Sanctuary or Ungoverned Spaces:identification, symptoms and responses

[Dayuhan]

Showing up in troubled places with a more neutral agenda that is more about empowering the locals to work out their issues short of warfare, and not seeking to control the outcome will lead to much fewer incidences of coming in with an agenda, recruiting local groups to support our agenda, and then bailing on them to deal with the consequences when our agenda either doesn't work out, or we simply change our mind.

When we impose the constraint "short of warfare" we are coming in with an agenda and seeking to control the outcome.

It's all very well and noble to say we should not try and control the outcome, but if we have no specific interest in the outcome - at least in preventing certain outcomes - we wouldn't be involved in the first place, would we? If we're there, there's an agenda.

There is no need to throw the populaces supporting the Northern Alliance under the bus in order to re-open negotiations with the Taliban. To bring the parties together in a truce that we set up and secure to work through these issues. The Karzai/Northern Alliance is an unsustainable model, and their constitution guarantees oppression and conflict. It is time to stop supporting tyranny that supports our interests, and begin embracing more neutral, less controlling approaches.

Does anybody think the Karzai regime suits our interests? As far as I can see they suit their own interests, rather predictably.

Do you really believe that the Taliban and the Karzai crowd, the Pashtun and the non-Pashtun minorities, the drug lords and the religious leaders are all going to stop fighting, participate in governance together, share power, hold hands and sing "kumbayah" if only they get the right Constitution? I wish I could believe that, but I don't. A Constitution codifies consensus, it doesn't create it. If there's no consensus to codify, a Constitution means nothing. If they pursue a Constitution because we want it, it means nothing.

I would expect that as soon as we leave, there will be a fight. The fight will go on until somebody wins, the winners will stomp the losers, and the losers will become insurgents. The winners won't control all of Afghanistan, but given that Afghanistan is a pretty abstract construct to begin with, that hardly matters. This will happen no matter what deals are made and what documents are signed. If the Taliban make a deal to throw out AQ they will break the deal as soon as they think they can get away with it... probably they will never comply with the deal in the first place. How would we verify compliance anyway? This is the nature of the place: we will not change it, we might as well accept it. Jungle Rules apply, as Stan would say, though Desert Wasteland Rules might be more accurate.

The Afghan Constitution doesn't guarantee conflict and oppression, the prevailing political culture does. A new Constitution will not change that culture. Time and evolution might, but the process is likely to be violent, and we cannot simply circumvent that process by imposing a deal that happens to suit our interests, our our idea of what their interests ought to be. We talk about empowering them to make peace... but what if they want power more than they want peace, or if they think peace can only come when they have their boot on the other guy's throat and their hand in the other guy's wallet?

This is a no-trust environment. We need to provide the neutral presence to allow them to sort out how to work together in such an environment until such time as they develop "new guards for their future security" together.

Agree on the no-trust environment, but how do you think we're going to change that? The only "guard for future security" that means anything in that environment is having lots of men with guns and doing unto others before they have a chance to do unto you... can we change that?

Or we can keep surging in more troops and ramp up for the next fighting season, Clear more terrain, Develop more progjects, kill more Taliban squad leaders (the bulk of what the Ranger's bag), and fire more drone-borne rockets into FATA bedroom windows. Just because we are good at doing the wrong thing is no reason not to attempt to do the right thing.

Or we can forget about pursuing goals we cannot accomplish - and installing an inclusive, cooperative democracy in Afghanistan is certainly in that category - and accept that Afghanistan is what it is, Afghan political culture is what it is, and our agenda is what it is. Then we get down to the specific question of how to achieve our agenda (it is, after all, why we're there) within that culture and that environment, instead of trying to change that environment to suit ourselves.

A "peace agreement" would have one great virtue: it would give us a face-saving exit point. It would not create peace, nor would it keep AQ out. We'd probably end up back in, though at least maybe if we go back we might be able to do it sensibly from the start. There's something to that, I suppose...

[Ken White]

More and more facts support my opinion. Currently and historically.

My post lacked clarity. My apologies. My comment on opinion was based on one aspect only:

Just because we are good at doing the wrong thing is no reason not to attempt to do the right thing.

It was that statement and it alone to which I referred when I wrote:

"However, on that opinion of yours -- and that's what it is, an opinion, not a statement of fact -- we can continue to disagree."

Specifically, I meant that what we are good at doing is not necessarily the wrong thing -- it may be inappropriate for a specific campaign or mission but it is not "wrong" and if you or anyone views it as universally wrong, you and they will err -- badly. The real opinion issue is raised by your last clause; "...no reason not to attempt to do the right thing." What is "right" in your opinion is not necessarily either de facto or de jure right.

I added: "Don't try to change the Elephant, you'll fail. Simply better use its strength..." to once more with no snark and with good intent suggest you have good ideas but tend to gloss over things that seem minor impediments to be ignored by you but that others view as significant details that must be addressed. IOW, you have a great product but a really bad sales pitch...

[Dayuhan]

I went back to edit out the "hold hands and sing "kumbayah" comment in the post above, but the edit window had closed. That was inappropriate, and I apologize.

I do get a certain frustration in this debate that tempts to intemperance, because it's an issue I encounter all the time in my own milieu. In the Philippines we have a largely toxic pattern of governance despite a quite adequate legal framework. When the laws are incompatible with the prevailing political culture, the laws are simply ignored. Of course we have the ritual parade of well-meaning Americans coming through, looking around, and pronouncing that the problem is governance... to which the only possible reply is somewhere between "duh" and "thank you, Captain Obvious".

Of course the problem is governance. The problem in that problem is that patterns of governance do not spring from structures or documents, but from a political culture, which is in turn a product of fundamental perceptions of power and privilege, loyalty and identity. They don't govern that way because of the Constitution or the laws, they govern that way because that's the way they govern. That's what they believe governance is.

These things do change. Europeans no longer believe in the divine right of kings, Americans no longer believe that power is the exclusive prerogative of white males. These changes happen over time, through an evolutionary process that often involves violence. They do not happen because some external deus ex machina dictates that they must.

Afghan political culture will change, in time. We don't know where those changes will lead, and we cannot dictate what they will be or how and when they will occur. If we declare that we are going to impose a truce and they are going to sit down and work out a power-sharing framework and execute it peacefully, we are dictating the outcome, even if we don't try to dictate the content of the agreement. We are trying to unilaterally direct another country's evolutionary process, and we are doing it to suit our own interests.

I don't believe that we can change other people's political cultures. I don't believe that we should try. We may be able to very subtly assist the evolutionary process, though if we're not very careful indeed we can easily end up derailing it. We may be able to mitigate the worst side effects and we may be able to prevent those processes from spilling over onto us. Trying to impose change in another political culture by fiat is an errand worthy of Quixote, and I can't see it ending well.

[Bob's World]

A pretty good collection of "hard data" recently complied by interviewing 1000 men in Kandahar and Helmand.

http://www.icosgroup.net/documents/a..._variables.pdf

(I have mentioned on here previously that many rural Afghans assume the Coalition forces are Russians. A continuation of that previous invasion. This may be aided in part by the fact that we work with many of the same Afgan officials. In this report it discloses that 90% of those interviewed had never heard of 9/11 and that most assume we were just there to control their country.)

[Ken White]

are Jews based on the rationale that only Muslims and Jews wear beards and the SF weenies aren't Muslim...

What your survey and my comment may well mean is that the Info War is not going well.

May also mean that SF is being misused.

[Bill Moore]

Posted by Infanteer,

How would one deny sanctuary by taking the FATA? So we slice off another slab of Pashtunistan that where we have to put a village guard in every corner. Is that going to solve anything?

When one looks over a map of the insurgency in Kandahar province it is amazing how small the area is; I have a map of one of our training areas that is larger. Each house is a literal fort. We cannot control these little forts as is, so I don't know how increasing the AO would be conducive to pacifying the Pashtun.

First I think it is doubtful that we're actually trying to control these areas, and still are very in the patrol by COIN mode, with the exception of SF's recent change in tactics which requires them to live the villages, which does facilitate greater control (perfect control may be possible, but only at great cost and only for a short period of time). However, there are varying degrees of control, and in areas of Pakistan (perhaps relatively small) some insurgent groups have considerable freedom of movement and enjoy relative safehaven with the exception of a few drone strikes (effective against the leadership, but their foot soldiers or their logistics). You take away the perception of safe haven by putting boots on the ground, which will limit their freedom of movement, and enable coalition forces (Pakistan can and should participate if they're really our ally, but I think the jury is still out on that one) to disrupt their ability to sustain the insurgency in Afghanistan by pushing them further away from the border, destroying their caches, and most importantly destroying their perception that they have a safe haven, which over time changes their views on their ability to win. As stated originally it is part of a much larger strategy, but it is critical to deny it as a safehaven. That doesn't mean we will deny operations from there entirely, we simply amp up the risk for them doing so. Ultimate success will require several small successes over time, and it a way it is very much a war of attrition. They must be convinced they can't win, and our current strategy is far from convincing. We're not going to win the war of the narrative, we already lost that fight. We can win the fight, and in so doing convince the Afghan populace that the Afghans can win, instead of simply believing they should remain neutral until the U.S. leaves and then surrender to the Taliban when they return. David made a bold statement that we couldn't do it based on assumptions that many, to include some Pakistanis, consider to be incorrect. The reality is we can do it, and there is a moral arguement to do it or leave Afghanistan. Winning the villages over in Afghanistan will accomplish nothing, but as Bob stated elsewhere, create a gap for us to exit. We're currently practicing the strategy of appeasement, and ISAF appears cowardly, which further feeds the global jihad. If the risks of a such a proposal are not worth it, then how much more blood and treasure is Afghanistan worth? One thing you don't do is stand up and tell the enemy, yes you have a safehaven and there is nothing we can do about it. That may be very European, but it isn't effective.

Posted by Bob's World,

(I have mentioned on here previously that many rural Afghans assume the Coalition forces are Russians. A continuation of that previous invasion. This may be aided in part by the fact that we work with many of the same Afgan officials. In this report it discloses that 90% of those interviewed had never heard of 9/11 and that most assume we were just there to control their country.)

I have seen this previously and it is telling that the locals are adhering to a completely different narrative than we are, and yet we expect them to clearly see that our goals are legitimate and just. It is amazing we're doing as well as we are. Thank goodness incompetence is a disease that affects all of us, friend and foe alike.

[davidbfpo]

Bill,

OK then, action is taken against the safe haven across the Durand Line, say on an identified logistic facility or even a series of actions. What is the effect on the campaign in Afghanistan? Yes, our opponents know we can strike them there and have to reconsider their actions.

Locally the tribes are hardly neutral and are pushed / pulled more towards the insurgency. The Pakistani impact, well that has been covered already and the logistic access is closed TFN (say a couple of months).

Do we ignore the impact of the narrative in Pakistan and beyond?

The safe haven will be hurt, it will still exist and how far do we strike beyond the Durand Line?

That is why I argue the political policy is not to cross the Durand Line and the military has to adjust accordingly. I remain unconvinced that the scarce resources we have in Afghanistan should be expended in cross border safe haven actions.

Covert action and other methods - is a separate issue and best not debated here.

[slapout9]

Although a little off the safe havens topic this interview of Jonathan S. Landay has some interesting comments that bear on the discussion of what to do and who to support in order to win in A'stan. Don't know how credible this guy is, but he argues for a more classic COIN approach (nation building) as the real solution.
Link to the interview is below.


http://www.therealnews.com/t2/index....&jumival=5923#

[Bill Moore]

Posted by Davidfpo,

That is why I argue the political policy is not to cross the Durand Line and the military has to adjust accordingly. I remain unconvinced that the scarce resources we have in Afghanistan should be expended in cross border safe haven actions.

Covert action and other methods - is a separate issue and best not debated here.

Reference covert action we're in agreement and as you stated nuff said.

I also agree that the political policy, which we are of course abiding by is not to cross the Durand Line, and I am challenging the logic behind that policy (as weak as it may be, because I do recognize the risks associated with crossing the line). While not fully convinced myself that crossing the line is the right answer, I think the assumptions for not crossing it need to be re-examined in the light of day and see if they stand up against the counter arguments. If they do then fine, I'll retract my position.

As for expending scant resources to cross the line, I'll propose a simple military counterargument. Are our resources best used in a defensive mode or an offensive mode? Normally offensive actions win wars.

Slap I'll check your link out tonight.

[Bill Moore]

Slap,

I listend to the video and did a quick background check on the speaker, he is well educated and an experienced reporter. However, while he mentioned troops in Afghanistan in the 2006 period realized it was a COIN fight and started their own disjointed economic development efforts, I didn't hear him champion it as the means to victory.

Below the video is a transcript of his presentation and if you read his last paragraph it is pretty alarmist (and probably accurate). I don't think our current COIN efforts alone will prevent this from happening, it will only delay it. We are still confusing the means with the strategy. We can stay forever and do what we're doing now and hold things in place, but our efforts at nation building are undermined by the very clowns we're trying to prop up to run the country.

Read the transcript, or listen to the video again, and let me know what I'm missing. Does he specify anywhere that nation building will prevent what he is predicting in the last paragraph?

[slapout9]

Slap,

I listend to the video and did a quick background check on the speaker, he is well educated and an experienced reporter. However, while he mentioned troops in Afghanistan in the 2006 period realized it was a COIN fight and started their own disjointed economic development efforts, I didn't hear him champion it as the means to victory.

Below the video is a transcript of his presentation and if you read his last paragraph it is pretty alarmist (and probably accurate). I don't think our current COIN efforts alone will prevent this from happening, it will only delay it. We are still confusing the means with the strategy. We can stay forever and do what we're doing now and hold things in place, but our efforts at nation building are undermined by the very clowns we're trying to prop up to run the country.

Read the transcript, or listen to the video again, and let me know what I'm missing. Does he specify anywhere that nation building will prevent what he is predicting in the last paragraph?

BillM, this is the part of the interview that gave me that impression.

Copied fromt the Real News Network interview of Johnathan S. Landay by Paul Jay.

JAY: President Bush, in a speech in--just days following the beginning of the bombing of Kabul and which led to the overthrow of the Taliban, he made a speech where he said there'd be something like a Marshall Plan for Afghanistan and we won't abandon you again.


LANDAY: Well, they weren't abandoned, but there certainly was absolutely no Marshall Plan under the Bush administration. And, in fact, it wasn't until the last year when they really sort of came up with the basics of a strategy, of a counterinsurgency strategy. Indeed, I was there in 2006 when US troops in the east who had come--many of whom had come from Iraq, understood that what needed to be done was a counterinsurgency, a full-scale counterinsurgency strategy, in which reconstruction played a very large role. And they began doing sort of small-scale reconstruction projects on their own using funds that they had available to them. There was no direction from Washington.

[Bill Moore]

Slap,

That is what I thought you were referring to, but when you read the rest of the article, it doesn't add up. Nation building won't fix the problems he identified, problems that must be fixed if they're going to avoid another round of ethnic warfare. It will take years to bring Afghanistan to that level, and we're trying to do it with a largely incompetent State Department, underfunded, lack of consensus within ISAF, an incompetent Afghan Government, and Pakistan conducting UW to undermine our efforts. None of that doesn't mean it can't be accomplished of course, but it will be challenging and more of the same won't move us further down the road IMO.

[slapout9]

Bill, I probably should have made it clear that because the title of the interview is a "missed opportunity" I think he is responding to what might have worked in the past (traditional COIN campaign), hence missed opportunity. I don't think he has a "current" solution at least I didn't take it that way.

[Bill Moore]

Bill, I probably should have made it clear that because the title of the interview is a "missed opportunity" I think he is responding to what might have worked in the past (traditional COIN campaign), hence missed opportunity. I don't think he has a "current" solution at least I didn't take it that way.

I never read the titles

[Entropy]

Bill,

I also agree that the political policy, which we are of course abiding by is not to cross the Durand Line, and I am challenging the logic behind that policy (as weak as it may be, because I do recognize the risks associated with crossing the line).

We don't know the exact risks. We don't know what the Pakistanis have said they would do if we go freelancing the FATA or NWFP. Our government surely knows the risks as I have no doubt the Pakistanis have made it clear where the red lines are. If we ignore that and go ahead and intervene without Pakistan's consent, the government could not stand by and do nothing. The question is, what would they do? They have a lot of options and none of them are good for us. Closing down the supply routes through Pakistan would probably be a first step. That is bad enough that an incursion wouldn't be worth it IMO except perhaps for a one-time raid to get UBL or Zawahiri.

[Bob's World]

Like anything, there are dozens of ways to go at AQ in the FATA. There are several things I would guard against in the effort:

1. Rationalizing that firing a missile from an unmanned drone is somehow less abusive of Pakistan sovereignty than boots on the ground are.

2. Half-ass intel that conflates the various Afghan/Pakistan Pashtun insurgent groups with AQ. (Popping foreign fighters who come to assist AQ is probably fine, as they signed up for that in coming to the FATA and I doubt there is much popular blowback to their loss on the populaces and their own conditions of insurgency back home).

3. Unilateral operations.

I would recommend an "AQ and Foreign Fighter only" policy, coupled with the development of a combined Afghan/Pakistan Commando unit made up of Pashtuns to the degree possible. Model this on the Afghan Commandos. Use SF advisors and leverage the Coalitions enablers to develop the intel, and provide logistical and airlift support. I suspect that this is something that the government of Pakistan could grant approval to. If possible, split the basing to be in both countries. All raids would be 90% Afghans and Pakistanis and under their C2. Cancel all Predator drone strikes, other than in support to such raids.

Such a force would be able to "KLE their way across the objective," quickly sorting out who belonged, and who did not; and do so in a manner consistent with and respective of local traditions and customs.

Consider a permanent combined force to police the many areas along this border in the future as well. Not border police, but more like Texas Rangers working a vast, self-governed space under rules and authorities agreed to by both nations.

Sovereignty is evolving, we must evolve as well. Meanwhile, I am still struck by the words of a village elder in the FATA to a US operator during the first Pak mil excursion up into this region back in '02:

"We really do not like the government forces coming up into our region. You, however, we do not mind, because you are here for revenge, and revenge we understand."

Meanwhile, I would continue negotiations with the Taliban to withdraw the sanctuary that they give to AQ. Diplomacy as the main effort, smart (right size, right design, right force, right duration, right targets, etc) military operations in support.

[William F. Owen]

are Jews based on the rationale that only Muslims and Jews wear beards and the SF weenies aren't Muslim...

If they are smart men, who remember to call their mothers, are polite and careful with money, then you are probably correct!

[carl]

1. Rationalizing that firing a missile from an unmanned drone is somehow less abusive of Pakistan sovereignty than boots on the ground are.

Aren't the drones making strikes in Pakistan based in Pakistan and therefore sanctioned by the Pak Army/ISI? I don't understand how that is abusive of Pakistan's sovereignty regardless of their public pronouncements.

[Bob's World]

Carl,

One would think, right?

This is a great example of the tremendous conflict of interest we have created for the government of Pakistan. Two of their most vital national interests are:

1. Maintaining a close relationship with the U.S. (particularly a U.S. that is working to get closer to India every day); and

2. Maintain control over an unstable Afghanistan through the employment of the Pashtun populace/Taliban.

During the Soviet invasion we shared these interests, and then after that, but prior to 9/11 we were neutral as to the second one. Following 9/11 that all changed, and that is where the conflict of interest began that I believe is the #1 contributor to instability in Pakistan.

Today a great example of that conflict and how it tears at the fabric of governance in Pakistan is a government that feels compelled to allow Predators to base on their soil on one hand; and to protest violations of their sovereignty on the other. We force a thinly veiled duality that is not sustainable, and shows growing signs of major, negative effects.

We cheer the news of successful strikes, wonder about how bad the collateral damage is, and how serious the reports of such strikes influencing the Pashtun populace to become more anti-government. Soon the mystery may be over if we keep this up. The fact that a Biden-plan rooted in such drone strikes is the top alternative on the table to pop-centric nation building is worrisome to say the least.

[Ken White]

If they are smart men, who remember to call their mothers, are polite and careful with money, then you are probably correct!

they generally fit the first three factors and failed miserably on the third...

Everyone needs a Gold Rolex...

Even if the second hand moves in full second increments.