Sanctuary or Ungoverned Spaces:identification, symptoms and responses

[Entropy]

Bob,

Well, to take this cancer line a bit further, allow me to offer a slightly different take.

Ok, where does that get us in terms of the sanctuary in Pakistan and our AfPak strategy?

David,

I was slightly anxious when I started this thread, partly as for reasons lost to me SWC has of late refrained from a debate on AFPAK and so far - apart from a couple of posts all is well - we have stayed on the main subject.

I pretty much agree with your comment. Well said.

Slap,

You could put up an Alligator fence as in mine the border between A'stan and Pak'stan.

The Soviets tried that. Not only did they heavily mine the border, but they also made it a kill zone - anyone in the border area could be killed on sight. Even if our ROE allowed the use of such methods, they probably wouldn't work and would end up killing a lot more civilians than fighters.

[Bob's World]

I'll fall back to my original post, that the first step in coming up with a plan for effectively dealing with any "sanctuary" is to understand that sanctuary is much more than some "ungoverned space" and to understand and deal with the specific aspects that contribute to providing the sanctuary one is concerned with.

The Taliban sanctuary issue is VERY different than the AQ sanctuary issue, though both share the same space.

If we focus on the AQ sanctuary issue, which should be our focus, my take is that it is primarily a sanctuary provided by the Taliban, and one that the Taliban can evict them from at will. Given that, the key for the US is to engage with the Taliban and see if there is a way to cut that deal. Sides deals will need to be cut with Afghanistan and Pakistan to get them to go along, but neither of those governments can deny AQ sanctuary without also working through the Taliban.

Bob

[William F. Owen]

The Soviets tried that. Not only did they heavily mine the border, but they also made it a kill zone - anyone in the border area could be killed on sight. Even if our ROE allowed the use of such methods, they probably wouldn't work and would end up killing a lot more civilians than fighters.

Just because the Soviets lack skill and brains does not mean we do. You can build obstacles for less cost and time that it takes to build the same length of Highway.
It would be perfectly possible to build a credible obstacle barrier on the AF-PAK border.

[Bob's World]

Just because the Soviets lack skill and brains does not mean we do. You can build obstacles for less cost and time that it takes to build the same length of Highway.
It would be perfectly possible to build a credible obstacle barrier on the AF-PAK border.

Yes, all true, but to what effect? Most Taliban live 24-7 in Afghanistan. What comes across the border often simply drives in through official border crossings and travels along the highway until it gets to its destination. No barrier system has any effect on what is probably 90 % of the Taliban problem; and No effect on any of the AQ problem.

Not to mention to adverse affect that driving such a wedge straight through the heart of the Pashtun populace and territory would have. They can ignore the irritation of the Durrand line when it is merely a line on a map. Turning it into a physical disruption of their daily lives is not a good idea if one is seeking to reduce the Pashtun-based insurgency in Afghanistan.

[slapout9]

The Taliban sanctuary issue is VERY different than the AQ sanctuary issue, though both share the same space.


Bob

There's the Alligator again. Kill the AQ alligator and the Taliban are not going to be such a problem, then it might be possible to cut a deal but until then it want. Why should they cut a deal if the situation hasn't changed?

[Bob's World]

First, the Taliban insurgency is not caused by AQ, it is caused by the current Karzai government that we are protecting.

Second, we really won't know what it takes to get the Taliban to enter a truce with Karzai to come to some compromise and hand us (or at least evict) AQ until we ask them.

Next time we fire a drone missle into some guys bedroom window, we should tie a note to it...or better yet just talking to them.

[slapout9]

First, the Taliban insurgency is not caused by AQ, it is caused by the current Karzai government that we are protecting.

Didn't the Taliban exist prior to Karzai?

[Fuchs]

@Slapout:
He referred to the TB insurgency, not to the TB in general.

First, the Taliban insurgency is not caused by AQ, it is caused by the current Karzai government that we are protecting.

Add the Western troops as well, for except a few hundred of them they are not Muslim and thus an ideal target for propaganda which in turn helps them a lot to generate recruits, motivate leaders and motivate supporters.

I still think that the TB were pretty much in a hopeless situation back in 2002, they had no real chance to have a comeback in AFG unless we Westerners propped them up with our presence.


Moreover, a smart strategist would have garnered a real political, probably a real paramilitary opposition in AFG that could absorb the inevitable opposition and dry out the pool for the TB at least in AFG.

Such things aren't in our repertoire, though.



An anecdote, to show the benefit of superficially paradox and certainly selfless actions in another example:

I bought a gift booklet for a friend years ago - it was about Japanese wisdoms. The quick test-reading was satisfactory, and I recall one story very well. It was impressive.
A successful, famous Japanese leader worried that his highly successful reign might cause a very tough beginning for the future reign of his son. He began to act foolish up to a point where nobody saw the great leader in him any more and everybody got impatient about the succession. He finally died and his son proved to be a highly successful prince as well.

The lesson is of course that sometimes you need to shed some prestige to achieve what you want. This readiness to sacrifice something is crucial (and it doesn't always need to be whole armies in war). The West may do exactly this; step back, allow Karzai to gain in the process.

The ability and readiness to sacrifice a bit - a pawn for a queen, some ground in Schlagen aus der Nachhand - is incredibly important at times.
It's also a mark of a true strategist.

[slapout9]

@Slapout:
He referred to the TB insurgency, not to the TB in general.

Whats the difference?

[Entropy]

Just because the Soviets lack skill and brains does not mean we do. You can build obstacles for less cost and time that it takes to build the same length of Highway.
It would be perfectly possible to build a credible obstacle barrier on the AF-PAK border.

Ok, given enough resources anything is possible. I submit that the requirements to effectively close the border are beyond our current capabilities much less Afghans. The Afghans can't even fund their own security forces, much less a huge, complex border security system.

Bob,

If we focus on the AQ sanctuary issue, which should be our focus, my take is that it is primarily a sanctuary provided by the Taliban, and one that the Taliban can evict them from at will.

I generally agree with your "sanctuary within a sanctuary" construct, but it's actually multiple sanctuaries within a sanctuary. AFAIK, the Taliban (talking Quetta Shura here) don't have direct control over AQ and so I am skeptical that Taliban have the ability to give them up even if they were inclined to. There are a lot of groups that could take them in (HiG, Haqqani, LeT, etc.). I'm perfectly willing to play a game of "let's make a deal" with the Taliban but I think I'm quite a bit more skeptical than you are that going after the second-tier sanctuary (TB) would do much.

If you think TB engagement will solve the sanctuary problem, then it would be useful if you could explain how that would actually work.

[Bob's World]

The Taliban were the government of Afghanistan until such time as we assisted the Northern Alliance in driving them into exile in Pakistan. There was little in the way of insurgency for the next several years.

Following Karzai's sham election and the production of the current disaster of a constitution we clearly announced to the world that the government would not draw it's legitimacy from the governed, and that only those who met Karzai's approval would be allowed to participate all of that changed. Taliban-led insurgency grew steadily following those political actions. We then responded by building foreign presence to protect that government from insurgency, at which point the resistance aspect of the insurgency surged as well.

[slapout9]

As David would say from my armchair. September 10th the Taliban were just fine. On September the 12th they were the enemy. The differentiating fact was AQ. We have an Alligator problem and the big Alligator is Bill Laden and his family of Alligators is in Saudi Arabia.

COIN is Poli-Tricks, it is occupation by indirect means and they (Taliban) don't like it. Kill the Alligators and the fish will like youat least they want bite you. I think the Taliban are scared of AQ, that is why they put up with them. Remove that threat and stop occupying their home and things might just work out.

[Steve the Planner]

Borders, boundaries, obstacles.

Entropy's response begs deeper questions and answers not within our capability.

Ok, given enough resources anything is possible. I submit that the requirements to effectively close the border are beyond our current capabilities much less Afghans. The Afghans can't even fund their own security forces, much less a huge, complex border security system.

The Maginot Line was built out of expedience, and a hopeless effort to substitute technology for manpower, and practical solutions.

Stable borders are part physical and part accepted and meaningful: Dividing one recognized place from another, or one people from another.

Having spent much of my young army life staring at East German watchtowers, I find it hard to believe that, in the Durand application, we could still be having a debate about building an Iron Curtain to force a division that is neither accepted nor definable by reasonable practice.

IMO, perhaps the best way to end the division would be to create it. First, we divide these two places by walls, dogs, mines, machine gun emplacements---essentially a huge public works project comparable to the Great Wall and visible from satellite.

During construction, we employ tens of thousands of contractors, builders, suppliers on both sides of the line, of necessity carving out new roads across the entire area for supplies, and worker encampments.

Do the math on the sheer amount of labor and logistics needed to man and control the checkpoints. That, of itself, creates links never imagined, and defies credibility that either the enfeebled Afghans or unconcerned Pakistanis would ever support, staff or pay for.

Assuming it is ever completed, we funnel all trade through a few key checkpoint Charlies while cutting off centuries old informal connections on both sides, forcing ancient towns, peoples and relations to either "find a new life" or find a new way through the obstacle.

Finally, when all is said and done, some other political consequence, perhaps, in part, driven by the wall itself, causes a political realignment in this haphazard and unnatural border. The result: Like Hitler retaking Rhineland, driving through the forest to Bastogne, or bypassing the Maginot, it becomes a very large paperweight.

Whose wall is this, after all?

Whose actual short-term objectives are going to be addressed by it?

We really should try to go a little beyond just making this stuff up. No?

[slapout9]

IMO, perhaps the best way to end the division would be to create it. First, we divide these two places by walls, dogs, mines, machine gun emplacements---essentially a huge public works project comparable to the Great Wall and visible from satellite.

During construction, we employ tens of thousands of contractors, builders, suppliers on both sides of the line, of necessity carving out new roads across the entire area for supplies, and worker encampments.

Do the math on the sheer amount of labor and logistics needed to man and control the checkpoints. That, of itself, creates links never imagined, and defies credibility that either the enfeebled Afghans or unconcerned Pakistanis would ever support, staff or pay for.

Thats why I suggested Aerial Mining, it could be done. Combined with some 1st World War style Air Policing....it's possible.Something to think about anyway.

[Steve the Planner]

Slap:

My big concern about aerial mining is that, afterwards, the international community will force us to de-mine. At that point, if not already, the US Empire would truly collapse from the cost.

But, I really believe that creating it, whether as a physical or dense mine environment, will absolutely bring things to a head (of unknown dimensions), and be a big step to a Final Answer.

[slapout9]

Slap:

My big concern about aerial mining is that, afterwards, the international community will force us to de-mine. At that point, if not already, the US Empire would truly collapse from the cost.

But, I really believe that creating it, whether as a physical or dense mine environment, will absolutely bring things to a head (of unknown dimensions), and be a big step to a Final Answer.

There is always what was called "interference" bombing (gets rid of the mine problem) they essentially dropped what amounted to hand grenades but not to kill but to keep them confined to certain areas. Keep the Alligators inside their swamp, but if they come out they get skinned.

[Entropy]

Bob,

I agree that the structure of the Afghan government is a disaster that has caused a lot of governance problems. At the same time, that's the structure the Afghans who participated in the 2004 Loya Jirga picked. And while the structural governance problems are a huge factor - maybe even the biggest - they aren't the "cause" of the insurgency all by themselves. After all, Hekmyatar, Haqqani and the Quetta Shura leadership decided to fight long before the current government existed.

Regardless, we can debate coulda-shoulda-woulda's all day, but that doesn't get us anywhere going forward. It's my contention that at this point the sanctuary problem is a bridge to far and we can no longer base our strategy on closing down the sanctuaries in Pakistan.

Slap,

The problem with mining is that mines can't tell the difference between combatants and noncombatants. There is a lot of legitimate cross-border traffic and mining would end up killing a lot of those people. Plus, extensive mining is going to give insurgents access to free high explosives. Overall, I think costs greatly outweigh the benefits.

PS: The border with Pakistan is 1500 miles. We don't have enough air assets where "interference bombing" would be effective.

[slapout9]

PS: The border with Pakistan is 1500 miles. We don't have enough air assets where "interference bombing" would be effective.

Well get some more

[Backwards Observer]

There is a lot of legitimate cross-border traffic and mining would end up killing a lot of those people. Plus, extensive mining is going to give insurgents access to free high explosives.

Slap, just out of curiosity, wouldn't someone who professes to hold the moral level of war as the most important be more concerned with the above part of Entropy's statement than the one you quoted?

When you write "moral", I'm assuming that to mean "not whacking civilians". Are you using it in another context; such as in "whacking civilians until they submit to our superior morality"?

[Bob's World]

Entropy,

It's more than "shoulda-woulda, whatever"; as I am sure you will agree that it has been a couple generations since this country has had a governance with broad acceptance. It stands to reason that resistance groups are well formed, hell the current government was a resistance group.

A couple books that give good insights into how a populace reacts to such drastic changes of governance as come from revolution, and key factors setting limits on power, protecting rights, how people are selected to lead, who is eligible, term limits, etc are:

"The Summer of 1787" by David O. Stewart; and

"Unruly Americans" by Woody Holton

Now, yes, Afghanistan is not America, and any constitution must be tailored to the populace and culture, but there are some fundamental dynamics at work.

Dynamic one: The new government tends to prepare an initial constitution designed to PREVENT what was deemed as bad in the last government. At least it did in both the US and Afghansitan.

For the colonies, this was any form of centralized authority; so all sovereignty was vested in the separate states. It was more a treaty between sovereign nations than a constitution of a united nation.

For Afghanistan it was the opposite, it was power in decentralized warlords.

Both initial documents were short-sighted over-reactions. For the Colonies, while it sufficed (barely) to muddle through the war, the wheels quickly fell off once that rallying issue was resolved. Inflation through the roof, no credit, no effective taxation, no ability to implement laws that served the majority as they required a consensus, etc. Daniel Shay in 1786 was but the tip of the iceberg with his rebellion. A few years later New England was seriously considering succession, and of course the Southern States ultimately did. Even with a new constitution that was brilliantly crafted bringing such diverse parties together is difficult. But under the Articles it would have never happened.

This is where Afghanistan sits today. It sits as America sat in January of 1787. Internal rebellion, ineffective governance, diverse interest groups all pulling in different directions, perhaps a majority of the populace wanting to go back under British/Taliban rule, and surrounded by foreign nations who were all working their own agenda for their own national interests.

The Afghan George Washington was sadly assassinated just prior to 9/11, but it takes more than one man to build a nation. Seeking a truce to bring in members of rebel groups to work with the current government to build upon the foundation of their current constitution is just smart governance. It is smart COIN. The US helps best by taking a neutral role. Karzai is losing ground with his Northern Alliance team as it stands, for him to reach out to the Taliban would likely be the straw that breaks that camel's back. The Northern Alliance wants peace, but not at the expense of risking becoming subjugated once more to Pashtun rule or Taliban extremes of governance.

Someone has to be the bigger man. Currently the bigger man is working diligently to suppress the insurgency so that he can go home. My argument is that we need to stop taking sides, become more neutral, and work to resolve the insurgency. We can do this, but we have to relinquish control to do so.