Sanctuary or Ungoverned Spaces:identification, symptoms and responses

[davidbfpo]

I recall from my university days, around 1975, that there was a view that the UK becoming ungovernable was fashionable; Prof. Anthony King wrote a long article, alas not readily found on free websites. Much has changed since then, but the theme re-appeared recently.

Google then found a more contemporary article on the USA's favourite state, yes California, becoming ungovernable: http://www.economist.com/displayStor...ry_id=13649050

Once again I echo Ken and others - look behind you!

davidbfpo

[Bob's World]

ungoverned spaces are interesting, but it is poorlygoverned populaces that are dangerous.

[Mack]

Great discussion.

Berghof Research Center, 9 Apr 09:

Building Peace in the Absence of States: Challenging the Discourse on State Failure

Complete 98-page paper at the link.

Jedburgh,

Those are some really good articles on this topic and I wish it was required reading for Political Science 101.

I was going through my notes on the Berghof papers and came across this quote from "On Hybrid Political Orders and Emerging States: What is Failing – States in the Global South or Research and Politics in the West?" by Volker Boege, Anne Brown, Kevin Clements and Anna Nolan (p. 15- p. 37):

"However, as Morten Boas and Kathleen Jennings (2005, 388) point out: 'To say that something ‘fails’ or ‘is failing’ is a normative judgement that is only meaningful in comparison to something else; in this case, that something else is the existence of a westernised, ‘healthy’ state that, unfortunately, has little relevance to most of the states in question because it has simply never existed there.' Promoting the liberal state as the ultimate model is to ignore the historical context, and with it the fact of the rather recent historical emergence of the modern state (p. 18)."

I think that this quote highlights the sentiment in this thread.

In terms of security, I guess as long as territory 'X' has its own effective system to deal with "undesirables" (terrorists, drug traffickers, insurgents, etc.), and does not harbour individuals who pose a threat to national security, territory 'X' can be governed through a variety of ways (e.g. tribal structures, "hybrid states", and other informal/non-state forms of governance).

[Jedburgh]

28 May 10: An Operational Definition of "Failed States"

This In Brief aims to contribute to the operationalisation of the concept of ‘fragile states’ for use in development policy. Following a review of different definitions of ‘fragile states’, it proposes a three-pronged definition of fragility that broadly encompasses other classifications. Fragile states are defined as states that are failing, or in danger of failing, with respect to authority, comprehensive socioeconomic entitlements or governance legitimacy. We show that many states are fragile along one or two dimensions, but rather few are fragile along all three, despite causal connections among them—a lack of comprehensive data in the most fragile countries may partly account for this. A consideration of how fragility, as defined, relates to some other significant development approaches to vulnerable societies indicates that fragility in its various dimensions corresponds most closely to failures on particular Human Rights. Yet, the Human Rights approach applies to all countries and embodies a particular way of approaching development, whereas ‘fragile’ states form a specific subset of especially vulnerable countries and the concept as such does not imply a distinct approach to aid and development.

[davidbfpo]

In the 'How to build a state in a non state environment' thread, Slap challenged Bill Moore:

Bill Moore, if you were General in charge of fixin A'stan and could do anything you wanted.... what would do?

Bill responded and I want to isolate one point:

5. Push to establish an emergency zone of control in parts of Pakistan where the Taliban and other insurgents and terrorists seek shelter. Strategic comms are we're in Afghanistan to win, if you can't address these issues we will. I can hear the uproar now, but my narrative is these folks are killing coalition troops and Afghan civilians with immunity (with the exception of an occassional UAV strike). We're incompetent if we continue to allow that to happen, our patience doesn't extend into infinity. By the way our coalition in effort in Pakistan would be subordinate to me in a perfect world. Right now they're getting away with being PAKMIL lap dogs, while we do plane side ceremonies nightly.

SWC have discussed the concept and practicalities of sanctuary before IIRC. A cross-border incursion and / or a series of ground raids are seen as very different to drone strikes (later covered in:http://council.smallwarsjournal.com/...ead.php?t=7385 ). Plus several threads on "working" with the Pakistanis.

Doing "something" about the sanctuaries has become an issue again and Anatol Lieven has written in the NYT:

if American generals genuinely want to increase such raids, then it needs to be stated emphatically that this is not just a lunatic idea, but one that demonstrates how far senior American (and British) commanders have become obsessed with the war in Afghanistan at the expense of the struggle against terrorism as a whole.

Short summary:http://watandost.blogspot.com/2010/1...-pakistan.html and the original article:http://www.nytimes.com/2010/12/30/op...dlieven30.html

I did wonder if SWC would benefit from a thread with Slap's question posed differently: If you were the politician giving orders on fixin A'stan, what limits / conditions would you set?

I'm still pondering my own answer - from an armchair.

[jcustis]

Doing something about the sanctuaries is very important, and I would be all over it if I had a hand in formulating the policy. To some degree, despite the logistical issues inherent, it just takes the guts to try and the planning acumen of several staffs to do the job. With all due respect to the process, that can be a Herculean effort, considering who controls the various ISR, maneuver, and aviation support assets in the theater.

My battalion conducted a 160km raid to the AfPak border area known as Bahram Cha and spent 24 hours or so disrupting a significant Taliban C2 and logistics hub. At the end of the day, the most significant result was the destruction of enough ammonium nitrate that could have made 2,000 IEDs

That raid wasn't actually a cross-border incursion, mind you, but given the sensitivity concerning Pakistan's potential reaction, you might have thought it was. The area sits virtually astride the border, and the effects of our fires had to be evaluated to avoid straying into Pakistan.

Sanctuaries create logistical breathing space for the enemy, in such a way that no matter how hard you try to focus on the population, it allows the enemy to husband resources, re-arm/re-fit, and employ that they've got all the watches but we have all the time sort of fighting technique to outlast you. Take that course of action away, and you may be able to force him to fight closer to your terms.

[Fuchs]

I'd like to refer to
Musings about a military theory framework

You can squeeze the opponent ever more and deny him ever more options, but the marginal cost of your effort explodes and the marginal rate of return approaches zero.

A six-year old can develop an eliminationalist strategy, and this should help us to question its wisdom.


I'd like to advise to go a bit 'Chomsky' and ask wtf the conflict is about.
Slapout's question for Moore was probably already wrong. A General should not decide what to do about AFG. It's simply not his job.

[Entropy]

There are a lot of things we could do about the sanctuaries. Unfortunately, most of them require violating Pakistani sovereignty. So the question becomes, are the sanctuaries enough of a problem that we're willing to give Pakistan the middle finger, engage in actions that would be a clear casus belli, and deal with the resulting consequences? For ten years the answer has been no. I think the answer should continue to be no.

[Fuchs]

There are a lot of things we could do about the sanctuaries. Unfortunately, most of them require violating Pakistani sovereignty.

Isn't this comical?

Violating some other countries' sovereignty was exactly what was done when AQ took sanctuary in AFG back in '01 - for the EXACT SAME REASON.


It's no wonder that certain people value nukes highly nowadays - the U.S. offers a reason for their procurement every day, eight years in a row.

[slapout9]

Slapout's question for Moore was probably already wrong. A General should not decide what to do about AFG. It's simply not his job.

Slap, says you missed the point entirely. The question is entirely right. Bill Moore is not a General, we don't need any Generals, that is the problem IMO. Bill is a long time Green Beret...he doesn't think Conventionally he thinks Unconventionally which is the only way we have any chance at all IMO.

[Dayuhan]

It's no wonder that certain people value nukes highly nowadays - the U.S. offers a reason for their procurement every day, eight years in a row.

Not all about nukes. As long as the US has a major military presence in Afghanistan they need supply routes through Pakistan. Can't manage the logistics just from air bases in Kyrgyzstan and Uzbekistan. I can't see the Pakistanis firing off a nuke in response to a US incursion, but they could definitely shut down the supply lines.

[jcustis]

Isn't this comical?

Violating some other countries' sovereignty was exactly what was done when AQ took sanctuary in AFG back in '01 - for the EXACT SAME REASON.


It's no wonder that certain people value nukes highly nowadays - the U.S. offers a reason for their procurement every day, eight years in a row.

Hey, no one said we had to be realistic in looking at the problem and stick to keeping the gloves on? You can't hold me to the limits of our coercive or diplomatic power!

[Ken White]

It's no wonder that certain people value nukes highly nowadays - the U.S. offers a reason for their procurement every day, eight years in a row.

Likely will keep on doing so. The problem is that we used to do it at least a little better than we do nowadays...

To address your earlier question and statement:

Isn't this comical?

Yes -- or ironic. Or both.

Violating some other countries' sovereignty was exactly what was done when AQ took sanctuary in AFG back in '01 - for the EXACT SAME REASON.

Sort of; close enough anyway.

The sooner we realize that we cannot reform other nations and stop trying to do so, the better off we'll be. The answer to sanctuaries is quite simple -- tell the world that we will not tolerate them. If they then appear (and they will...) then we go in, lay waste, foment hate and discontent and depart as rapidly as we cam -- with an announcement that if it's tried again, we'll be back.

Strategic raids. Leave the low level FID to SF and State / USAid.

First, though, we've got to park the COIN / FID - mobile; stop trying to tell others how to act and determine what our true interests are. Wake me when that occurs...

Slap is right, we don't need the Generals to sort it -- those guys grew up in and are captives of a system; that system effectively started in 1917 and then shot its wad in 1945. It has for the most part and as an institution totally failed to keep up with events since that time, it's consistently a few days late and a bunch more than a dollar short. There have been individuals in the services who understood what was required but they and their ideas generally were shoved aside.

I do disagree with Slap on one point -- IMO, SF has done a little better since the early 60s but even they are not realizing their potential...

Anyone who thinks we've got much of anything right since DoD was created really needs to look at where we are and what we're doing -- and how long we've been there...

[Bob's World]

Ken,

To be fair, prior to DoD, the U.S. could follow the lead of others. Easier to drive from the back seat than from behind the wheel. We've done ok, but yeah, SF and DoD and the U.S. as a whole is good, but not as good as we like to think we are, and not as good as we need to be. Tend to be to quick to believe our own PR.

Recognizing that is step one to getting a little bit better. But then you post nails it pretty well.

[Steve the Planner]

Fuchs:

Slapout's question for Moore was probably already wrong. A General should not decide what to do about AFG. It's simply not his job.

Sly comment indeed. With many dimensions.

Regrettably, a general will be asked Slap's question despite that is actually one that far exceeds his pay grade, lane, expertise. The reason that would happen probably extends through our lack of precision in defining a mission within a country that is not actually within that country, and with intrinsic geopolitical, historical, cultural and diplomatic levels and linkages far beyond the scope of his assigned "battle space."

That problem is not one of Slap's making.

Ken is essentially proposing the only strategy that has ever worked (in the short-term) in and around the Durand Line---massive retaliation when it becomes so bad that retaliation is necessary.

The sooner we realize that we cannot reform other nations and stop trying to do so, the better off we'll be. The answer to sanctuaries is quite simple -- tell the world that we will not tolerate them. If they then appear (and they will...) then we go in, lay waste, foment hate and discontent and depart as rapidly as we cam -- with an announcement that if it's tried again, we'll be back.

Ken didn't even do any heavy lifting for this one. It is what the Brits and Pakistanis always used to "control" (read "limit extreme externalities") in the "sanctuaries." (He definitely didn't need to call Chuck Norris for input).

Extra-national sanctuaries do, however, raise the issue of substantial escalation with unpredicatable dimensions beyond some minimum temporary impacts.

Under the Powell Doctrine, we would be shifting from "breaking" countries in the mid-range (20-30 million) to a real one (160 million). A general could not even begin to calculate the dimensions of anything more than what Entropy has described as "not worth it."

[Fuchs]

Slap, says you missed the point entirely. The question is entirely right. Bill Moore is not a General, we don't need any Generals, that is the problem IMO. Bill is a long time Green Beret...he doesn't think Conventionally he thinks Unconventionally which is the only way we have any chance at all IMO.

Actually your question was (my emphasis):

Bill Moore, if you were General in charge of fixin A'stan and could do anything you wanted.... what would do?

You wrote that - not my fault.

A Green beret is still no more qualified to answer the question than any other citizen. It's a political job. It's a job for statesmen and their advisers (and I don't mean career uniform wearers here).
It's a problem for a Kissinger, Machiavelli, Bismarck, Churchill, Eisenhower guy.
Your whole intro to your core question was leading into a wrong direction imho.

[Steve the Planner]

Fuchs:

It's a political job. It's a job for statesmen and their advisers (and I don't mean career uniform wearers here).
It's a problem for a Kissinger, Machiavelli, Bismarck, Churchill, Eisenhower guy.

Excuse me?

One thing I learned about this board is that some threads are populated by folks who were or are on the ground, and have seen their respective pieces of the puzzle. By working together, they sometimes build a next level of insight (or just get to blow off ideas or steam).

One thing I learned from deployment to Iraq in that silly civilian capacity you referenced as the source of all omnipotence is that, there is no one home--- except, maybe the Wizard of OZ.

These folks with their puzzle pieces are, in many circumstances, the only ones who know what they know from the ground---and that's really all that is known in an environment where there is no underlying well-conceived strategy or plan to test against first contact with an opponent.

It's magical thinking to assume there is a Kissinger, or Bismarck to save the day.

Even Bismarck couldn't keep the three balls in the air---just respond to each dropped ball.

Steve

[Fuchs]

Steve, a country with 308 million people has most likely ten thousands of people with the right brain to save the day, and likely hundreds with the right brain and a suitable background.
The system doesn't elevate them into the necessary position of power, but they are there.

There's little reason to think that any General, green beret, SWC forum user or whatever has the right brain because of him/her belonging to that group, though. It's furthermore for sure that they're not in the right position of power to save the day in AFG.



The 'small' people feed* the info upwards, and do the work. Their personal experience and personal training is specific and not comprehensive. Small people jobs (including generals) do not qualify for saving the day in macro problems. Other things such as great info research because of personal interest may qualify them, but not such jobs.


The 'big' people in the right jobs for saving the day may be the wrong people for the job, of course. Blame the system.

I'm not among the people who expect a happy ending anyway - I never did since Marines landed in Kandahar in '01.

---------------
And now away from who's competent to end the mess:


*
Does feeding info into a forum for the search for a suitable answer in a collective have promise? Maybe. I'm not sure that a large amount of information is necessary to make the right decision, though. (And with 'right' I mean of course the decision that I assume to be 'right'.)

You do operate under a specific assumption; the assumption that saving the day means to succeed.
I work under the assumption that saving the day means to cut the losses because continuing the involvement is orders of magnitude away from being justified by a cost:benefit analysis.
The SWC doesn't even discuss the right questions to even discuss how or why the involvement should be aborted. The SWC forum is still dominated by a military "mission was issued, we can do this! (somehow)" attitude.


You don't need nearly as much information for an abortion of the involvement as you need for developing hope for its continuation.



I wrote this two and a half years ago:

Sometime, several hundred years ago, Europeans did a remarkable step in social development; they invented the Enlightenment. Reasoning became supreme over faith and ignorance.

I've seen some hints that reasoning might indeed be applicable to military affairs as well. In fact, it might even prevent stupid mistakes and disasters. Maybe we should try it. It's not fashionable to use any other part of the brain than the fear center to think about military affairs, but I don't care.

Just as an experiment and a test of our newly-discovered ability to actually think in objective terms about war and warfare - let's think about the commitment in the Afghanistan civil war.

I believe we need to answer (at least) the following five questions with “yes” (all of them) to feel that our support for the Western participation in the civil war in Afghanistan is justified:

1st: Can we expect that the Taleban have a comeback if we leave?

2nd: Can we expect that the Taleban would again harbor/support terrorists after a comeback (who fight us)?

3rd: Are these terrorists significantly more dangerous if supported by Taleban than without this support?

4th: Can we expect that our presence there keeps the Taleban away?

5th: Can we expect that our participation there hurts us less than would otherwise do additional terror strikes against us (killed & wounded citizens, economic losses)?

I would answer these questions at least three times with “No.”

(If we wanted to help foreign people who are in a serious economic situation, we can do so with much higher efficiency (same money, much more helpful effects) elsewhere first.)

See? A General's view on the problem is myopic unless he moves well beyond the horizon required for a General. The same applies to green berets and almost all jobs in the world.

To 'save the day in AFG' isn't about accomplishing a mission. It's first and foremost about getting the mission right at the highest level.

The whole endeavour looks like created by political brains shut off and on autopilot. The brains need to be activated again and the course needs to be determined by the pilot.
I don't really care about what the rudder thinks about the airflow. I want the autopilot switched off and the pilot's brain switched on.


Oh, btw. The last quoted text (above) should be very relevant to the thread's topic!

[Dayuhan]

To 'save the day in AFG' isn't about accomplishing a mission. It's first and foremost about getting the mission right at the highest level.

The whole endeavour looks like created by political brains shut off and on autopilot. The brains need to be activated again and the course needs to be determined by the pilot.

True enough. All too often, though, the course is charted with more attention to domestic political imperatives than to the actual task at hand. Post 9/11 domestic politics demanded aggressive military action and they demanded that we cast ourselves as the good guys. Simply kicking some butt and leaving with a "don't make us come back", as Ken reasonably suggests, wasn't enough: we had to bring truth, justice, and the American way to those deprived of it. That was a mistake, born of excessive subservience to a presumed domestic political demand.

[Bill Moore]

Posted by Fuchs,

You do operate under a specific assumption; the assumption that saving the day means to succeed.
I work under the assumption that saving the day means to cut the losses because continuing the involvement is orders of magnitude away from being justified by a cost:benefit analysis.
The SWC doesn't even discuss the right questions to even discuss how or why the involvement should be aborted. The SWC forum is still dominated by a military "mission was issued, we can do this! (somehow)" attitude.

I think more people here agree with you than disagree. We are generally too quick to define the nature of the problem to be solved, and then realize several hundred lives and billions of dollars later that we're trying to solve the wrong problem. You're also right that some of us have a military mindset for obvious reasons, and since we were given a mission (regardless of its feasibility) we're obligated to work on it. Don't mistake that for meaning we're blind to the larger issues, or that all even believe the conflcit at this point is helping us defeat/suppress extreme political Islam globally, and in fact may be making the situation worse. We can debate policy and state our opinions, but ultimately in accordance with an oath we all freely took we're obligated to follow orders and do.

IMO the poorly conceived policies we're pursuing are based largely on the naive pseudointellectual extremely liberal rhetoric coming out of think tanks like "Center for a New America Security" and similiar think tanks. This is idealism without ideas and policy without pragmatism, and furthermore it is largely disconnected from our original objective of revenging the 9/11 attacks (killing those that hit us), protecting the homeland and waging a longer term "global" (not restricted to a couple of geographical spaces that have been incorrectly identified as centers of gravities) war on terrorism/political extremism. This of course requires a very well thought out strategy instead of knee jerk reactions.

In some ways the longer we stay in Afghanistan the harder it is to leave, and this is true especially after you commit general purpose forces to combat. I think bringing in GPF initially for a major punitive raid, to include pursuing AQ into Pakistan while we had enough international consensus to do so after the 9/11 would have been appropriate, and we could have redeployed the GPF shortly after that and call it a win (a battle, not a war). Of course going after the safehaven in Pakistan isn't so easy now, and it goes back to the old saying, "make a hard decision now, or a harder one later."

Everyone has great hindsight, probably why we don't see folks wearing glasses on the back of their head, but consider if we did what I envisioned above, and then left some SOF elements, USAID and State Department folks (as Ken suggested) to assist the emerging Afghanistan (staying out of their internal politics) what would have unfolded? Especially if we promised to bring the big stick back if needed to beat up on someone (now we have credibility). Then if the assistance didn't work out we would quietly leave without fanfare and lay the blame squarely on the shoulders on of the Afghans where it would have belonged. Instead we took ownership of the mission (the flawed Powell Doctrine) and now any failure will be seen as our failure with the associated repercussions at the strategic level. At this point I don't know if it takes more courage to stay or leave? Nor do I pretend to know if the right answer is to stay or leave.

Reference my comment, as David said, he only extracted one of several proposals that would have to be done collectively to have any chance of success (and they were rough ideas to stimulate debate, they were not intended to be a complete strategy by any stretch). None the less to Fuchs point, I think the greater risk to our military strategy (since that is the strategy we are pursuing currently) is continuing to ignore the safe havens. This is so obvious that a 6th grader would recognize it, and his dad would have a very hard time explaining to him why his brother died in a conflict that we're not committed to winning. Strategy as you know touchs a lot of a domains, things, places and people. Some of it is exceedingly complex and some it is very simple (don't try to make it more complex than it is in that case).

A Green beret is still no more qualified to answer the question than any other citizen. It's a political job. It's a job for statesmen and their advisers (and I don't mean career uniform wearers here).
It's a problem for a Kissinger, Machiavelli, Bismarck, Churchill, Eisenhower guy.
Your whole intro to your core question was leading into a wrong direction imho.

It may not have been the ideal question, but it was the question and it is a question that our military leaders are being asked. I personally don't see a lot of civilian political leaders jumping out of the woodwork with better ideas do you? In one respect this is the essence of the problem, we're overly stovepiped in so called centers of excellence as reflected in our so called elements of national power, diplomacy, information, military and economic and then within the military by lines of operation. Each with its own objectives and its own bureaucracy, which is not well synched as a collective whole into something that we would recognize as a coherent national level strategy. Sadly, there is more focus on protecting rice bowls than there is on building consensus and a workable strategy. You're absolutely right, the type of headgear you wear doesn't qualify you for this, but neither does a wearing a suit, or sporting a Phd diploma on your wall. In the end we just need the right person (lady or man /in uniform or out of uniform) who has a realistic vision, the resources and sufficient authority to implement the strategy. Unfortunately things don't work that way in the American system.