rome was supplanted and brought the values of their heritage with them. One proved one's fitness to lead through succeeding in a direct challenge of arms with an incumbent (AKA duel), not by killing the incumbent at a distance with a sling or bowshot. BTW, unlike steel swords, slings and bows were relatively cheap to make, becoming, therefore, the weapons of the hoi polloi, not the elite.

[tequila]

The first "Western" example of disdain for archers/missile weapons that I could find is the Greek hoplite disregard for such "lightly" armed troops. Aeschylus specifies arrows as "barbarian" weapons in The Persians, Euripides calls them "coward's weapons" in The Madness of Heracles, and both Thucydides and Herodotus note Spartan disdain for "spindle"-like arrows as effeminate. This despite, of course, numerous examples of the slaughter of hoplites by light-armed troops - i.e. the Athenian invasion of Aetolia, the Spartan surrender at Sphacteria to Athenian rowers, etc.

Like the men-at-arms' hatred for archers and crossbowmen in medieval Europe, this downgrading of the effectiveness of projectile weapons was largely class-based. Rights, social regard, and also responsibilities were based on economic prosperity. Athenians below a certain property threshold could vote but not hold office. Above such qualifications came the perquisites of both eligibility for religious office, political office, and also the legal obligation to serve as hoplites. A hoplite panoply of hoplon-style shield and thrusting spear could be afforded at lower costs, but was still far more expensive than a bow and arrows or light javelins.

Thus by purchasing the comparably expensive hoplite armor, shield, and weapons, a Greek declared himself a substantial member of his society, a social equal or near-equal with the wealthier legally-obligated hoplites who formed the elite of society. Naturally this required the casting of aspersion on the impoverished men who showed up to the levy with nothing but javelins, bows, or just a sling. Thus the idea that fighting with such was cowardly, unmanly, or even unethical.

[Van]

LawVol, re: psychological projection- oh, as long as everyone agrees that this knife cuts both ways Both sides are flawed, but... the Air Force culture is based on a premise that pilots are a precious commodity, have to treated with kid gloves, and and are above worldly matters. It goes back to the Army Air Corps decision to commission people and train them as pilots rather than take trained officers and teach them to fly. On the other hand, the Army tends to over react, forgetting or ignorant that AF pilots treat their own support officer with as little respect, and that air power is a critical edge in any operation. At the end of the day, we need to put this adolescent silliness to one side and do our jobs. And at the muddy boots level, it isn't perfect, but it is pretty good, it is just these darned GOs.

Yeah, air power saves a lot of U.S. lives (even more than are lost in air to ground fratricides), but air power has yet to go it alone successfully (and will never be able to go it alone in COIN).

Steve & WM, re: the Roman model - I find a lot of value in examples from Roman history (some things to copy, others to avoid). The absence of a open rivalry between different catagories of Roman soldier (as opposed to the levies from the provinces as mentioned earlier) might be significant. A legion commander had artillery (catapults), cavalry, infantry, and various support elements. From what I read (a while back now) I never got a sense of rivalries even between the line infantry and cavalry (pervasive since the Renaissance, but I would suspect older). They were Romans, and it was them against the world. Maybe I missed something, but this state seems desireable. Combined combat power is greater than the sum of the parts, and this petty sniping really doesn't serve U.S. interests.

Re: Medieval stand-off weapons - Did the Welsh archers in their three centuries of insurgency against the English influence antipathy between close combatants and ranged weapon users?

[Norfolk]

I first noticed the trend when reading about Air Force involvement in Vietnam. I came across it again when reading about Korea. There was a constant "airpower could have won everything if we had been allowed to do it our way" thread, which usually translated into bombing everything that moved (and most things that didn't). There's often a disconnect between the theory and its application in a world where political constraints are ALWAYS a part of military operations.

In terms of the failing to fight consideration, I don't think it's a recruiting tool as much as it is an IO consideration in many areas and with some cultures. By failing to put people on the ground, you can appear to be afraid of the insurgents, giving them a sense of legitimacy they might not have otherwise. You also deprive yourself of invaluable COIN intelligence: being able to SEE and HEAR the people. Sensors are great, but they just don't substitute for the impressions that can be formed on the ground.

Intimidation has always been a part of insurgent operations, but most COIN attempts to "pay them back in their own coin" have been total failures. Part of successful COIN is being able to offer real alternatives to the insurgents, not a choice between who's going to shoot you in the back of the head.

The fundamental problem with the Air Force isn't so much its preoccupation with high-techology or its focus on the pilot's point of view, or numbers of systems, but its doctine, or rather ideology. The founding (and continually evolving) myth of the Air Force derives from the Doctrine of "Victory Through Air Power", but as anyone can read for themselves, from Douhet to Warden to Dunlap's piece (not that I'd necessarily rank Dunlap up with either of those two theorists), that "Doctrine" is really more of an Ideology masquerading as a doctine and is seeking its fulfillment in History (and like Marxists, they're going to be waiting forever).

This ideology, like any other, requires selective use (or abuse) of history to try to prove its truth and efficacy and ultimate, inevitable triumph. Just as Ken said about the Air Force, "It's a servive in search of a mission". I'm not totally convinced, but he may be right that creating an Air Force independent of the Army was a mistake. Both the Navy and the Marines have their own "Air Forces", and while not perfect, I don't hear very many people saying that the Air Force is better than either of them (except the Air Force themselves).

As long as the Air Force remains rooted in the "Ideology of Victory Through Air Power", and its fixation on "all or nothing" Total War, it can be a fairly blunt instrument for large-scale conventional war; for small wars (and unconventional warfare for that matter), it may be just a rampaging bull in a china shop. You can't make the local population feel safe with you and trust you when your flyboys just can't see why they shouldn't be turned loose to take out villages, houses, power plants, and water works with PGMs just because that's where the enemy is (and thus has to be "destroyed" with all the violence available at hand), while you're trying to move amongst the same people whose houses are getting it and who don't have safe water or electricity (if they're used to having it) because the Air Force bombed the utilities.

[Culpeper]

As long as the Air Force remains rooted in the "Ideology of Victory Through Air Power", and its fixation on "all or nothing" Total War, it can be a fairly blunt instrument for large-scale conventional war; for small wars (and unconventional warfare for that matter), it may be just a rampaging bull in a china shop.

Not true. At the risk of quoting you out of context, the USAF is over their strategic mindset of WWII. Reagan's Rapid Deployment Force, which is the little sister of today's Special Operations, put an end to that nonsense once and for all. Also, their own technology put an end to the bull in a china shop. Most actual real-time USAF missions in regard to small wars, on the ground or in the air, are Special Ops in nature. Nevertheless, the argument of victory through air power was made obsolete by Billy Mitchell. Air power during the Gulf War saved numerous lives. In that campaign, air power was the decisive denominator. Also, many Airmen today are earning, sometimes posthumously, the same commendations as Army grunts. Most people have a stereotyped image of the USAF. The USAF is much more complicated and diversified than most people think.

[slapout9]

The USAF is much more complicated and diversified than most people think.

That is absolutely true. One example is at Maxwell AFB where they doing some of the most advanced R&D on negotiation and human influence operations that I have ever seen. They also have and are doing some very sophisticated R&D on less lethal and non-lethal weapons.

[Steve Blair]

But you also have to remember the institutional "face" of the Air Force...which remains victory through air power (although space power and dominance of cyberspace have both been added to the formula).

I don't deny that there is some very interesting research going on within Big Blue, or that there are pockets and individuals that are looking beyond the basic framework...but when was the last time you saw someone with equal (or higher) rank come out with an article contradicting or arguing with what Dunlap and others have written? The public face remains very much the same.

Every large organization is complicated and diverse. That's the nature of a large organization. But if you look at the official writings, the tone set by those in authority, you'll still find the old mantra. The Air Force as an organization (not as individuals) has been dragged into other roles (sometimes kicking and screaming), but the larger whole still struggles to get back to that familiar "high ground" of air power.

No matter what some might think, this isn't Air Force bashing. It's recognizing the reality of the ORGANIZATION as a whole, not the parts within that organization. As far as the organization being "over" the Second World War....I'd have to disagree. The terms have changed, but many within the senior leadership still look for victory through technology and preferably air power. Not all the individuals are like that. There are some great thinkers within the AF...many who are willing and eager to think outside the conventional borders and come up with new roles and ways of doing business. But they are all too often silenced or ignored.

We may see changes in the next 10 years or so...as the next generation of officers (including many who've come into the AF from other services) rise in rank. But I have yet to be convinced that the ORGANIZATION as a whole has changed. Some parts, yes, and there are some interesting steps being taken. But those parts have yet to impact the whole in a major way.

And it's not just the AF. Look at the tug of war within the Army regarding COIN and 3-24. I tend to single out the AF because as an organization they have been the most consistent at shutting out current events in favor of the war they'd like to fight (one could make an argument for the Navy as well in this category).

And Norfolk, I'd also propose that the AF ideology springs from both technology and pilots/aircraft. In many ways you can't discuss one without bringing in the other. And with reference to CAS, one of the former Chiefs of Staff (McPeak) argued toward the end of his tenure that CAS should be given back to the Army, with them and the Marines given primacy for the mission.

[Norfolk]

Very much agreed Steve, and as far as AF ideology deriving from both pilots/aircraft and technology, I agree very much as well, it's just that with my political philosopher's schooling, I may be biased to look for the qualititative rather than the quantitative, and trip over the stone blocks as I search for the fortifications.

Both Culpeper and Slapout9 are correct to the extent that the Air Force is very a diverse organization, but how many Air Observers, CCT's, PJ's, SOF Crewmen, etc., make Chief of Staff? For that matter, how many rise to 3- or 4-star flag ranks; not too many. Most of the 3- and 4-stars are fighter, bomber, materiel, even intelligence types. A few strategic airlift transport types make their way to the upper levels on the stairway to the stars. By and large the guys who make it to the top (and in charge of doctrine) are those thinking in terms of the Big One, and those fighting small wars or unconventional ones amount to their (elite) cupbearers at most. This certainly doesn't detract from the vital and gutsy work that the PJ's, the CCT's, the SOF Aircrew, and the Air Observers do; but it very much testifies to their being marginalized at the top.

Culpeper (and Slapout too, being an ex-jumper himself about the time RDF was formed) are completely correct in that the Air Force was compelled to field a serious and reliable strategic airlift capability to take the Army's light divisions wherever they needed to go (especially if that destination was the Middle East) - no more Lebanon 1958's, where the Army's Airborne Divisions (STRAC) couldn't get there and tried to send front-line troops from Germany because the Air Force couldn't live up to its committments for adequate strategic airlift to get them there; that really burned the Army in general and the Airborne in particular, especially when Ike had to send in the Marines to do the job. But even now, the Air Force can't do much more than airlift a single light division (which is still more than anyone else) and keep it supplied for a month or so; the rest of XVIII Airborne Corps has to either cool their heels or board ships just like the Heavy Divisions.

But in its institutional heart of hearts, the Air Force remains essentially unchanged. Unrestricted, Total War theory remains the core of its doctrine. The Five Rings Theory remains unpurged from Air Force doctrine and teaching, and that theory is less than 20 years' old (well past WWII, Korea, and even surviving the Cold War). It's somewhat ironic that Fielded Military Forces is the outermost, and therefore the least essential, ring to be targeted by Air Power. Targetting the Population remains a tier above this, and targeting the Infrastructure (which we did in Iraq in 1991, Kosovo/Serbia in 1998, and Iraq again in 2003), and the destruction or damage which was inflicted on said in 2003 is dogging SSO ops in Iraq 4 years later - Iraqis are very ticked that their water and electricity is spotty at times, or even most of the time. Above that of course you get to Systems Essentials and finally the Leadership.

This is what the institutional Air Force still very much sees as how to fight war. That means air superiority and missiles/bombs on target, the bigger the better, and the more, the merrier, until the enemy utterly collapses under the full force of aerial bombardment. The reason that the Air Force doesn't deliberately target the civilian population (a la WWII and Korea) is that sort of thing just won't be tolerated morally by most of the public or politically by most of the political leadership. Yet the civilian population (and infrastructure even more so) remains a greater priority target in Air Force doctrine than enemy troops on the field (and no new-build CAS aircraft has been built for the AF since 1982, but F-16's designed for tactical air strikes are supposed to replace the A-10, hmmm...)

This is not at all consistent with the proper conduct of small wars (or unconventional wars) where you're trying to protect the population against the enemy and rebuild their lives, infrastructure, and their trust in someone carrying a gun (or flying a fighter-bomber). Even when honest mistakes are made, and a fighter-bomber takes out someone's village or house or field in error, and killing civilians, all the progress that the troops on the ground may have made with these people is completely undone; in some areas, such incidents have made it impossible to even try to reach out to this people at all. And, for that matter, even General Wars must not be waged as Total Wars; the enemy population, and civilization must be preserved; good Armies instinctively understand this in their bones, as their true mission isn;t the extermination of the enemy, but the preservation of civilization. Total War is a descent into barbarism, or worse.

When the Five Rings Theory (and its ilk) are formally and finally ditched (or extensively revised to remove civilians and civilian infrastructure from targetting and destruction) and the Air Force is led once in a while by PJ's or SOF types, then I think that the Air Force will have really changed, in its institutional heart of hearts, and for the better.

Personally, I think that the Air Force should include the Airborne (I'm going to be shot dawn and hung at sunrise in some Airborne quarters after they read this - especially since I'm a leg), just as the Navy includes the Marines, and then the higher echelons of the Air Force might have more of an interest in, exposure to, and direct involvement with, land warfare in general and small wars in particular. I'd also give the CAS mission (except for the Air Force Airborne) and planes like the A-10 and its Air Observer variant, the excellent OA-10 to the Army; I'd also give (and this is what is just practice anyway) Strategic Air Defence to the Air Force (and let the Army concentrate on tactical and operational AD of Army ground forces).

[Ken White]

Aside from the arch heresy of suggesting that Airborne forces should belong to the Air force, you have compounded the felony by suggesting -- nay, saying -- the Marine Corps is 'included' in the Navy.

Best advice I can give is avoid any patterns in your life style, have your land line telephone disconnected, change your cell phone, take different routes in all your travels...