Costly Protection

[Ironhorse]

Pardon the semantics, but I don't think that's possible.

We only run into problems when we erroneously define force protection as armor, big walls, etc. that we think segregate us from the threat but instead fix us for them, and isolate us from success.

As opposed to preservation of the force in order to accomplish the mission, with that preservation and all good things achieved through HUMINT, immersion in the population, etc.

We are at that same point where the brave knight was, sick of seeing his compadres drilled by cross-bow bolts, who thought it is time to nude up and get more mobile.

Also reminds me of that scene from the Full Monty - "I didn't think they could be too big."

Force protection is not something you can never have either enough or too much of. It is just something you always need more of, but must always stay IN SUPPORT OF the mission. And must not be poorly "provided" in sophomoric, counter-productive ways.

[Ironhorse]

P.S. should the HMMWVs, etc., be armored? By all means!

Do we still need to get out of them? HELL YES!

[soldiernolongeriniraq]

The highly restrictive rules of engagement issued at the beginning of the war were dropped. Soldiers were told to treat all Iraqis, whether they appeared to be civilians or not, as enemies first. The exact wording of the order was cautious, but the tone and meaning were unmistakable: Shoot first, ask questions later, and don't worry about the consequences. I

Is he joking?

And as much as I greatly admire Sewall, I believe he is caricaturing her points to fit a premise that's simply a cartoon.

With some competence, the author might have ventured into questions of the sagacity of our ongoing force structure, CMNF-I strategy to "lower the footprint" of US operations so that ISF would stand up or the uneven implementation of COPs by SF, MTT and USMC units (and the Tal Afar experiment), but to create a blanket view of our COIN efforts in such a way only distorts what was really going on.

I don't understand this because he's been to OIF, has written fairly good stories about complicated topics (http://www.nxtbook.com/nxtbooks/mh/d...p?startpage=30) and doesn't seem to be intentionally obtuse.

Is his audience so lacking in sophistication that they can't understand nuance when it comes to the actual ROE in 2003, questions about force structure or COP tactics that began in both Army and USMC units more than year before the so-called "Surge" finally began?