Sanctuary or Ungoverned Spaces:identification, symptoms and responses

[Tom Odom]

Another history lesson I just put out:

"Only one option was left, as the Americans understood all too well. In the 1979 memo that described the weaknesses of the resistance, Brzezinski also explained that the United States had to “reassure Pakistan and encourage it to help the rebels….”28 Pakistan, which shared a nearly 1,500-mile border with Afghanistan, needed reassurance and encouragement because it was in a precarious position. Much as they had with the Iranians, the Soviets explicitly threatened to invade Pakistan if it became involved in the war. And much like the Iranians, the Pakistanis had other concerns, most importantly, ongoing disputes with India. These concerns meant that Pakistan went to great lengths to avoid open aid to the resistances. But that caution did not make Pakistan neutral in the Soviet-Afghan War, far from it.

In addition to becoming the temporary home for the millions of Afghan refugees who fled the war, Pakistan played the most important role in facilitating the resistance. Refugees were not the only ones who fled over the border. Most of the exiled Afghan resistance parties went to Pakistan and directed their efforts within Afghanistan from across the border in Peshawar. The rugged terrain and harsh conditions along the winding and mountainous Afghanistan-Pakistan border was in many ways an ideal boundary over which to fight and aid an insurgency. Hundreds of mountain passes connected the two countries, the terrain made it impossible to close all these routes across the border, and the harsh conditions helped protect fleeing rebels. As a result, Pakistan became the primary sanctuary for the Mujahideen in Afghanistan. Not only that, it also became the essential supply route for the weapons and materiel that kept the Mujahideen going throughout the war. Pakistan became the funnel to the resistance for the outside world."

We hear much talk of borders these days and the challenges inherent in their control, the risks associated with ignoring them, or the dangers implicit in their crossing. This installment of the JRTC BiWeekly History lesson uses the Combat Studies Institute's Occasional Paper #17, Out of Bounds, Transnational Sanctuary in Irregular Warfare, by Thomas A. Bruscino, Jr. as a case study on the roles of external sanctuaries and insurgencies. Dr. Bruscino's study is in two parts. The first part is a case study of the Vietnam War and the Viet Cong and North Vietnamese use of sanctuaries in Laos and Cambodia. The second part is a relook at the Soviet experience in Afghanistan focused on the role of Pakistan.

I would highlight the second case study as immediately relevant to what is happening in Afghanistan today. Indeed you cannot understand events in Afghanistan if you do not see them as intertwined with events in Pakistan. As this case study proves that is hardly an emerging phenomenon as it has long been the case. Still recent events reinforce its currency. Finally Dr. Bruscino concludes his paper with a discussion of sanctuaries in irregular warfare and the need for a countervailing strategy to deal with them. The study can be downloaded at CSI OP #17.

Best

Tom

[Vic Bout]

I wrote a naive graduate thesis on g-war and geography. Using some rudimentary statistics, I found that the most successful post-WW2 irregulars absolutely enjoyed some kind of cross-border sanctuary. What I failed to incorporate (or think of at all for that matter) was a measurement for how much that sanctuary added to the insurgent cause. Percentage-wise across time etc. And does it trump popular support as a variable? Hmmm....And obversely, 'cause memory fails me, has any sanctuary in recent history (say 1945-present) failed an insurgency as a supporting factor? I'm inclined to say "Of course not...why go to Hooters if you're not welcome there?"

My apologies for the stream of consciousness...just typing out loud

[Stan]

I wrote a naive graduate thesis on g-war and geography. Using some rudimentary statistics, I found that the most successful post-WW2 irregulars absolutely enjoyed some kind of cross-border sanctuary. What I failed to incorporate (or think of at all for that matter) was a measurement for how much that sanctuary added to the insurgent cause. Percentage-wise across time etc. And does it trump popular support as a variable? Hmmm....And obversely, 'cause memory fails me, has any sanctuary in recent history (say 1945-present) failed an insurgency as a supporting factor? I'm inclined to say "Of course not...why go to Hooters if you're not welcome there?"

My apologies for the stream of consciousness...just typing out loud

Vic,
Intriguing thought ! I think Ken could tell you tons about Vietnam (along Cambodia's border) which would say, shed light on the lack of sanctuary for insurgents back then.

If I look at my time in Sub-Sahara, the only folks that remotely respected geographical borders were foreigners, either on PKO or other official missions (don't tell Rangers that).

I'd say "support base" rather than sanctuary...You can run, but you can no longer hide

[Ken White]

...
I'd say "support base" rather than sanctuary...You can run, but you can no longer hide

Particularly in view of the fact that most such 'sanctuaries' are provided by nations that may have mixed emotions about doing so but on balance would prefer not to be viewed as a sanctuary. While the Nation, per se, would rather not, there were / are generally enough people who do support the cause to enable that support base to exist to one degree or another.

Cambodia is a good example; so is Thailand during the Malayan Emergency, Pakistan then and now, Haiti to the DomRep and of course, Laos -- which suffered the indignity as much due to the odd qualities of the US Ambassador of the time as any other reason.

In all those cases, the sanctuary provider broadly would have preferred to not be that but for either political or military reasons, was not able to do more than voice a pro forma objection. In the case of Thailand, continued British protests didn't do much good because the Thais were not able to control the border. So the SAS did some cross border stuff (so I was told by guys who were there and involved -- but it's well buried, I haven't been able to find it in writing anywhere). A lot of our Cambode and Lao ops are open source, more are not. Same's true with Pakistan.

The big difference today is that Turkey (small), Syria and Iran -- and probably to a limited and covert extent, Saudi Arabia -- are capable of denying sanctuary or support but choose instead to support it...

[Tom Odom]

I wrote a naive graduate thesis on g-war and geography. Using some rudimentary statistics, I found that the most successful post-WW2 irregulars absolutely enjoyed some kind of cross-border sanctuary. What I failed to incorporate (or think of at all for that matter) was a measurement for how much that sanctuary added to the insurgent cause. Percentage-wise across time etc. And does it trump popular support as a variable? Hmmm....And obversely, 'cause memory fails me, has any sanctuary in recent history (say 1945-present) failed an insurgency as a supporting factor? I'm inclined to say "Of course not...why go to Hooters if you're not welcome there?"

My apologies for the stream of consciousness...just typing out loud

No not at all. Good question on sanctuary versus popular support. I kinda separate classic guerrilla versus insurgent on that issue, the guerrilla not necessarily basing what he does on the need to increase or maintain popular support, the insurgent in contrast has to do just that.

Brascino emphasizes that the Soviets did adapt in Afghanistan and their brutal tactics in some areas did have the effects they sought. What hurt them the most was the issue of the cross border sanctuaries where the Muj could R&R at will (at least at first).

I know in addressing the threat from the Hutu camps along Rwanda's borders, they were a combination of refuge and host population, all catered by the UNHCR and the international community. As former refugees, insurgents, and counterinsurgents in two wars, the leaders of the RPF had no doubt that the camps were a threat, one that had to be addressed. When the international community failed to do so, they did. The results were and still are horrific in the Congo--but it allowed the RPF to win the COIN effort inside Rwanda. After years of meddling by Mobutu, the RPF leaders were more than willing to make that choice, especially if it got rid of Mo in the process.

Best
Tom