Memorable flights in questionable old aircraft.Originally Posted by Tom Odom
Fairchild C123 Provider with one engine on fire. What made this flight interesting was that it was our second jump during jump week. Jump Master made us get out of the airplane. That was one order I didn't mind taking. BTW, the plane made it back safely. I love that aircraft.
De Havilland C7 Caribou (Air National Guard need flight time). I was a little concerned looking at this particular aircraft. Ugly thing and old like some VW Bug all rusted out and leaking oil. The plane flew fine that day. The only thing interesting about this flight was Sgt. Kim Allen decided to show us that chute rigging was more of an art than a necessity. He demonstrated this to us by opening up his main chute and stuffing it back into the pack. The key, he stated, was the pilot chute. It looked like a lump of #### on his back. He used it. It worked but it didn't look pretty like art. Kim Allen was a little crazy. Last ROMAD out of Vietnam and all that stuff. I hope he is doing okay.
Cessna 02 Skymaster - About as ugly as the Caribou. The flying bathtub. Logged on a flight as a passenger. Went on a practice mission firing Willie Petes at targets. I threw up until I was dehydrated. Came close to ####ting in my pants. And that's no ####. Air America type flying. Scared me half to death.
"But suppose everybody on our side felt that way?"
"Then I'd certainly be a damned fool to feel any other way. Wouldn't I?"
Nothing like the smell of AVGAS and puke to rev one's motors
As a skydiver from the days of round parachutes and radial engines, I cannot help but smile everytime I hear one of these birds cough and spit itself into life.
Then again I feel the same way about Hueys versus Blackhawks.
Highest altitude jump in my logbook: 18,500 feet
A/C: Huey
Illegal as hell: 2 warrants bet each other who could coax a loaded Huey higher. 18.5 won by a nose.
I only have three thoughts to add to this entire thread: there are no perfectly good airplanes; a Falcon is a member of the 325th Airborne Infantry Regiment, not an airplane; and even though not perfect, the A-1 Skyraider was way sexier than that joint strike whatever it is.
"Pick up a rifle and you change instantly from a subject to a citizen." - Jeff Cooper
Wow! When I was a kid my dad worked on Skyraiders at Alameda Naval Air Station. I got to sit in one once a long time ago when I was about 8 years old. It was during the Vietnam Conflict. You must be right. I can still remember that day.I only have three thoughts to add to this entire thread: there are no perfectly good airplanes; a Falcon is a member of the 325th Airborne Infantry Regiment, not an airplane; and even though not perfect, the A-1 Skyraider was way sexier than that joint strike whatever it is.
"But suppose everybody on our side felt that way?"
"Then I'd certainly be a damned fool to feel any other way. Wouldn't I?"
This was an interesting article that once again, tries to explain the professionalism and contributions that Airmen make in any war. However, we are also guilty, as we have allowed our own successes cloud reality. As an example, after Gulf I, many in the Air Force touted airpower as the “war winner". It made the then-deposed Tony McPeak look like a hero even though he was dismissed from the top Air Force leadership position for "speaking out of school." In any case, the 1990's "proved" that air power ruled supreme, or so many thought. The sad reality is that most of the other services understood the need for air power as a partner but Air Force leaders looked at themselves as "The Big Dog."
What is often overlooked then and now, is/was the contributions of those airmen who did not fly airplanes but provided support to airpower or the end-users of that airpower. I am retired Air Force and I spent my entire career in what is now called "Combat Weather". This included several tours with the U.S. Army directly supporting their combat operations. In fact, we were "more in bed" with the Army than the rest of the Air Force community who provided other services and the Army knew it. When I deployed with the Army, it was with an M16 and/or M9, 110lb ruck on my back, plus portable weather equipment; you did not see me carrying golf clubs or a portable color televisions as some of the other Air Force warfighters might have had with them. In addition, we used to take pride and enjoy "out Armying the Army" so to speak. I can remember an FTX when I was stationed with the 7ID(L) and the division's Chief of Staff stood up in the headquarters area and announced in a very loud voice how the Air Force comes to war with their S&*t together and the rest of the division didn't. The lesson here is that many Air Force members are not just "glory hounds" supporting, the "fast mover" community. Many had to undergo the same difficult situations as their Army brothers-in-arms did. The same holds true today. They are often overlooked.
It is too bad that the article will not receive mainstream coverage and that the image of the Air Force remains as it is. However, this was a great try to overcome some of the "bad press."
USAF General Dunlaps Newest Article
The Winter edition of Air and Space Power is out. Below is a link to General Dunlap's newest article on Air power use in Irregular warfare.
SWC's member Steve Metz is referenced in the article for his expertise in understanding Airpower in a COIN environment.
http://www.airpower.maxwell.af.mil/a...07/dunlap.html
Last edited by slapout9; 12-05-2007 at 01:08 PM. Reason: add stuff
No McPeak replaced the AF Chief of Staff in the fall of 90 after the Chief ran off at the mouth about war plans. McPeak was very much involved in the AF effort to use Desert Storm to say the AF won the war. McPeak directed the Gulf War Study and then classified the results when after 3 rewrites it did not say what he wanted. I know this because I worked the Army srtudy and the Air Force historians came over and briefed Bob Scales, my boss.This was an interesting article that once again, tries to explain the professionalism and contributions that Airmen make in any war. However, we are also guilty, as we have allowed our own successes cloud reality. As an example, after Gulf I, many in the Air Force touted airpower as the “war winner". It made the then-deposed Tony McPeak look like a hero even though he was dismissed from the top Air Force leadership position for "speaking out of school."
Best
Tom
Tom:
Correct. The last chapter in my book on the World War II USSBS was on the GWAPS and it was clear that senior AF leaders like Gen McPeak were not satisfied with the results and wanted them supressed. Too, these senior airmen were supported by historians like Richard Hallion who were making preposterous claims that the Gulf War had proved that airpower could "control ground." Nothing new, however, in this thinking and it can be traced all the way back to Douhet.
gian
Here is link to an article on Dynamic Targeting from an AF viewpoint on another thread but it should probably go here to. Link to article is on the other thread, it should pop up when you go there.
http://council.smallwarsjournal.com/...3564#post33564
I met him--he used to hang out in Checkmate wearing flight rompers and a scarf..it can be traced all the way back to Douhet.
Seriously, when I reported to the Desert Storm Study Group, then BG Scales was in somewhat hot water because he had given an interview about the project and the title for the news report was "Army Forms Study Group to Refute Air Force Gulf War Claims." The elephants at the Pentagon did not like that title even though it was indeed what we set out to do. Our budget was 250K with some 10-15 officers and civilians--the AF History office had 1 million and its entire staff. Binnie Peay (then DCSOPS) and Bob Scales were as far as I know the guys who decided we would write a book. The Tate report was already out--that was where Ken White's friend probably fit into this story--but it was not the most readable thing. Scales' charter from Peay was to write a book that would tell the Army story--and be of interest to young officers.
But I remember the AF historians coming over and briefing Scales; he filled us (Terry Johnson and me) in afterward. McPeak kept rejecting any version that said combined arms employing all services won the war. He did not even like Marine or Naval fixed wing getting credit; it had to be Air Force blue. But the USAF History Office held its ground and its work got buried.
McPeak's next project was the "Delta Airlines" USAF uniform
Best
Tom
You have to remember that AF history is in many ways similar to history under Stalin: it exists to prove a point. Facts may or may not matter in that case, and anyone who disagrees is somehow against "jointness" and true national defense.
"On the plains and mountains of the American West, the United States Army had once learned everything there was to learn about hit-and-run tactics and guerrilla warfare."
T.R. Fehrenbach This Kind of War
Tom:I met him--he used to hang out in Checkmate wearing flight rompers and a scarf..
You had me rolling with that one. I still have in my mind the photo of Warden with some Captain briefing then sec/Def Chaney on a map about the air plan for the Gulf War. The GWAPS was actually a quality piece of work. I mean it did have plenty of top-flight (pun intended) historians on its roles: Eliot Cohen, Wick Murray, John Guilmartin and many others. Its quality in trying to tell a balanced story of air power in the Gulf War was probably why senior airmen and others wanted it squashed.
Steve Blair your use of Stalin to explain the Air Force and its use of history is spot-on. And it has been that way since its inception. World War II airmen looked to the USSBS to do just that.
gian
Tom you never told me Douhet was Warden
McPeak's next project was the "Delta Airlines" USAF uniform
I, and many others, despised that uniform. It ripped whatever heritage we had away. I think the current CSAF understands this, and is currently trying to go back to an old-style uniform.
McPeak is not well remembered by many in the USAF, either. He did some good things (he conceived and pushed development of the JDAM), but overall, I believe he had a negative effect on the force.
George
George,
I can believe that; I have some close AF friends who at the time just shook their heads and gritted their teeth. They collectively hated the new AF uniform; funny that McPeak in justifying said he wanted the AF to break away from wearing what he called an "army" uniform when actually the Army copied the USAF in the late 40's early 50s. McPeak it seemed to me was the ultimate expression of the fighter mafia gone buck ass wild. Any other AF personnel were lesser beings.
Gian and Slap,
I cannot recall the AF BG's name who briefed me and two others late one evening in Aug 1990 in Checkmate on the "great takedown" of Iraq that would have put at risk al US ground forces in northern Saudi Arabia. He was wearing rompers and a scarf.
Steve,
You are on the mark as usual. I still credit the USAF History Office to standing up to the CSAF about that post war study. Took major cajones. Sometimes we (the Army) come close to that approach; I know that we got a good bit of pressure at CSI in the mid-80s to use history to validate the LIDs. CSI did a good job of walking the walk on that one; I believe Scott McMichael's light infantry study is worthy of greater praise that it got.
Best all
Tom
Last edited by Tom Odom; 12-06-2007 at 02:15 PM.
Tom,
The new AF uniform design is another Army throwback...this time to the '50s "Leisure Suit" version (complete with a belt that has loops that currently have to be individually tailored for each wearer). Mosley went for it over the high collar WW I version that actually polled higher than the Leisure Suit with AF Times readers. And I still think the ABU looks a bit too much like an ARVN camo pattern....
What can be annoying about the AF is its rather schizophrenic relationship with its own history and purpose. They rant and rave about Mitchell now, but there was a time when he was barely mentioned. Chennault comes and goes in terms of fashion, and I don't think they've ever quite acknowledged the impact that LeMay had on the institution as a whole. And don't get me started on the shifting sands of unit history and the lack thereof within the AF...and then they wonder why they have such difficulty building a strong culture outside of the pilots and their respective platforms.
And buried within all the rhetoric and revisionist history there are some real gems. It's a shame that so much of it gets lost (even within the AF) between the smoke and mirrors.
"On the plains and mountains of the American West, the United States Army had once learned everything there was to learn about hit-and-run tactics and guerrilla warfare."
T.R. Fehrenbach This Kind of War
Right and one of the bright spots in AF History was Dick Kohn when he was Air Force Historian in, I think, the early 80s.
gian
Has anybody posted this yet?
It's a bit old, but free and interesting... The Air Force Role in Low-Intensity Conflict. It looks at the role of air power as a bit problematic in LIC (see page 105).
Sam Liles
Selil Blog
Don't forget to duck Secret Squirrel
The scholarship of teaching and learning results in equal hatred from latte leftists and cappuccino conservatives.
All opinions are mine and may or may not reflect those of my employer depending on the chance it might affect funding, politics, or the setting of the sun. As such these are my opinions you can get your own.
Good find, thanks for posting it.
I'd also recommend Airpower in Small Wars by Corum and Johnson. They tend to give IMO a realistic appraisal of the strengths and weaknesses of air power in small wars and are not reluctant to point out failures.
Seems to me Colonel Dean and the two authors I cite have a better handle on the issues than does MG Dunlap...
Now I feel obligated to stop referring to Charlie as the antichrist.
Actually what he's doing is trying to use someone seen as an "Army" guy against the Army. I've spent decades critiquing the Army while on its payroll though. I never quite fit in. I feel like Marilyn on the Munsters.
Posting Permissions
Bookmarks