Costly Protection

[LawVol]

Below is a link to a story arguing that we place too much emphasis on force protection and that it has a negative effect on our goals in Iraq. I would be interested in reading the thoughts of some of the trigger pullers out there.

http://www.governmentexecutive.com/f.../0907-01s3.htm

[RTK]

Below is a link to a story arguing that we place too much emphasis on force protection and that it has a negative effect on our goals in Iraq. I would be interested in reading the thoughts of some of the trigger pullers out there.

http://www.governmentexecutive.com/f.../0907-01s3.htm

I'd argue that applied a few years ago more than it does now. I think both Kilcullen and FM 3-24 talk about the drawbacks of focusing too much on force protection.

[LawVol]

I'm told the link may have issues. Here it is again.

http://www.governmentexecutive.com/f.../0907-01s3.htm

[Steve Blair]

This was noted in Vietnam during Withdrawls. Cutting back on patrolling tended to lead to a loss of control of areas close to base camps and a corresponding lack of motivation on the part of the troops (who had precious little to be motivated about in any case by 1970).

[Stan]

Tom and I had an O-7 in charge of the JTF-A who left his 'gate Guards' standing with an empty SAW and M-16 in the middle of a civil war and refugee crisis.

Wasn't my place to tell him that even the Africans know what a weapon looks like without a magazine or belt.

I did get the SGM's attention - perhaps more than he cared to hear about.

Force Protection has its place, but the applications seem to be generic and a global cookie cutter's not gonna work in Congo and Iraq simultaneously.

[Tom Odom]

The shift in American priorities from protecting the Iraqi population to protecting U.S. troops began on March 29, 2003, when a taxi packed with explosives blew up at an American checkpoint, killing four soldiers. Fanatical attacks by Iraqi irregulars dressed as civilians in the first days of the war already had unsettled American commanders. That suicide bombing provoked overreaction by U.S. military leaders, the exact result intended by such attacks.

The entire article is a series of hyperbole-laden paragraphs, in which the author has pushed, stretched, and twisted the facts until they seem to fit the points offered. I offer the above as a sample: events are rarely so decisive in their effects. Yes there were numerous and well-documented irregular attacks against Coalition forces in OIF 1. Were US commanders "unsettled" by such attacks? Unsettled implies un-nerved; I would dispute that. Certainly then LTG Walace remarked the enemy was not the one they had briefed and a division commander I talked with echoed that. He was not, however "unsettled". Did a VBIED blow on March 29., 2003? Probably so given the author ofers a date. Did US commanders declare "weapons free" on Iraqi civilians as a result? No, unless you call increased security as the same thing as "shoot on sight."

Is force protection a US military priority? Yes and it should be. How that force protection is accomplished is flexible. Certainly there has been a shift toward accepting greater immediate risk to achieve ultimately the greatest force protection measure, winning the war. Have US commanders sought to control escalation of force against civilians? Yes and that was going on well before FM 3-24 was issued.

My overall assessment is nothing new here other than excessive use of hyperbole.

Tom