Sanctuary or Ungoverned Spaces:identification, symptoms and responses

[Entropy]

Before this thread becomes yet another debate about the nature of warfare, let's get back to sanctuaries for a just a minute - Pakistan in particular.

Here's the way I see things:

1. Our strategy is based on the assumption that creating a viable state in Afghanistan will prevent AQ from returning to establish a safe-haven.

2. The safe-haven in Pakistan, like a cancer that never quite gets killed off, makes the establishment of #1 extremely difficult. If you can't kill or coopt the cancer, it will continue to spread to Afghanistan at every opportunity.

3. For ten years a host of plans and strategies have been floated about how to deal with the Pakistani safe-haven and so far they have all failed. What I've seen over the last couple of years are simply rehashed efforts marketed as new initiatives.

4. In light of that history is it reasonable to expect the US to be able to deal with the safe-haven, by whatever method (Kinetic or "lets-make-a-deal"), within a relevant timeframe - ie. the next few years?

5. If not, then where does that leave our strategy for creating a semi-stable state in Afghanistan?

[Bob's World]

Well, to take this cancer line a bit further, allow me to offer a slightly different take.

The sanctuary of Pakistan is not the cancer, it is some organ where the cancer cells are most resilient to treatments of chemo therapy, and an organ that cannot simply be cut out and discarded.

The cancer is the Taliban, a cancer caused by the carcinogenic practices of the government of Afghanistan.

Our approach is to radiate the hell out of cancer cells wherever we find them; put the body onto a path to healthy eating and exercise; but totally ignore the chain-smoking activities of the same. The futility of attacking the symptoms of the disease, while working desperately to build up the resistance of the body to the disease, while pointedly ignoring the primary causation of the disease should be obvious. Perhaps someday it will be, as it is in treating actual diseases today. As to political diseases, we are still in the dark ages in our understandings and treatments.

[Bill Moore]

Bob,

Eventually you will have to make up your mind, and also realize that your solution is not one size fits all. The Taliban didn't gain power originally strictly due to an ineffective Afghanistan government post Soviet era, but obviously the ineffective gov contributed to it. The Taliban gained power militarily (not politically) that was enabled by support from Pakistan, as you previously wrote was primarily based on Pakistan's strategic interests concerning India. You also said the Pakistan government wouldn't allow the Taliban to compromise with ISAF (only 3% have, that is a stunning success at reconciliation), because they have larger regional strategic interests, so in fact Entrophy is correct.

Once again the conversation drifts back to the Taliban and further and further away from AQ.

[slapout9]

Once again the conversation drifts back to the Taliban and further and further away from AQ.

Thats right. It's the Drain the Swamp theory. Except you know what happens when you drain the Swamp? THE DAMN ALLIGATORS GET OUT! and they eat people! If you kill the alligators(Bill Laden and the Acuna boys) or put them in the Zoo you don't have to drain the swamp(Talibans). And you know something else about Alligators you CAIN"T negotiate with them, they will not change or become nice because they have a good Swamp(government) they will always be Alligators and they will always eat people.... unless you eat them first,sell their hides and eat the meat or get all fuzzy and stuff and keep them in a Zoo.

I used to go here as a kid, used to go to school with some of the owners kids. They used to have a big sign inside that said "Don't feed the Alligators...they think "you" are the food"

http://www.gatorland.com/

[Bob's World]

Bill,

Not sure what your point here is, but I've never suggested that one size solution fits all, only that all insurgencies share a common causation. There are other forms of informal conflicts, such as what is going on now in Mexico with the drug cartels; or those for control of diamonds in Africa; that are not insurgencies. Similarly, as I pointed out earlier today, Colonial counter guerrilla operations are not COIN either; not if they are executed with the goal of sustaining some friendly, locally illegitimate government in power. FM3-24 is really a Colonial counter-guerrilla warfare manual.

As to the Taliban, you are right, I have said and stand that I believe that Pakistan will resist efforts at reconciliation and sees it in their best interest to keep a string on the Taliban as their agent to maintain a degree of control over Afghanistan. I don't think anything anyone can do to change how they perceive that national interest. In fact, our efforts to bring India into Afghanistan must surely make them want to pursue that interest with even greater effort.

But there are a wide range of powerful indicators that the Taliban is open to reconciliation. But as the Ahmed Rashid "The Way out of Afghanistan" piece points out so well, it is complicated (Via SWJ or directly with:http://www.nybooks.com/articles/arch...nistan/?page=1 ). Any solution must address the very real fears of the minority groups that make up the Northern Alliance to guarantee that they will not once again be subjugated to Pashtun rule. Pashtuns must have confidence that they will not be forced to be subjugated to Karzai's cronies, or to Tajiks, Hazaras, Uzbeks, etc. But I suspect the indicators are that if the right guarantees can be made, if the right constitution to codify clear roles, barriers, rights, roles, etc can be crafted; that they would gladly end their current deal with Pakistan to participate once again legally in their own country. Giving up AQ is what they have to bring to the table to entice the US to broker this deal. But we have to shed our commitment to the preservation of the Karzai regime. That is the anchor around our neck. We need to take better account of the national interests of Iran, Pakistan, and the other countries bordering on Afghanistan who all have their own national interests and populace ties that reach across those fuzzy borders.

The fact is that Gen Petraeus is conducting a massive suppression operation currently. We are not executing "Population-Centric COIN," we are conducting "COIN symptom suppression." Combining massive development, night raids, and clear-hold-build operations in Afghanistan; coupled with drone strikes into Pakistan; so create a window of suppressed symptoms that allow us to declare success and withdraw on schedule. He may well succeed in that. But that will not accomplish the mission against AQ, and that will not resolve the insurgency in Afghanistan either. It will get us out, but it is a cop out.

All I am saying is that the mission is AQ. The key to AQ is the Taliban; and the key to the Taliban is a comprehensive reconciliation program. That gets us out of AFPAK.

Then we can get on to dealing with the much larger problem of the growing support for AQ across so much of the Middle East, the Stans and N. Africa. Defeating AQ in Pakistan is not enough, they will go elsewhere or others will step up to replace them. We have to address the policy issues feeding those conditions.

[Fuchs]

Once again the conversation drifts back to the Taliban and further and further away from AQ.

It's a strong, strong current of irrationality.


I can remind people as often about a certain fact (that the Taliban only became our enemies when we attacked them for harbouring AQ in AFG and that this condition ended almost a decade ago as) I want. It never does the magic.


We've got a big green hammer. The nail that scratched us was nowhere to find, so we hammered another nail. That one was sunk in the wood long ago, but we keep hammering and hammering - it's so useless and stupid.

[davidbfpo]

I was slightly anxious when I started this thread, partly as for reasons lost to me SWC has of late refrained from a debate on AFPAK and so far - apart from a couple of posts all is well - we have stayed on the main subject.

The main subject? Given the issues faced, what are the policies and strategy on achieving our poorly stated aims in Afghanistan, given that our non-state opponents have a sanctuary over the Durand Line in parts of Pakistan (whatever their quasi-independent status)?

In my "armchair" I shall quickly leave the region and return home. In Western Europe in particular public support for the Afghan campaign is minimal, reflected in the slow draining away of national military contingents. The impact of the body count in Western Europe is IMHO the largest factor, in the USA it is two-fold - the body count (heaviest to date for the USA) and the financial cost.

Crossing the Durand Line is not an option. Entropy's posts have made that clear, politics, strategy and logistics combined. The military - the American in reality - will have to adjust their strategy and as Jon Custis has illustrated with his post on the deep raid, within Afghanistan, there maybe options to hurt our opponents.

Others far more expert, as in the original post, speculate that any ground incursion across the Durand Line, will lead to a violent reaction within the Pakistani military (leaving aside the local response). IMHO I would expect that such actions in Western Europe would be widely seen as illegitimate and few governments could remain actively committed in Afghanistan.

I shall now dig into my "armchair" and watch how SWC responds.

[davidbfpo]

Mike Few has touched upon this subject, in a SWJ link on 'Solitude and Leadership':http://smallwarsjournal.com/blog/201...nd-leadership/

Thanks to a RCP mailing, from a similar article 'How Little the U.S. Knows of War' in the WaPo by Richard Cohen, I only cite the last paragraph:

The Great Afghanistan Reassessment has come and gone and, outside of certain circles, no one much paid attention. In this respect, the United States has become like Rome or the British Empire, able to fight nonessential wars with a professional military in places like Iraq. Ultimately, this will drain us financially and, in a sense, spiritually as well. "War is too important to be left to the generals," the wise saying goes. Too horrible, too.

Link:http://www.realclearpolitics.com/art...ar_108425.html

[slapout9]

2. The safe-haven in Pakistan, like a cancer that never quite gets killed off, makes the establishment of #1 extremely difficult. If you can't kill or coopt the cancer, it will continue to spread to Afghanistan at every opportunity.

You could put up an Alligator fence as in mine the border between A'stan and Pak'stan.

[Entropy]

Bob,

Well, to take this cancer line a bit further, allow me to offer a slightly different take.

Ok, where does that get us in terms of the sanctuary in Pakistan and our AfPak strategy?

David,

I was slightly anxious when I started this thread, partly as for reasons lost to me SWC has of late refrained from a debate on AFPAK and so far - apart from a couple of posts all is well - we have stayed on the main subject.

I pretty much agree with your comment. Well said.

Slap,

You could put up an Alligator fence as in mine the border between A'stan and Pak'stan.

The Soviets tried that. Not only did they heavily mine the border, but they also made it a kill zone - anyone in the border area could be killed on sight. Even if our ROE allowed the use of such methods, they probably wouldn't work and would end up killing a lot more civilians than fighters.

[Bob's World]

I'll fall back to my original post, that the first step in coming up with a plan for effectively dealing with any "sanctuary" is to understand that sanctuary is much more than some "ungoverned space" and to understand and deal with the specific aspects that contribute to providing the sanctuary one is concerned with.

The Taliban sanctuary issue is VERY different than the AQ sanctuary issue, though both share the same space.

If we focus on the AQ sanctuary issue, which should be our focus, my take is that it is primarily a sanctuary provided by the Taliban, and one that the Taliban can evict them from at will. Given that, the key for the US is to engage with the Taliban and see if there is a way to cut that deal. Sides deals will need to be cut with Afghanistan and Pakistan to get them to go along, but neither of those governments can deny AQ sanctuary without also working through the Taliban.

Bob

[slapout9]

The Taliban sanctuary issue is VERY different than the AQ sanctuary issue, though both share the same space.


Bob

There's the Alligator again. Kill the AQ alligator and the Taliban are not going to be such a problem, then it might be possible to cut a deal but until then it want. Why should they cut a deal if the situation hasn't changed?

[Bob's World]

First, the Taliban insurgency is not caused by AQ, it is caused by the current Karzai government that we are protecting.

Second, we really won't know what it takes to get the Taliban to enter a truce with Karzai to come to some compromise and hand us (or at least evict) AQ until we ask them.

Next time we fire a drone missle into some guys bedroom window, we should tie a note to it...or better yet just talking to them.

[slapout9]

First, the Taliban insurgency is not caused by AQ, it is caused by the current Karzai government that we are protecting.

Didn't the Taliban exist prior to Karzai?

[Fuchs]

@Slapout:
He referred to the TB insurgency, not to the TB in general.

First, the Taliban insurgency is not caused by AQ, it is caused by the current Karzai government that we are protecting.

Add the Western troops as well, for except a few hundred of them they are not Muslim and thus an ideal target for propaganda which in turn helps them a lot to generate recruits, motivate leaders and motivate supporters.

I still think that the TB were pretty much in a hopeless situation back in 2002, they had no real chance to have a comeback in AFG unless we Westerners propped them up with our presence.


Moreover, a smart strategist would have garnered a real political, probably a real paramilitary opposition in AFG that could absorb the inevitable opposition and dry out the pool for the TB at least in AFG.

Such things aren't in our repertoire, though.



An anecdote, to show the benefit of superficially paradox and certainly selfless actions in another example:

I bought a gift booklet for a friend years ago - it was about Japanese wisdoms. The quick test-reading was satisfactory, and I recall one story very well. It was impressive.
A successful, famous Japanese leader worried that his highly successful reign might cause a very tough beginning for the future reign of his son. He began to act foolish up to a point where nobody saw the great leader in him any more and everybody got impatient about the succession. He finally died and his son proved to be a highly successful prince as well.

The lesson is of course that sometimes you need to shed some prestige to achieve what you want. This readiness to sacrifice something is crucial (and it doesn't always need to be whole armies in war). The West may do exactly this; step back, allow Karzai to gain in the process.

The ability and readiness to sacrifice a bit - a pawn for a queen, some ground in Schlagen aus der Nachhand - is incredibly important at times.
It's also a mark of a true strategist.

[William F. Owen]

The Soviets tried that. Not only did they heavily mine the border, but they also made it a kill zone - anyone in the border area could be killed on sight. Even if our ROE allowed the use of such methods, they probably wouldn't work and would end up killing a lot more civilians than fighters.

Just because the Soviets lack skill and brains does not mean we do. You can build obstacles for less cost and time that it takes to build the same length of Highway.
It would be perfectly possible to build a credible obstacle barrier on the AF-PAK border.

[Bob's World]

Just because the Soviets lack skill and brains does not mean we do. You can build obstacles for less cost and time that it takes to build the same length of Highway.
It would be perfectly possible to build a credible obstacle barrier on the AF-PAK border.

Yes, all true, but to what effect? Most Taliban live 24-7 in Afghanistan. What comes across the border often simply drives in through official border crossings and travels along the highway until it gets to its destination. No barrier system has any effect on what is probably 90 % of the Taliban problem; and No effect on any of the AQ problem.

Not to mention to adverse affect that driving such a wedge straight through the heart of the Pashtun populace and territory would have. They can ignore the irritation of the Durrand line when it is merely a line on a map. Turning it into a physical disruption of their daily lives is not a good idea if one is seeking to reduce the Pashtun-based insurgency in Afghanistan.

[Entropy]

Just because the Soviets lack skill and brains does not mean we do. You can build obstacles for less cost and time that it takes to build the same length of Highway.
It would be perfectly possible to build a credible obstacle barrier on the AF-PAK border.

Ok, given enough resources anything is possible. I submit that the requirements to effectively close the border are beyond our current capabilities much less Afghans. The Afghans can't even fund their own security forces, much less a huge, complex border security system.

Bob,

If we focus on the AQ sanctuary issue, which should be our focus, my take is that it is primarily a sanctuary provided by the Taliban, and one that the Taliban can evict them from at will.

I generally agree with your "sanctuary within a sanctuary" construct, but it's actually multiple sanctuaries within a sanctuary. AFAIK, the Taliban (talking Quetta Shura here) don't have direct control over AQ and so I am skeptical that Taliban have the ability to give them up even if they were inclined to. There are a lot of groups that could take them in (HiG, Haqqani, LeT, etc.). I'm perfectly willing to play a game of "let's make a deal" with the Taliban but I think I'm quite a bit more skeptical than you are that going after the second-tier sanctuary (TB) would do much.

If you think TB engagement will solve the sanctuary problem, then it would be useful if you could explain how that would actually work.

[William F. Owen]

Ok, given enough resources anything is possible. I submit that the requirements to effectively close the border are beyond our current capabilities much less Afghans. The Afghans can't even fund their own security forces, much less a huge, complex border security system.

You don't need to "close the boarder.

a.) In a lot of places, terrain is impassable.
b.) In a lot of places, all that is need is an 3-stand 8-coil barbed wire fence, and/or a 3-m dike.

What people forget is that border obstacles work and have been proven to do so.

[Fuchs]

You don't need to "close the boarder.

a.) In a lot of places, terrain is impassable.
b.) In a lot of places, all that is need is an 3-stand 8-coil barbed wire fence, and/or a 3-m dike.

What people forget is that border obstacles work and have been proven to do so.

http://www.boingboing.net/2011/01/03/two-girls-race-to-to.html