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Thread: Sanctuary or Ungoverned Spaces:identification, symptoms and responses

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  1. #1
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    Default Sanctuary and the State: Scale, Surrogates, Sponsors, and the Agency Pivot

    Quote Originally Posted by Rex Brynen View Post
    To add another case study to the link Ted posted--not from the perspective of the counter-insurgent, however, but rather focusing on what strategies insurgent groups may adopt to obtain and maintain sanctuary in third countries:

    Rex Brynen, Sanctuary and Survival: The PLO in Lebanon (Boulder: Westview Press, 1990). The book is out of print now, and the link is to a web version of the text.
    I'd second that - Rex's book is the only one that I'm aware of that intelligently applies guerrilla warfare theories on sanctuary as an interface between state and non-state actors.

    Take a look also at this Norwegian Defence Research Establishment report on Islamist Insurgencies, Diasporic Support Networks, and Their Host States: The Case of the Algerian GIA in Europe, 1993-2000. It takes the theoretical framework from Sanctuary and Survival and applies it to good use elsewhere.

    I'd also suggest a look at my own edited book on the subject, out as of last summer, entitled Denial of Sanctuary: Understanding Terrorist Safe Havens (Westport, CT: Praeger, 2007). It doesn't offer an overarching analytical framework in the way that Sanctuary and Survival does, and that wasn't its intent. The idea, instead, was to poke holes and raise questions with regard to the political orthodoxies of the last seven years on the subject of "ungoverned territories".

    Quote Originally Posted by Jedburgh View Post
    Rob, this issue of "ungoverned spaces" (and by extension, weak and/or corruptly governed) is a serious one, and one which significantly impacts US interests directly and indirectly. It is one which I deal with regularly, yet I find many not willing to conceptually deal with any threat which is not immediate.

    I originally posted this in the Adversary/Threat sub-forum when it was first published, but I've cut it out and put here because I feel you've put a better start on the topic of discussion:

    RAND, 23 Aug 07: Ungoverned Territories: Understanding and Reducing Terrorism Risks
    One thing I can appreciate about the RAND report is that it limits itself to ungoverned "territories", rather than using ungoverned "space", the more usual political handle which actually revolves around a much broader category of issues analogous to the complex physical, human, and information terrain of the Australian Army's Future Land Operational Concept: Complex Warfighting.

    Where I think things get a bit more complicated, and bear a whole a lot more study, is with the problem of scale. It's good to be thinking in terms of sanctuary as a macro-level security issue and challenge of political legitimacy, development and governance. But there are more immediate and local dimensions of sanctuary, just as there are non-physical aspects to the issue. The best work I've seen on this so far is by Ron Hassner, a political scientist at Berkeley, who's been writing about insurgent uses of sacred sites, as well as comparative just war theory approaches to sanctuary. Citations as follows:

    Hassner Ron E. "'To Halve and to Hold': Conflicts Over Sacred Space and the Problem of Indivisibility.” Security Studies 12:4 (Summer 2003): 1-33.

    _____________. “Fighting Insurgency on Sacred Ground.” Washington Quarterly 2:29 (Spring 2006): 149-166.

    _____________. "Islamic Just War Theory and the Challenge of Sacred Space in Iraq." Journal of International Affairs 61:1 (Fall/Winter 2007): 131-152.

    Problems of surrogacy and state sponsorship are certainly vexing. In international law, a "harboring thesis" places the burden of responsibility on states to ensure that their territories aren't made available to int'l/transn'tl criminal and terrorist organizations. Both Tal Becker and Dan Byman cover this pretty well in their respective books on states and state sponsorship. Where I think the logic fails is while it rightly emphasizes preventing state provision of sanctuary, it also neglects non-state actor acquisition and exploitation of sanctuary, absent state-level intent to support. Both Byman and Becker do this by looking to passive forms of support as a lowest common denominator, which to my mind stretches the credulity of the argument.

    This ties back to another SWC thread on Hizbullah tactical effectiveness; basically, non-state actors evolve, demonstrate agency, etc., and this needs to be given at least as much consideration as the capabilities of states and their responsibilities under int'l law - especially since the logic of state failure/collapse, taken to its extreme, means that some states will be (and have proven to be) incapable of either actively providing sanctuary or preventing terrorist exploitation of their resources. At that point, non-state actor acquisition and development of sanctuary has to be the focus.
    Last edited by Jedburgh; 03-25-2008 at 07:13 PM. Reason: Added link.
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    CSIS, 20 Mar 08: A Steep Hill: Congress and U.S. Efforts to Strengthen Fragile States
    The difficulties experienced during U.S.-led interventions in Afghanistan and Iraq and the increasing recognition of the threat posed by ungoverned spaces have once again placed fragile states at the forefront of the U.S. national security agenda. Yet, the United States remains ill-equipped to meet the challenges of stabilization and reconstruction. There is a lack of coordination and strategic engagement within the U.S. government and no clear legislative authority for an overall strategic plan.

    This study—the first to examine the role of Congress in strengthening fragile states before, during, and after interventions—identifies key legislative and executive branch obstacles to effective stabilization and reconstruction operations and explores opportunities for a new grand bargain that embodies goals both branches support.....
    Complete 93 page paper at the link.

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    Quote Originally Posted by Jedburgh View Post
    CSIS, 20 Mar 08: A Steep Hill: Congress and U.S. Efforts to Strengthen Fragile States

    Complete 93 page paper at the link.
    Thanks for posting, I look forward to reading the full report.

    There was an interesting report in the Int' Herald Tribune a few days ago that touched on this. I wrote it up in the Complex Terrain Lab blog HERE.
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    Default New CTLab Post by Stephen D.K. Ellis on State Failure

    Dear SWC Members - I'd like to draw your attention to a new post at the Complex Terrain Lab on state failure, by Stephen D.K. Ellis, the author of The Mask of Anarchy: The Destruction of Liberia and the Religious Dimension of an African Civil War (NYU Press, 1999; Hurst & Co Publishers, 2006). It's his first post to CTLab.

    Stephen's CTLab bio is here

    The post on state failure is here

    Best

    Mike
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    Council Member marct's Avatar
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    Interesting post, Mike. I think it raises some really good points about he semantics of "failed/ing" vs "fragile" states.
    Sic Bisquitus Disintegrat...
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    RAND, 9 May 08: Breaking the Failed State Cycle
    In their research and field experience, the authors have observed a wide gulf separating the treatment of the security problems of failed states from the treatment of those states’ economic problems. This, in turn, may impair treatment of political problems. Such disunity of effort in assisting failed states may suboptimize resource allocation, hinder coordination, and cause important demands to be neglected. With their different backgrounds—security, economic development, political systems, health policy, and institution-building—the authors felt that, as a team, they might be able to forge an integrated, general approach to rescuing failed states, recognizing that each specific case demands a tailored approach. After holding a seminar with representatives of the World Bank, the United Nations, development agencies, and several security organizations, the RAND team set out in search of ideas that would bridge the gap and thus permit more effective strategies and actions toward failed states.

    The approach on which they settled was to identify certain critical difficulties that contribute to the cycle of violence, economic collapse, and political failure that ensnares vulnerable states. While such difficulties demand special attention, they often suffer from inattention—precisely because they fall into the crevasses between security, economics, and politics. Simply stated, the international community is ill equipped to treat the causes of state failure....

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    Wow, counter-terrorism activities are so far away from the World Bank's responsibilities that this is ridiculous.

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