Understanding Airmen

[wm]

This is very much a Western myth of warfare, and ignores the experiences and cultures of the various nomadic/semi-nomadic horse tribes of Central Asia....not to mention the whole longbowmen myth. However, it can also tie into the fighter pilot "kill tally" idea and their own arguments about prowess (and lack thereof) with their bomber pilot brethren.

It's also worth remembering that the Romans trained their soldiers to use sword AND the pilum, which was a missile weapon and a central part of their tactics through at least the early Empire period. One of the key parts of the Byzantine military was the heavily-armored horse archer. I suspect the "unmanly" part may have crept in during the romanticism of the Medieval period....

Romans threw the pilia, which had soft, hollow heads, first. The soft head embedded the spear into an opponent's shield. The shaft then distorted, pulling the opponent's shield downward as well. Thereby, the enemy was uncovered and made easy prey as the Roman legionnaires closed to use the gladius, the heavy short sword, which was designed as a stabbing rather than a slashing weapon.

The Romans had no compunction about using their allies as archers and slingers to soften up their opponebnts first. Roman's didn't use these weapons themselve primarily because they didn't know how. Why waste time learning how to use them if you have allies available who are better at this than you--sort of like the US Army using Native American scouts during the frontier conflicts of the 1800s.

I think Steve is partly correct about the the unmanly aspect of "indirect fire" weapons/long distance engagements creeping in during the Middle Ages--it was, I believe, a hallmark of the Germannic "barbarians'" style of fighting to engage in one-on-one combat rather than long distance "missile" exchanges. Thes folks became the martial leadership of Western Europe as Rome was supplanted and brought the values of their heritage with them. One proved one's fitness to lead through succeeding in a direct challenge of arms with an incumbent (AKA duel), not by killing the incumbent at a distance with a sling or bowshot. BTW, unlike steel swords, slings and bows were relatively cheap to make, becoming, therefore, the weapons of the hoi polloi, not the elite.

[tequila]

The first "Western" example of disdain for archers/missile weapons that I could find is the Greek hoplite disregard for such "lightly" armed troops. Aeschylus specifies arrows as "barbarian" weapons in The Persians, Euripides calls them "coward's weapons" in The Madness of Heracles, and both Thucydides and Herodotus note Spartan disdain for "spindle"-like arrows as effeminate. This despite, of course, numerous examples of the slaughter of hoplites by light-armed troops - i.e. the Athenian invasion of Aetolia, the Spartan surrender at Sphacteria to Athenian rowers, etc.

Like the men-at-arms' hatred for archers and crossbowmen in medieval Europe, this downgrading of the effectiveness of projectile weapons was largely class-based. Rights, social regard, and also responsibilities were based on economic prosperity. Athenians below a certain property threshold could vote but not hold office. Above such qualifications came the perquisites of both eligibility for religious office, political office, and also the legal obligation to serve as hoplites. A hoplite panoply of hoplon-style shield and thrusting spear could be afforded at lower costs, but was still far more expensive than a bow and arrows or light javelins.

Thus by purchasing the comparably expensive hoplite armor, shield, and weapons, a Greek declared himself a substantial member of his society, a social equal or near-equal with the wealthier legally-obligated hoplites who formed the elite of society. Naturally this required the casting of aspersion on the impoverished men who showed up to the levy with nothing but javelins, bows, or just a sling. Thus the idea that fighting with such was cowardly, unmanly, or even unethical.

[Van]

LawVol, re: psychological projection- oh, as long as everyone agrees that this knife cuts both ways Both sides are flawed, but... the Air Force culture is based on a premise that pilots are a precious commodity, have to treated with kid gloves, and and are above worldly matters. It goes back to the Army Air Corps decision to commission people and train them as pilots rather than take trained officers and teach them to fly. On the other hand, the Army tends to over react, forgetting or ignorant that AF pilots treat their own support officer with as little respect, and that air power is a critical edge in any operation. At the end of the day, we need to put this adolescent silliness to one side and do our jobs. And at the muddy boots level, it isn't perfect, but it is pretty good, it is just these darned GOs.

Yeah, air power saves a lot of U.S. lives (even more than are lost in air to ground fratricides), but air power has yet to go it alone successfully (and will never be able to go it alone in COIN).

Steve & WM, re: the Roman model - I find a lot of value in examples from Roman history (some things to copy, others to avoid). The absence of a open rivalry between different catagories of Roman soldier (as opposed to the levies from the provinces as mentioned earlier) might be significant. A legion commander had artillery (catapults), cavalry, infantry, and various support elements. From what I read (a while back now) I never got a sense of rivalries even between the line infantry and cavalry (pervasive since the Renaissance, but I would suspect older). They were Romans, and it was them against the world. Maybe I missed something, but this state seems desireable. Combined combat power is greater than the sum of the parts, and this petty sniping really doesn't serve U.S. interests.

Re: Medieval stand-off weapons - Did the Welsh archers in their three centuries of insurgency against the English influence antipathy between close combatants and ranged weapon users?

[Culpeper]

Actually, it provides a fine window for how the Air Force views itself, which ties directly back to the foundation myth. I could pick the piece apart, but that's not really the point right now. Dunlap is cheerleading, which is often what he does. It's been a characteristic of semi-official Air Force writing going back to the late 1940s (and of course other services do it as well...).

His use of LeMay as someone who questioned authority is interesting, especially given LeMay's penchant for crushing those who disagreed with him or deviated from established SAC policy. His comment on AF officers doing most of the fighting is also somewhat disingenuous, because within the AF structure pilots HAVE to be officers.

I'll stop now....but it is a very interesting piece for those who want to see how the Air Force sees itself.

For the most part the Air Force has a habit of eating their young. Too much administration BS for the average airman to want to stick around past one enlistment. What would be the point. They have always lagged in promotion and excelled in training. This leads to unnecessary turnover.

You may find this surprising but my direct experience with Air Force officers was not very good. First off, they were mostly O-1 FAC pilots on an RF-4 air base. Put yourself in their place waiting in line with an antiquated Cessna bathtub with a prop in front and back Thinking back....don't put yourself in their place. In the field most were "wait a minute lieutenants" because we were always having to wait on them for one thing or another. On the ground they were completely lost, even with a compass and map, and didn't have basic coordination to look at a stop watch and a map while transmitting and listening at the same time. There were some that were good but that is all. They were out of shape and had no intention of running with us every morning. I guess you can say I didn't like them. The exception to my rule was the A-10 pilots. I enjoyed working with them but I rarely met them face-to-face. They flew out of different air base to a mutual range we used for practicing. That goes for other attack aircraft pilots I worked with as well as Army battalion commanders.

Now, the talk about LeMay. LeMay was a good commander because he was a sociopathic mass killer at the right time and place in history with God on his side. He did what he had to do and he did it well. He also ate his young.

[stanleywinthrop]

As a Marine Aviator, I have a somewhat unique perspective of the Air Force and it's culture. On the whole when it comes to the Air-to-Air mission, the Air Force is thorougly well trained and professional in what it does. I think when it comes to the direct strike role the Air Force is quite good as well. However, when it comes to integrating with ground forces (as CAS requires)the Air Force generally isn't willing to go to the lengths that we Marine Aviators do. For instance in one fight I was involved in, F-16s showed up with no charts, GRGs, or even basic knowledge of the battleground beneath them and then openly complained on the radio when we were getting most of the drops.

From a historical prospective, the Air Force is indeed wedded to technology and has been since its infancy. In the European theater, the 8th Air Force dogmatically stuck to its belief in unescorted bomber mission, even in the face of extreme casuaties. It did this because many of the Air Force leadership played a roll in the development of the doctrine in the 1930s.

[goesh]

In Nam rumors always went around that the Air Force had secret swimming pools only for Air Force personnel. they had a wonderful PX at Danang and when the NVA blew it up with 122s, we almost broke down and wept. We didn't see many of them but my buddy Curt summed it up best when he said, "they sure are shiny guys, I bet none of them stink". We sort of admired them and rumors spread fast and easy about them, that they had steak to eat on a regular basis was another popular one. It was taken for granted that they had thick mattresses with clean linen to sleep on and we never held it against them.

[LawVol]

In Nam rumors always went around that the Air Force had secret swimming pools only for Air Force personnel. they had a wonderful PX at Danang and when the NVA blew it up with 122s, we almost broke down and wept. We didn't see many of them but my buddy Curt summed it up best when he said, "they sure are shiny guys, I bet none of them stink". We sort of admired them and rumors spread fast and easy about them, that they had steak to eat on a regular basis was another popular one. It was taken for granted that they had thick mattresses with clean linen to sleep on and we never held it against them.

I can neither confirm nor deny the existence of AF swimmng pools and steak dinners. Off we go, into the wild blue yonder...

[Norfolk]

I first noticed the trend when reading about Air Force involvement in Vietnam. I came across it again when reading about Korea. There was a constant "airpower could have won everything if we had been allowed to do it our way" thread, which usually translated into bombing everything that moved (and most things that didn't). There's often a disconnect between the theory and its application in a world where political constraints are ALWAYS a part of military operations.

In terms of the failing to fight consideration, I don't think it's a recruiting tool as much as it is an IO consideration in many areas and with some cultures. By failing to put people on the ground, you can appear to be afraid of the insurgents, giving them a sense of legitimacy they might not have otherwise. You also deprive yourself of invaluable COIN intelligence: being able to SEE and HEAR the people. Sensors are great, but they just don't substitute for the impressions that can be formed on the ground.

Intimidation has always been a part of insurgent operations, but most COIN attempts to "pay them back in their own coin" have been total failures. Part of successful COIN is being able to offer real alternatives to the insurgents, not a choice between who's going to shoot you in the back of the head.

The fundamental problem with the Air Force isn't so much its preoccupation with high-techology or its focus on the pilot's point of view, or numbers of systems, but its doctine, or rather ideology. The founding (and continually evolving) myth of the Air Force derives from the Doctrine of "Victory Through Air Power", but as anyone can read for themselves, from Douhet to Warden to Dunlap's piece (not that I'd necessarily rank Dunlap up with either of those two theorists), that "Doctrine" is really more of an Ideology masquerading as a doctine and is seeking its fulfillment in History (and like Marxists, they're going to be waiting forever).

This ideology, like any other, requires selective use (or abuse) of history to try to prove its truth and efficacy and ultimate, inevitable triumph. Just as Ken said about the Air Force, "It's a servive in search of a mission". I'm not totally convinced, but he may be right that creating an Air Force independent of the Army was a mistake. Both the Navy and the Marines have their own "Air Forces", and while not perfect, I don't hear very many people saying that the Air Force is better than either of them (except the Air Force themselves).

As long as the Air Force remains rooted in the "Ideology of Victory Through Air Power", and its fixation on "all or nothing" Total War, it can be a fairly blunt instrument for large-scale conventional war; for small wars (and unconventional warfare for that matter), it may be just a rampaging bull in a china shop. You can't make the local population feel safe with you and trust you when your flyboys just can't see why they shouldn't be turned loose to take out villages, houses, power plants, and water works with PGMs just because that's where the enemy is (and thus has to be "destroyed" with all the violence available at hand), while you're trying to move amongst the same people whose houses are getting it and who don't have safe water or electricity (if they're used to having it) because the Air Force bombed the utilities.

[Culpeper]

As long as the Air Force remains rooted in the "Ideology of Victory Through Air Power", and its fixation on "all or nothing" Total War, it can be a fairly blunt instrument for large-scale conventional war; for small wars (and unconventional warfare for that matter), it may be just a rampaging bull in a china shop.

Not true. At the risk of quoting you out of context, the USAF is over their strategic mindset of WWII. Reagan's Rapid Deployment Force, which is the little sister of today's Special Operations, put an end to that nonsense once and for all. Also, their own technology put an end to the bull in a china shop. Most actual real-time USAF missions in regard to small wars, on the ground or in the air, are Special Ops in nature. Nevertheless, the argument of victory through air power was made obsolete by Billy Mitchell. Air power during the Gulf War saved numerous lives. In that campaign, air power was the decisive denominator. Also, many Airmen today are earning, sometimes posthumously, the same commendations as Army grunts. Most people have a stereotyped image of the USAF. The USAF is much more complicated and diversified than most people think.

[slapout9]

The USAF is much more complicated and diversified than most people think.

That is absolutely true. One example is at Maxwell AFB where they doing some of the most advanced R&D on negotiation and human influence operations that I have ever seen. They also have and are doing some very sophisticated R&D on less lethal and non-lethal weapons.

[Steve Blair]

But you also have to remember the institutional "face" of the Air Force...which remains victory through air power (although space power and dominance of cyberspace have both been added to the formula).

I don't deny that there is some very interesting research going on within Big Blue, or that there are pockets and individuals that are looking beyond the basic framework...but when was the last time you saw someone with equal (or higher) rank come out with an article contradicting or arguing with what Dunlap and others have written? The public face remains very much the same.

Every large organization is complicated and diverse. That's the nature of a large organization. But if you look at the official writings, the tone set by those in authority, you'll still find the old mantra. The Air Force as an organization (not as individuals) has been dragged into other roles (sometimes kicking and screaming), but the larger whole still struggles to get back to that familiar "high ground" of air power.

No matter what some might think, this isn't Air Force bashing. It's recognizing the reality of the ORGANIZATION as a whole, not the parts within that organization. As far as the organization being "over" the Second World War....I'd have to disagree. The terms have changed, but many within the senior leadership still look for victory through technology and preferably air power. Not all the individuals are like that. There are some great thinkers within the AF...many who are willing and eager to think outside the conventional borders and come up with new roles and ways of doing business. But they are all too often silenced or ignored.

We may see changes in the next 10 years or so...as the next generation of officers (including many who've come into the AF from other services) rise in rank. But I have yet to be convinced that the ORGANIZATION as a whole has changed. Some parts, yes, and there are some interesting steps being taken. But those parts have yet to impact the whole in a major way.

And it's not just the AF. Look at the tug of war within the Army regarding COIN and 3-24. I tend to single out the AF because as an organization they have been the most consistent at shutting out current events in favor of the war they'd like to fight (one could make an argument for the Navy as well in this category).

And Norfolk, I'd also propose that the AF ideology springs from both technology and pilots/aircraft. In many ways you can't discuss one without bringing in the other. And with reference to CAS, one of the former Chiefs of Staff (McPeak) argued toward the end of his tenure that CAS should be given back to the Army, with them and the Marines given primacy for the mission.

[Norfolk]

Very much agreed Steve, and as far as AF ideology deriving from both pilots/aircraft and technology, I agree very much as well, it's just that with my political philosopher's schooling, I may be biased to look for the qualititative rather than the quantitative, and trip over the stone blocks as I search for the fortifications.

Both Culpeper and Slapout9 are correct to the extent that the Air Force is very a diverse organization, but how many Air Observers, CCT's, PJ's, SOF Crewmen, etc., make Chief of Staff? For that matter, how many rise to 3- or 4-star flag ranks; not too many. Most of the 3- and 4-stars are fighter, bomber, materiel, even intelligence types. A few strategic airlift transport types make their way to the upper levels on the stairway to the stars. By and large the guys who make it to the top (and in charge of doctrine) are those thinking in terms of the Big One, and those fighting small wars or unconventional ones amount to their (elite) cupbearers at most. This certainly doesn't detract from the vital and gutsy work that the PJ's, the CCT's, the SOF Aircrew, and the Air Observers do; but it very much testifies to their being marginalized at the top.

Culpeper (and Slapout too, being an ex-jumper himself about the time RDF was formed) are completely correct in that the Air Force was compelled to field a serious and reliable strategic airlift capability to take the Army's light divisions wherever they needed to go (especially if that destination was the Middle East) - no more Lebanon 1958's, where the Army's Airborne Divisions (STRAC) couldn't get there and tried to send front-line troops from Germany because the Air Force couldn't live up to its committments for adequate strategic airlift to get them there; that really burned the Army in general and the Airborne in particular, especially when Ike had to send in the Marines to do the job. But even now, the Air Force can't do much more than airlift a single light division (which is still more than anyone else) and keep it supplied for a month or so; the rest of XVIII Airborne Corps has to either cool their heels or board ships just like the Heavy Divisions.

But in its institutional heart of hearts, the Air Force remains essentially unchanged. Unrestricted, Total War theory remains the core of its doctrine. The Five Rings Theory remains unpurged from Air Force doctrine and teaching, and that theory is less than 20 years' old (well past WWII, Korea, and even surviving the Cold War). It's somewhat ironic that Fielded Military Forces is the outermost, and therefore the least essential, ring to be targeted by Air Power. Targetting the Population remains a tier above this, and targeting the Infrastructure (which we did in Iraq in 1991, Kosovo/Serbia in 1998, and Iraq again in 2003), and the destruction or damage which was inflicted on said in 2003 is dogging SSO ops in Iraq 4 years later - Iraqis are very ticked that their water and electricity is spotty at times, or even most of the time. Above that of course you get to Systems Essentials and finally the Leadership.

This is what the institutional Air Force still very much sees as how to fight war. That means air superiority and missiles/bombs on target, the bigger the better, and the more, the merrier, until the enemy utterly collapses under the full force of aerial bombardment. The reason that the Air Force doesn't deliberately target the civilian population (a la WWII and Korea) is that sort of thing just won't be tolerated morally by most of the public or politically by most of the political leadership. Yet the civilian population (and infrastructure even more so) remains a greater priority target in Air Force doctrine than enemy troops on the field (and no new-build CAS aircraft has been built for the AF since 1982, but F-16's designed for tactical air strikes are supposed to replace the A-10, hmmm...)

This is not at all consistent with the proper conduct of small wars (or unconventional wars) where you're trying to protect the population against the enemy and rebuild their lives, infrastructure, and their trust in someone carrying a gun (or flying a fighter-bomber). Even when honest mistakes are made, and a fighter-bomber takes out someone's village or house or field in error, and killing civilians, all the progress that the troops on the ground may have made with these people is completely undone; in some areas, such incidents have made it impossible to even try to reach out to this people at all. And, for that matter, even General Wars must not be waged as Total Wars; the enemy population, and civilization must be preserved; good Armies instinctively understand this in their bones, as their true mission isn;t the extermination of the enemy, but the preservation of civilization. Total War is a descent into barbarism, or worse.

When the Five Rings Theory (and its ilk) are formally and finally ditched (or extensively revised to remove civilians and civilian infrastructure from targetting and destruction) and the Air Force is led once in a while by PJ's or SOF types, then I think that the Air Force will have really changed, in its institutional heart of hearts, and for the better.

Personally, I think that the Air Force should include the Airborne (I'm going to be shot dawn and hung at sunrise in some Airborne quarters after they read this - especially since I'm a leg), just as the Navy includes the Marines, and then the higher echelons of the Air Force might have more of an interest in, exposure to, and direct involvement with, land warfare in general and small wars in particular. I'd also give the CAS mission (except for the Air Force Airborne) and planes like the A-10 and its Air Observer variant, the excellent OA-10 to the Army; I'd also give (and this is what is just practice anyway) Strategic Air Defence to the Air Force (and let the Army concentrate on tactical and operational AD of Army ground forces).

[Ken White]

Aside from the arch heresy of suggesting that Airborne forces should belong to the Air force, you have compounded the felony by suggesting -- nay, saying -- the Marine Corps is 'included' in the Navy.

Best advice I can give is avoid any patterns in your life style, have your land line telephone disconnected, change your cell phone, take different routes in all your travels...

[Norfolk]

Aside from the arch heresy of suggesting that Airborne forces should belong to the Air force, you have compounded the felony by suggesting -- nay, saying -- the Marine Corps is 'included' in the Navy.

Best advice I can give is avoid any patterns in your life style, have your land line telephone disconnected, change your cell phone, take different routes in all your travels...

I was under the influence; I didn't know what I was saying; These were statements made under duress; Please spare my life, I have so much to live for...!

As for the Marines, I meant that in terms that they are part of the Department of the Navy, not the US Navy proper; and if I may beg your pardon for continuing down this same path with regard to the Air Force and the Airborne, I would suggest (purely hypothetically of course, I'm thinking of Kurt Student and the Luftwaffe Paras here...) the same sort of relationship between the Department of the Air Force and the Airborne; there is no way even a leg like me would ever let the flyboys get their nice, soft, clean, pink hands on the tactical and day-to-day affairs of the Infantry (no 1st Allied Airborne Armies led by flyboys on my watch).

Returning to the matter at hand Ken...Please, PLEASE pardon me and spare my life... I am suffused with the inherent stupidity, arrogance, and inexperience that accompanies youth...I require the wisdom, correction, and firm guidance of my elders...Save me Obi Wan...!

[Culpeper]

I just realized we went from discussing "airmen" as the title of the thread to the Air Force as a whole.

[Ken White]

I was under the influence; I didn't know what I was saying; These were statements made under duress; Please spare my life, I have so much to live for...!
. . .

Returning to the matter at hand Ken...Please, PLEASE pardon me and spare my life... I am suffused with the inherent stupidity, arrogance, and inexperience that accompanies youth...I require the wisdom, correction, and firm guidance of my elders...Save me Obi Wan...!

I am indeed ancient, am long retarded and am almost excessively forgiving of youthful indiscretion such as thine. I long ago stopped trying to impart wisdom to anyone who does not seriously ask for such assistance -- even then, I'm rather careful; people tend to get dicey if your assistance is helpful because you knew something they didn't and if the assist wasn't helpful, they're even more irked. So, I'm not Obi and you're on your own.

You also missed in suggesting I care, you really need to worry about those younger than yourself -- they're the ones who take that stuff really seriously...

[Norfolk]

I am indeed ancient, am long retarded and am almost excessively forgiving of youthful indiscretion such as thine. I long ago stopped trying to impart wisdom to anyone who does not seriously ask for such assistance -- even then, I'm rather careful; people tend to get dicey if your assistance is helpful because you knew something they didn't and if the assist wasn't helpful, they're even more irked. So, I'm not Obi and you're on your own.

You also missed in suggesting I care, you really need to worry about those younger than yourself -- they're the ones who take that stuff really seriously...

I'm not so worried about some of them, if they're as young and dumb as me, it's the old and wise that scare me most. A GPMG and a Carl G laid on the driveway, some Claymores and Elsies out back (huh, Elsie mines are banned now - oops,) and a surprise inside waiting for those who make it to my door (two actually, I'll be hunkered down in the back of the beer store across the street when they arrive), and I just might get out of this alive...maybe.

Even if they do get to me, I'll still go down as the man who actually got the Air Force guys and the Airborne to come together and agree on something tactical. How often have you heard "Death From Above" and "Airborne!" shouted at the same time - in unison.

[Culpeper]

I'm not so worried about some of them, if they're as young and dumb as me, it's the old and wise that scare me most. A GPMG and a Carl G laid on the driveway, some Claymores and Elsies out back (huh, Elsie mines are banned now - oops,) and a surprise inside waiting for those who make it to my door (two actually, I'll be hunkered down in the back of the beer store across the street when they arrive), and I just might get out of this alive...maybe.

Even if they do get to me, I'll still go down as the man who actually got the Air Force guys and the Airborne to come together and agree on something tactical. How often have you heard "Death From Above" and "Airborne!" shouted at the same time - in unison.

Uh, I'm really getting confused now with this pairing Airborne with USAF. In the late 70s and early 80s I served in the Air Force as a ROMAD. I went to Airborne training at Ft. Benning. My sister squadron was actually stationed at Pope AFB. I guess you can state my squadron was the second string. What I'm getting at is that all the planes I jumped out of were USAF and I was USAF so I don't know what you mean by joining the Airborne with the USAF. Also, PJ and Combat Controllers also go through Airborne training at Ft. Benning as well. The two airmen I went through jump school with went on and completed Air Assault school at Ft. Campbell as well. I think some of you guys have a distorted view on the Air Force. Like how many PJs have become chief of staffs. That is irrelevant. PJs are enlisted personnel. And I'm not just talking about enlisted USAF guys either. Take for example, the C123 that took down a Soviet helicopter by throwing large chains out of the back ramp at night over Loas. Some of you need to get out of the 1940s. The title of the thread refers to understanding airmen. Airmen in USAF company language are enlisted personnel. You are never going to get the 82nd Airborne Division to become a USAF Combat Wing if that is what you are driving at. so, I have heard "Death From Above" and "Airborne" in unison. They are both 82nd and 101st Airborne bravado. I think you're getting confused with "Death on Call". That is a CAS bravado.

[Steve Blair]

Actually, Culpeper, these days the term "Airmen" is used by senior leadership in much the same way the Army is trying to use Solider or the USMC uses Marine. That's the language Dunlap is speaking, not airmen in terms of enlisted personnel. You see it in their doctrine as well...though it's not really "caught on" with the rank and file (or those below, say, O-6).

This ain't the 1970s Air Force....well...except for the new service dress coat.....

[Culpeper]

Ah, I get it now! Like the Army gave everyone a beret.