Sanctuary or Ungoverned Spaces:identification, symptoms and responses

[slapout9]

Slap, just out of curiosity, wouldn't someone who professes to hold the moral level of war as the most important be more concerned with the above part of Entropy's statement than the one you quoted?

When you write "moral", I'm assuming that to mean "not whacking civilians". Are you using it in another context; such as in "whacking civilians until they submit to our superior morality"?

No, you got it right. My suggestions were just to see IF it was even physically feasible to do it. IMO we have already gone past any moral sense as to what we should do. Nobody seems to agree with me as to what we should actually be doing.

[carl]

I wanted Bill's high level opinion if he was in charge of everything, that is all.

Slap:

I hope you don't mind carl's low level opinion if he were in charge of everything.

The first thing would be to require the government of the United States to fully recognize and publicly acknowledge that we cannot resolve this thing unless the Pak Army/ISI butts out. Then we would wholly commit ourselves to making them butt out, short of going into Pakistan militarily. I am inclined to think Omarali50's bluff calling would work, but we have never had the nerve to do even that.

If we could not do both of those things, I would leave Afghanistan ASAP, making provisions for 500,000 to 1,000,000 special entry and permanent US residency visas for all the Afghans who were foolish enough to work closely with us and their families. As for the rest of them, make a special radio broadcast saying "Tough luck for you. Fooled 'em again."

Then after bugging out, I would reduce the size of the Army by 60% (but doubling the size of the Green Berets, only them not the rest of specops) and spend all of the money saved on the Navy and the Air Force.

Finally, after that, I would require that for the next 60 years every single piece of official US gov correspondence having anything at all to do with foreign relations begin with this statement "Do not trust the government of the United States (English speaking nations, heed this also)."

That is what I would do.

[Steve the Planner]

Carl/slap:

I remember a House hearing on Iraq in early 2008. McCaskell(?) was asking very pointed questions about the $300 cost per head for the SOIs, and the effectiveness of paying folks not to make war on us.

I think a lot of observers (myself included) thought, initially, that she was criticizing the program. By the end, though, I'm sure she was just trying to understand whether it wouldn't be cheaper to pay-off the bad guys, and end the engagement. (More as a theoretical construct).

How much would it cost, instead, to just bribe all the bad guys not to get on a plane to NYC, or let anybody else do it?

Like Barbary Pirates, just pay them a few billion a year, instead of having to build the Great Wall of Afghanistan (pay it out of the avoided debt service on the $200 billion or so it would cost?).

[carl]

How much would it cost, instead, to just bribe all the bad guys not to get on a plane to NYC, or let anybody else do it?

The author of Insurgent Archipelago argues that these guys are sort of like Hofer's true believer, they are trying to plug a hole in their souls. I don't think money would plug the hole.

[Steve the Planner]

The burning pit in the Talib soul is the fact that we are there.

If that were solved, the burning pit in their coin purse (after our payola stops) is just as easily solved by legal currency, as by poorly laundered drug profits.

A true leader of his people will take the cash, and take steps to make sure it isn't threatened by someone under his control/influence.

[Bill Moore]

Posted by davidbfpo,

Crossing the Durand Line is not an option. Entropy's posts have made that clear, politics, strategy and logistics combined. The military - the American in reality - will have to adjust their strategy and as Jon Custis has illustrated with his post on the deep raid, within Afghanistan, there maybe options to hurt our opponents.

Others far more expert, as in the original post, speculate that any ground incursion across the Durand Line, will lead to a violent reaction within the Pakistani military (leaving aside the local response). IMHO I would expect that such actions in Western Europe would be widely seen as illegitimate and few governments could remain actively committed in Afghanistan.

I agree that Entrophy has made some strong arguments, but I disagree that crossing the Durand Line is not an option, it is always an option and it is a legitimate option if we're being attacked by elements seeking safehaven there and Pakistan refuses to do anything about it. If Pakistan supports it as widely reported in the open press, then in my view that would be an act of war or something very close to it (promoting violence to achieve political aims).

The worst case assumptions about repercussions if we launched punitive raids into Pakistan are just that assumptions. They have to be evaluated against the assumptions of what will happen if we don't take action (and Pakistan continues not to address the issue) to see what the risk versus gain really is in the short and long term.

I much rather see Pakistan address these issues, but is that realistic? First off do they have the means to do so? Most reports indicate that the Pakistan military is fully extended conducting aggressive COIN and CT operations, so they're not sitting back and simply watching this, they're fighting hard. The question is we can really expect them to conduct operations in the badlands anytime in the near future (next two years)? Also is it is in Pakistan's interest to do so? Unlike the U.S. they're probably thinking of long term strategic goals, and they still want influence in Afghanistan to use as advantage over India.

I think the issue here is this whole mess is extremely complex. This isn't simply one war (us against the Taliban, or us against terrorism) where good guys are fighting bad guys, there are multiple conflicts, and mulitple nations and non-state groups have multiple interests and this all converges in interesting and challenging ways.

Do I think an incursion into Pakistan would be helpful? It depends on what we're really trying to accomplish. If we don't know, then I agree we shouldn't make the problem worse with a half ass effort with no real end in mind. On the other hand if it contributes to our strategic objectives then perhaps it is the right choice. I think it is clear that none of us can really provide a helpful answer only opinions based on our varied experiences, but the option is clearly not off the table.

[slapout9]

carl,Steve,everybody else, the more that respond the better. I wanted Bill Moore's opinion so I asked him directly. That doesn't mean that anyone should hold anything back that they would like to contribute.

Some of my personal thoughts.

1-Omarali50 is a pretty smart guy and I have said before we are being played for suckers. If they want fight the Taliban why should we....whats in it for us?
2-Our problems at home are becoming far more serious than those over there,we may be only millimeters away from financial collapse and or major civil unrest.
3-carl's idea of saying AQ is gone from A'stan and they don't want to fight the Taliban and they don't want us there, so lets come on home amy be what finally happens. I am biased, I have kin folks over there being shot at and I am not real sure what it is all for.


Time for some music
Freda Payne "Bring the Boys Home"

http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=OU0qdbcHmpw

[Bill Moore]

carl,Steve,everybody else, the more that respond the better. I wanted Bill Moore's opinion so I asked him directly. That doesn't mean that anyone should hold anything back that they would like to contribute.

No other opinions are authorized, they'll only create additional confusion and indecision. Just do what I recommended, then call me and let me know how it worked out.

[William F. Owen]

Ok, given enough resources anything is possible. I submit that the requirements to effectively close the border are beyond our current capabilities much less Afghans. The Afghans can't even fund their own security forces, much less a huge, complex border security system.

You don't need to "close the boarder.

a.) In a lot of places, terrain is impassable.
b.) In a lot of places, all that is need is an 3-stand 8-coil barbed wire fence, and/or a 3-m dike.

What people forget is that border obstacles work and have been proven to do so.

[carl]

The burning pit in the Talib soul is the fact that we are there.

I wasn't referring to the Taliban. I was talking about the guys who are inclined to get on the plane to NYC. All of them have been pretty well off. They were doing it for something other than money. That is why I compared them to the true believer.

Taliban & company don't like us, that is true. But the thing that really sets them off is they aren't in charge like they used to be.

[Bob's World]

I wasn't referring to the Taliban. I was talking about the guys who are inclined to get on the plane to NYC. All of them have been pretty well off. They were doing it for something other than money. That is why I compared them to the true believer.

Taliban & company don't like us, that is true. But the thing that really sets them off is they aren't in charge like they used to be.

1. Carl is right in that "The Taliban" didn't get on planes; 3/4 of those guys were Saudis. Just as most foreign fighters who went to fight under the AQ flag in Iraq after our invasion there were Saudis. On 9/11 we were some 60 years down the road of meddling significantly with politics and survival of the Saudi Royals. There populace produces a long line of guys who are wiling to leave home and do harm to that perceived contributor to their grievances at home. The Saudi government has long supported letting such men go, or arresting without warrant or habeas corpus those who attempt to stay and act even slightly subversive on the home front.

2. Since 9/11 we have been playing catch-up in the AFPAK region with our meddling. The Taliban probably were largely neutral, with equal parts positive and negative toward the US on 9/11. After all, we'd helped them during the Soviet invasion and generally left them alone. Our biggest fault being that we were godless sinners who meddled too much in the lives of Arab and Persian Muslims, but they, of course, are neither Arab nor Persian. Today is another story. Who would be surprised today if a major terrorist attack took place to hear that many of the perpetrators were Taliban? What has changed, and who changed it?

3. As to what really sets them off, I suspect it is much more HOW they were removed from power, and then the subsequent government that was formed and protected by us that is designed to prevent them from ever regaining power in legal fashion. We can surely all appreciate how we'd feel in our own respective countries if some foreign power came in, and through sheer overwhelming military power enabled the minority opposition party to sweep into power; and then stayed and protected that party as they established a government around a man selected by that foreign power and helped him to create a constitution that vested virtually all power in that man and blocked any legal recourse for blackballed leaders to rise up on the back of popular support. Who helped that minority party recruit and train a "national" police and military that was recruited 95% from their ranks, and then sent out into the region of the party that was thrown out to suppress those who dared to act out illegally to complain about the same.

(This, by the way, all contributes to the "perceptions of illegitimacy" and the denial of the "hope" of legal recourse to effect change that I see as the two primary causal factors of insurgency locally. For the US it is this type of manipulative controlling foreign policy design and enactment that I see as the primary causal driver of act of international terrorism against us as well.)

The Taliban were not and are not the enemy. They were just between us and what we needed to do to get at AQ. They hesitated in helping us, and we weren't in a mood to wait and talk about it at the time. It's never too late to refocus and get back on track. It's not too late for the Taliban, and it's not too late for the U.S. If we wait for Karzai, or the Northern Alliance, or Pakistan to call a truce and work this out, it will never happen. It is simply not in the best interests of any of those parties to do so. The Status quo works great for them so long as we are willing to keep paying and playing. If we are too burned by our actions to step into a neutral role, then someone else, but I shake my head in wonder at mentions of the Saudis playing that role. England or Russia? No way with their histories there. China? Open the door to expanding the Great Game? That is an option that may sound workable initially, but will have hard consequences in the long run. It falls to the U.S. Despite our recent faux pas, we still have the power and credibility to step into a neutral role, call for a cease fire and provide a security bubble for a new Constitutional Loya Jirga to take place within.

What does it hurt to try? Or, we can just launch into another fighting season, with record budgets and record casualties, and record assassinations of governmental officials. We'll probably put up new records as to night raid and drone strike kills, acres "Cleared", and development projects executed as well, but to what effect?

To try the first is to turely support Afghan COIN in a civil emergency. To continue with the latter is to wage Colonial anti-guerrilla warfare to sustain our man, coupled with efforts to suppress the symptoms of the insurgency. That is not "COIN." We are at a cross roads, and we still have options.

[Steve the Planner]

Bill:

think the issue here is this whole mess is extremely complex. This isn't simply one war (us against the Taliban, or us against terrorism) where good guys are fighting bad guys, there are multiple conflicts, and mulitple nations and non-state groups have multiple interests and this all converges in interesting and challenging ways.

Not to mention inter-tribal conflicts and past resettlement issues---the Pashtuns resettled from the South to solidify control in the North. In the west, we rely on "voting by feet" as the means of distributing people to places; forced resettlements---as was a routine practice in these conflict areas as a process of political subjugation---is something we haven't quite got our heads around.

Slap:

State and local fiscal years start on June 30, with budgets up for adoption in the month prior. Absent Stimulus offsets, the real financial/service bloodbaths will begin. Several knowledgeable financial advisors have pointed to state/municipal bond defaults as the next big wave, equal to Goldman Sachs, etc... (Many of these are also underwriters on the bonds).

Bob:

I suspect the transition will be rapid from "The Taliban are not our enemy," to something like, "The Taliban are our trusted allies...." if further domestic financial scandals push the need for an immediate face-saving exit.

[Fuchs]

You don't need to "close the boarder.

a.) In a lot of places, terrain is impassable.
b.) In a lot of places, all that is need is an 3-stand 8-coil barbed wire fence, and/or a 3-m dike.

What people forget is that border obstacles work and have been proven to do so.

http://www.boingboing.net/2011/01/03/two-girls-race-to-to.html

[William F. Owen]

http://www.boingboing.net/2011/01/03/two-girls-race-to-to.html

So? I can't see how this is relevant to the discussion?

[Fuchs]

I found "What people forget is that border obstacles work and have been proven to do so." too optimistic and have set a somewhat subtle and short counterpoint.

I could have written a lot about how border obstacles are really useless without proper control (just the same as with battlefield obstacles - they're ineffective unless defended).
There were many examples of border obstacles that were politically counter-productive or simply failures and you simply suggested a much more optimistic view.


Just one example: To seal off the border against all illegitimate travel even only at bottlenecks would
- led to great corruption among border agents and customs, so that illegitimate crossings are being ignored
- lead to attempts of smart smugglers to defeat the border security concept
- turn the border regions which profit a lot of the smuggling into additional violent enemies
- draw away resources (such as some of the few non-corrupt, competent and loyal commanders) away from other tasks.


It's furthermore not simple (enough) to control a border, even if the terrain is difficult to negotiate.The mere surveillance of hundreds of kilometres of mountain border requires thousands of non-corrupt, loyal and at least somewhat competent (such as proficient with observation and communication tools) men.

- - - - - - - - - -

IIRC there was an attempt to get a grip on the TB and weapons smuggling two or three years ago. IIRC that attempt was given up when a certain smuggler tribe picked up its AKs and began to take IED DIY classes.

[Bob's World]

If on were to build a fence, where exactly should it go?

http://www.worldfuturefund.org/wffma...afghan.map.htm

The bottom map, dated 1849 probably lays out the most sustainable borders; but as they say, "you can't un-F*%# that goat."

Best any thoughts of fence building or border sealing be set aside. The senseless money pit is deep enough already.

[Bill Moore]

It is not impossible to significantly enhance border security, and while fences and other physical security measures can play an important role, it is still part of a much larger whole that involves the all nations touching that border. Some the military see border defense as a series of physical barriers covered by observation and fires. That is a defensive position, not border security. There are several significant shortfalls in that region of the world that will take to fix, but I would argue investment in building capacity In systems not tied to the military may actually result in more return
Consider all factors to create a system that provides security in depth across different domains. Some examples would include (focusing on the Afghanistan/Pakistan border):
Each nation develops laws that make smuggling illegal (a lot of it isn’t right now, so when we ask these governments to stop it, what are they supposed to do? Act outside the law?).
The concerned nations must develop a robust enough legal structure to prosecute serious violators (those smuggling lethal aid, illegal narcotics, etc.), instead of the catch and release stuff we’re doing now, which simply tells the world this is a low risk venture.
There is a requirement to develop a national ID card and associated database (and if the individual has been detained before, any relevant biometrics data).
Information sharing mechanisms (in place now, but again a lot of this simply isn’t in violation of the country’s laws, or is in violation of the law in one country and not the other).
Robust public affairs to inform the relevant public of the new laws and the consequences if caught, because laws don’t serve as deterrents if the targeting audience isn’t aware of them.
Despite the comments to the contrary, physical barriers and other technology do play a critical role in border security if they’re well designed, but they must be part of a larger effort. There are case studies available showing where this has worked, but keep in mind no solution is perfect. Remember the adage, don’t let perfect become the enemy of good enough.
Border security is definitely one of the means to reduce threats coming out of sanctuaries. Of course border security isn’t just at the border, it also include airports and where relevant seaports of entry. I think U.S. border security is far from perfect, but a hell of lot better than it was since 9/11 against relevant threats. Illegals from Mexico are not relevant threats, they’re a political issue tied to economic issues, not terrorism.

[Bob's World]

One problem we westerners have, is that many of the people we see as least civilized, or most "failed" in their ability to form functional states (as measured by such metrics as border security); are those who have been "globalized" for hundreds or thousands of years, and it is just the West that is catching up. The Tri-border area of the Sulu Sea; the Maghreb across Africa; the trade routes across Central Asia. All areas where today AQ finds the type of disorganized formal governance and supportive populaces for their message and operations.

We go in, and say "you all need to become more like the West in how you deal with borders, otherwise you are a failed state."

Meanwhile it is our own systems of commerce and interactions in the West that are evolving to become more like these areas that never bought into the concepts of crisp, sharp divisions to begin with. It could just as easily be the other way around, that these people say to the West "no, actually it is you that needs to evolve to become more like us."

Given the realities of our own border security efforts we are already more like them than we care to admit, and the hypocrisy is not lost on many. We really need to evolve in our definitions of what "success" looks like, as our current metrics don't fare well under the harsh light of day.

Just an observation and a dynamic that I find interesting.

[slapout9]

No other opinions are authorized, they'll only create additional confusion and indecision. Just do what I recommended, then call me and let me know how it worked out.

Your points about Pakistan are important. They are not really in control of their?/ country so it is not really Pakistan.... it is........Gatorland. And as long as the Gators come across the border and attack our troops we should go after them. This goes to a much deeper point that I have been talking about and that is you cannot fight these networks like they are countries. Wherever there is a swamp they will go hide in it, and if you drain the swamp they will just go to another swamp. But you can kill em and skin em!

What kind of a Strategy would allow thugs to attack our troops and then run across some imaginary line in the sand and just thumb their noses at us and say you can't catch me over here We need to go Gator hunting or go home. Harqqani is the big Gator and we need skin him and wipe out his nest!

Operaion Gatorland needs to start now.

[slapout9]

One problem we westerners have, is that many of the people we see as least civilized, or most "failed" in their ability to form functional states (as measured by such metrics as border security); are those who have been "globalized" for hundreds or thousands of years, and it is just the West that is catching up. The Tri-border area of the Sulu Sea; the Maghreb across Africa; the trade routes across Central Asia. All areas where today AQ finds the type of disorganized formal governance and supportive populaces for their message and operations.

Yea, they are swamps. So either kill the Gators when they overpopulate or stay out of the swamps to start with. Or fence them in!