I'm told the link may have issues. Here it is again.
http://www.governmentexecutive.com/f.../0907-01s3.htm
I'm told the link may have issues. Here it is again.
http://www.governmentexecutive.com/f.../0907-01s3.htm
-john bellflower
Rule of Law in Afghanistan
"You must, therefore know that there are two means of fighting: one according to the laws, the other with force; the first way is proper to man, the second to beasts; but because the first, in many cases, is not sufficient, it becomes necessary to have recourse to the second." -- Niccolo Machiavelli (from The Prince)
This was noted in Vietnam during Withdrawls. Cutting back on patrolling tended to lead to a loss of control of areas close to base camps and a corresponding lack of motivation on the part of the troops (who had precious little to be motivated about in any case by 1970).
"On the plains and mountains of the American West, the United States Army had once learned everything there was to learn about hit-and-run tactics and guerrilla warfare."
T.R. Fehrenbach This Kind of War
Tom and I had an O-7 in charge of the JTF-A who left his 'gate Guards' standing with an empty SAW and M-16 in the middle of a civil war and refugee crisis.
Wasn't my place to tell him that even the Africans know what a weapon looks like without a magazine or belt.
I did get the SGM's attention - perhaps more than he cared to hear about.
Force Protection has its place, but the applications seem to be generic and a global cookie cutter's not gonna work in Congo and Iraq simultaneously.
The entire article is a series of hyperbole-laden paragraphs, in which the author has pushed, stretched, and twisted the facts until they seem to fit the points offered. I offer the above as a sample: events are rarely so decisive in their effects. Yes there were numerous and well-documented irregular attacks against Coalition forces in OIF 1. Were US commanders "unsettled" by such attacks? Unsettled implies un-nerved; I would dispute that. Certainly then LTG Walace remarked the enemy was not the one they had briefed and a division commander I talked with echoed that. He was not, however "unsettled". Did a VBIED blow on March 29., 2003? Probably so given the author ofers a date. Did US commanders declare "weapons free" on Iraqi civilians as a result? No, unless you call increased security as the same thing as "shoot on sight."The shift in American priorities from protecting the Iraqi population to protecting U.S. troops began on March 29, 2003, when a taxi packed with explosives blew up at an American checkpoint, killing four soldiers. Fanatical attacks by Iraqi irregulars dressed as civilians in the first days of the war already had unsettled American commanders. That suicide bombing provoked overreaction by U.S. military leaders, the exact result intended by such attacks.
Is force protection a US military priority? Yes and it should be. How that force protection is accomplished is flexible. Certainly there has been a shift toward accepting greater immediate risk to achieve ultimately the greatest force protection measure, winning the war. Have US commanders sought to control escalation of force against civilians? Yes and that was going on well before FM 3-24 was issued.
My overall assessment is nothing new here other than excessive use of hyperbole.
Tom
Last edited by Tom Odom; 09-13-2007 at 07:06 PM.
The first priority of work for any operation or activity was, has been, and always will be security. If you don't have that, you can't do anything else.Originally Posted by Tom Odom
If the inference is that all American forces are doing is turtling up in FOBs, then the whole COP piece tears down that argument."She says the pre-eminence of force protection as a U.S. military mission is a holdover from 1990s peacekeeping efforts in the Balkans and Somalia. Troops were consolidated on large bases and contact with the civilian population was limited to prevent the possibility of "collateral damage" in tense confrontations between Americans and civilians. This practice quickly was extended to Iraq when the American military began battling a determined insurgency and commanders tried to minimize losses."
I don't know of any units that are camping out at the FOB. I don't know any that are not going on patrols. I'm not sure where this logic is coming from.
Last edited by Tom Odom; 09-13-2007 at 07:07 PM. Reason: Fixin my typos, not RTK's
Example is better than precept.
What is the risk vs. benefit of foot patrols vs. vehicle patrols? Do we rely on vehicle patrols in an overabundance of caution? Does this reliance hurt our COIN effort?
I am phrasing the questions this way because I saw only vehicle patrols from the FOB where I was deployed. Maybe they dismounted after getting into town, but on the two I played tourist on, we didn't.
-john bellflower
Rule of Law in Afghanistan
"You must, therefore know that there are two means of fighting: one according to the laws, the other with force; the first way is proper to man, the second to beasts; but because the first, in many cases, is not sufficient, it becomes necessary to have recourse to the second." -- Niccolo Machiavelli (from The Prince)
LawVol: Respectfully, that goes into a TTP category we probably shouldn't discuss.
Example is better than precept.
Haven't been there and i'm sure someone who has
will provide a better answer but generically, foot patrols in COIN are far better and the more of them the better. The number of them will be highly dependent on the type of unit.
Light infantry will prefer to patrol on foot though many such units were mistakenly (IMO) forced into HMMWVs early on in Iraq. Mechanized infantry have vehicles to worry about; you cannot just leave them and they do vehicles for a living so they're more comfortable doing vehicular patrols. Artillery and Armor units operating as Infantry are a mixed bag.
Light infantry is usually willing to kick out Squad and even Team sized patrols; the mounted guys are used to operating as platoons and tend not to go to below that level. Command desires enter into it. For example, when Sanchez went into Kosovo with elements of the 1st Armored Division, the already on the ground units of the 82d Abn Div had LTs and even SSGs out in the villages acting as de facto Mayors; they were patrolling heavily. Sanchez upon arrival gathered small units into larger enclaves and insisted tha a Field Grad officer accompany all sorties. he was Armor and used to formation maneuver; he also in Iraq insisted on vehicles for light infantry units and on no less than platoon sized patrols. Different strokes...
All in all, it's terrain and situation dependent; the unit culture does have an effect. Foot patrols are subject to more fire fights, vehicles patrols to mines and IEDs. Casualty rates can vary depending on many parameters.
That's an overview, I'm sure someone will provide more accurate theater specifics.
Posting Permissions
Bookmarks