Sanctuary or Ungoverned Spaces:identification, symptoms and responses

[Dayuhan]

But this idea of us actually coming to possess OBL troubles me. Better to leave him in his spider hole, IMO. If we have him, and we administer our "justice" to him, we will be in the same troublesome spot to many other audiences as the progressive Pakistani governor arguing to drop the blesphemer sentence. Jesus may have advised putting the stones down, but more than one was thrown in his name.

I'm all for leaving OBL in his spider hole. If something unofficial (virtual natural causes) occurred to him, that is one thing. I personally don't want him in US custody subject to US prosecution, just because, at some point, we could do without a next wave of Jihadis chasing a revived martyr.

I thought of that, and it would be a problem. It would be ideal for all concerned if they simply turned him over in a plastic bag, but that might be too much to ask.

Of course a starting position is seldom where a negotiation ends, and just because we start with "you turn over the bad boys and we leave" doesn't mean we wouldn't settle for having some lesser bad boys turned over and the key individuals placed in a position where they could be removed in a drone strike and subsequently identified, which would save face for them and trouble for us. Of course in a few weeks the whole sordid deal would come out on Wikileaks, but we'd survive and it would be better than having them on trial in the US.

[Dayuhan]

Just to clarify... I don't for a moment think that the offer proposed above would be accepted. It is, however, in our power to make the offer. Having formally recognized the Karzai administration as the sovereign government of Afghanistan and the current Constitution as legitimate, we cannot now go to the Taliban and offer to dismiss that Government, tear up the Constitution, and replace both with new versions that assure Taliban participation... unless of course we propose to declare that we are the government of Afghanistan.

[Bob's World]

Ok, so the plan is we just ask the Talban to give us bin Laden in a plastic bag. Well, at least you appreciate it is the Taliban we need to ask, rather than the ISI, or Pak military, or the Pakistan or Afghan governments. That alone moves your recommendation up the merit list.

But as you constantly rail, why would they comply? What is your approach to gain that compliance. "What" is the easy part, and your "what" is the same as mine for the most part. "How" is the challenge. So, how do you propose this is done?

[Dayuhan]

But as you constantly rail, why would they comply? What is your approach to gain that compliance. "What" is the easy part, and your "what" is the same as mine for the most part. "How" is the challenge. So, how do you propose this is done?

They wouldn't comply, but at least we'd be offering something we have the power to give, and we might create the impression that we're willing to leave if a tangible and reasonable (revenge is understood in those parts) demand is met. Might be a bit of PR value there.

Offering to restructure the Afghan government is a bit of a problem, because at the end of the day all we can offer is yet another Loya Jirga. We can't promise the Taliban that their interests will be protected, and we can't promise the non-Pashtun population that their interests will be protected, because we can't deliver on those promises unless we control the process and if we control the process it's pointless. Are we going to tell the non-Pashtuns that they'll be protected from the Taliban by... a Constitution? I suspect they'll be less than reassured.

I can actually see the Taliban being willing to "negotiate", if they could freeze military operations and bring various withdrawal deadlines closer by doing so. Can't really see it as much more than a ploy to advance their own plans.

[carl]

I didn't say they were innocents,...

...This would be very hard, and it could easily fall apart. But it could work as well, and it offers a much more enduring solution than continuing our current course seems to offer.

I have several questions.

Where would something like this be held?

How would you determine standing, or rather who would determine standing? For example, would the IMU be included?

You mentioned the US focusing on protection of rights, does that include women's rights? There is a large difference in what women can do in now and what they could do when the Taliban ran the place, close to a matter of life and death for some women.

You also mentioned referees, how would the referees be chosen and what power would they have to back them up?

The new coalition you mentioned gives a prominent place to the Pak Army/ISI (don't tell me why I shouldn't use that phrase because I'll not stop) and Iran but less so for India and China. What if the Indians decided they didn't want to go along with that, or what if a significant portion of the Afghans decided they wanted the Indians in on the deal in a big way? I don't think we could stop them.

Would it be a good idea to give the Pak Army/ISI a formal role at the table at all? In my view they are the demon that is primarily responsible for keeping the blood flowing. Ahmed Rashid says part of the Taliban really wants to break away from the Pak Army/ISI. It seems to me it would be in our interests too to help them do so. To further that aim I think it would be good to keep the Pak Army/ISI as far away as possible.

I am skeptical this will work but it might be worth a try especially if it might help cut the Pak Army/ISI out of the picture. That is why I asked where this would be held. If it was held in Afghanistan and we gave strong guarantees of safety and said MO, Hik and Haq couldn't play unless they were in Afghanistan, that would help. It would be like giving them sanctuary from the Pak Army/ISI.

I still think the most direct and effective thing would be to put serious pressure on the Pak Army/ISI, which we have never found the nerve to do. I have never been able to figure out why we don't pressure those guys.

Last thing...which part of the Taliban do you think is covering for AQ? If it is the Pakistani Taliban, how would doing a deal with the Afghan Taliban & company get us anywhere? Unless we know for sure the Afghan Taliban has them firmly in grasp, why should we deal? Do we know for sure?

As you know, I think the ISI is covering for AQ too and everybody involved will never give them up for ideological reasons so the question is to me a hypothetical. But I still want to know.

[carl]

There is a requirement to develop a national ID card and associated database (and if the individual has been detained before, any relevant biometrics data).

Bill:

I thought this kind of program was a fundamental. You mean we still haven't done this after going on 10 years?

[Fuchs]

Bill:

I thought this kind of program was a fundamental. You mean we still haven't done this after going on 10 years?

Isn't it ironic how much obligatory ID cards are opposed in the U.S. itself as oppression by the state?

[Bill Moore]

I thought this kind of program was a fundamental. You mean we still haven't done this after going on 10 years?

Partly for the concern Fuchs expressed, and partly due to the huge logistical undertaking this really is, I'm not surprised. We could have the military use their equipment to make ID cards, but they would be easily counterfeited and probably not worth the effort.

It all depends on how we're going to solve the problem. If we're going to "defeat" the insurgent we have to control the population to separate the insurgent from the populace. Depending on the procedures used and the degree of control implemented it can be a rather nasty process, and is much more accepted if it is implemented by their own country men instead of foreigners. Fuchs must think I am constantly in disagreement with him. I'm not, I'm only saying if we're going to use a counterinsurgency strategy, then there are certain things that go with that strategy in order for it to be successful. We're not limited to historical examples, but I'm not aware of any historical example where an insurgency was defeated or co-opted with economic development or civil military operations. Again show me the examples, and help bring me in from the dark.

As for making a deal with Taliban, I think we're well past that point if we want to be recognized as reliable partners to other foreign partners for the next two decades. What exactly happens to all the Afghans who have been working with us for the past 10 years? Does a secure base for the Taliban in Pakistan further threaten Pakistan's security? Once the Taliban no longer need the ISI will they turn on them? When you claim this "may" work, how will it work? What do we expect the outcome to be?

Another approach is to disengage from the politics period, and simply fight those we designate as a threat to our nation and let the Afghans determine their own future. How many years and how many billions of dollars have we thrown at the Afghanistan security forces? If they can't hold their hold against an irregular threat by now, then clearly we're missing something very basic.

[carl]

We could have the military use their equipment to make ID cards, but they would be easily counterfeited and probably not worth the effort.

The UN made ID cards in the Congo as part of the de-mob program. I don't know how well they worked but well enough to make the effort anyway. In any event I always read that a local census was a basic part of fighting a small war. IDs would be part of that. I am very disappointed if we haven't been at least trying to do that. They didn't throw all the retina scanners they used in Iraq away I hope.

As for making a deal with Taliban, I think we're well past that point if we want to be recognized as reliable partners to other foreign partners for the next two decades. What exactly happens to all the Afghans who have been working with us for the past 10 years? Does a secure base for the Taliban in Pakistan further threaten Pakistan's security? Once the Taliban no longer need the ISI will they turn on them? When you claim this "may" work, how will it work? What do we expect the outcome to be?

I am skeptical that the type of negotiation proposed by Bob's World would work but it might be worth a try, Especially if it would give us some kind of wedge to pry Taliban & company away from the Pak Army/ISI.

I also think, and stated, that an AQ trade for our leaving isn't possible. Ideologically, Taliban & company and the Pak Army/ISI won't go for it.

The key is that incubus, the Pak Army/ISI. Like I said in my post #98 we have to deal with that or leave. Please read that post because I also stated what we should do if we don't confront the incubus.

[slapout9]

The UN made ID cards in the Congo as part of the de-mob program. I don't know how well they worked but well enough to make the effort anyway. In any event I always read that a local census was a basic part of fighting a small war. IDs would be part of that.

I read somewhere that in Vietnam in order to prevent that you not only had an ID of your self, but a family ID photo that you had to carry with you(it had a name and somebody here may remember) but it was hard to fake a family photo because a Master copy was kept and could be compared back to at the local level.

[davidbfpo]

Catching up and noted the issue of a national, Afghan ID card. The irony is that Pakistani has a very advanced national ID card system, which IIRC was provided by a local IT company and now sold onwards - even to European country. In a recent UK TV documentary there was a glimpse of the system in operation, to prevent flood relief famine with card readers in the field offices.

Official Pakistani ID website:http://www.nadra.gov.pk/

[Dayuhan]

I am skeptical that the type of negotiation proposed by Bob's World would work but it might be worth a try, Especially if it would give us some kind of wedge to pry Taliban & company away from the Pak Army/ISI.

I also think, and stated, that an AQ trade for our leaving isn't possible. Ideologically, Taliban & company and the Pak Army/ISI won't go for it.

Agreed... but why not make the offer and let them refuse it? We'd make it clear that we're willing to leave if a reasonable condition is met, which would be an advantage from the PR perspective, and they'd get to look intransigent. Then when they say they are fighting to get rid of the foreigners, we could point out that we'd be happy to leave if only they'd get rid of that other bunch of foreigners, the ones who brought us there in the first place. Ok, so they were guests... but what obligation does a host have to a guest whose intemperate and stupid behaviour brings destruction on his house?

It's not about making a deal, it's about undermining the narrative.

The key is that incubus, the Pak Army/ISI. Like I said in my post #98 we have to deal with that or leave. Please read that post because I also stated what we should do if we don't confront the incubus.

Again agreed, but our leverage is questionable. Certainly they want and depend on our aid, but as long as we have substantial forces in Afghanistan we want and depend on their ports and land supply routes to support our forces. That kind of cancels out. How can we skew that equation in our favor? We might actually have more leverage if we didn't have a major military presence in Afghanistan requiring Pakistani cooperation for its support.

All very well to say we must confront the incubus, but we have to do it in a way that has some reasonable chance of getting us what we want.

As for making a deal with Taliban, I think we're well past that point if we want to be recognized as reliable partners to other foreign partners for the next two decades. What exactly happens to all the Afghans who have been working with us for the past 10 years?

We would have to be honest, at least with ourselves... cutting a deal with the Taliban would mean selling out our erstwhile allies and the non-Pashtun minorities to buy ourselves a face-saving exit strategy. Nothing more, nothing less.

Another approach is to disengage from the politics period, and simply fight those we designate as a threat to our nation and let the Afghans determine their own future.

Wouldn't it have been easier if we'd done that from the start? Not like some of us weren't recommending exactly that...

[Infanteer]

This one's on a bit of a spin cycle, but I had a question/point.

How would one deny sanctuary by taking the FATA? So we slice off another slab of Pashtunistan that where we have to put a village guard in every corner. Is that going to solve anything?

When one looks over a map of the insurgency in Kandahar province it is amazing how small the area is; I have a map of one of our training areas that is larger. Each house is a literal fort. We cannot control these little forts as is, so I don't know how increasing the AO would be conducive to pacifying the Pashtun.

[Ken White]

We would have to be honest, at least with ourselves... cutting a deal with the Taliban would mean selling out our erstwhile allies and the non-Pashtun minorities to buy ourselves a face-saving exit strategy. Nothing more, nothing less.

Politicians want to avoid warfare but also want to shape others as they see fit. Thus they send troops off to do good works (in their view) while telling them not to hurt anyone...

That's rather simplistic -- but it is a truth. Other than WWII, the US has always very foolishly tried to place limits on its warfare. The Gods alone know how many people that errant stupidity has needlessly killed.

They also alone know how many we've abandoned. We left Korea -- and we owe a lot of Koreans who did what we asked. We left Viet Nam -- and we owe a lot of Viet Namese (and Laotians) who did more than we asked. We left The Kurds in '96, we left the Iraqi Shia in 91 (and wonder why they do not love us... ). One could say we also abandoned the Afghans in '88. In fact, we've abandoned a lot of folks a lot of places over the years.

We need to stop doing that, it breeds hate and discontent. The Gods may be the only ones with an accurate count of abandonees -- but most of the World has a broad idea.

Wouldn't it have been easier if we'd done that from the start? Not like some of us weren't recommending exactly that...

Yes. Even much maligned Donald Rumsfeld wanted to do that...

[Dayuhan]

How would one deny sanctuary by taking the FATA? So we slice off another slab of Pashtunistan that where we have to put a village guard in every corner. Is that going to solve anything?

It would probably not solve anything, and would probably create a whole lot more mess. That's why the question of denying sanctuary usually comes back to either pressuring Pakistan to deny sanctuary or trying to cut a deal with the Taliban to deny sanctuary. Both options present their own share of problems and obstacles, and it's not clear that any of them would be effective. Not an easy nut to crack.

[Ken White]

This one's on a bit of a spin cycle, but I had a question/point... Each house is a literal fort. We cannot control these little forts as is, so I don't know how increasing the AO would be conducive to pacifying the Pashtun.

The answer is, of course, that we aren't going to do that regardless of the dreamers. The West does not have the numbers of people, the multi generational patience or the funds to change South Asia. Nor is it really necessary -- probably not even desirable...

Reminds me of the Kipling line about a fool trying to hustle the East...

[carl]

They also alone know how many we've abandoned. We left Korea -- and we owe a lot of Koreans who did what we asked. We left Viet Nam -- and we owe a lot of Viet Namese (and Laotians) who did more than we asked. We left The Kurds in '96, we left the Iraqi Shia in 91 (and wonder why they do not love us... ). One could say we also abandoned the Afghans in '88. In fact, we've abandoned a lot of folks a lot of places over the years.

We need to stop doing that, it breeds hate and discontent. The Gods may be the only ones with an accurate count of abandonees -- but most of the World has a broad idea.

Yes, yes, yes, yes, yes! Ken, I'm glad you're around.

[Bob's World]

Yes, yes, yes, yes, yes! Ken, I'm glad you're around.

This is why I advocate for a retirement of Containment as the core of our foreign policy for an approach better designed for the post Cold War world we live in today.

Showing up in troubled places with a more neutral agenda that is more about empowering the locals to work out their issues short of warfare, and not seeking to control the outcome will lead to much fewer incidences of coming in with an agenda, recruiting local groups to support our agenda, and then bailing on them to deal with the consequences when our agenda either doesn't work out, or we simply change our mind.

There is no need to throw the populaces supporting the Northern Alliance under the bus in order to re-open negotiations with the Taliban. To bring the parties together in a truce that we set up and secure to work through these issues. The Karzai/Northern Alliance is an unsustainable model, and their constitution guarantees oppression and conflict. It is time to stop supporting tyranny that supports our interests, and begin embracing more neutral, less controlling approaches.

This is a no-trust environment. We need to provide the neutral presence to allow them to sort out how to work together in such an environment until such time as they develop "new guards for their future security" together.

Or we can keep surging in more troops and ramp up for the next fighting season, Clear more terrain, Develop more progjects, kill more Taliban squad leaders (the bulk of what the Ranger's bag), and fire more drone-borne rockets into FATA bedroom windows. Just because we are good at doing the wrong thing is no reason not to attempt to do the right thing.

[Ken White]

This is why I advocate for a retirement of Containment ... Showing up in troubled places with a more neutral agenda that is more about empowering the locals to work out their issues short of warfare, and not seeking to control the outcome...

As you know, I'm in agreement on that...

Or we can keep surging in more troops and ramp up for the next fighting season, Clear more terrain, Develop more progjects, kill more Taliban squad leaders (the bulk of what the Ranger's bag), and fire more drone-borne rockets into FATA bedroom windows. Just because we are good at doing the wrong thing is no reason not to attempt to do the right thing.

However, on that opinion of yours -- and that's what it is, an opinion, not a statement of fact -- we can continue to disagree.

Don't try to change the Elephant, you'll fail. Simply better use its strength...

[Bob's World]

More and more facts support my opinion. Currently and historically.

Gen. P is a smart operator, and I think he is indeed on track to create a window of suppressed insurgency that meets the President's timeline. That is as much as a military solution can offer, and he is accomplishing his mission in that regard. I have no doubt he appreciates that very well.

Problem is, of course that such an effect will not likely last long unless coupled with true changes in Afghan governance, and I don't see them leaning forward on their own to make any such changes. Increased security capacity alone is not likely to work; as we take our boot off the problem and they place theirs on it in our place. But this governance issue is not really a military problem to solve, so it goes largely unaddressed, and inappropriately prioritized below the afore mentioned military efforts. This is the principal problem with punting insurgencies to the military to resolve, and classifying them as "wars" to be won or lost.

For the West, COIN means "Colonial Intervention," and it's time to move forward from that inherited approach that we put a new coat of paint on with FM 3-24. Sustaining friendly despots is no longer good enough.