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Thread: Sanctuary or Ungoverned Spaces:identification, symptoms and responses

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  1. #1
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    Default Can anyone explain this?

    http://www.msnbc.msn.com/id/41770667...ew_york_times/

    KABUL, Afghanistan — After years of fighting for control of a prominent valley in the rugged mountains of eastern Afghanistan, the United States military has begun to pull back most of its forces from ground it once insisted was central to the campaign against the Taliban and Al Qaeda.

    The withdrawal from the Pech Valley, a remote region in Kunar Province, formally began on Feb. 15. The military projects that it will last about two months, part of a shift of Western forces to the province’s more populated areas. Afghan units will remain in the valley, a test of their military readiness.
    Are we going back to the days of take the hill, then give it back to the enemy so we can take it again? This region has been and remains a key safe haven for those actually affilitated with Al Qaeda and LeT and a lot of other groups that are truely transnational bad actors. Not just local insurgents fighting the occupiers. Maybe this is the right thing to do, but I have my doubts. How do you feel about this?

  2. #2
    Council Member Ken White's Avatar
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    Default Probably not

    Quote Originally Posted by Global Scout View Post
    http://www.msnbc.msn.com/id/41770667...ew_york_times/ Are we going back to the days of take the hill, then give it back to the enemy so we can take it again? ... Maybe this is the right thing to do, but I have my doubts. How do you feel about this?
    Not there so cannot reply with any tactical knowledge. However, I can say that IMO generally, the idea of small FOBs is not tactically sound.

    What is fact is that we do not have enough Troops to stay on the Hill (metaphorically speaking -- and actually...) and we therefor should adopt TTP that do not entail such occupation or defense. In fact, given US Troop strength, I believe any attempt at conventional counterinsurgent efforts it pretty badly misguided. That applies not only to Afghanistan today but to the world before 2001 and after Afghanistan. It can be done but only in some limited circumstances and provided we assess our capabilities honestly and accurately (not a US Armed Forces strong point...).

    Stasis kills and should be avoided...

    It also has a huge support cost for generally little benefit.

    The article you linked has this: ""And it is an emotional issue for American troops, who fear that their service and sacrifices could be squandered. At least 103 American soldiers have died in or near the valley’s maze of steep gullies and soaring peaks, according to a count by The New York Times, and many times more have been wounded, often severely "" (emphasis added /kw).

    Yep. Unfortunately, warfare calls for quite strong suppression of emotion...

    The WaPo article differs a bit (LINK)""U.S. military officials are planning a significant repositioning of troops that would reduce the number of bases in one of Afghanistan's most dangerous valleys and free up American forces to conduct shorter-duration strike missions into enemy havens."" (emphasis added / kw).

    That IMO is a far better approach and what we should be doing / have been doing all along (I include Globally, worldwide strategic type, in that "should be". That would include both Afghanistan and Iraq post mid 2003..). I can only hope that the state of training and risk avoidance depletion factors allow it to be done effectively. It will work very well provided it is done even half right.

    That article also had this: ""Only about .2 percent of the population in the east is in that valley," said Maj. Gen. John Campbell, the commander of U.S. forces in eastern Afghanistan. "We have to realign our forces to better protect the Afghan people."

    U.S. commanders are hoping to complete the shift over the next several months but are still working to win the support of senior Afghan officials. "We are not in total agreement in all of these areas," Campbell said."
    "

    I agree with the basic premise in that first paragraph, though I think that the last clause in it is a platitude of little merit.

    The second paragraph quoted shows the fun of coalition warfare - and why the policies change so often...

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