When we impose the constraint "short of warfare" we are coming in with an agenda and seeking to control the outcome.
It's all very well and noble to say we should not try and control the outcome, but if we have no specific interest in the outcome - at least in preventing certain outcomes - we wouldn't be involved in the first place, would we? If we're there, there's an agenda.
Does anybody think the Karzai regime suits our interests? As far as I can see they suit their own interests, rather predictably.
Do you really believe that the Taliban and the Karzai crowd, the Pashtun and the non-Pashtun minorities, the drug lords and the religious leaders are all going to stop fighting, participate in governance together, share power, hold hands and sing "kumbayah" if only they get the right Constitution? I wish I could believe that, but I don't. A Constitution codifies consensus, it doesn't create it. If there's no consensus to codify, a Constitution means nothing. If they pursue a Constitution because we want it, it means nothing.
I would expect that as soon as we leave, there will be a fight. The fight will go on until somebody wins, the winners will stomp the losers, and the losers will become insurgents. The winners won't control all of Afghanistan, but given that Afghanistan is a pretty abstract construct to begin with, that hardly matters. This will happen no matter what deals are made and what documents are signed. If the Taliban make a deal to throw out AQ they will break the deal as soon as they think they can get away with it... probably they will never comply with the deal in the first place. How would we verify compliance anyway? This is the nature of the place: we will not change it, we might as well accept it. Jungle Rules apply, as Stan would say, though Desert Wasteland Rules might be more accurate.
The Afghan Constitution doesn't guarantee conflict and oppression, the prevailing political culture does. A new Constitution will not change that culture. Time and evolution might, but the process is likely to be violent, and we cannot simply circumvent that process by imposing a deal that happens to suit our interests, our our idea of what their interests ought to be. We talk about empowering them to make peace... but what if they want power more than they want peace, or if they think peace can only come when they have their boot on the other guy's throat and their hand in the other guy's wallet?
Agree on the no-trust environment, but how do you think we're going to change that? The only "guard for future security" that means anything in that environment is having lots of men with guns and doing unto others before they have a chance to do unto you... can we change that?
Or we can forget about pursuing goals we cannot accomplish - and installing an inclusive, cooperative democracy in Afghanistan is certainly in that category - and accept that Afghanistan is what it is, Afghan political culture is what it is, and our agenda is what it is. Then we get down to the specific question of how to achieve our agenda (it is, after all, why we're there) within that culture and that environment, instead of trying to change that environment to suit ourselves.
A "peace agreement" would have one great virtue: it would give us a face-saving exit point. It would not create peace, nor would it keep AQ out. We'd probably end up back in, though at least maybe if we go back we might be able to do it sensibly from the start. There's something to that, I suppose...
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